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Abstract 
In 2005, the European Union (EU) launched the European Emissions Trading System 
for greenhouse gases (GHG). Since then, however, EU-15 firms under IFRS have no 
mandatory regime on accounting for GHG emission allowances. The only exception is 
Spain, where domestic guidance on emissions trading schemes is compulsory to entities 
linked to the Spanish allowances allocation plan, regardless if they draw up their 
financial statements under national GAAP or under IFRS.  
Prior literature suggests that harmonization of international accounting practices may 
arise from two different forces: institutional endeavors to harmonize international 
financial reporting standards; and, voluntary movements by firms acting internationally 
towards similar accounting practices, regardless the harmonization of accounting 
regulations. Building on this background, the aim of this study is twofold: to confirm 
the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of accounting standards and, to test the 
existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of markets, both concerning disclosure on GHG 
emission allowances in the annual accounts (carbon financial disclosure). To that end, it 
was considered either the harmony in, or the level of disclosure provided, from 2005 to 
2012, by 168 listed firms based in the EU-15. To measure the level of disclosure, a 
disclosure index was constructed. To measure harmony in disclosure, T indices 
(Taplin, 2004) were applied.  
Results confirm the “disciplinarian effect” of accounting standards by significantly 
enhancing both the harmony in, and the level of carbon financial disclosure. Otherwise, 
the markets do not seem to exert, by itself, a “disciplinarian effect” over disclosure. 
Extending the hypotheses formulated by Oliver (1991) to an international environment, 
this study suggests that, in view of multiplicity and fragmentation of foreign 
stakeholders, EU-15 listed firms that operate in foreign markets tend to respond 
primarily to domestic institutional pressures from which organizational dependencies, 
particularly as regards the allocation of allowances and the control of GHG emissions, 
are perceived as higher. Accordingly, their disclosure strategies are ultimately driven by 
the accounting guidance in home-country, required, or not, for entities under IFRS. 
Key words: Carbon financial disclosure, harmonization of disclosure practices, 
accounting standards, internationalization, institutional theory.  
JEL Classification: M41, M48. 
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Resumo 
Em 2005, a União Europeia (UE) iniciou o sistema europeu de comércio de licenças de 
emissão de gases com efeito de estufa (GEE). Desde então, no entanto, as empresas da 
UE-15 que aplicam normas internacionais de contabilidade (IFRS) não estão sujeitas a 
qualquer regime obrigatório para o relato financeiro de licenças de emissão. A única 
exceção é Espanha, onde o normativo nacional é vinculativo para todas as entidades 
ligadas ao plano espanhol de atribuição de licenças, independentemente de elaborarem 
demonstrações financeiras segundo normas nacionais ou IFRS. 
A literatura sugere que a harmonização das práticas contabilísticas internacionais pode 
ser induzida por duas forças diferentes: esforços institucionais para harmonizar as 
normas internacionais de contabilidade; e movimentos voluntários por parte das 
empresas que atuam internacionalmente, adotando práticas similares independentemente 
da harmonização das normas contabilísticas. Neste contexto, o objetivo deste estudo é 
duplo: confirmar o “efeito disciplinador” das normas; e testar o “efeito disciplinador” 
dos mercados, relativamente à divulgação de licenças de emissão de GEE nas contas 
anuais (divulgação financeira de carbono). Para isso, foi analisada quer a harmonia, 
quer o nível da divulgação prestada, de 2005 a 2012, por 168 empresas cotadas sediadas 
na UE-15. Para medir o nível de divulgação, foi construído um índice de divulgação. 
Para medir a harmonia na divulgação, foi usado o índice T (Taplin, 2004).  
Os resultados confirmam o “efeito disciplinador” das normas, aumentando 
significativamente, quer a harmonia, quer o nível da divulgação financeira de carbono. 
Ao contrário, os mercados não parecem exercer, por si só, um “efeito disciplinador” 
sobre a divulgação. Estendendo as hipóteses formuladas por Oliver (1991) a um 
ambiente internacional, este estudo sugere que, perante a multiplicidade e fragmentação 
dos stakeholders estrangeiros, as empresas cotadas da UE-15 que atuam em mercados 
externos tendem a responder primordialmente às pressões institucionais domésticas face 
às quais as dependências organizacionais, designadamente quanto à atribuição de 
licenças e ao controlo das emissões de GEE, são percebidas como mais elevadas. 
Assim, as suas estratégias de divulgação são essencialmente determinadas pelas normas 
contabilísticas do país de origem, obrigatórias, ou não, para entidades a relatar em IFRS. 
Palavras-chave: Divulgação financeira de carbono, harmonização das práticas de 
divulgação, normas de contabilidade, internacionalização, teoria institucional. 
Classificação JEL: M41, M48. 
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1. Introduction 
The globalization of capital markets underlined the need for internationally comparable 
financial statements, leading standard-setting bodies to join efforts over the last four 
decades to reduce disparity in financial reporting “as a means to facilitate cross-border 
capital formation while providing adequate disclosure for the protection of investors 
and the promotion of fair, orderly and efficient markets” (SEC, 2007, p. 4, italic added 
by the author).  
At first, efforts were focused on reducing differences between the accounting principles 
used in major capital markets around the world. Then, international accounting 
harmonization became an objective of modern accounting (Baker and Barbu, 2007; 
Barlev and Haddad, 2007), and the title international accounting harmonization has 
been used to describe a process of reducing accounting differences among countries. In 
related literature, the concept of harmonization has been defined in many different ways 
(Taplin, 2011; Cole et al., 2009, 2012), and later, in the 1990s, often replaced by the 
concept of convergence (Ali, 2005, p. 9) when referring to the removal of existing 
dissimilarities, and the “development of high-quality, compatible accounting standards 
that could be used for both domestic and cross-border financial reporting” (IASB, 2002, 
italic added by the author).  
According to Tay and Parker (1990), harmonization of financial reporting is a process 
involving movement away from total diversity towards a state of harmony indicated by 
a concentration of firms around one or a few of the available accounting choices. While 
harmonization refers to a process, harmony is a state at a given point in time, being that 
past literature generally uses the term harmony when referring to the comparability of 
firms’ accounts (Taplin, 2011). Both harmonization and harmony may be either de jure 
(formal) or de facto (material). The former refers to accounting standards, statutory 
rules or stock exchange regulations, and the latter relates to the actual practices of firms. 
In an attempt to address the problem of international accounting diversities, nine 
professional accountancy bodies1 agreed to establish, in 1973, the first international 
                                                             
1 From Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Ireland, and the United States of America (US). 
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standard-setting body (IASC)2. Within the European Union (EU), the process of de jure 
(formal) accounting harmonization started with the adoption of the Fourth Directive, in 
1978, and had significant development with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, requiring 
publicly traded firms governed by the law of a Member State to prepare their 
consolidated accounts in conformity with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS)3 for years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. 
Although there are several IFRS containing guidelines on the recognition, measurement, 
and disclosure of financial elements connected to environmental matters, there is not a 
single standard focused exclusively on environmental issues and their associated effects 
on firms’ accounts. To that extent, financial reporting of environmental issues is largely 
outside the scope of the formal accounting harmonization within the EU. However, the 
need to integrate environmental information into financial reporting, in order to enable 
transparency, is well underlined in the Commission Recommendation of May 2001 
(EC, 2001) by stating that “In the absence of harmonised authoritative guidelines in 
relation to environmental issues and financial reporting, comparability between 
companies becomes difficult…” (EC, 2001, § 5). 
Since Recommendation EC (2001), new issues in the environmental area have emerged. 
One of them is carbon financial accounting. In 2005, the EU launched the European 
Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) as a policy instrument to mitigate global climate 
change. The scheme is based on the “cap and trade” principle, according to which there 
is a “cap”, or limit, on the total amount of greenhouse gases (GHG)4 that can be emitted 
by the installations under the system. Within this cap, firms that operate such 
installations receive emission allowances (also called emission rights) that can be spent 
or traded, as needed. The limit on the total number of allowances available ensures that 
they have a market value, being their price determined by supply and demand. As a 
                                                             
2 IASC - International Accounting Standards Committee that since 2001 was renamed to IASB - 
International Accounting Standards Board. 
3 International Financial Reporting Standards are standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). They include the International Accounting Standards and their interpretations 
adopted by the IASB from its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). 
4 The term greenhouse gas (GHG) refers to the following gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon 
dioxide (CO2), the major GHG, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and chlorofluorocarbons. These GHG are often measured as carbon dioxide 
equivalents, being that related literature generally uses the expressions “CO2 emissions” and “carbon 
emissions” interchangeably with “GHG emissions”.  
 - 3 - 
result, a new commodity was created in the form of GHG emission allowances, and 
since carbon dioxide (CO2) is the principal greenhouse gas, this is known as the 
“carbon market”. In 2012, around 8 billion allowances were traded with a total value of 
€ 56 billion, excluding derivatives (EC, 2013). 
The purpose of EU-ETS is to generate a price signal, the carbon price, strong enough to 
drive investment, production and consumption decisions towards a low-carbon 
economy. Within this policy, carbon financial accounting and reporting could be an 
important tool to reduce emissions by clearly releasing costs of carbon to stakeholders 
so that they could incorporate this information in strategic decision-making. However, 
EU-15 firms under IFRS have no mandatory guidance on how to report emission 
allowances in their annual accounts. The only exception is Spain, where national 
accounting dispositions on emission allowances are compulsory to entities operating 
installations linked to the Spanish allowances allocation plan, regardless if they draw up 
their financial statements under national GAAP or under IFRS. 
Due to the lack of specific guidance, divergent accounting practices have emerged, and 
their implications may be significant not only for the financial position and performance 
reported in the annual accounts, but also on how a firm may decide to manage emission 
allowances (PwC and IETA, 2007; Lovell et al., 2010; Black, 2013; Haupt and Ismer, 
2013; Giner, 2014). In view of this, disclosure provided in the explanatory notes would 
be of major importance for users to evaluate firms’ performance in terms of GHG 
emissions. According to Lovell and Mackenzie (2011, p. 727) some firms under EU-
ETS have advocated a readiness for clear guidance from standard-setting bodies “so that 
companies can be fairly compared with their competitors, creating a level playing field”.  
Prior literature on international accounting harmonization (Meek and Saudagaran, 1990; 
Ali, 2005; Baker and Barbu, 2007) suggests that, in general, de facto (material) 
harmony may arise from two different forces: institutional endeavors to harmonize 
international financial reporting standards; and, voluntary movements by firms towards 
similar accounting practices, independently from the harmonization of accounting 
regulations.  
The harmonization of practices through the harmonization of accounting regulations is 
 - 4 - 
one purpose of accounting standard-setting bodies. When this goal is achieved de jure 
(formal) harmonization leads to de facto (material) harmonization. But the existence of 
formal harmonization does not assure, by itself, the comparability of accounting 
information (van der Tas, 1992b; Emenyonu and Gray, 1992; Emenyonu, 1993; Cairns, 
1997; Emenyonu and Adhikari, 1998; Nobes, 1998; Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 
2000; Ball et al., 2003; Barbu et al., 2014). Even when compliance with regulations is 
legally required, firms may not comply if it is perceived that the consequences of non-
compliance are not serious (Tay and Parker, 1990; Oliver, 1991).  
On the other hand, the diversity or the lack of accounting standards does not necessarily 
imply the diversity of practices. Some research (van der Tas, 1988; Tay and Parker, 
1990; Aisbitt, 2001) suggests that convergence may occur by a process of voluntary or 
spontaneous harmonization when most firms consider that it is of their convenience. In 
particular, the globalization of capital markets and the internationalization of firms’ 
operations are singled out in related literature as factors that may lead to voluntary 
harmonization (Thorell and Whittington, 1994; Cañibano and Mora, 2000; Jaafar and 
McLeay, 2007). 
Concurrently, some strands of international accounting research suggest that national 
accounting standards, in spite of no longer applying to the consolidated statements of 
EU listed firms since 2005, may explain some continued dissimilarities in their 
reporting practices (Nobes, 2006, 2008; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010), namely on the level of 
environmental disclosure (Barbu et al., 2014). However, most of prior multi-country 
studies examining disclosure practices of EU firms applying IFRS do not consider 
discrepancies in national accounting guidance. Moreover, as regards harmonization 
studies, while numerous research has been conducted on the harmonization of 
measurement practices, investigation concerned with the harmonization of disclosure is 
scarce (Emenyonu and Gray, 1996; Ali, 2006). 
Against this background, this study fills a gap in literature in two different ways: 
primarily, by linking international accounting harmonization with environmental 
disclosure; additionally, taking into consideration the existing accounting guidance, in 
firms’ home-country, mandatory, or not, for entities under IFRS. The aim is twofold: 
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(i) To provide evidence whether guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances, issued in firms’ home-country, enhances the harmony in, as well as, 
the level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts 
(hereafter, carbon financial disclosure). If so, a “disciplinarian effect” of 
accounting standards over carbon financial disclosure would have occurred. 
(ii) To investigate whether the internationalization of firms, through the capital 
markets or through foreign sales, is likely to improve, by itself, the harmony in, 
as well as, the level of carbon financial disclosure. If so, a “disciplinarian effect” 
of markets over carbon financial disclosure would have occurred. 
Acknowledging that, in general, high harmony levels are more likely to take place when 
there is low release of information (Rahman et al., 2002), this study examines both the 
level of disclosure and the level of harmony (in disclosure), in order to fully evaluate a 
possible “disciplinarian effect” of standards and markets on the dissemination of further 
and more comparable information on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. 
Overall, the purpose of this investigation is to shed light on areas where previous 
research showed mixed results (the relationships between firms’ internationalization and 
disclosure) or is scarce (disclosure practices under mandatory guidance), and 
simultaneously contribute to the ongoing debate on mandatory versus voluntary 
disclosures on GHG emissions (Simnett and Nugent, 2007; Simnett et al., 2009; Cowan 
and Deegan, 2011; Choi et al., 2013). 
Additionally, regulatory influences coming from industry affiliation are also examined. 
At EU level, high carbon intensive firms are subject to further sector-level regulations 
on their emissions. Therefore, due to more scrutiny and institutional pressure, they are 
more likely to have created routines to collect, treat and release information on GHG 
emission allowances, than less pollutant activities (Stanny and Eli, 2008; Stanny 2013). 
On the other hand, harmony is likely to occur at industry level, since sector-level 
institutions play a key role in the diffusion of minimum standards for corporate social 
responsibility (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Bearing this in mind, this study tests 
industry effects over the harmony in, and the level of carbon financial disclosure. 
In order to accomplish the study objectives a sample of 168 EU-15 listed firms covered 
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by EU-ETS was considered over an eight-year period (2005-2012), amounting to 1 344 
firm-year observations. The selection of the beginning period has been due to the start 
of the first trading period of EU-ETS in 2005. 
The research is organized into seven chapters, including this introduction. Next, 
Chapter 2 refers the regulatory background, describing the European scheme for the 
trading of GHG emission allowances, and the accounting framework for EU-15 listed 
firms covered by the system. The analysis comprehends an overview, at EU-15 level 
and by Member State, of accounting regulations on GHG emission allowances. In 
particular, it addresses dissimilarities in existing guidance as for the clarity and detail of 
the items to be reported in the explanatory notes to the annual accounts. Prior literature 
on mandatory disclosure remarks that simply creating further reporting regulations will 
not necessarily lead to real change in disclosure, unless such dispositions are clearly 
delineated to reduce management discretion (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Peters and 
Romi, 2013). Expanding prior research, this study examines if the same applies to 
guidance that it is not mandatory. 
Chapter 3 presents a review of literature concerning the concept and the measurement of 
harmonization of financial reporting, addressing in particular the operationalization of 
the concept of de facto (material) accounting harmony. Following related literature, the 
T index, introduced by Taplin (2004), is employed to measure de facto (material) 
disclosure harmony in the present research. The T index seems to be the most 
appropriate method as it brings together all of the required properties to quantify 
harmony of firms’ accounts (Cole et al., 2009; Mustata et al., 2011). The T index equals 
the probability that two firms randomly selected, with replacement, have accounts that 
are comparable (ranging from 0, when all firms have financial statements non-
comparable to each other, to 1, when all firms have financial statements that are 
comparable to each other). Changes in index values over time would indicate that 
harmony is increasing (decreasing), suggesting, therefore, that harmonization 
(disharmonization) occurred. 
Chapter 4 presents theoretical and empirical frameworks to examine harmony of firms’ 
accounts under mandatory guidance or due to voluntary processes, and to identify the 
drivers of both mandatory and voluntary environmental disclosure. Consistent with 
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prior investigation on environmental disclosure (Deegan, 2002; Cormier et al., 2005; 
Chen and Roberts, 2010), a multi-theoretical framework is adopted to address research 
questions, assuming that corporate disclosure is an outcome of management’s 
assessment of economic incentives, public pressures, and institutional constraints. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to fully investigate patterns of disclosure across different 
types of national institutional environments. However, considering that macro-level 
factors (e.g., culture, form of equity market, sociopolitical environment), are likely to 
affect the ways in which firms communicate with stakeholders (Midttun et al., 2006; 
Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011; Carnevale et al., 2012; Faisal et al., 2012), variables 
capturing the institutional environment in firms’ home-country are also incorporated in 
the analysis when examining levels of carbon financial disclosure among EU-15 firms. 
Chapter 5 provides empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory background, 
affiliation in high carbon intensive industries, and international exposure, over the level 
of carbon financial disclosure. For the purpose of measuring firms’ level of disclosure, a 
disclosure index (dichotomous, unweighted, and adjusted for non-applicable items) is 
constructed. Following related literature, a set of multilevel (hierarchical) models are 
estimated to examine the effects of firm-level and country-level explanatory variables 
on carbon financial disclosure, and to test if the explanatory variables at the country-
level (type of guidance) serve as moderators of the firm-level relationships between 
internationalization and disclosure. 
Chapter 6 provides empirical evidence aiming at evaluate whether accounting guidance 
or the internationalization of firms lead to increased harmony in carbon financial 
disclosure. For the purpose of measuring harmony (comparability) of firms’ accounts, T 
indices (Taplin, 2004) are computed for different groups of firms (sorted according the 
relevant criteria to test research questions), as well as for the whole sample to evaluate 
harmony in carbon financial disclosure at EU-15 level. In all cases, to assure that the 
harmonization towards a more informative policy gets a higher score, different levels of 
comparability are allocated to different disclosure methods in accordance with the 
extent of information provided by each method.  
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the main research findings and their implications, 
major contributions and limitations of the study, and suggestions for further research. 
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Altogether, findings allow not reject that accounting guidance on GHG emission 
allowances, even not mandatory for firms under IFRS, exerts a “disciplinarian effect” 
over carbon financial disclosure, by significantly increasing the harmony in, as well as, 
the level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. As 
anticipated, the highest levels of harmony and disclosure are associated with the 
scenario of mandatory guidance followed by the case of not mandatory guidance that 
details the items to be reported in the annex. In the opposite pole lies the scenario of no 
guidance where levels of harmony and levels of disclosure are minimal. 
Additionally, a more in-depth analysis reveals that, although not ensuring full 
compliance, mandatory guidance seems to exert the major “disciplinarian effect” on the 
dissemination of quantitative items, precisely the kind of disclosure that firms are less 
willing to reveal as it conveys more proprietary information (Cho and Patten, 2007; 
Cormier et al., 2009). These outcomes are important for regulatory bodies aimed at 
enhance utility and relevance of financial statements. It is essential that firms provide 
quantitative (monetary and non-monetary) disclosure on their efforts and achievements 
in reducing GHG emissions, namely to assist investors in assessing the trade-off 
between risk and return (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011), to provide the information 
that users need to project future cash flows (EFRAG, 2012), and to evaluate firms’ 
environmental and financial performances. To this end, evidence suggests that 
mandatory guidance is needed because, otherwise, the level of carbon financial 
disclosure, especially on quantitative items, is predicted to be significantly lower.  
As regards the influence of regulatory background at country level, this study indicates 
that disclosure practices of firms applying IFRS are likely to be affected by domestic 
guidance on GHG emission allowances not intended for them. Actually, national 
guidance is the most significant predictor in explaining variance between countries, at 
EU-15 level. Largely, findings suggest that national guidance, even not mandatory for 
firms under IFRS, is able to interfere with the process of de facto (material) accounting 
harmonization among EU-15 firms applying IFRS.  
Also, as expected, outcomes confirm the prediction that higher levels of disclosure and 
harmony are more likely to occur in high carbon intensive industries, than in low carbon 
intensive industries. In fact, among all the firm-level predictors, industry affiliation is 
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the one that added the major contribution in explaining within countries variance, and 
exhibits the strongest association with the level of carbon financial disclosure. 
Moreover, results point out that harmony is likely to occur at industry level, since levels 
of harmony are significantly higher within industries, than between industries. 
Otherwise, results do not confirm the assumption that firms’ internationalization, 
through the capital markets or through foreign sales, is likely to put forth, by itself, a 
“disciplinarian effect” over carbon financial disclosure. 
With regard to the internationalization through the capital markets, it should be noted 
that almost all foreign listed firms in the sample are registered in US stock exchanges. 
Consequently, for EU-15 firms (domiciled in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol) 
the internationalization through the quotation in US stock exchanges (a country that has 
not ratified the Protocol) does not seem to exert further pressure (in addition to the 
existing in firms’ home-country) to enhance carbon financial disclosure. In the lens of 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory, results suggest that, as foreign listed firms 
realize that this particular information is not broadly valued by their foreign 
stakeholders, to be accountable in front of a wider stakeholders audience is not enough 
to motivate, by itself, a “disciplinarian effect” over carbon financial disclosure. So, 
when considering either the harmony in or the level of carbon financial disclosure, 
results indicate that, ceteris paribus, EU-15 firms listed abroad are not likely to perform 
significantly different than EU-15 firms listed only in domestic stock exchanges. 
As regards the internationalization through foreign sales, findings allow admitting that, 
ultimately, the improvement on the level of carbon financial disclosure among EU-15 
firms operating internationally is triggered by guidance in home-country. Extending the 
hypotheses advanced by Oliver (1991) to an international environment, the lack of 
international consensus regarding either the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, or the 
appropriate accounting model for emissions trading schemes, do not favor a process of 
voluntary release of costs of carbon by EU-15 multinational firms. In particular, due to 
multiplicity and fragmentation of foreign stakeholders (lack of broadly diffused, or 
widely validated, values, norms and practices on emissions trading schemes), EU-15 
firms operating globally tend to respond primarily to domestic institutional pressures, 
from which organizational dependencies are deemed to be higher. 
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Accordingly, evidence suggests that disclosure strategies of EU-15 firms exposed to 
foreign markets are primarily driven by guidance in home-country. That is, under not 
mandatory detailed guidance the improvement on the level of disclosure is likely to 
occur by means of more qualitative information, while the release of quantitative data is 
more likely to occur under mandatory guidance. In turn, when there is no specific 
guidance in the firm’s home-country or when existing guidance does not specify the 
items to be disclosed, firms’ skepticism about the strategic utility of carbon financial 
disclosure as a tool to manage a multiplicity of foreign stakeholders seems to inhibit 
further improvements on the level of disclosure among EU-15 firms with higher 
exposure to foreign markets. Hence, all else equal, the levels of disclosure among them 
are not significantly different from those of EU-15 firms operating mainly in domestic 
markets. Moreover, as regards the harmony in carbon financial disclosure, results 
indicate that, under no mandatory regime, differences between firms with higher and 
lower exposure to foreign markets are not statistically significant. 
Overall, when evaluating harmony in, and level of carbon financial disclosure among 
EU-15 firms, although some progresses were registered along the research period, we 
arrive at 2012 with 38% of sample firms not disclosing any information in their annual 
accounts. In particular, with regard to the harmony at EU-15 level, the probability that 
two firms randomly selected have accounts that are comparable ranges from, 3,5%, in 
2005, to 5,6%, in 2012. Currently, both firms and regulators are more conscientious of 
the urgent need for mandatory guidance in order to enable comparability of carbon 
financial disclosure (Lovell and McKenzie, 2011; ANC, 2012; EFRAG, 2012; Giner, 
2014). Findings confirm this view, by suggesting that we cannot rely on a possible 
“disciplinarian effect” of markets to induce EU-15 firms to disclose further or more 
comparable information on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. 
Finally, it should be noted that, despite being consistent with theories based upon the 
concept of organizational legitimacy, the above mentioned results must be taken with 
restraint. The number of countries used for this analysis is limited to EU-15 Member 
States, and even within these countries the study covers just a sample of firms under 
EU-ETS. Hence, any attempt to generalize or extrapolate the findings of this study 
outside this context should be made with caution. 
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2. Overview of regulatory background 
This chapter describes the European scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas emission 
allowances, and the accounting framework for EU-15 listed firms covered by the 
system. 
2.1. The Kyoto Protocol 
In 1992, countries participating at Rio Conference organized by the United Nations 
agreed to cooperate in order to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations (largely 
carbon dioxide) “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human 
induced) interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 4). The ultimate 
goal was that “such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” 
(UNFCCC, 1992, p. 4). Subsequent negotiations lead to the signature of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997, entering into force only in 2005 after a complex ratification process1. 
According to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”, the Kyoto 
Protocol places a heavier burden on developed countries to reduce GHG emissions. The 
underlying notion is that industrialized countries are largely responsible for the current 
high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere, which are the result of more than a 
century and a half of industrial activity. In fact, most of the world’s emissions come 
from a relative small number of countries. The seven largest emitters (US, EU, China, 
Russia, Japan, India, and Canada) accounted for more than 70% of energy-related CO2 
emissions, in 2004. In particular, the US was responsible for 20% of global emissions, 
being the largest emitter in absolute terms and, on a per capita basis, US emissions were 
roughly twice as high as those of EU or Japan and five times the world average (Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, 2009, pp. 1-2). Interestingly, among the countries 
that signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, only the US has not ratified it2. In turn, Canada 
(a country that has signed the agreement in 1997 and ratified it in Parliament in 2002) 
decided to withdraw in 2012. 
                                                             
1 Information available at the web site of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
2 US agreed with Kyoto Protocol in principle but the US Congress has not ratified it. 
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Under the Kyoto Protocol, three market-based mechanisms were created as means for 
participants comply with their targets (besides adopting other climate policy measures at 
domestic level): (i) Clean Development Mechanism; (ii) Joint Implementation 
Mechanism; and (iii) International Emissions Trading. In this regard, a distinction is 
made between the so-called Annex I countries (industrialized countries) and non-
Annex I countries (developing countries). Each Annex I country is obliged to reach a 
domestic target to mitigate climate change, while non-Annex I countries do not have 
emission reduction targets but must ratify the Protocol in order to be hosting emission 
reduction projects under the Clean Development Mechanism. 
The Clean Development Mechanism, defined in Article 12th of the Protocol, allows a 
country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol (Annex I country) to implement an emission-reduction project (for instance, a 
rural electrification project using solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient 
boilers) in developing countries with no emission reduction targets (non-Annex I 
countries). Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits 
which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.  
On the other hand, the Joint Implementation Mechanism, defined in Article 6th of the 
Kyoto Protocol, allows a country with an emission reduction or limitation commitment 
under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex I country) to earn saleable emission reduction units 
(ERU) from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in another Annex I 
country, which can be counted towards meeting its Kyoto target.  
Finally, the International Emissions Trading, set out in Article 17th of the Kyoto 
Protocol, allows Annex B countries (Annex I countries, except Turkey and Belarus) that 
have accepted targets for limiting or reducing emissions (expressed as levels of allowed 
emissions) to sell any excess capacity (emissions permitted to them but not used) to 
countries that are over their targets. Emissions trading schemes (ETS) may be 
established at the national level or the regional level. Under such schemes, authorities 
set emissions obligations to be reached by the participating entities. 
The largest system in operation is the European Union emissions trading scheme, 
(described in the next section), being that, over the research period (from 2005 to 2012), 
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regional initiatives were scarce3 and at, national level, only three emissions trading 
schemes were initiated outside the EU - New Zealand ETS (2008), Swiss Federal ETS 
(2008), and Japan Voluntary ETS (2009) -, the later working on a voluntary basis4. 
2.2. The European Emissions Trading System 
In 2000, the EU Commission created the European Climate Change Program5 to help 
identify the most environmentally-effective and most cost-effective strategies that could 
be taken at the EU level to cut GHG emissions. The immediate goal was to help ensure 
that the EU would meet its target for reducing emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. This 
commitment required the countries that were EU members before 2004 (EU-15) to cut 
their combined emissions of greenhouse gases to 8% below the 1990 level, by 20126. 
Figure 2-1: Emissions limitation or reduction commitments by 2012 in accordance with 
Article 4th of the Kyoto Protocol (% of base year 1990) 
27,0% Portugal
25,0% Greece
15,0% Spain
13,0% Ireland
4,0% Sweden
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Netherlands -6,0%
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Denmark -21,0%
Germany -21,0%
Luxembourg -28,0%
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Source: OJ L 130, 15.5.2002, p.19. 
                                                             
3 New South Wales GHG Abatement Scheme (2003), Alberta ETS (2007), US Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic States Regional GHG Initiative (2009), HB 7135 Florida (2010). 
4 Additionally, the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme was initiated in UK, in 2010, covering only large non-
energy intensive organizations that fall below EU-ETS thresholds. Information available at the web site of 
the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), http://www.ieta.org/worldscarbonmarkets. Last 
accessed on 19 July 2014. 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp/first/index_en.htm. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
6 The EU-28 does not have a common target under the Kyoto Protocol in the same way as the EU-15. Of 
the 13 countries which have joined the EU since the Kyoto Protocol was agreed, all except Cyprus and 
Malta have individual emission reduction commitments under the Protocol. 
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The 8% collective reduction commitment has been translated into national emission 
limitation targets for each one of the EU-15 Member States under what is known as the 
“burden sharing” agreement. These national targets, compulsory under the EU law7, are 
differentiated according to each Member State’s relative wealth at that time, and range 
from an emissions reduction of 28%, for Luxembourg, to an increase of 27%, for 
Portugal, as shown in figure 2-1. 
In order to achieve those targets, the EU launched, in 2005, the European Emissions 
Trading System (EU-ETS)8. It is the first and biggest international scheme for the 
trading of GHG emission allowances9 (also called emission rights or licenses because 
one allowance gives the right to emit one tone of GHG). It covers CO2 emissions from 
installations, above certain levels of ability, such as power stations, combustion plants, 
oil refineries and iron and steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, 
bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. Since the beginning of 2012, aviation activities 
were also included, and in 2013 the scheme was further expanded to the petrochemicals, 
ammonia, and aluminum industries, as well as to additional GHG. 
The EU-ETS established by Directive 2003/87/EC (EU-ETS Directive)10 is based on the 
“cap and trade” principle. According to this principle, there is a “cap”, or limit, on the 
total amount of GHG that can be emitted by the installations under the system. Within 
this cap, firms that operate such installations receive emission allowances that can be 
spent or traded, as needed. The limit on the total number of allowances available 
ensures that they have a value.  
                                                             
7 Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 concerning the approval, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the joint fulfillment of commitments thereunder, 15.5.2002, OJ L 130, pp. 1-20.  
8 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
9 Currently, it comprises nearly 12000 industrial plants in 31 countries: the 28 EU Member States plus 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
10 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC, 13.10.2003, OJ L 275, pp.32-46. Amended by Directive 2004/101/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
project mechanisms, 13.11.2004, OJ L 338, pp.18-23; Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, 13.1.2009, 
OJ L 8, pp.3-21; and Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme of the community, 5.6.2009,OJ L 140, pp.63-87. 
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Since 2005, the EU-ETS worked for two trading periods (2005-2007 | 2008-2012). 
Before the start of each trading period, each Member State should submit to the EU 
Commission a National Allocation Plan (NAP) setting out how many allowances were 
being allocated for the next period and how many allowances would receive each 
installation covered by the scheme. The assessment of the NAP was made by the EU 
Commission in order to assure that the allowances were in line with the Kyoto Protocol. 
For the third trading period (2013-2020), there will no longer be any NAP. Instead, the 
allocation is determined directly at the EU level. 
According to the Article 14th of the EU-ETS Directive, the EU Commission has adopted 
guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions under EU-ETS11. After 
the end of each calendar year, each firm has to report its actual emissions from that year, 
assure independent verification of this report, and submit it to the competent national 
authority by 31 March. By 30 April, the firm has to surrender a number of allowances 
equivalent to its verified emissions in the previous year. When actual emissions are 
lower than allowances held, a firm can keep the spare licenses to cover its future needs 
(within the same trading period) or sell them to another firm. Otherwise, when firms 
return an insufficient number of allowances to cover their emissions they have to pay a 
financial penalty for each missing allowance to the corresponding Member State12, 
being that the payment of the excess emissions penalty does not release the operator 
from the obligation to surrender an amount of allowances equal to those excess 
emissions when surrendering allowances in relation to the following calendar year. 
Annual compliance cycle is closed by the cancellation of surrendered allowances by 30 
June. 
The information collected by firms to respond to the requirements of the GHG emission 
monitoring and reporting process (e.g., tones of GHG emissions made during the year, 
shortfall or surplus of allowances at year-end), along with other disclosure (namely 
monetary data showing the effects on financial position and performance), would be 
useful for users of financial statements be aware of the risks, and the associated 
mitigation efforts, that GHG emissions pose to firms. 
                                                             
11 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/monitoring/index_en.htm. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
12 The financial penalties were established at € 40 and € 100, for the first and second trading periods, 
respectively. 
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The need to integrate environmental matters into financial reporting as a key factor that 
enables transparency of information was well underlined in the Commission 
Recommendation of May 2001 (EC, 2001)13 by stating that “In the absence of 
harmonised authoritative guidelines in relation to environmental issues and financial 
reporting, comparability between companies becomes difficult…” (EC, 2001, § 5).   
In particular, evidence suggests that, under no specific accounting guidance on how to 
report GHG emission allowances, firms are likely to provide very limited disclosure in 
their annual reports (Haque and Deegan, 2010). In view of this, accountants at major 
firms under EU-ETS have suggested a readiness for clear guidance from standard-
setting bodies “so that companies can be fairly compared with their competitors, 
creating a level playing field” (Lovell and Mackenzie, 2011, p.727).  
Next section describes the accounting framework for EU-15 listed firms covered by the 
system. The analysis comprehends an overview, at EU-15 level and by Member State, 
of accounting regulations on GHG emission allowances. Other explanatory factors 
influencing the level of disclosure and the harmony of firms’ accounts are discussed in 
chapter 4. 
2.3. Accounting guidance on GHG emission allowances 
Preliminary remark 
The comprehensive accounting for GHG emissions goes beyond the scope of the 
financial reporting accounting standards. It involves also the establishment of 
internationally accepted rules for quantifying the GHG released to the atmosphere by 
activities producing emissions. Both issues belong to a wider research field known as 
“carbon accounting” (Guenther and Stechemesser, 2011; Milne and Grubnic, 2011). 
The last area is outside of the aim of the present investigation. 
2.3.1. Overview at the EU-15 level 
At the EU level, the process of de jure (formal) accounting harmonization started with 
                                                             
13 Commission Recommendation of 30 May 2001 on the recognition, measurement and disclosure of 
environmental issues in the annual accounts and annual reports of companies, 13.6.2001, OJ L 156, 
pp. 33-42. 
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the adoption of the Fourth Council Directive14 of July 25, 1978, and had significant 
development with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of July 19, 200215, requiring publicly 
traded firms governed by the law of a Member State to prepare their consolidated 
accounts in conformity with IFRS for years beginning on or after January 1, 200516. 
Although there are several IFRS containing guidelines on the recognition, measurement, 
and disclosure of environmental matters, the IASB has not delivered a standard focused 
exclusively on environmental issues and their associated effects in the annual accounts. 
To that extent, environmental financial reporting is largely outside the scope of the 
formal accounting convergence process within the EU.  
It should be noted that the absence of harmonized authoritative guidelines on 
environmental reporting had already motivated the Recommendation EC (2001) 
concerning both the recognition, valuation and reporting of environmental issues in the 
annual accounts, and the provision of environmental information in firms’ annual 
reports. 
The dispositions relating to the environmental information to be provided in the 
corporate management report were later incorporated in Directive 2003/51/EC 
(Modernisation Directive)17, and subsequently transposed into the national legal 
systems of the various Member States. The Modernisation Directive enhanced 
requirements for the annual report to include non-financial information related to 
environmental and employee matters, when relevant for an understanding of the firm’s 
                                                             
14 Fourth Council Directive 78/660 of 25 July 1978 on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 
14.8.1978, OJ L 222, pp.11-31. This Fourth Company Law Directive coordinates Member States’ 
provisions concerning the presentation and content of annual accounts and annual reports, the valuation 
methods used and their publication in respect of all companies with limited liability. Together with the 
Seventh Council Directive that coordinates national laws on consolidated accounts, it belongs to the 
family of accounting directives that form the arsenal of EU legal acts governing company accounts. 
15 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the 
application of international accounting standards, 11.9.2002, OJ L 243, pp.1-4. 
16 Member States have the option to extend this requirement to unlisted companies and to individual 
financial statements. On the other hand, companies traded both in the EU and on a regulated market 
outside the EU that were already applying another set of internationally accepted standards (for example, 
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)), and companies that had issued debt instruments 
but not equity instruments could be temporarily exempted by the Member States and not required to 
comply with IFRS until January 1, 2007. 
17 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 amending 
Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated 
accounts of certain types of companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, 
17.7.2003, OJ L 178, pp. 16-22. 
 - 18 - 
development, performance or financial position. These requirements came into effect on 
January 1, 2005 in all EU Member States18. 
With regard to the recognition, valuation and reporting on environmental issues in the 
annual accounts, although some countries (e.g., Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal, and 
Spain) have issued national accounting standards to promote the implementation of the 
Recommendation EC (2001), generally such dispositions do not apply to entities under 
IFRS and so, for them, most of the provisions of this Recommendation remains as 
voluntary guidelines.  
There are no major conflicts between the Recommendation EC (2001) and similar 
IFRS. Most subjects detailed there are covered by IAS 16 Property, Plant and 
Equipment (IAS 16), IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of 
Government Assistance (IAS 20), IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (IAS 36), 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (IAS 37), and 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets (IAS 38), and in that extent they already apply for listed firms 
pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002. However, in IFRS the environment is not 
emphasized as a distinct area and evidence suggests that these lack of specific rules for 
the recognition, measurement and disclosure of environmental matters undermines the 
transparency and the comparability of firms’ accounts (Lovell et al., 2010; ANC, 2012; 
EFRAG, 2012; Black, 2013; Haupt and Ismer, 2013; Barbu et al., 2014; Giner, 2014). 
Since the issuance of Recommendation EC (2001), new topics in the environmental area 
have emerged. One of them is the accounting of GHG emission allowances. In this 
regard, the IASB’s International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) 
developed an interpretation (IFRIC 3 Emission rights) to explain how to apply existing 
IFRS to “cap and trade” schemes. It was concluded in December 2004, to be ready for 
the launch of the EU-ETS in January 2005.  
Next Table summarizes main guidelines, being that IFRIC 3 only covers recognition 
and measurement criteria. As regards disclosure, it concludes that no requirements were 
                                                             
18 The Modernisation Directive applies to all large and medium sized European entities regardless of 
whether they are listed or not. However, Member States may choose to exempt medium-sized entities 
from the obligation to make certain non-financial disclosures. This option was not taken up by Lithuania, 
Portugal and Spain. 
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needed beyond those already contained in the existing standards (IFRIC 3, Basis for 
Conclusions, §§ 35-36). 
Table 2-1: Guidance provided by IFRIC 3 Emission rights withdrawn June 2005 
IFRIC 3 main guidelines 
√ A “cap and trade” scheme GIVES RISE TO: 
- An asset for allowances held, whether issued by government or purchased. 
Allowances (rights to emit pollutant) are intangible assets that should be recognized 
in the financial statements in accordance with IAS 38. 
When allowances are issued to a participant by government, or government agency, 
for less than their fair value, the difference between the amount paid, if any, and their 
fair value is a government grant that is accounted for in accordance with IAS 20. 
- A liability for the obligation to deliver allowances. 
As a participant produces emissions, it recognizes a provision for its obligation to 
deliver allowances equal to emission that have been made, in accordance with 
IAS 37. This provision is measured at the market price of the number of allowances 
required to cover emissions made up to the balance sheet date. 
√ A “cap and trade” scheme DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO a net asset or liability. 
Source: IFRIC 3 Emission rights (IASB, 2004) 
The consensus in IFRIC 3 is that a “cap and trade” scheme gives rise to an asset for 
allowances held, a government grant for allowances issued for less than their fair value, 
and a liability for the obligation to deliver allowances measured at market price at 
balance sheet date. Moreover, the Interpretation remarks that a “cap and trade” scheme 
does not give rise to a net asset or liability, ruling out the possibility of offsetting 
(netting off) assets (that is, allowances held) and liabilities (that is, the obligation to 
deliver allowances), and prevents participants from using the option in IAS 20 that 
would allow them to recognize free allocations at a nominal amount of nil value. 
As part of the EU endorsement process, the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG) provided an opinion on the adoption of IFRIC 3 within EU. According 
to the EFRAG, IFRIC 3 did not meet all the requirements established in the 
Regulation (EC) No 1606/200219 and, therefore, EFRAG recommended that the EU 
Commission should not endorse IFRIC 3.  
                                                             
19 EU publicly traded companies will be required to comply with only those IFRS that have been 
endorsed by the European Commission (EC). IFRS can only be endorsed if they: (1) are not contrary to 
EU Accounting Directives and the true and fair view principle; (2) are conducive to the European public 
good; and (3) meet the criteria of understandability, relevance, reliability, and comparability (Regulation 
(EC) No 1606/2002, Article 3(2)). 
 - 20 - 
Although considering IFRIC 3 an appropriate interpretation of the existing standards 
(IAS 20, IAS 37, IAS 38), both the IFRIC and the IASB acknowledged that IFRIC 3 
created unsatisfactory measurement and reporting contradictions:  
(i) Under the IFRIC 3 cost model, the allowances would be measured at cost 
(following IAS 38 cost model), while the liability would be measured at current 
value (in accordance with IAS 37). 
(ii) Under the IFRIC 3 revaluation model, the carrying amount of the allowances and 
the liability would match, but the changes in the value of the allowances would be 
recognized in equity (IAS 38), while the re-measurement of the liability would be 
recognized in the income statement (IAS 37).  
Faced with these inconsistencies, the IASB withdrew IFRIC 3 with immediate effect at 
its meeting in June 2005, and in September 2005 added to its agenda a project to 
generate a comprehensive model for emissions trading schemes. However, since then, 
the IASB has postponed consecutively the review of emission rights’ accounting.  
Currently, there is in effect no IFRIC or specific IFRS for the accounting of emission 
rights and due to the lack of specific guidelines divergent accounting practices have 
emerged whose effects on the financial statements are potentially material (EFRAG, 
2012, § 5). Previous studies examining existing accounting practices (PwC and IETA, 
2007; Warwick and Ng, 2012; Black, 2013; Haupt and Ismer, 2013) identified a number 
of accounting treatments that, despite their variety, can be grouped into three main 
variants: 
- The IFRIC 3 approach. 
- The “cost of settlement approach”. 
- The “net liability approach”. 
Table 2-2 summarizes the recognition and measurement criteria according these three 
accounting models.  
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Table 2-2: The main accounting practices for the recognition and measurement of GHG 
emission allowances after the withdrawal of IFRIC 3  
 Full market Remainder value approaches 
 value approach Gross liability approach Net liability approach 
 IFRIC 3 CoS – GLA (CoS) CoS – NLA (NLA) 
Allowances    
Recognition As intangible assets, when 
able to exercise control. 
As intangible assets, when 
able to exercise control. 
As intangible assets, when 
able to exercise control. 
Initial 
measurement  
Granted allowances:  
at fair value at grant date. 
 
Purchased allowances: at 
cost. 
Granted allowances:  
at fair value at grant date. 
 
Purchased allowances: at 
cost. 
Granted allowances:  
at a nominal amount of nil 
value. 
Purchased allowances: at 
cost. 
Subsequent 
measurement 
At cost or at revalued 
amount, subject to review 
for impairment.  
At cost or at revalued 
amount, subject to review 
for impairment.  
At nil (granted) | At cost 
subject to review for 
impairment (purchased). 
Government grant 
Recognition As deferred income, at 
grant date when 
allowances are issued for 
less than their fair value. 
As deferred income, at 
grant date when 
allowances are issued for 
less than their fair value. 
Not applicable. 
Initial 
measurement  
At the difference between 
the fair value of the 
allowances granted and 
the amount paid for them 
if any. 
At the difference between 
the fair value of the 
allowances granted and 
the amount paid for them 
if any. 
Not applicable. 
Subsequent 
measurement 
Amortized on a systematic 
and rational basis over the 
compliance period. 
Amortized on a systematic 
and rational basis over the 
compliance period.  
Not applicable. 
Liability    
Recognition When incurred, as 
emissions are made. 
 
When incurred, as 
emissions are made. 
When incurred, as 
emissions are made, being 
that liability becomes 
greater than zero only 
when actual emissions 
exceed free allocations. 
Initial 
measurement 
Fully based on the market 
price of allowances, 
whether the allowances 
are in hand or have to be 
purchased from the 
market.  
For allowances held: at 
carrying amount (cost or 
revalued amount, less 
impairment) on either a 
FIFO or weighted average 
cost basis. 
For any excess of 
emissions: at market price 
of allowances. 
For allowances held: at 
carrying amount (nil value 
or cost less impairment) 
on either a FIFO or 
weighted average cost 
basis. 
For any excess of 
emissions: at market price 
of allowances. 
Subsequent 
measurement 
Re-measurement until the 
settlement of the 
obligation at the market 
price of allowances at 
each period end, whether 
the allowances are in hand 
or have to be purchased 
from the market.  
Re-measurement until the 
settlement of the 
obligation. For allowances 
held: at carrying amount 
(cost or revalued amount, 
less impairment) on either 
a FIFO or weighted 
average cost basis. For any 
excess of emissions:  
at the market price of 
allowances at period end. 
Re-measurement until the 
settlement of the 
obligation. For allowances 
held: at carrying amount 
(nil value or cost less 
impairment) on either a 
FIFO or weighted average 
cost basis. For any excess 
of emissions: at the 
market price of 
allowances at period end. 
Source: Adapted from PwC and IETA (2007, p. 27) | Note: Allowances held-for-trading are not under consideration. 
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Under the IFRIC 3 approach, the full obligation to surrender allowances is recognized at 
fair value at balance sheet date (full market value approach). However, following the 
withdrawal of IFRIC 3, firms often apply a different measurement criterion in which the 
portion of the liability covered by the licenses held is measured at the carrying amount 
of those licenses and only the shortfall of allowances is measured at fair value at the 
period end. This procedure is known as “remainder value approach” because only 
missing allowances are valued at fair value at balance sheet date, or “cost of settlement 
approach’’ (hereafter named as CoS) because the amount of liability can be considered 
as representing the cost to solve the obligation to deliver allowances. Within this 
method, a common policy choice consists in measuring allowances granted free of 
charge at a nominal amount of nil value (IAS 20, § 23). In this case, a liability is 
recognized only when actual emissions exceed free allocations, arriving at a model 
generally known as “net liability approach” (hereafter named as NLA).  
The overall effects on the annual accounts, for a participant in an emissions trading 
scheme, other than a broker or other position-taking institution, are illustrated in Table 
2-3 (positions before settlement) and Table 2-4 (positions after settlement), according to 
the main accounting approaches identified earlier (PwC and IETA, 2007; Warwick and 
Ng, 2012; Black, 2013; Haupt and Ismer, 2013) for GHG emission allowances: 
(1) IFRIC 3 cost model (IFRIC 3). 
(2) IFRIC 3 revaluation model (IFRIC 3 rev). 
(3) Cost of settlement approach with allocated allowances measured at fair value at 
grant date (CoS). 
(4) Net liability approach with allocated allowances measured at a nominal amount of 
nil value (NLA). 
Under each of the four alternative methods, three scenarios are considered: 
(A) Granted allowances equal the emissions made during the year. 
(B) Granted allowances are insufficient to cover the emissions made during the year 
(deficit of allowances). 
(C) Granted allowances exceed the emissions made during the year (surplus of 
allowances). 
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Table 2-3: Impact on annual financial statements of GHG emission allowances accounted 
under full market value and remainder value approaches – positions before settlement 
Background 
Emission allowances held for compliance purposes
Annual compliance periods that coincide with firm's reporting periods
Year 1
Allowances granted free of charge  10 000 tones
Market price of allowances at grant date   10 CU per ton
Market price of allowances at the year-end   11 CU per ton
Scenario A - Emissions made during Year 1: tones
IFRIC 3 IFRIC 3 rev CoS NLA
BALANCE SHEET (partial) 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1
Intangible assets - emission allowances  100 000  110 000  100 000   0
Total assets  100 000  110 000  100 000   0
Revaluation surplus -  10 000 - -
Net profit (loss) for the year ( 10 000) ( 10 000)   0   0
Provisions | Liability to deliver allowances  110 000  110 000  100 000   0
Total equity and liabilities  100 000  110 000  100 000   0
Year 1 Year 1 Year 1 Year 1
Income - release of government grant  100 000  100 000  100 000   0
Provisions | Emissions expense ( 110 000) ( 110 000) ( 100 000)   0
Net profit (loss) for the year ( 10 000) ( 10 000)   0   0
Scenario B - Emissions made during Year 1: tones
IFRIC 3 IFRIC 3 rev CoS NLA
BALANCE SHEET (partial) 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1
Intangible assets - emission allowances  100 000  110 000  100 000   0
Total assets  100 000  110 000  100 000   0
Revaluation surplus -  10 000 - -
Net profit (loss) for the year ( 21 000) ( 21 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000)
Provisions | Liability to deliver allowances  121 000  121 000  111 000  11 000
Total equity and liabilities  100 000  100 000  100 000   0
INCOME STATEMENT (partial) Year 1 Year 1 Year 1 Year 1
Income - release of government grant  100 000  100 000  100 000   0
Provisions | Emissions expense ( 121 000) ( 121 000) ( 111 000) ( 11 000)
Net profit (loss) for the year ( 21 000) ( 21 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000)
Scenario C - Emissions made during Year 1: tones
IFRIC 3 IFRIC 3 rev CoS NLA
BALANCE SHEET (partial) 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1 31 Dec Year1
Intangible assets - emission allowances  100 000  110 000  100 000   0
Total assets  100 000  110 000  100 000   0
Revaluation surplus -  10 000 - -
Net profit (loss) for the year ( 9 000) ( 9 000)   0   0
Provisions | Liability to deliver allowances  99 000  99 000  90 000   0
Government grant  10 000  10 000  10 000 0
Total equity and liabilities  109 000  109 000  100 000   0
INCOME STATEMENT (partial) Year 1 Year 1 Year 1 Year 1
Income - release of government grant  90 000  90 000  90 000   0
Provisions | Emissions expense ( 99 000) ( 99 000) ( 90 000)   0
Net profit (loss) for the year ( 9 000) ( 9 000)   0   0
IFRIC 3 - IFRIC 3 cost model | IFRIC 3 rev - IFRIC 3 revaluation model
CoS - Cost of settlement approach with granted allowances measured at FV at grant date 
NLA - Net liability approach with granted allowances measured at a nominal amount of nil value
 10 000
 11 000
 9 000
Jan,1
Dec,31
INCOME STATEMENT (partial)
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Table 2-4: Impact on annual financial statements of GHG emission allowances accounted 
under full market value and remainder value approaches – positions after settlement 
Background 
Emission allowances held for compliance purposes
Annual compliance periods that coincide with firm's reporting periods
Aquisition of missing allowances|Sale of surplus of allowances 1 000 tones | 11 CU per ton
Surrender of allowances to cover actual emissions made in Year 1
Scenario A - Emissions made during Year 1: tones
No acquisition or sale of allowances occurred
IFRIC 3 IFRIC 3 rev CoS NLA
BALANCE SHEET (partial) 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2
Intangible assets - emission allowances   0   0   0   0
Total assets   0   0   0   0
Revaluation surplus -  10 000 - -
Retained earnings ( 10 000) ( 10 000)   0   0
Net profit (loss) for the year  10 000   0   0   0
Provisions | Liability to deliver allowances   0   0   0   0
Total equity and liabilities   0   0   0   0
Scenario B - Emissions made during Year 1:  11 000 tones
Acquisition of missing allowances at 1 Jan Year 2: 1 000 tones | 11 CU per ton
IFRIC 3 IFRIC 3 rev CoS NLA
BALANCE SHEET (partial) 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2
Intangible assets - allowances   0   0   0   0
Cash and cash equivalents ( 11 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000)
Total assets ( 11 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000)
Revaluation surplus -  10 000 - -
Retained earnings ( 21 000) ( 21 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000)
Net profit (loss) for the year  10 000   0   0   0
Provisions | Liability to deliver allowances   0   0   0   0
Total equity and liabilities ( 11 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000) ( 11 000)
Scenario C - Emissions made during Year 1:  9 000 tones
Sale of surplus of allowances at 1 Jan Year 2: 1 000 tones | 11 CU per ton
IFRIC 3 IFRIC 3 rev CoS NLA
BALANCE SHEET (partial) 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2 30 April Year 2
Intangible assets - allowances   0   0   0   0
Cash and cash equivalents  11 000  11 000  11 000  11 000
Total assets  11 000  11 000  11 000  11 000
Revaluation surplus -  10 000 - -
Retained earnings ( 9 000) ( 9 000)   0   0
Net profit (loss) for the year  20 000  10 000  11 000  11 000
Provisions | Liability to deliver allowances   0   0   0   0
Deferred income - government grant   0   0   0 0
Total equity and liabilities  11 000  11 000  11 000  11 000
IFRIC 3 - IFRIC 3 cost model | IFRIC 3 rev - IFRIC 3 revaluation model
CoS - Cost of settlement approach with granted allowances measured at FV at grant date 
NLA - Net liability approach with granted allowances measured at a nominal amount of nil value
 10 000
Year 2 
Jan,1
Apr,30
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For clarity of exposition, the analysis is focused only on allowances held for compliance 
purposes. Acquisitions or sales of allowances held-for-trading were not considered in 
this illustrative example, but the existence of such transactions would not change the 
points made below. It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this study to fully 
illustrate all methods currently in use to report GHG emission allowances in annual 
accounts20. Otherwise, the aim is only to enhance how diverging accounting practices 
are likely to reduce comparability of firms’ accounts, unless detailed information 
(enough to reconcile the different methods) is provided in the annex. 
According to the IFRIC 3 cost model (IFRIC 3), allowances granted at no cost are 
measured at fair value at grant date whereas the liability to deliver allowances is 
measured at fair value at the balance sheet date. This mixed measurement leads to the 
appearance in the income statement of a profit or loss due to changes in allowances’ 
market price during the period. That is, because the liability to deliver allowances is 
fully measured at market price at the period end (regardless whether the allowances are 
in hand or have to be purchased from the market), even when the number of allowances 
granted free of charge equals actual emissions (Table 2-3 | scenario A | IFRIC 3), a loss 
(10 000 CU) is recognized because the market price of allowances has increased (from 
10 to 11 CU) during the period. This loss will be compensated in the following year by 
the recognition, in the income statement, of a profit of the same amount on the 
settlement of the obligation (Table 2-4 | scenario A | IFRIC 3). Meanwhile, at period 
end, results are affected by this measurement mismatch. Hence, volatility in earnings 
can arise from valuing the entire obligation at the prevailing market price of allowances 
at the balance sheet date. 
Under the IFRIC 3 revaluation model (IFRIC 3 rev) there is no inconsistency on 
valuation criteria since both the allowances and the correspondent liability are measured 
at fair value at the balance sheet date. Considering the situation where the number of 
allowances granted free of charge equals actual emissions (Table 2-3 | scenario A | 
IFRIC 3 rev) comprehensive income equals zero. However, as revaluation gains are 
recognized directly in equity while expenses and income related to emissions are 
                                                             
20 Refer to PwC and IETA (2007), Warwick and Ng (2012), Black (2013), and Haupt and Ismer (2013) 
for a survey of existing reporting practices currently applied by the participants in the EU-ETS. 
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recognized in the profit or loss account, a revaluation surplus (10 000 CU) is registered 
in equity whereas a net loss of the same amount (10 000 CU) is recorded in the income 
statement (Table 2-3 | scenario A | IFRIC 3 rev). This discrepancy goes beyond the end 
of the compliance period, since it is not permitted to bring the revaluation surplus and 
the restatement of the net expenses, together, in the income statement at the settlement 
of the obligation in the following year (Table 2-4 | scenario A | IFRIC 3 rev). 
In order to mitigate the mixed measurement mismatch originated by IFRIC 3, most 
firms adopted the “remainder value approach” either on a gross (CoS) or net (NLA) 
basis.  
As mentioned before, under IFRIC 3 the liability is entirely measured at market price at 
period end, regardless whether the allowances are in hand or have to be purchased from 
the market. Differently, under the “remainder value approach” the portion of the 
liability relating to allowances held is measured at the carrying amount of those 
allowances and only the liability relating to any excess of emissions is measured at 
market price of allowances at the balance sheet date. In particular, where allowances 
granted for free are measured at a nominal amount of nil value (NLA) a liability 
corresponding to the expected cost of allowances that have to be purchased to cover the 
shortfall is only recognized to the extent that actual emissions exceed free allocations  
(Table 2-3 | scenario B | NLA). Otherwise, no accounting entries are made (Table 2-3 | 
scenarios A and C | NLA). 
When compared with the “gross cost of settlement approach” (CoS), where granted 
allowances are measured at their fair value at grant date, the “net liability approach” 
(NLA) where granted allowances are measured at nil value, leads to an under-
representation of the balance sheet and the income statement, although both procedures 
arrive at same net profit or loss for the year (Table 2-3 | scenarios A, B, C | CoS, NLA). 
When compared with the IFRIC 3 approach, dissimilarities are evident either in the 
statement of financial position and in the results for the year. 
Further differences can arise under the “remainder value approaches” (CoS and NLA) 
since the amount of the liability and the associated emissions expense will depend on 
whether allowances held are discharged on a FIFO or on a weighted average cost basis, 
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being that the impact on the financial statements will also depend whether the firm 
reports quarterly or half-yearly results or whether the financial year coincide, or not, 
with the annual compliance period.  
The proximity of the EU-ETS third trading period (2013-2020) brought again into 
discussion the accounting for emission rights. In May 2012, the French accounting 
standard-setting body (Autorité des Normes Comptables - ANC) issued the Discussion 
Paper Proposals for Accounting of GHG Emission Rights reflecting companies’ 
business models (ANC, 2012) that intend to contribute to the launch of an international 
accounting standard by the IASB. Based on the ANC’s (2012) proposal, the EFRAG 
issued the Draft Comment Paper Emissions Trading Schemes, in December 2012. A 
feedback statement on this draft comment paper was released in November 2013, and, 
resulting from this process, EFRAG recommendations will be presented to the IASB.  
ANC (2012) and EFRAG (2012) agreed that specific accounting guidance was required 
because the withdrawal of IFRIC 3 has resulted in diverging practices, reducing 
comparability of information. Moreover, both papers remark that, although GHG 
emission allowances exhibit similar characteristics to inventory and intangible assets, 
due to their specific nature and innovative features, no perfect analogy can be drawn 
from existing IFRS.  
On one hand, emission allowances are similar to commodities in the sense that entities 
participating in EU-ETS use these rights in their production process. Because they can 
be held for sale or to settle the obligation arising from the production process of the 
entity, emission allowances could meet the definition of inventories in 
IAS 2 Inventories (IAS 2). However, it is not possible to draw a perfect analogy to 
inventory because the rights are not physically consumed during the production process 
and the entity can complete production without obtaining the emission allowances first 
(EFRAG, 2012, § 16). On the other hand, emission allowances are similar to intangible 
assets in the sense that they are identifiable non-monetary assets without physical 
substance. However, their linkage with the obligation to return a number of allowances 
to cover emissions made over the compliance period is an additional specific feature 
that differentiates them from other types of assets (EFRAG, 2012, § 25). In view of this, 
there is a general consensus that explicit guidance should be developed for emissions 
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trading schemes because they have specific characteristics that existing standards do not 
easily accommodate (EFRAG, 2012, § 26).  
Table 2-5: Proposals of ANC (2012) and EFRAG (2012) for the recognition and 
measurement of GHG emission allowances under the compliance model 
 ANC (2012)  EFRAG (2012)  
Allowances Free allocations are initially 
measured at a nominal amount of nil 
value.  
Free allocations should be initially 
recognized at fair value at grant date, 
being that is yet to determine if the 
other side of the entry will be deferred 
income or other comprehensive 
income (OCI). 
 Free allocations are carried at a 
nominal amount of nil value. 
Purchased allowances are carried at 
cost less impairment. 
Allowances held (free allocations or 
purchased allowances) are carried at 
cost less impairment (the deemed cost 
of free allocations being their initial 
fair value). 
 Purchased allowances are expensed, 
as production costs, as the entity 
emits GHG.  
When surrendering the allowances, an 
entity should derecognize the liability 
and the allowances surrendered. 
Deferred 
income 
or OCI 
Not applicable The deferred income is released (or 
the other comprehensive income is 
recycled) as a negative production 
cost, ensuring that the profit and loss 
shows a production cost that reflects 
the real cost of the scheme for the 
entity. 
Liability A liability is recognized (against a 
production cost) when, and only 
when, the entity has emitted more 
than its holding rights. 
A liability and a production cost is 
recognized as the entity produces 
emissions. 
 The liability is valued at the fair 
value of emission allowances, unless 
the firm has fixed the purchased 
price with a forward contract (in such 
case, the liability is first valued using 
the purchase price of the contract 
entered into the compliance period, 
and then for any residual excess 
using the market value on the date 
the liability is recognized). 
The liability is measured at the 
expected weighted average cost for the 
year determined as the average of the 
carrying amount of the allowances 
held for compliance (free and 
purchased), plus the purchase price of 
forward contracts entered into for 
compliance period, and for any 
residual excess, the current market 
value at the reporting date. 
 The liability is discharged by the 
purchase of allowances. 
When surrendering the allowances, an 
entity should derecognize the liability 
and the allowances surrendered. 
Source: Discussion Paper Proposals for Accounting of GHG Emission Rights reflecting 
companies’ business models (ANC, 2012) | Draft Comment Paper Emissions Trading Schemes 
(EFRAG, 2012) 
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Also, there is general acceptance that the accounting model should depend on whether 
firms are going to use (purchased) allowances for compliance or trading purposes. 
As regards the trading model, both papers conclude that emission allowances should be 
initially and subsequently measured at fair value (with changes recognized in the 
income statement) to reflect the fact that they were purchased voluntarily and are held 
for trading. Otherwise, with respect to the compliance model, ANC (2012) and EFRAG 
(2012) show dissenting views, as summarized in Table 2-5. In particular, by linking the 
measurement of the liability to the carrying amount of the allowances held, both 
proposals intend to reduce the accounting mismatches which were created under the 
IFRIC 3 approach. However, unlike the ANC’s (2012) model where free allocations are 
measured at nil value and a liability is recognized if, and only if, the entity has emitted 
more than its holding rights, the EFRAG’s (2012) model adopts a “gross liability 
approach”, reporting separately the (entire) liability incurred and the assets held to meet 
this obligation. The underlying reason is to provide the information that users need to 
project future cash flows (EFRAG, 2012, § 37), namely: 
- The cost of pollution that the entity bears due to its activities. 
- The gain that free allowances represent (this being depicted in each accounting 
period as the best possible representation of the real monetary cost to the entity). 
- How the entity can face its surrendering obligation. 
As concerns disclosure, except for the information to justify the firm’s business model 
(ANC, 2012, section V), none of the two papers covers the issue directly. Nonetheless, 
EFRAG (2012, § 108-f) believes that specific disclosure requirements, in addition to 
those existing in the current standards, will be necessary for emissions trading schemes.  
Meanwhile, at national level, some dispositions on how to report GHG emission 
allowances were issued by local regulatory bodies. Next section summarizes existing 
guidance in EU-15 Member States during the research period.  
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2.3.2. Overview at national level  
The present overview of national accounting guidance for GHG emission allowances is 
based on European Environment Agency technical reports concerning the application of 
the EU-ETS Directive by EU Member States21, as well as official data collected from 
the websites of national accounting standard-setting bodies, and information provided in 
firms’ annual reports. Table 2-6 summarizes country status, over the research period. 
Table 2-6: EU-15 national accounting guidance on GHG emission allowances (2005-2012) 
Specific guidance on accounting for  
GHG emission allowances at national level 
(2005 - 2012) 
Type of guidance for 
entities under IFRS 
Recognition 
Measurement 
 
Disclosure 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom (1) 
   No specific guidance 
X X 
Austria 
   Opinion of 22.2.2006, AFRAC V V d 
Belgium 
   Avis CNC 179/1 of  1.8.2005 
   Avis CNC 179/1 of 26.11.2008 (update)  
V V d 
Finland 
   Opinion KILA Nº 1767/2005 of 15.11. 2005 (2) V V D 
France 
   Avis du CU Nº 2004-C of 23.3.2004  
   Recommendation N°2009-R-02 of 5.03.2009 
V V d 
Germany 
   Opinion IDW RS HFA Nº 15 of 2.3.2005 V V d 
Portugal 
   Technical Interpretation IT Nº 4 of 26.4.2006 
   Accounting standard NCRF Nº 26 of 7.9.2009  
V V D 
Spain 
   Resolution of 8.2.2006, ICAC  M M D 
X – No specific guidance on how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. 
V – Guidance not mandatory for entities under IFRS. 
M – Guidance mandatory for all entities operating installations linked to the Spanish allowances 
allocation plan, regardless if they draw up their financial statements under national GAAP or 
under IFRS. 
D – Guidance comprising detailed items to be reported in the annex (refer to Table 2-9). 
d – Guidance addressing the accounting policies to be adopted for GHG emission allowances, 
but not specifying detailed items to be reported in the annex (refer to p. 34). 
(1) The Financial Reporting Advisory Board has issued guidance, based in the IFRIC 3, only 
to public sector installations under the Government’s Financial Reporting Manual. 
(2) Later included in the “General guidelines for environmental issues and the presentation of 
the financial statements” issued in 24/10/2006 by the Finnish accounting standard-setting 
body (KHT-yhdistys). 
                                                             
21 Available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/technical_report_2008_13. Last accessed on 19 
July 2014. 
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From 2005 to 2012, in seven EU-15 Member States (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden) no particular guidance specifying how to apply 
the existing accounting standards to “cap and trade” schemes was provided. In the 
United Kingdom, the Financial Reporting Advisory Board published guidance, based in 
the IFRIC 3, intended only to public sector installations under the Government’s 
Financial Reporting Manual. As regards the remaining seven EU-15 Member States 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain) regulatory bodies 
have issued specific accounting guidelines on how to report GHG emission allowances 
in the annual accounts. Among the guidance issued at national level, in six EU-15 
Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and Portugal) the 
accounting dispositions on GHG emission allowances are only relevant for operators 
which draw up their financial statements according to national GAAP. Differently, in 
Spain, the Resolution ICAC (2006) also applies to firms under IFRS in the extent that it 
is mandatory to every firm that has been awarded GHG emission allowances through 
the Spanish National Allocation Plan (ICAC, 2006, § 1). 
Concerning the scope, all the guidance provided at national level addresses recognition 
and measurement criteria, being that the accounting model varies across countries as 
described in Table 2-7 (main features) and Table 2-8 (illustrative example): 
- The Finnish guidelines follow the “net liability approach” (NLA), with free 
allowances measured at nil value, and the obligation to surrender allowances 
recognized when, and only when, actual emissions exceed free allocations. 
- The French and Spanish guidelines establish the “gross liability approach” (CoS) 
with free allowances recognized at fair value at grant date, and the obligation to 
surrender allowances measured according the “remainder value approach”. 
- The Portuguese guidance, in its latest version (CNC, 2009 | NCRF 26), follows a 
variant of the “remainder value approach” where free allowances are recognized at 
fair value at grant date, but existing allowances are amortized, and a provision is 
recognized when, and only when, actual emissions exceed allowances held. 
- The Austrian, Belgian, and German guidelines allow either the “gross liability 
approach” or the “net liability approach”, being that in the Austrian and German 
models allowances are classified as inventory or other current assets. 
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Table 2-7: Main features of EU-15 national guidelines for the recognition and measurement of GHG emission allowances (2005-2012) 
Belgium Belgium Portugal
   France Finland
Portugal (IT 4)
Spain
CoS NLA NCRF 26 model
  FV at grant date   Nominal amount   FV at grant date   FV at grant date   Nominal amount 
  ---   ---   Amortization   ---   ---
  Prov | O. Liab gross method   Provisions net method   Provisions net method   Provisions gross method   Provisions net method
Allowances
Recognition Intangible assets Intangible assets Intangible assets 
Granted allowances: Fair value at 
grant date
Granted allowances: Nominal 
amount of nil value
Granted allowances: Fair value at 
grant date
Granted allowances: Fair value at 
grant date
Granted allowances: Nominal 
amount of nil value
Purchased allowances: Cost Purchased allowances: Cost Purchased allowances: Cost Purchased allowances: Cost Purchased allowances: Cost
Granted allowances: Nominal 
amount of nil value
Granted allowances: Nominal 
amount of nil value
Purchased allowances: Cost 
less impairment losses
Purchased allowances: Lower 
of cost or market
Government Grant
Recognition As deferred income Not aplicable As other changes in equity As deferred income Not aplicable 
Initial measurement Fair value at grant date Not aplicable (nil value) Fair value at grant date Fair value at grant date Not aplicable (nil value)
Subsequent 
measurement
Release of government grants 
when expenses relating to granted 
allowances are recognized
Not aplicable (nil value) Release of government grants 
when expenses relating to granted 
allowances are recognized
Release of government grants 
when expenses relating to granted 
allowances are recognized
Not aplicable (nil value)
Liability Prov | O. Liab - Gross method                                            
First carrying value of allowances 
granted, then of the allowances 
purchased, and fair value | best 
estimate | market value | at 
balance sheet date for missing 
allowances 
Provisions - Net method                       
First carrying value of 
allowances granted (nil value), 
then of allowances purchased, 
and fair value at balance sheet 
date for missing allowances
Provisions - Net method                       
If, and only if, there is a shortfall of 
allowances, a provision is made for 
the best estimate of the cost to be 
incurred to cover the missing 
allowances
Provisions - Gross method                       
First carrying value of allowances 
granted, then of allowances 
purchased, and market value at 
balance sheet date for missing 
allowances
Provisions - Net method                       
First carrying value of 
allowances granted (nil value), 
then of allowances purchased, 
and market value at balance 
sheet date for missing 
allowances
Initial measurement 
Subsequent 
measurement
Granted and purchased 
allowances: Lower of cost or 
market (the deemed cost of 
granted allowances being their 
initial fair value)
Granted and purchased 
allowances: Cost less amortization 
and impairment losses (the deemed 
cost of granted allowances being 
their initial fair value)
Granted and purchased 
allowances: Cost less impairment 
losses (the deemed cost of 
granted allowances being their 
initial fair value)
Austria
Inventory | Other current assets
Germany
AFRAC | IDW models
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Table 2-8: EU-15 national guidelines for the recognition and measurement of GHG emission allowances (2005-2012) – Illustrative example 
Background Belgium Belgium Portugal
Allowances granted free of charge France Finland
 10 000 tones Portugal (IT 4)
Emissions made during the year Spain
 9 000 tones CoS NLA NCRF 26 model
Market price of allowances   FV at grant date   Nominal amount   FV at grant date   FV at grant date   Nominal amount 
At grant date 10 CU per ton   ---   ---   Amortization   ---   ---
Positions before settlement   Prov | O.Liab gross method   Provisions net method   Provisions net method   Provisions gross method   Provisions net method
BALANCE SHEET at year-end (partial)
Intangible assets  100 000   0  10 000 --- ---
Inventories | Other current assets --- --- ---  100 000   0
 100 000   0  10 000  100 000   0
Net profit (loss) for the year   0   0   0   0   0
Deferred income | Other changes in equity  10 000   0  10 000  10 000   0
Provisions | Other liabilities  90 000   0   0  90 000   0
 100 000   0  10 000  100 000   0
INCOME STATEMENT (partial)
Income - release of government grant  90 000   0  90 000  90 000   0
Provisions | Emissions expense | Other operating expenses ( 90 000)   0   0 ( 90 000) 0
Amortization --- --- ( 90 000) --- ---
Net profit (loss) for the year   0   0   0   0   0
Total assets
Total equity and liabilities
Austria
Germany
AFRAC | IDW models
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With regard to disclosure, the guidance issued in Spain, Portugal, and Finland specifies 
detailed requirements for information to be provided in the annex, covering qualitative 
and quantitative data, as summarized in Table 2-9. The information to be delivered in 
the annual accounts according to the Resolution ICAC (2006) will be the basis for the 
construction of the disclosure index in chapter 5. Similar dispositions for disclosure can 
be found in the Portuguese and Finnish standards, namely requiring information (in 
currency units and in physical units - CO2 tones) covering granted allowances, actual 
emissions, acquisitions and sales of allowances, evolution of allowances’ market prices, 
and impact on performance and financial position. Differently, the guidance provided in 
Austria, Belgium, France and Germany does not set out clearly (item-by-item) the 
information to be reported in the annex:  
- In Austria (where both a “gross liability approach” and a “net liability approach” 
are permitted), AFRAC Opinion (2006, § 8.3) indicates that the method of 
accounting and the measurement criteria “are explained in the annex”, but no 
further requests or details on items to be reported in the explanatory notes are 
mentioned.  
- In Belgium (where both a “gross liability approach” and a “net liability approach” 
are permitted), Avis CNC 179/1 (2005, p. 10; 2008 update, p. 9) establishes that it 
should be included in the annex a “sufficiently detailed summary” with 
information allowing to assess the accounting method adopted, but no further 
requests or details on items to be reported in the annex are indicated.  
- In France (where only a “gross liability approach” is allowed), Recommendation 
2009-R-02 (2009, § 4) put forward that the “assumptions to estimate” future GHG 
emissions as well as “relevant information” on CO2 risk management are 
included in the annex, but no further requests or details on items to be reported in 
the explanatory notes are set out.  
- In Germany (where both a “gross liability approach” and a “net liability 
approach” are permitted), Opinion IDW RS HFA Nº 15 (IDW, 2005, § 26) 
recommends that the method of accounting and measurement criteria are 
explained in the annex, namely the criteria for the measurement of allowances free 
of charge, but no further requests or details on items to be reported in the 
explanatory notes are specified.  
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Table 2-9: Information on GHG emission allowances to be provided in the annex to the 
annual accounts according to Spanish, Portuguese and Finnish guidelines 
Information to be provided in the annual account in addition to dispositions already 
imposed by the relevant existing standards  
Spain 
Resolution ICAC (2006, §9) 
Portugal 
IT 4 (2006, §7) 
NCRF 26 (2009, §12) 
Finland 
KILA 1767 (2005, §3) 
GG (2006, Appendix 5) 
1. Accounting policies 
Criteria for the valuation of GHG emission 
allowances. Criteria for the assignment to 
results of the expenses arising from GHG 
emission. 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
2. Other explanatory notes - separate note on 
GHG emission allowances: 
a) Emission allowances allocated under NAP: 
- Amount (CO2 tones) of allowances 
allocated during the period of validity of 
National Allocation Plan (2005-2007 | 
2008-2012). 
- Annual distribution of allocated emission 
allowances (CO2 tones). 
- Information on whether the assignment 
has been free or paid.   
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
b) Analysis of the movements of emission 
allowances during the year, including any 
impairment losses that might correct the 
carrying amount, detailing: 
- The carrying amount at the beginning of 
the year. 
- Acquisitions and other increases. 
- Disposals and other decreases. 
- The carrying amount at the end of the year. 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
c) Expenses resulting from GHG emissions, by 
specifying its calculation. 
√ √ 
d) Amount of the Provision for GHG 
emissions, specifying the amount that 
proceeds by deficits of emission allowances 
within it, where appropriate. 
√ √ 
e) Information on futures contracts on GHG 
emission allowances. 
X X 
f) Government grants received by allocated 
emission allowances, specifying the amount 
recognized in profit or loss during the year. 
√ N.a. 
g) Contingencies related to fines or other 
sanctions pursuant the EU-ETS law. 
√ X 
h) The fact of being part of a group of facilities 
under EU-ETS, where appropriate. 
X X 
Source: Resolution of 8.2.2006, ICAC, Spain. Technical Interpretation IT Nº 4 of 26.4.2006, 
and Accounting standard NCRF Nº 26 of 7.9.2009, CNC, Portugal. Opinion KILA 
Nº 1767/2005 of 15.11.2005, and General guidelines for environmental issues and the 
presentation of the financial statements of 24/10/2006 (GG), KHT-yhdistys, Finland. 
Translation is made by the author. √ - Required | X – Not required | N.a. – Not applicable. 
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In summary, as regards disclosure, Austrian, Belgian, French, and German guidance 
refer mainly to descriptive information on the accounting treatment and the valuation 
methods applied, being that their requests are formulated in a more vague (imprecise) 
way than the demands made by the Spanish, Portuguese, and Finnish guidelines.  
Next table summarizes EU-15 national accounting guidance on GHG emission 
allowances for EU-ETS participants under IFRS, according the type of requirement 
(mandatory versus not mandatory), and the type of disclosure (detailed versus not 
detailed), over the research period. 
Table 2-10: Synthesis of EU-15 national accounting guidance on GHG emission allowances 
for entities under IFRS (2005-2012) 
Country Type of requirement  
for entities under IFRS 
Type of guidance on 
disclosure items 
Spain Mandatory Detailed 
Finland, Portugal Not Mandatory Detailed 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany Not Mandatory Not Detailed 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, UK No Guidance --- 
Previous studies on mandatory disclosure remark that simply creating additional 
reporting regulation will not necessarily lead to real change in disclosure, unless such 
requirements are clearly delineated (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Peters and Romi, 
2013). Expanding prior research, this study intends to examine if formal guidance 
(mandatory or not) is an incentive for additional information especially when setting out 
straight requests on items to be provided in the annex, and evaluate if such guidelines 
are likely to enhance the harmony of disclosure practices relating to GHG emission 
allowances. For this purpose, a review of literature on the harmonization of financial 
reporting is presented in the next chapter. 
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3. Harmonization of financial reporting 
This chapter presents a review of literature related to the measurement of 
harmonization of financial reporting, addressing in particular the operationalization of 
the concept of de facto accounting harmony. 
3.1. The concept of accounting harmonization  
The concept of international accounting harmonization arose in the middle of the 
twentieth century in response to economic integration after World War II, and 
corresponding increases in capital flows between countries. At first, efforts were 
focused on reducing differences among the accounting principles used in major capital 
markets around the world. Then, international accounting harmonization became an 
objective of modern accounting (Baker and Barbu, 2007; Barlev and Haddad, 2007), 
and the term international accounting harmonization has been used to describe a process 
of reducing accounting differences among countries. 
Literature generally distinguishes between accounting harmonization and accounting 
standardization (Tay and Parker, 1990; Taplin, 2011; Cole et al., 2009, 2012), being 
that both concepts involve a reduction in accounting diversity. The difference between 
them lies in their relative flexibility or strictness. 
The concept of harmonization has been defined in many different ways. For Tay and 
Parker (1990), harmonization of financial reporting is a process involving movement 
away from total diversity towards a state of harmony indicated by a concentration of 
firms around one or a few of the available accounting choices. Whereas harmonization 
is a process, harmony is a state at a given point in time. As presented by Tay and Parker 
(1990, p. 73), the concept of harmony comprehends any state between total diversity 
and uniformity, excluding these two extreme situations. 
Standardization is also a process involving movement away from total diversity but 
implies a more strict approach resulting ultimately in a state of total uniformity. At an 
international level, standardization implies uniform standards in all countries while 
harmonization encompasses a reconciliation of different requirements in individual 
countries under compatible conceptual frameworks.  
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It is generally accepted that standardization is a process of uniformity while 
harmonization is a process of coordination, but to avoid confusion over this two 
concepts authors like Taplin (2011, pp. 384-385) prefer to use the term “comparability” 
in place of the more traditional term “harmony”. On the other hand, since the 1990s, the 
concept of harmonization has been sometimes replaced by the concept of convergence, 
when referring to the removal of existing dissimilarities, and the “development of high-
quality, compatible accounting standards that could be used for both domestic and 
cross-border financial reporting” (IASB, 2002 | The Norwalk Agreement). 
Standardization, uniformity, harmonization, and harmony can exist both at the level of 
regulation and practice. As stated in previous literature (van der Tas, 1988, 1992a, 
1992b; Tay and Parker, 1990, 1992), both states (uniformity, harmony) and processes 
(standardization, harmonization) may be either de jure (formal) or de facto (material). 
The former refers to accounting standards, statutory rules or stock exchange regulations 
and the latter relates to the actual practices of firms. This study is concerned with de 
facto (material) accounting harmonization as a way to assess any progress in the 
comparability of financial statements to users. 
Figure 3-1 presents possible combinations between states of de jure (formal) and de 
facto (material) harmony. One purpose of accounting standard-setting bodies is to 
promote the convergence of accounting practices through the convergence of 
accounting regulations. When this goal is achieved de jure (formal) harmonization leads 
to de facto (material) harmonization. De jure (formal) and de facto (material) harmony 
will coexist, in some extent, at a given point in time, and formal and material 
harmonization processes will lead to higher levels of harmony (e.g., fig.3-1, P → P'). 
But the existence of formal harmonization does not assure, by itself, the comparability 
of accounting information. Even when compliance with regulations is legally required, 
firms may not comply if it is perceived that the consequences of non-compliance are not 
serious. So, the diversity of practices may subsist despite the existence of standardized 
rules. Moreover, formal harmonization may lead to material disharmonization when 
standards evolve allowing more options for firms (e.g., fig. 3-1, P → P''). 
On the other hand, the diversity or the absence of accounting standards does not 
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necessarily imply the diversity of practices. Some research (van der Tas, 1988; Tay and 
Parker, 1990; Cairns, 1997; Cañibano and Mora, 2000; Aisbitt, 2001; Land and 
Lang, 2002) suggests that convergence may occur by a process of voluntary or 
spontaneous harmonization when most firms consider that it is of their convenience 
(e.g., fig. 3-1, Pº). 
Figure 3-1: Possible combinations of de jure and de facto harmony 
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Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Either formal and material harmonization or standardization may refer to measurement 
or to disclosure issues. In general, studies on measurement harmonization evaluate the 
way in which transactions and events are reflected in the financial statements, while 
investigation concerned with harmonization of disclosure considers the extent and detail 
of the information provided in the annex1. Figure 3-2 illustrates the concepts of de jure 
(formal) and de facto (material) harmonization applied to these two dimensions of 
financial reporting (measurement and disclosure). 
                                                             
1 Refer to Rahman et al. (2002) for a comprehensive classification of accounting harmonization studies 
that comprehends six (not mutually exclusive) categories: regulation studies; practices studies, clusters 
studies; association studies; relevance studies; and methodology studies. 
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Figure 3-2: The concept of accounting harmonization  
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Source: Adapted from Cañibano and Mora (2000, p. 352) 
Measurement and disclosure harmonization are both required for the comparability of 
financial statements. Actually, there appears to be general agreement that the 
assessment of the level of measurement harmony itself is not sufficient to evaluate the 
overall level of harmony in accounting information (Grove and Bazley, 1993; Ali, 
2006). In particular, when alternative measurement criteria are allowed or when the 
method of presentation in the financial statements is the offset of positions (as currently 
happens in accounting for GHG emission allowances) disclosure plays an essential role 
for the comparability of firms’ accounts2.  
While numerous studies have been conducted on the harmonization of measurement 
practices, research on the harmonization of disclosure is scarce (Emenyonu and Gray, 
1996; Ali, 2006). The present analysis fills this gap by evaluating the level of de facto 
(material) disclosure harmony on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts of 
EU-15 firms and identify any progress towards harmonization among them. As pointed 
out by Tay and Parker (1990, p. 73), it is difficult to measure a process. For that reason, 
to ascertain the evolution in (the process of) accounting harmonization, empirical 
research tries to measure states of harmony at different points in time. Section 3.2 
discusses the operationalization of this concept in related literature. 
                                                             
2 In view of this, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued ASU 2011-11 Balance Sheet 
(Topic 210): Disclosures about Offsetting Assets and Liabilities, and ASU 2013-01 Balance Sheet (Topic 
210): Clarifying the Scope of Disclosures about Offsetting Assets and Liabilities, requiring entities to 
disclose both gross and net information about those instruments and transactions eligible for offset in the 
statement of financial position. The purpose is to facilitate comparisons between entities that prepare their 
financial statements under US GAAP and entities under IFRS. 
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3.2. Operationalization of the concept of de facto accounting harmonization 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Initially, empirical studies had not computed a single measure of harmony. Instead, they 
relied only on descriptive statistics to analyze the comparability of accounting 
information (Choi and Bavishi, 1982; Evans and Taylor, 1982; Mckinnon and Janell, 
1984). To overcome this limitation, van der Tas (1988) suggested three indices of 
harmony that are intended to quantify the degree to which accounts are comparable:  
- The H index to measure national harmony. 
- The C index to measure harmony where there is multiple reporting. 
- The I index to measure international harmony. 
Earlier developed to measure the degree of concentration in industrial economics 
research, the H index (or Herfindahl index) was introduced by van der Tas (1988) as a 
measure of harmony in accounting literature, with the underlying notion that a higher 
level of harmony is achieved when firms’ choices concentrate on one or few accounting 
alternatives. Hence, comparability increases when the choices made by firms converge 
towards a generally accepted method or when the number of accounting methods in use 
is reduced. 
The formula of the H index, as presented by van der Tas (1988, p. 159), is as follows: 
                                               
(3-1)
 
where: 
n represents the number of alternative accounting methods 
pi represents the relative frequency of accounting method i 
Considering that pi is the probability that two firms randomly selected from the sample, 
independently (with replacement of the first firm before selecting the second firm), both 
use the same accounting method i, it therefore follows that H index equals the 
probability that two firms randomly selected (with replacement) from the sample use 
the same accounting method, that is, their accounts are comparable. 
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With respect to a particular sort of transaction or event surveyed, the H index has a 
maximum value of 1 when all firms use the same method (uniformity) and a minimum 
of 1/n when firms are proportioned evenly over n alternative methods. Therefore, H 
approaches 0 as the number of alternative methods, all with the same frequency, 
approaches infinity (Herrmann and Thomas, 1995, p. 256). 
The H index is typically used to quantify national harmony (i.e, the harmony in a single 
country), but van der Tas (1988) pointed out that it can also be used to quantify 
international harmony (i.e., the harmony in several countries) by ignoring the country to 
which a firm belongs. For instance, harmony in the EU could be quantified using the H 
index by treating all firms in the sample as belonging to the same nation irrespective of 
their country of origin within the EU. 
The H index, as the I index described further ahead, cannot comprise situations where 
the accounts of a firm are provided using more than one accounting method (multiple 
reporting), because they require each firm to be classified as using exactly one method. 
In view of this, to take account of multiple reporting, van der Tas (1988, pp. 167-168) 
proposed the C index which is given by the following expression: 
                                        
(3-2)
 
where: 
at represents the number of firms applying accounting method t 
i represents the number of alternative accounting methods 
n represents the total number of firms 
The C index is not a concentration index, although a mathematical relationship exists 
between the C index and the H index (van der Tas, 1988, p. 167). C equals the 
probability that two firms randomly selected from the sample (without replacement) 
have accounts that are comparable, being that C can also be interpreted as a model of 
inter-firm comparison (Archer et al., 1995, p. 92), as it is obtained by dividing the 
pairwise comparisons between firms using the same method by the total number of 
possible comparisons. 
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Finally, to measure the level of international harmony, van der Tas suggested the I 
index. Considering only two countries, the formula presented by van der Tas (1988, 
p. 165), is as follows: 
                                          
(3-3)
 
where: 
fi1 represents the relative frequency of method i in country 1 
fi2 represents the relative frequency of method i in country 2 
n represents the number of alternative accounting methods 
The I index for two countries equals the probability that two randomly selected firms 
(one from each country) use the same accounting method. Although this definition of 
the I index is similar to the definition of the H index, it is not equivalent. In fact, by 
requiring the two firms being compared to come from different countries, the I index 
emphasizes the level of harmony between countries at the expense of the level of 
harmony within countries. As pointed out by Taplin (2004), while the I index ensures 
that each country is given equal weight because it requires one firm to be selected from 
each country, the H index is likely to select both firms from the same country if that 
country has a much larger number of firms in the sample.  
Van der Tas applied the I index for two countries and suggested in an appendix (van der 
Tas, 1988, p. 168) that it could be generalized to more than two countries in the 
following way: 
                          
(3-4)
 
where: 
fim represents the relative frequency of method i in country m 
m represents the number of countries 
n represents the number of alternative accounting methods 
In this formulation, the I index is computed by multiplying, across countries, the 
proportion of firms practicing a particular accounting alternative and then summing 
over all alternative practices. So, when there are more than two countries, the equation 
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consists in the product of m terms, and the I index equals the m-1st root of the 
probability that m randomly selected firms (one from each of the m countries) all use the 
same accounting method. This differs from the H index, since it is not required a pair of 
firms to have comparable accounts but m firms to have comparable accounts. 
As the probability that a larger number of firms use the same accounting method is 
likely to be lower than only two firms use the same method, van der Tas (1988) 
suggested the exponent 1/(m-1) in the definition of the index, to correct this tendency. 
But, by doing so, the simplicity and interpretability of the I index is lost in the 
generalization to more than two countries, as the m-1st root of a probability is not as 
easily interpreted as a probability (Taplin, 2004, p. 59). Moreover, the similarity with 
the H index is reduced. 
Since the pioneer work of van der Tas (1988, 1992a, 1992b) several proposals had 
emerged in the literature to refine this methodology or outline alternatives. The main 
contributions, which are presented below, aim to solve the need for:  
- Improvements on measures of accounting harmony (discussed in section 3.2.2.) 
- Statistical tests of significance on value variations of indices (discussed in section 
3.2.3.). 
3.2.2. Improvements on measures of accounting harmony 
As the use of indices to quantify states of harmony became widespread in accounting 
research, several authors have suggested modifications to the basic H, C, and I indices 
provided by van der Tas (1988). Detailed reviews of international accounting 
harmonization literature can be found in, amongst others, Ali (2005), Taplin (2003, 
2004), and Baker and Barbu (2007). I present below a summary of the main 
contributions which are primarily concerned with: 
(a) Treatment of non-disclosure. 
(b) More accurate specifications of traditional measures of harmony. 
(c) New indices proposed by Taplin (2004, 2011). 
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a) Improvements related to the treatment of non-disclosure 
It is difficult to assess the comparability of the accounts of a firm that does not state the 
accounting method used for a policy choice, especially if it is unknown whether the 
policy choice is not applicable or whether an accounting method was applied but not 
disclosed. When the policy choice is not applicable to a firm, it is plausible to consider 
its accounts comparable with the accounts of all other firms. Otherwise, when the policy 
choice is applicable but it is not known which accounting method was applied, 
comparability may be reduced. In view of this, treatment of non-disclosure has been 
discussed by numerous authors, including Archer et al. (1995), Morris and Parker 
(1998), Pierce and Weetman (2000, 2002), Aisbitt (2001), and Taplin (2004, 2010, 
2011). 
Archer et al. (1995) suggest three alternative ways to treat non-disclosure cases: (i) they 
can be omitted from the analysis; (ii) they can be treated as not applicable; (iii) or they 
can be treated as if the item exists but is not disclosed. Besides, the authors also 
advocate that sometimes (iv) a default assumption may be made if non-disclosers can be 
assumed to use a particular method, such as one required by an accounting standard. In 
this particular case, non-disclosers can simply be added to firms disclosing that they use 
the default method. 
In order to avoid miscalculation of harmony by simply (i) omitting non-disclosures 
from the calculations, Archer et al. (1995) suggest adjustments to the C index. When 
non-disclosure is (ii) regarded as not applicable, it means that each non-disclosing firm 
is comparable with all other non-disclosers and with every disclosing firm, for the item 
in question. Hence, Archer et al. (1995) proposed the calculation of a “disclosure-
adjusted C index” that recognizes this “universal comparability of not-applicable 
observations”. In this case, the formula has a denominator that allows for the number of 
potentially comparable pairs, and a numerator that assumes universal comparability3. In 
                                                             
3 As advanced by Archer et al. (1995, p. 72), whereas van der Tas’ (1988) C index equals {Pairwise 
comparisons between companies using same method}÷{ Maximum pairwise comparisons between 
companies disclosing method}, the “disclosure-adjusted C index” equals {Pairwise comparisons between 
companies using same method (including the default method) plus pairwise comparisons with and 
between companies which did not include the item in their financial statements}÷{ Maximum pairwise 
comparisons between all companies (including all disclosers and non-disclosers)}. 
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contrast, when (iii) the item exists but is not disclosed, the denominator, but not the 
numerator, of the C index should be adjusted for non-disclosures.  
Archer et al. (1995) define, but did not provide, a general formula for the disclosure-
adjusted C index. Later, Morris and Parker (1998) set out an adjusted index, which they 
call the “raw” C index, for applicable cases that are not disclosed. In the “raw” C index 
the denominator allows for the number of potentially comparable pairs but the 
numerator assumes that non-disclosures are not comparable with any of the disclosed 
cases. In a simulation study, Morris and Parker (1998) illustrate that the “disclosure-
adjusted” C index will usually produce higher scores, and the “raw” C index lower 
scores, than the C index calculated by omitting non-disclosures entirely. Building on 
prior research, Morris and Parker (1998) also extend to the I index the adjustment rules 
proposed by Archer et al. (1995), suggest a rule for adjusting the H index for non-
disclosure cases, and indicate its relationship to van der Tas’s (1988) C index. In 
addition, the authors show that, due to their statistical properties, between-country C 
index is preferable to the I index when a non-disclosure adjusted index is required.  
Later, Aisbitt (2001) conducted a survey that sought to examine the usefulness of 
Archer et al.’s (1995) modified C index. However, given the sample, the author rejects 
the calculation of non-disclosure adjusted indices. Regarding to the non-disclosure of an 
accounting policy choice, Aisbitt (2001) remarks that (unlike some research assuming 
that the lack of information may be interpreted as corresponding to the use of the policy 
required by regulations) it was not possible to make a default assumption without 
risking distortion of the results. As regards the non-disclosure of an item in the annex, 
the author argues that it was clear in most reports that the item was applicable, but the 
firm had chosen not to make such disclosure. Therefore, Aisbitt (2001) concludes that 
adjusted indices would have presented a score higher than the true level of harmony. 
Differently, Pierce and Weetman (2002) develop further the works of Archer et al. 
(1995), and Morris and Parker (1998) by applying a generalized formula for the 
between-country C index, in which non-disclosure is a mix of applicable and not-
applicable cases. The authors conclude that harmony is better estimated when the data is 
analyzed to distinguish applicable from not-applicable cases of non-disclosure, and the 
formulae applied are adjusted appropriately in both the numerator and denominator. 
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More recently, Taplin (2004, 2011) introduce (within the framework of the T index 
described further ahead) the treatment of non-disclosure as an accounting method 
encompassing all the four assumptions discussed in previous literature: 
(i) Not applicable (firms that do not disclose are removed from the sample) - this 
option may be appropriate when it is intended to measure the level of harmony 
only for firms for which this particular accounting policy is an issue. 
(ii) Comparable to everything - this option may be appropriate when assuming that 
non-disclosure results from non-applicability, and therefore the accounts of a non-
disclosing firm are comparable with the accounts of any other firm.  
(iii) Comparable to nothing - this option may be appropriate if firms fail to disclose 
their accounting policy choice in order to withhold information and make 
comparisons between accounts difficult, rather than because it was not applicable. 
(iv) Comparable to the standard (or default) method - this option may be appropriate if 
non-disclosure implies that the accounting method used is a standard or default 
method required by regulation and it is reasonable to assume that the method used 
was not disclosed because it is understood that default was applied. 
Moreover, the author advocates that, when it is difficult to conclude why firms do not 
disclose their accounting method, it may be beneficial to report and compare values of 
the harmony index calculated under several options. 
b) Improvements related to the specification of measurement techniques 
In general, developments in the formulation of indices aim to provide more accurate 
measures of harmony, and, in particular, to solve some flaws in previous specifications 
of the C and I indices. 
Regarding to the I index, a severe limitation pointed out in related literature is due to its 
sensitivity to nil proportions. As mentioned before, the I index is computed by 
multiplying, across countries, the proportion of firms practicing a particular accounting 
alternative (see pp. 43-44). Hence, when the number of countries exceeds two, the 
practices of one or more of the countries can, in extreme cases, render the score of the I 
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index totally meaningless. To illustrate this drawback, Emenyonu and Gray (1996, 
p. 274) present an example consisting of four countries and two accounting methods 
being their relative frequencies as follows (%): 
Country 1 2 3 4 
Accounting method 1 1,0 1,0 0,0 1,0 
Accounting method 2 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 
Accordingly, I index = (1,0 x 1,0 x 0,0 x 1,0 + 0,0 x 0,0 x 1,0 x 0,0) 1/(4-1) = 0,0 1/3 = 0 
Therefore, despite all the firms in three countries (1, 2, 4) apply the same accounting 
method, the I index equals zero erroneously suggesting that there is no degree of 
harmony among the four countries, being that this misleading result arrives from the 
fact that all firms from country 3 adopt the accounting method 2 which is not in use by 
any of the firms in the other three countries. 
Van der Tas’s (1988) formulation of the I index for more than two countries was also 
criticized by Archer and McLeay (1995) on the grounds that the exponent correction 
factor l/(m-l) is not consistent with the I index being an analogue of the H index4. To 
ensure that the I index is an equivalent of the H index, Archer and McLeay (1995) 
suggest a modified I index when examining more than two countries. However, their 
version also suffers from sensitivity to zero frequencies, and it “…is not particularly 
useful because it lacks simplicity…” (Taplin, 2004, p. 60). 
To control for this sensitivity Herrmann and Thomas (1995) employed a modification to 
the I index, by recording as 0,99 the proportion for the unanimous method and as 0,01 
the proportion for the non-practiced method (instead of 1 and 0, respectively), in cases 
where all firms in a particular country chose one of the two available methods. 
Otherwise, facing the same problem, when the number of countries exceeds two and a 
zero frequency is observed, Emenyonu and Gray (1996) decided not to compute the 
score of the I index for that particular topic. 
                                                             
4 Archer and McLeay (1995) pointed out that the exponent l/(m-l) does not equal 2 (the exponent in the H 
index), and is applied to the sum of cross products and not to individual cross products for each 
accounting method. 
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With regard to the C index, Archer et al. (1995) documented the possibility to 
decompose this measure in a way that allows distinguishing comparability within 
countries (intra-national) from comparability between countries (inter-national). For this 
purpose, Archer et al. (1995) divided the C Index into the within-country and between-
country components, and, unlike van der Tas (1988), were able to use only one index to 
measure harmony both at national and international level. Taplin (2004) describes the 
within-country C index as the probability that two firms selected randomly (without 
replacement) have accounts that are comparable if the two firms are selected such that 
they must belong to the same country, whereas the between-country C index represents 
the probability that two firms selected randomly (without replacement) have accounts 
that are comparable if the two firms are selected such that they must not belong to the 
same country.  
Krisement (1997) criticized van der Tas’s (1988) C index on the grounds that it is 
affected by the number of observations and Archer et al.’s (1995) model because the 
within-country and between-country components do not sum to the total value of the 
global C index. Instead of this index, to measure comparability of financial reporting 
Krisement (1997) suggested the coefficient of entropy as the only concentration index 
to be additively decomposable5. However, entropy has a caveat as it fails at the 
occurrence of multiple reporting. So, Krisement (1997) proposed a combination of the 
coefficient of entropy and the C index (suited to deal with multiple reporting) to 
measure the degree of comparability where the accounts of a firm are provided using 
more than one accounting method. 
Another modification to van der Tas’s (1988) C index, motivated by the dependence of 
this index on the number of accounting methods or on the number of firms analyzed, 
was proposed by Lainez et al. (1999). The authors introduced a new indicator, which 
they call the “CJL index”, resulting from the modification of the C index for the 
purpose of eliminating the bias arising from its use for cases in which the number of 
accounting alternatives considered differs from the number of firms for which the study 
                                                             
5 The properties of five concentration indices: Herfindal index, Entropy, k-firm concentration ratio, 
Hannah and Kay index, and variance of logarithms, were discussed by Curry and George (1983) based on 
prior research by Hall and Tideman (1967), and Hannah and Kay (1977). 
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of the practice in question is meaningful6. To evaluate comparability over time and 
between different accounting practices, the authors calculate the “real level of minimum 
uniformity”, based on the firms for which each one of the practices analyzed was 
actually applicable, and subsequently transferred it to a common scale from 0 to 1. 
Along with the above mentioned modifications to the basic indices proposed by van der 
Tas (1988), other tools to measure accounting harmonization also appeared in related 
literature, namely the use of statistical methods. However, these approaches are not 
equivalent to the use of indices, as they are intended to measure different concepts of 
harmonization, as discussed below.  
To capture the extent to which changes in harmony could be attributed to efforts 
towards international harmonization or national standardization, Archer et al. (1996) 
provided a methodology based on a hierarchy of nested statistical models used to 
describe accounting policy choices made by firms. In order to modeling the 
harmonization process, the authors express harmony in a way that identifies departures 
from “equiprobable accounting policy choice”. This notion is based on the concept of 
“distributional harmony” in which, other things being equal, the expected distribution of 
accounting policy choices is the same in each country. According to Archer et al. 
(1996), international harmonization occurs when the distributions of firms across 
accounting methods in two or more countries become aligned over time, and domestic 
standardization occurs when the distribution of accounting methods across firms 
changes over time so that the absolute frequency of one accounting method significantly 
increases. These concepts differ from previous research, but Archer et al. (1996) 
reconcile their results with the indices of van der Tas (1988) and Archer et al. (1995). 
McLeay et al. (1999), and Jaafar and McLeay (2007) developed the methodology 
conducted earlier by Archer et al. (1996) based on nested hierarchy of general linear 
models, to carry out an analysis of standardization and harmonization in reporting 
practices. Again, their technique is not similar to the use of indices, since the two 
methods rely on different concepts of harmonization. In particular, the model of 
                                                             
6 This bias arises from the dependency of the value of the C index on the number of existing alternatives 
and the number of firms analyzed. That is, the C index only reaches the minimum value of zero when 
each one of the firms adopts a different method and the number of accounting alternatives is equal to the 
number of firms analyzed, which is a very unlikely situation to occur (Lainez et al., 1999, pp. 97-98). 
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McLeay et al. (1999) provide a measure of harmony for which the comparability would 
depend on the use of accounting methods appropriate to a firm’s circumstances and not 
on the use of the same method by all firms. In the same vein, for Jaafar and 
McLeay (2007) full harmony occurs when similar firms are comparable. 
Another tool applied to assess harmony is the chi-square statistic (Emenyonu and Gray, 
1992, 1996; García Benau, 1994; Herrmann and Thomas, 1995; Emenyonu and 
Adhikari, 1998; Parker and Morris, 2001; Ali, 2005, 2006; Baker and Barbu, 2007). By 
comparing observed frequencies against expected frequencies, the chi-square statistic 
tests for the equality of the proportions of accounting policy choices across groups 
(generally countries). Notwithstanding, although the chi-square test of independence has 
been used as an alternative to indices, related literature distinguishes between these two 
techniques.  
Using harmony indices implies a notion of harmonization as the extent of concentration 
around a particular accounting policy choice. Therefore, the level of harmonization 
increases as the number of firms selecting the same accounting policy increases, and the 
maximum harmony is reached when all the firms select the same accounting policy (or 
give information enough to reconcile).  
Using the chi-square test implies a notion of harmonization as the extent to which the 
preferences of some independent groups are matched. Therefore, harmonization is 
achieved when the firms in each group (e.g., country) select accounting policies with the 
same frequency.  
So, for some time the chi-square test was considered suitable to assess the level of 
harmony between countries while indices were considered more appropriate to measure 
national harmony as the concentration of firms on one or some accounting alternatives 
(Herrmann and Thomas, 1995). However, the results from the chi-square tests should 
not always be expected to be consistent with the rankings given by the I index 
computations (Emenyonu and Adhikari, 1998; Taplin, 2003).  
As described by Taplin (2003, p. 91) the chi-square test may not be accurate for 
comparing the level of international harmony, namely when the level of harmony is 
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similar within countries, but the choice of method is significantly different between 
countries. Moreover, potential difficulties with chi-square test may arise due to the 
requirement of at least one specific cell frequency7 and to the sensitivity to sample size. 
For instance, “even if the distributions over accounting methods are held constant (…) 
the chi-square statistic will be higher with higher sample sizes and statistically 
insignificant in sufficiently small sample sizes. The harmony indices are not dependent 
on sample size in this way. They are also valid with small cell frequencies.” (Taplin, 
2006, pp. 7-8). 
c) Recent developments – the T and R indices  
Taplin (2004) argues that indices are superior to other measurement techniques and 
develops further prior research by providing a unified approach to measure international 
accounting harmony, which the author calls the “T index”. 
The T index comprises most of the previous indices, either directly or by retaining their 
desirable properties, and allows the researcher to form a specific index with the required 
characteristics, without sacrificing one desirable property in order to reach another 
desirable property. The flexibility in the T index comes from the possibility to specify 
which accounting methods are comparable, and the probability that the firms should be 
selected from a given pair of countries. This is achieved by specifying two coefficients:  
- αkl for the comparability between accounting method k and accounting method l  
- βij for the comparability between firms in countries i and j 
The general formula for the T index presented by Taplin (2004, p. 61) is as follows: 
                               
(3-5)
 
where: 
αkl is the coefficient of comparability between accounting methods k and l 
                                                             
7 Cochran (1952) suggests that at least 20 per cent of the alternatives must have a frequency of 5 and none 
less than 1. In case it does not happen some of the alternatives must be put together as being just one in 
order to comply with the requirement. In view of this, Taplin (2006) argues that categories are likely to be 
combined for statistical convenience rather than combined for accounting reasons. 
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βij is the weighting for the comparison between firms in countries i and j 
ρki is the proportion of firms in country i that use accounting method k 
ρlj is the proportion of firms in country j that use accounting method l 
N is the number of countries (labeled 1 to N)  
M is the number of accounting methods (labeled 1 to M) 
The T index equals the probability that two firms randomly selected (with replacement) 
have accounts that are comparable. In order to ensure that T ranges from 0 (complete 
disharmony) to 1 (complete harmony) is required the αkl and the βij to be between 0 and 
1, and that the βij sum to 1. The product ρki ρlj is similar to the product fi1 fi2 in the 
definition of the basic I index for two countries (see p. 43). The difference is that now 
the T index considers any two countries i and j from a sample of N countries, including 
the possibility that these countries i and j are the same country.  
According to the formulation created by Taplin (2004), T corresponds to a weighted 
average of the two-country I index. This arrangement, unlike the formulae of the I index 
proposed by van der Tas (1988) and Archer and McLeay (1995), allows the 
generalization to more than two countries without a correction factor in the exponent 
and without suffering from sensitivity to zero proportions.  
Based on prior literature, Taplin (2004) identified the main criteria to arrive at a specific 
index within this framework: 
1) The weighting given to firms or countries. 
2) The international focus: within country; between country; or overall. 
3) The treatment of multiple accounting policies. 
4) The treatment of non-disclosure. 
The first two criteria (1 and 2) determine the coefficient βij, and the last two criteria (3 
and 4) determine the coefficient αkl. 
The aim of coefficient αkl is to recognize the different impacts on comparability when a 
pair of firms adopts distinct accounting methods with a higher or lower level of 
dissimilarity. It should be noted that, in this framework, alternative accounting methods 
include accounting methods created for multiple reporting and for non-disclosure. 
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Besides, since the accounting method k does not have to be the same as accounting 
method l, the T index considers the possibility that two different accounting methods 
may be comparable. Moreover, it is possible to consider fractional comparability 
between two accounting methods, with αkl assuming a value on the continuum from 0 
(completely incomparable) to 1 (completely comparable). 
As shown in the next table, the options for the T index when estimating αkl comprises 
three treatments of multiple accounting policies (under criterion 3) combined with four 
ways of dealing with non-disclosure (under criterion 4).  
Table 3-1: Options for the T index when estimating αkl 
Criteria to estimate the coefficient of comparability between accounting methods k and l - αkl
3) Multiple accounting  policies 3a Multiple accounting policies are not allowed
if k≠l
3b Multiple accounting policies are allowed if completely comparable
when methods k and l are complete comparable
when methods k and l are complete incomparable
3c Multiple accounting policies are allowable with fractional comparability
takes a value on the continuum from 0 (completely incomparable) to 1 
(complete comparable)
4) Non-disclosure 4a Not applicable
Firms who do not disclose a method are removed from the sample
4b Comparable to everything
for all accounting methods K and l
4c Comparable to nothing
for all accounting methods K and l
4d Comparable to the standard (or default) method S
,   for all K and l
 
Source: Taplin (2004, pp. 65-66) 
With regard to the coefficient βij, the aim is to give distinct weights for comparisons 
between firms belonging to two different countries. For instance, different weights may 
be given to countries in order to absorb the impact of the sample size or the population 
size. As shown in Table 3-2, the options for the T index when estimating βij comprises 
three weighting schemes to be given to firms or countries (under criterion 1) combined 
with three types of international focus (under criterion 2).  
Since the options under these four criteria (1, 2, 3, 4) can be chosen independently, the 
T index allows numerous choices for the coefficients αkl and βij, being that such range 
of combinations was not possible using prior indices. 
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Table 3-2: Options for the T index when estimating βij 
Criteria to estimate the coefficient of comparability between firms in countries i and j - βij
1) Firm/country weightings 1a Firms are weighted equally
(each firm receives weight proportional to the number of firms sampled 
from that country)
where: 
ni = the number of firms from country i in the sample
n = the total number of firms in the sample
bi = the proportion of firms in the sample from country i
1b Countries are weighted equally
where: 
N = the number of countries
1c Countries are weighted according  to the total population number of firms 
in each country
where: 
ui = the total number of firms in country i (for instance, the total number of 
firms listed on the stock exchange rather than the number of firms in the 
sample)
2) International focus 2a Overall
2b Within country
if i=j
if i≠j
2c Between country
if i=j
if i≠j
where the summation for j is over all countries 1 to N except for country i
 
Source: Taplin (2004, pp. 64-65) 
Later, in order to address formally international comparability Taplin (2011) defined 
one more index, which the author named as “R index”. R is a ratio of indices, calculated 
under the T index framework, and it is obtained by dividing the between-country index 
by the within-country index. Accordingly: 
- When R equals 0, the between-country index must equals 0 and there is total 
disharmony between countries.  
- When R equals 1, the between-country and within-country indices are equal, so the 
level of harmony between countries is fully explained by the level of harmony 
within countries. This occurs when the distribution of accounting methods is the 
same for each country, matching the notion of harmony advocated by Archer et al. 
(1996), and McLeay et al. (1999).  
- When R is greater than 0 but smaller than 1, the index score can be interpreted as 
 - 56 - 
the percentage of comparability of firms from different countries, in relation to its 
maximum possible value, given the extent to which firms within the same country 
are comparable. 
The formulation developed by Taplin (2004, 2011) seems the most appropriate to 
measure comparability of accounts (Cole et al., 2009; Mustata et al., 2011), as it brings 
together all of the desirable properties of previous indices and solves the flaws of the C 
and I indices presented earlier. In view of this, the present investigation adopts the 
technique proposed by Taplin (2004), whose flexibility allows designing a set of indices 
suitable to measure disclosure harmony on GHG emission allowances in annual 
accounts, as described in chapter 6. 
3.2.3. Statistical tests of significance  
Despite the above mentioned difficulties associated to the use of the basic H, C and I 
indices, Tay and Parker (1990, 1992) considered this methodology useful. The score of 
the index can be interpreted as a measure of accounting harmony (a state), while the 
change in the value of the index over time can be regarded as a measure of accounting 
harmonization (a process). They noted, however, that no statistical tests had been 
devised to evaluate statistical significance of value variations of indices. To overcome 
this gap, Tay and Parker (1990, p. 85) suggest the use of “some appropriate significance 
test, for example, chi-square”. 
Since then, several studies used the chi-square test either to assess statistical 
significance of value variations of indices or to measure harmony (Emenyonu and Gray, 
1992, 1996; García Benau, 1994; Herrmann and Thomas, 1995; Emenyonu and 
Adhikari, 1998; Parker and Morris, 2001; Ali 2006).  
As discussed in previous section, although the chi-square test has been used in some 
research to measure harmony it is not equivalent to the use of indices, because these two 
techniques rely on different notions of harmonization. Regarding to the use of the chi-
square test to evaluate how trivial or statistically significant variations in index values 
are, some limitations are underlined by, amongst others, Cañibano and Mora (2000, 
p. 359). One of the assumptions to apply the chi-square test is the independence 
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between the groups, that is to say between the same sample of firms in different periods. 
This assumption implies accepting that the probability of a firm to select one accounting 
alternative in the following period is independent from its selection in the previous 
period. However, it is not a reasonable statement, since firms cannot easily shift from 
one accounting method to another every year. 
To overcome these difficulties, in addition to using the chi-square test, Cañibano and 
Mora (2000) also carried out a bootstrapping procedure to analyze if the change of the 
harmony index between two periods was statistically significant, and hence to conclude 
whether there was, or not, a process of harmonization. The bootstrapping procedure is a 
technique introduced by Efron (1979) for estimating the distribution of an estimator or 
test statistic by resampling original data set. The process is done by sampling with 
replacement to get samples of the same size in order to gather alternative versions of the 
single statistic that ordinarily would be calculated from just one sample8. 
The null hypothesis, tested by Cañibano and Mora (2000), was that the observed change 
in the value of the index was not different from the changes obtained with a randomly 
generated distribution. If the observed change was unlikely to come from the generated 
distribution, the initial assumption would be rejected. In Cañibano and Mora (2000) the 
distribution was generated by 1 000 interactions, where the accounting choices were 
randomly allocated using the binomial distribution. The C index was calculated for each 
of the 1 000 interactions, and 999 changes in the index were subsequently derived. The 
observed change in the index was then compared with this generated distribution, being 
that the probability of the observed change not being greater than zero was given by the 
rank of the observed change when contrasted with the generated distribution. In their 
study, Cañibano and Mora (2000, p. 365) consider “that a difference which is between 
the first ten differences of 1 000 could be regarded as a significant change in the value 
of the index, and not a random difference”. However, as pointed out by the authors, 
there is not a statistical rule to determine the limits to consider an outcome as 
significant. 
                                                             
8 It should be noted that the number of bootstrap samples recommended has increased, as available 
computing power has increased, but related literature does not specify a strict rule on this matter, being 
that increasing the number of samples does not increase the amount of information in the original data, it 
can only reduce the effects of random sampling errors. Actually, bootstrap does not apply to small data 
sets where the original sample is not a good representation of the population. 
 - 58 - 
Therefore, the need for statistical significance tests for value variations of indices 
remained a problem. To fill this gap, Taplin (2003) provided formulae for the standard 
error of the H index and the C index9. The author argues that by presenting not only the 
value of the index itself but also its standard error the problem should be solved as the 
differences between index values can be judged as being either significantly different or 
explainable by sampling variation alone. Beside, Taplin (2003, p. 83) adds that this 
procedure “avoid the necessity to perform computer intensive bootstrapping such as 
those adopted by Cañibano and Mora (2000)”. However, the methodology proposed by 
Taplin (2003) did not have widespread acceptance in empirical research. One possible 
reason is precisely the potentially large number of calculations involved. For instance, 
considering a sample of 8 countries and 5 accounting methods, the number of terms for 
the calculation of the covariances could amount to 84 x 54, that is 2 560 000 (Taplin, 
2010, p. 95). 
Later, Taplin (2010) also provided the formula for the standard error of the T index he 
had created before (Taplin, 2004). In Cairns et al. (2011) (a research conducted by 
Cairns, Massoudi, Taplin, and Tarca), the T index was adopted to measure harmony, the 
standard errors were computed to provide an assessment of how accurately the T indices 
have been estimated, and p-values were computed to summarize the evidence of a 
change in harmony from one year to another, being that these p-values were estimated 
from 10 000 bootstrap samples. 
Meanwhile, regarding to statistical inference, other tools were adopted by, amongst 
others, Murphy (2000), Aisbitt (2001), and Pierce and Weetman (2002). 
Murphy (2000) applied the H index to measure harmony and the Spearman correlation 
coefficient to identify a trend. This statistic may be used to test for trend between a 
bivariate sample of (Xi,Yi) pairs. In Murphy’s (2000) study, Xi is the fiscal year-end 
and Yi is the H index. The hypothesis 1 was formulated as follows: “There is no 
association between the year and the level harmony, as measured by the H index, for the 
8-year period 1988-1995”. This hypothesis was tested using the Spearman correlation 
                                                             
9 In the same study, Taplin (2003) shows that while H and C indices are biased, the bias of the H index is 
negligible in moderate to large samples and the bias of the C index is negligible in moderate to large 
populations. 
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coefficient, being that the rejection of hypothesis 1 would imply that the level of 
harmony between firms has changed. An increasing trend would indicate that 
harmonization occurred. A decreasing trend would indicate disharmonization (i.e., 
movement toward total diversity). 
Aisbitt (2001) used Archer et al.’s (1995) decomposed C index to measure states of 
harmony and applied the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to evaluate whether the changes in 
states of harmony (index scores) were significant for a 8-year period. First, the test was 
conducted to evaluate changes in median values of the indices. Then, in order to explore 
the reasons behind the observed lack of harmonization, the author examined the changes 
in values of indices on an item-by-item basis. 
Pierce and Weetman (2002) used Archer et al.’s (1995) between-country C index and a 
“generalized non-disclosure adjusted” between-country C index in which non-disclosure 
is a mix of applicable and not-applicable cases. Tests of differences in means and 
medians were conducted using one-way ANOVA and Mann-Whitney tests. 
Additionally, in order to evaluate direction and progress of the harmonization process, 
ordinary least square regression is used to estimate the slope of the trend line of the 
levels of harmony (index scores) over a 8-year period. A positive slope would indicate 
that harmonization occurred, and a negative slope would indicate disharmonization. 
Actually, the use of regression analysis to evaluate harmonization trends was suggested 
earlier by van der Tas (1992b). However, its application has been rather limited since 
then, probably because vast majority of empirical studies examines harmony of 
accounting practices only in a single year or in two different points in time. Otherwise, 
the present investigation fully covers an eight-year period, what allows conducting 
regression analysis to test jointly trends on harmonization and differences in the level of 
harmony between the various groups of firms in the sample, as described in chapter 6. 
Next table summarizes the main contributions on the operationalization of the concept 
of de facto (material) accounting harmonization in related literature, as discussed in this 
chapter. 
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Table 3-3: Operationalization of the concept of de facto accounting harmonization 
Author (s)  Measurement of de facto accounting harmonization - main contributions
Van der Tas (1988) Introduction of the H, C, and I indices to quantify harmony.
Tay and Parker (1990, 1992) Discussion of the need for statistical tests, such as the chi-square test, to evaluate statisticalsignificance of value variations of indices.
Van der Tas (1992a,1992b) Discussion of the need for statistical test to evaluate value variations of indices. Suggestionof statistical significance tests or regression analysis to test movements on the C index.
Emenyonu and Gray (1992, 1996)
García Benau (1994)
Herrmann and Tommas (1995)
Parker and Morris (2001)
Ali (2006)
Use of chi-square test either as a measure of harmony or a statistical test of significance of
value variations of indices.
Herrmann and Thomas (1995) Proposal of a modified I index for more than two countries in order to reduce a flaw of the Iindex when some countries have no sampled firms using an accounting method.
Archer and McLeay (1995)
Introduction of a new formula for the I index for more than two countries that is an
analogue of the H index, although suffering from sensitivity to zero frequencies like the
generalization provided earlier by van der Tas (1988).
Archer, Delvaille and McLeay (1995)
Decomposition of the overall C index into a between-country C (BCC) index and a within-
country C (WCC) index to emphasize comparisons in different countries or in the same
country, respectively.
Archer, Delvaille and McLeay (1995)
Morris and Parker (1998)
Aisbitt (2001)
Pierce and Weetman (2000, 2002)
Discussion of possible treatments of non-disclosure when applying harmony indices.
Proposals of new indices or modifications of the existing indices to allow for non-
disclosure in an appropriate way.
Archer, Delvaille and McLeay (1996)
Use of a new methodology based on a hierarchy of nested statistical models to describe
accounting policy choices made by firms. Reconciliation of results with the indices of van
der Tas (1988) and Archer et al. (1995).
Emenyonu and Gray (1996)
Discussion of the I index sensitivity to zero frequencies suggesting not to compute the
index when the number of countries exceeds two and a zero frequency is observed for a
particular item.
Krisement (1997)
Critic of van der Tas’s (1988) C index sensitivity to the number of observations and to
Archer et al.’s (1995) C index due to the BCC and WCC components not sum to the total
value of the global C index. Use of the coefficient of entropy (CE) as the only
concentration index to be additively decomposable. Use of a combination of the CE and the
C index, where there are multiple reporting.
McLeay, Neal and Tollington (1999)
Jaafar and McLeay (2007)
Development of the methodology based on a hierarchy of nested statistical models
proposed earlier by Archer et al. (1996).
Lainez, Jarne and Callao (1999)
Critic of van der Tas’s (1988) C index due to its dependence on the number of observations
or on the number of accounting alternatives. Introduction of a modified C index, called CJL
index, for the purpose of eliminating the bias arising from its use when the number of
alternatives differs from the number of firms.
Cañibano and Mora (2000) Use of bootstrapping procedure to evaluate statistical significance of changes in states ofharmony (index scores) between two periods.
Murphy (2000) Use of Spearman correlation coefficient to identify the direction and progress (the trend) ofthe harmonization process for a 8-year period.
Aisbitt (2001) Use of Wilcoxon signed ranked test to evaluate whether the changes in states of harmony(index scores) were significant for a 8-year period.
Pierce and Weetman (2002)
Use of OLS regression to estimate the slope of the trend line of the levels of harmony (C
index scores) for a 8-year period, in order to evaluate direction and progress of the
harmonization process.
Taplin (2003) Deduction of the formulae for the bias and standard error of the H and C indices.
Taplin (2004)
Introduction of a new index, called the T index, which provided a unified approach to most
of previous indices, retaining their desirable properties and allowing to solve the flaws of
the C and I indices presented earlier.
Taplin (2010) Deduction of the formulae for the bias and standard error of the T index.
Taplin (2011) Definition of a new index, called the R index, in order to address formally internationalcomparability within the T index framework.  
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4. Theoretical background and previous empirical evidence on de facto 
accounting harmonization and environmental disclosure 
This chapter presents theoretical and empirical frameworks to examine de facto 
accounting harmonization in response to regulatory requirements or due to voluntary 
processes, and to identify the drivers of both mandatory and voluntary environmental 
disclosure. 
4.1. Theoretical background of de facto accounting harmonization 
The harmonization of financial reporting is a recurrent theme in literature since the mid 
60’s of last century, but it was the creation of the IASC, in 1973, and the adoption of the 
Fourth Directive, in 1978, that triggered a special interest to the study of topics such as 
the feasibility of international accounting harmonization (e.g., Nair and Frank, 1981; 
Evans and Taylor, 1982; van der Tas, 1988, 1992b; Doupnik and Taylor, 1985; 
Emenyonu and Gray, 1992; Emenyonu, 1993; Yang and Lee, 1994), or the underlying 
reasons of divergent accounting practices across countries (e.g., Choi and Mueller, 
1992; Belkaoui, 1995; Nobes and Parker, 1995; Nobes, 1998)1. 
Despite the progress in de jure (formal) harmonization, the diversity of practices 
persisted, and for two decades related literature identified a large number of possible 
explanations for those differences with no general theory linking the causes, as 
described by Nobes (1998, pp. 162-163). Authors such as Schweikart (1985) or 
Harrison and McKinnon (1986) provide some elements for a theoretical framework, 
without specifying which factors were the major explanatory variables for the diversity 
of international accounting practices. On this view, stranded on the cross-cultural work 
of Hofstede (1980, 1983), Gray (1988) developed hypotheses on the association 
between accounting sub-cultural values and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  
Gray (1988) posits that the accountants’ value systems are related to, and derived from, 
the particular societal values in each country, and identified four accounting value 
dimensions that can be used to define a country’s accounting sub-culture: 
(i) professionalism versus statutory control; (ii) uniformity versus conformity; 
                                                             
1 Refer to Ali (2005), and Baker and Barbu (2007) for a detailed review of literature on international 
accounting harmonization.  
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(iii) conservatism versus optimism; and (iv) secrecy versus transparency. According to 
Gray (1998, p. 12), the first two dimensions relate to authority and enforcement of 
accounting systems, and the last two dimensions regard to the measurement and 
disclosure practices, at country-level. 
Building on Hofstede-Gray framework, several authors (e.g., Eddie, 1990; Salter and 
Niswander, 1995; Gray and Vint, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Wingate, 1997; Jaggi and Low, 
2000; Hope, 2003) conducted empirical tests to prove its validity2, while others 
(e.g., Perera, 1989; Fechner and Kilgore, 1994; Baydoun and Willett, 1995), attempt to 
refine or to extend Gray’s (1988) model, presenting economic and cultural factors as 
mediators in the relationship between accounting sub-culture and accounting practice. 
In the same line, Doupnik and Salter (1995) synthesize the reasons identified in earlier 
literature as explanations for international accounting differences, and suggested a 
model with three interacting categories that determine national accounting practices: (i) 
cultural values (individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity); 
(ii) institutional structures (legal system, capital market, tax system, inflation, level of 
education, and level of economic development); and (iii) external environment. 
Later, after examining previous literature, Nobes (1998) proposes a two-way 
classification model using two key factors: (i) the strength of equity markets; and (ii) 
the degree of cultural dominance. The underlying assumption is that the major reason 
for international differences in financial reporting is different purposes for that reporting 
in each country. According to Nobes (1998), the purpose of reporting is determined by 
the financial system of the country, and disclosure items are determined by the relative 
importance of outsiders (financiers who do not belong to the board of directors and do 
not have a privileged relationship with the firm) compared with insiders, being that in 
countries where outsiders are important, there is a demand for more disclosure.  
The rationale is that, in countries with strong equity markets, national accounting 
systems are oriented to help investors predict future cash flows, and disclosure is, 
therefore, intended to meet the information needs of public ownership. In contrast, in 
credit based countries, where banks are the main fund providers, national accounting 
                                                             
2 Refer to Finch (2009) for a review of empirical research on Hofstede-Gray framework. 
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systems are oriented to protect creditors’ rights. Thus, the pressure for disclosure in 
these countries tends to be weaker than in countries with developed equity markets. 
In summary, Nobes’ (1998) model suggests that in culturally self-sufficient countries 
(with strong indigenous cultures) the predominant accounting system depends on the 
strength of the equity-outsider market, and in culturally dominated countries (with 
imported cultures), the accounting system is determined by the cultural influence. 
However, it should be noted that this analytical framework was not focused on the 
categorization of countries but it was intended on the distinction of reporting practices 
used by firms (accounting practice systems). According to Nobes (1998, p. 184), as a 
country might exhibit the use of several accounting systems in any one year or over 
time, “…it is accounting practice systems, not countries, that should be classified”. 
Notwithstanding, all the above mentioned models (Gray, 1988; Fechner and Kilgore, 
1994; Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Nobes, 1998) are designed in the light of contingency 
theory according to which the influence of cultural and institutional environments in 
which firms operate are decisive in determining their accounting disclosure practices3. 
Concurrently, literature on comparative law divided major legal systems in the world 
into two main types: Roman (code) law, and common law (e.g., David and Brierley, 
1985). Based on this distinction, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) established a connection 
between law and finance, demonstrating that the legal environment (encompassing legal 
rules and their enforcement) matters for the size and the extent of a country’s capital 
market. In this regard, the authors find a statistical association between strong equity 
markets and common law countries, suggesting that code law countries have both the 
weaker investor protection and the least developed capital markets, when compared to 
common law countries. 
Since then, building on the work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), empirical research 
provides strong evidence that country-level legal environment affects voluntary 
disclosure as well as other accounting choices (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Jaggi and Low, 
                                                             
3 The underlying notion, developed by Thomas (1991, pp. 40-41) as a contingency theory of corporate 
financial reporting systems, is that an enterprise is an open system that interacts with, adapts to and seeks 
to control its environment in order to survive, being the “management’s choice of corporate financial 
reporting practices (...) contingent upon the differing constraints on entities”. 
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2000; Hope, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Bushman and Piotroski, 
2006; La Porta et al., 2006; Webb et al., 2008). 
On this subject, Jaggi and Low (2000) notice that firms in code law countries tend to 
make fewer disclosures, while Bushman and Piotroski (2006) find that bad news are 
reported faster in countries with higher quality legal systems (common law countries). 
Overall, empirical research points out a relationship between better financial reporting 
and common law countries, suggesting that international differences in accounting 
practice are likely to subsist, despite the progressive convergence between IFRS and US 
GAAP or the compulsory use of IFRS for consolidated financial statements in EU 
countries, since 2005 (Nobes, 2006, 2008; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010). 
When synthetizing prior literature on international accounting harmonization, 
Rahman et al. (2002) outline accounting harmonization as a complex process, multi-
faceted, dealing with four elements: influences, process, output and outcome, as shown 
in figure 4-1. 
Figure 4-1: Determinants of international accounting harmonization 
 
PROCESS
Harmonization of 
accounting practice 
leading to harmony, 
i.e., similar accounting  
practices
REGULATORY INFLUENCES
Statutory
Stock exchange
Accounting  standards OUTPUT
Comparable accounting 
numbers arising from 
accounting harmony
OUTCOME
Better informed capital 
market decisions
OTHER INFLUENCES
Firm characteristics
Country characteristics
International factors
Leads to actual change
Leads to change in perception
Influences on market perceptions
of accounting numbers
 
Source: Adapted from Rahman et al. (2002, p. 49) 
Influences can be regulatory or not. Regulatory influences comprise harmonization of 
accounting regulations (statutory, stock exchange or accounting standards), while other 
influences comprehend firm characteristics, country characteristics, and international 
factors like trade, and investments agreements, international regulatory institutions, and 
colonial influences. The process refers to the accounting policies chosen by firms, the 
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output is the result, at one point in time, in terms of the level of accounting harmony, 
and the outcome, which is expected to be better informed capital markets decisions, is 
the consequence of accounting harmonization. The relationships between these four 
elements can flow in both directions, being that influences can affect practices but 
practices can also affect regulatory influences.  
Against this background, the present study contributes to a better understanding of the 
determinants of international accounting harmonization in two ways.  
The first is providing evidence on whether de jure (formal) harmonization leads to de 
facto (material) harmonization. The issuance of compulsory dispositions for firms 
linked to the Spanish allowances allocation plan is an opportunity research to evaluate 
the effect of regulatory influences over the harmony in disclosure practices (the output). 
The second consists in shedding some light on the assumption that the 
internationalization of firms may be a driver of voluntary harmonization (Cañibano and 
Mora, 2000; Khanna et al., 2004; Webb et al., 2008). On this regard, research design is 
meant to evaluate the effect of firm-specific characteristics, such as the level of 
exposure to international markets, over the harmony in disclosure practices (the output), 
especially in the context of no mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances. 
In view of Nobes’ (1998) assertion that harmonization is ultimately tied to firms’ 
accounting practice systems, the theories trying to explain firms’ disclosure decisions 
are also the underlying fundamentals to analyze de facto (material) disclosure harmony, 
as illustrated in the next figure. Therefore, this chapter proceeds with disclosure theories 
that, along with contingency theory, intend to explain corporate disclosure, focusing in 
particular the release of environmental information. 
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Figure 4-2: Determinants of disclosure decision and de facto disclosure harmony 
 
DISCLOSURE
DECISION
REGULATORY INFLUENCES
Statutory
Stock exchange
Accounting  standards
DISCLOSURE 
HARMONY
OTHER INFLUENCES
Firm characteristics
Country characteristics
International factors
ACCOUNTING  DISCLOSURE THEORIES
 
Source: Adapted from Rahman et al. (2002, p. 49), with author’s additions. 
 
4.2. Theoretical background of corporate disclosure  
Disclosure is a complex phenomenon that several theories attempt to explain4. In 
accordance to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), accounting disclosure can be 
regarded as a tool to reduce agency costs. In the same vein, positive accounting theory 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1990; Leftwich et al., 1981) state that contracting costs 
(consisting of agency costs as well as transaction costs, information costs, renegotiation 
costs, and bankruptcy costs) are crucial to explain accounting choice (and thus 
disclosure). 
Based on the assumption that economic agents are rational and will act in an 
opportunistic manner to maximize their wealth, positive accounting theory conceives 
the firm as a pool (nexus) of contracts that are necessary to get self-seeking individuals 
to agree to cooperate. Considering the contracting costs associated with these contracts, 
positive accounting theory holds that managers will opportunistically select 
                                                             
4 Refer to Healy and Palepu (2001) for a detailed review of the empirical disclosure literature. Refer to 
Mathews (1984, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004), Gray et al. (1995a), Berthelot et al. (2003), and Parker (2005) 
for detailed review of theoretical and empirical research on social and environmental disclosure. 
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measurement and disclosure policies that will lead to an increase in their welfare 
(opportunistic perspective), and assumes that firms’ accounting decisions are affected 
by the will to minimize contracting costs (efficiency perspective) (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Holthausen, 1990). 
Beside the contribution to reduce agency conflicts between contracting parts, positive 
accounting theory also envisages voluntary disclosure as a tool to manage political 
costs. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1990), high visibility firms face high 
political costs, and therefore are likely to disclose more information in order to avoid 
potential pressure from governmental regulatory bodies, to reduce the likelihood of 
adverse political actions by other pressure groups, and ultimately to mitigate expected 
political costs. 
Beyond the role of reducing agency conflicts or managing political costs, voluntary 
disclosure can also be understood as a way to send a particular information (sign) to the 
market. In the light of signaling theory (Spence, 1973; Ross, 1977; Morris, 1987), 
information asymmetry is the key factor to explain why managers in high-quality firms 
are motivated to voluntarily disclose private information. The rationale is that the 
withholding of private information leads external investors to interpret such absence as 
the existence of bad news (Grossman, 1981). So, managers are motivated to use 
disclosure as a tool to signal firm’s good performance, and to reduce information 
asymmetry.  
In the same vein, cost of capital theory states that managers have incentives to provide 
voluntary disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry between informed and 
non-informed market participants, and consequently reduce the firm’s cost of capital 
(Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982, 1991; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). 
Notwithstanding, despite the above mentioned potential benefits, disclosure can also 
harm firm’s competitive position. In the view of proprietary costs theory (Verrecchia, 
1983; Dye, 1985; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough, 1993) 
managers take into account not only the benefits of disclosure but also inherent costs, 
and do not disclose when costs outweigh the benefits. Disclosure costs include costs to 
prepare and disseminate the information, as well as the costs of appropriation of the 
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information by third parties to inflict charges upon the firm (proprietary costs). 
Overall, agency theory, positive accounting theory, and other approaches derived from 
economic theory, analyze financial reporting, in the light of information asymmetry and 
agency conflicts, as a strictly economic decision. Within this framework, corporate 
environmental disclosure can be understood as an outcome of management’s 
assessment of the costs and the benefits to be derived from additional disclosure, 
namely the benefits from a reduction in information asymmetry as well as in 
information gathering costs to be assumed by investors (information costs), and the 
costs resulting from disclosure of proprietary information (proprietary costs). 
Although environmental disclosure may be regarded on the basis of cost-benefit 
outcomes (Berthelot et al., 2003; Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Gray et al., 1995a), such 
framework is sometimes pointed to in related literature as a reductive vision of the 
environmental issues (Mathews, 1984; Arrington and Francis, 1989; Tinker and 
Okcabel, 1991; Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002; Milne, 2002; Cormier et al., 2005), 
because it is focused on agency problems between managers, shareholders, and 
creditors, while many of the users of environmental information (e.g., environmentalists 
and other pressure groups) are not confined to strict economic rationality. 
In a more comprehensive way, the approaches derived from social and political theories 
conceive environmental disclosure as a central component of the interchange between 
firms and society. In this area, the most common perspectives are: (i) the legitimacy 
theory (early theoretical contributions from, amongst other, Schocker and Sethi, 1974; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Hogner, 1982; Patten, 1992; Lindblom, 1994); (ii) the 
stakeholder theory (early theoretical contributions from, amongst other, Ansoff, 1965; 
Freeman, 1983; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Ullmann, 1985; Evan and Freeman, 1988; 
Clarkson, 1995; Roberts, 1992; Donaldson and Preston, 1995); and (iii) the institutional 
theory (early theoretical contributions from, amongst other,  Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). 
While agency theory and positive accounting theory give emphasis to the relations 
between managers and investors, disregarding other social actors, legitimacy, 
stakeholder and institutional approaches refer to a wider notion of the firm, relying on 
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the concept of social contract, according to which the access to resources and the 
survival of organizations are not automatically assured but they depend on the 
perception of a firm’s legitimacy. Conceiving the firm as a part of the social system, the 
legitimacy theory seeks to explain disclosure practices by reference to the values, 
standards, customs and attitudes of the majority of the society in which the firm is 
inserted. It is the exercise of activities consistent with social values that, ultimately, will 
ensure businesses’ survival. So, disclosure decisions can be understood as a firm’s 
strategy for gaining the acceptance and the approval of the society. From this point of 
view, environmental disclosure is envisaged as a way to communicate with the public 
and to convince the society that the firm is to match their expectations. Lindblom (1994) 
classifies legitimation strategies in four categories: 
1. Educate and inform the relevant publics about the significant changes that have 
occurred in firms’ performance and activities. 
2. Change the perceptions of the relevant publics with respect to the firm, without 
changing its actual behavior. 
3. Manipulate perception, diverting the attention of a particular problem to other 
related issues, using, for instance, emotive symbols. 
4. Change external expectations regarding firm’s performance. 
It should be noted that the purpose will be to obtain, maintain or strengthen legitimacy 
among the relevant publics and not necessarily among all agents. Likewise, the 
stakeholder theory also allows to stand that managers are encouraged to disseminate 
information aimed at particular groups of stakeholders (those who possess strongest 
influence), signaling, by this way, that they are to act in accordance with the interests 
and the expectations of those groups5. 
Actually, the stakeholder theory highlights the influence that not only shareholders and 
creditors, but also other groups (e.g., employees, consumers, suppliers, public 
authorities, non-governmental organizations) exert on disclosure decisions. With this in 
                                                             
5 There are several branches of stakeholder theory. Deegan (2002) identify two variants: ethical or 
normative; and managerial or positive. The first holds that all stakeholders have the right to be treated 
fairly by a company. The second explains corporate social and environmental disclosure as a way of 
managing the firm´s relationship with different stakeholders. In the present study, the managerial branch 
is the one under consideration. 
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mind, disclosure is an instrument to respond to the information needs of the various 
interested parties, and managers will tend to use it to manage or to handle the most 
powerful stakeholders6 in order to guarantee their support. 
In the light of the legitimacy and stakeholder theories, the interaction with the 
environment in ways considered legitimate is, therefore, a necessary condition for 
firms’ subsistence. This concept of organizational legitimacy is also present in the 
institutional theory (Deegan, 2002; Chen and Roberts, 2010). The process through 
which an organization fits the expectations of the environment can be analyzed, in the 
light of institutional theory, through the notion of institutional isomorphism in its three 
sorts: coercive; mimetic and normative (Deegan, 2002; Baker and Barbu, 2007). From 
this perspective, institutional pressure influences the intensity with which sustainable 
development and disclosure practices spread between firms (Jennings and Zandbergen, 
1995; Neu et al., 1998; Baker and Barbu, 2007). 
The legitimacy theory became the most widely used in empirical studies on voluntary 
environmental disclosure (Deegan, 2002). But it is also common the articulation with 
stakeholder and institutional theories, given the degree of complementarity and the 
overlap that exists between these three approaches (Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002; 
O’Donovan, 2002; Cormier et al., 2005; Parker, 2005; Chen and Roberts, 2010; 
Eugénio, 2010).  
Consistent with prior literature, a multi-theoretical framework is adopted in the present 
investigation to address research questions. In this regard, Deegan (2002) notes that 
approaches derived from social and political theories are not dissenting and the minor 
differences that characterize them are useful to shed more light on some aspects of 
environmental reporting that otherwise could stay less clear. In the same line, Chen and 
Roberts (2010) argue that it is possible to reach compatible interpretations from 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory and the selection and 
application of these theories depends on the focus of the study. In a broader sense, 
authors like Cormier et al. (2005) state that disclosure decision can be analyzed through 
                                                             
6 Terms such as relevant publics, constituents, social actors and conferring publics can be found in 
related literature to describe the groups of stakeholders with the ability to confer or to withdraw 
legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002). 
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a multi-tiered conceptual background in which disclosure is an outcome from 
management’s assessment of economic incentives, public pressures, and institutional 
constraints and processes7.  
In general, the currents that are based on the concept of organizational legitimacy seem 
particularly suited to explain voluntary environmental disclosure. However, they do not 
appear robust to deal with the withholding of mandatory disclosure by managers. 
Actually, the theories assuming that firms are motivated by legitimacy-seeking 
behaviors can explain why firms are compelled to respond to institutional pressure and 
want to be seen as conforming to the rules, but do not provide plausible arguments to 
explain non-compliance (Adams et al., 1995, p. 104).  
For analyzing disclosure practices in regulated contexts, it appears more consistent the 
approach proposed by Oliver (1991), and adopted by, amongst others, Neu et al. (1998) 
and Criado-Jiménez et al. (2008). This is a refinement of the institutional theory that 
integrates in the analysis the possibility for firms to adopt distinct strategies in response 
to institutional processes (acquiesce, compromise, avoid, manipulate, defy), ranging 
from the obedience to the rules till the non-compliance with them. In the present 
investigation, the issuance of compulsory dispositions for firms linked to the Spanish 
allowances allocation plan, gives rise to an opportunity research to use an impression 
management perspective to analyze firms’ strategic responses, and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of enforced regulations. 
Finally, because firms do not operate in a vacuum, international differences in the ways 
in which organizations pursue and communicate their corporate social responsibilities 
are contextualized in the light of their institutional environment in home-country by, 
amongst others, Aguilera and Jackson (2003), Midttun et al. (2006), Deeg and Jackson 
(2007), Matten and Moon (2008), Jackson and Apostolakou (2010), Carnevale et al. 
(2012), and Faisal et al. (2012). To this end, national political economies are generally 
compared by referring to the ways in which firms solve their coordination problems, 
both internally, with employees, and externally, with a wide range of actors.  
                                                             
7 Concurrently, as described by Doh and Guay (2006, p. 56), some efforts have been made to integrate 
principles of stakeholder and agency perspectives on management (Hill and Jones, 1992), and to 
operationalize stakeholder concepts so that they have instrumental value (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Jones, 1995). 
 - 72 - 
The strands of corporate social responsibility research that seek to explain why 
corporate behavior varies across nations, often distinguish between two main types of 
national business systems (varieties of capitalism approach): (i) liberal market 
economies (LME) characterized by equity financing, dispersed ownership, active 
markets for corporate control, weak inter-firm cooperation, and flexible labor markets 
(e.g., US or UK); and (ii) coordinated market economies (CME) characterized by long-
term debt finance, ownership by large block-holders, weak markets for corporate 
control, strong inter-firm cooperation and rather rigid labor markets (e.g., Continental 
Europe or Japan). Hall and Soskice (2001) identify a third group of nations (including 
Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece) that are known as “Mediterranean” or “mixed” 
market economies (MME), because they show a more ambiguous position combining 
features of the two preceding groups (Hall and Gingerich, 2004). 
More recently, when analyzing political economy of corporate social responsibility in 
Western Europe, Midttun et al. (2006) recognize four distinct models: Anglo-Saxon; 
Mediterranean; Central European; and Nordic. According to Midttun et al. (2006, 
pp. 373-375), the Nordic countries are the most advanced welfare states, and the most 
“socially embedded socio-political models”, while the Anglo-Saxon countries are “polar 
opposites, scoring relatively low on most dimensions of social embeddedness of the 
economy”. Between those two extremes lie the Continental and the Mediterranean 
models.  
There is great acceptance that domestic business systems are likely to affect firms’ 
strategic choices, namely due to the different patterns of stakeholder involvement in 
corporate decision making. However, there is no general consensus on their overall 
effect on corporate behavior (Campbell, 2007; Matten and Moon, 2008; Jackson and 
Apostolakou, 2010).  
Campbell (2007) argues that firms are more likely to behave in socially responsible 
ways when they are engaged in institutionalized dialogue with stakeholders, which is 
more likely to occur in CME. Nevertheless, the stronger institutionalized patterns of 
stakeholder involvement in these countries may also lead to a smaller need for firms to 
communicate their environmental practices (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). On the 
other hand, in LME where stakeholder involvement is not strongly established, the 
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absence of institutionalized stakeholder participation may induce firms to communicate 
more about their activities. That is to say, where regulations are minimal, greater 
pressure may come from stakeholders towards the development of responsible 
environmental practices at firm-level, and firms have a chance to differentiate 
themselves from their competitors communicating more about their environmental 
initiatives. Hence, in LME disclosure may act largely as a substitute for more 
institutionalized patterns of stakeholder involvement (Matten and Moon, 2008; Jackson 
and Apostolakou, 2010). 
It is beyond the scope of this study to fully investigate patterns of disclosure across the 
different types of business systems. However, considering that national business 
systems are likely to affect firms’ strategic choices, namely in the ways in which they 
communicate with stakeholders (Midttun et al., 2006; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011; 
Carnevale et al., 2012; Faisal et al., 2012), the influence of institutional environment in 
firms’ home-country will be incorporated in the analysis when examining diversity of 
disclosure practices at EU-15 level. 
Figure 4-3 summarizes theoretical background for corporate accounting disclosure, as 
described in this section. It should be noted that this is a partial and simplified 
representation, as it depicts only the theoretical strands that are relevant for the present 
investigation, and ignores the above mentioned overlap between several branches. 
This study proceeds with the review of prior evidence to support the formulation of 
research questions, addressing, in particular, investigation focused on environmental 
disclosure, and highlighting how the general theoretical framework presented above has 
been applied to empirical research in this area. Next section comprehends a discussion 
on disclosure practices and de facto (material) accounting harmony under mandatory 
guidance. Then, section 4-4 addresses disclosure practices and de facto (material) 
accounting harmony due to voluntary processes, focusing in particular the cases of firms 
acting internationally, and firms pertaining to industries with high environmental impact 
(environmentally sensitive). 
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Figure 4-3: Synthesis of theoretical background for corporate disclosure 
ECONOMICS-BASED THEORIES
Corporate behavior focused on wealth maximization
Disclosure as a strictly economic decision
SOCIO-POLITICAL THEORIES
Corporate behavior based on the concept of  social contract
Disclosure as a tool to gain the approval of the society
Agency theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To reduce agency costs
Positive accounting theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To reduce contracting costs and political costs
Signaling theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To transmit signals to the market
Proprietary costs theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To disclose only when benefits outweigh the costs 
to prepare and disseminate the information as well 
as the proprietary costs it contains
Cost of capital theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To reduce information asymmetry and, hence, 
firm´s cost of capital
Strategic legitimacy Institutional legitimacy
Stakeholder theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To obtain approval from
powerful stakeholders 
Institutional theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To conform to regulations or to 
the established patterns of 
other similar social institutions
Legitimacy theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To meet social expectations and gain social acceptance
New institutional theory
Rationale of disclosure:
To respond strategically to 
institutional processes 
Instrumental theory of stakeholder management
Rationale of disclosure: As an ethical behavior that 
can result in significant competitive advantage
Comparative approach
Varieties of capitalism
Rationale of disclosure: 
To mirror or to substitute 
institutionalized forms of 
stakeholders 
participation, depending 
on the national 
institutional environment  
Note: The dotted lines indicate that there are other theoretical branches. 
Source: Gray et al. (1996, p. 49), Chen and Roberts (2010, p. 653), with author’s additions. 
 
4.3. Previous empirical evidence on disclosure and de facto accounting harmony 
under mandatory guidance 
Level of disclosure under mandatory guidance 
Whenever the distinction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure is not set out 
clearly or depends upon the assessment of materiality, management may use discretion 
when determining what information represents a mandatory disclosure, as described by, 
amongst others, Barth et al. (1997), Heitzman et al. (2010), and Lo (2010). 
Nevertheless, limited attention has been given in empirical research to analyze 
management decisions when facing mandatory disclosure regimes.  
Many of the prior literature generally assume that firms select the extent of voluntary 
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disclosure, but do not exercise discretion when facing mandatory guidelines. The 
underlying assumption is that firms will adjust their practices to comply. However, 
despite the greater likelihood of opportunistic behavior under voluntary than under 
mandatory disclosure, even mandatory rules do not prevent strategic withhold of 
environmental information (Barth et al., 1997; Larrinaga et al., 2002; Mobus, 2005; 
Frost, 2007; Llena et al., 2007; Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Peters and Romi, 2013).  
When analyzing the impact of regulatory framework on management commentary 
reports, Seah and Tarca (2006) notice that, in accordance with Verrecchia’s (1991) 
model, under a mandatory regime, both the costs and the benefits of disclosure 
potentially increase, changing the equilibrium point and expanding the level of a firm’s 
disclosure. Notwithstanding, when examining economic consequences of mandatory 
IFRS adoption in the UK, Christensen et al. (2007) remark that the harmonization of 
standards does not affect all firms in a uniform way, and the response to mandatory 
rules varies across firms being conditional on the perceived benefit.  
With regard to the disclosure of mandatory environmental information, apart from the 
works of Freedman and Stagliano (1995), Barth et al. (1997), and Bebbington (1999), 
empirical research is lacking until the 90’s of last century partially due to the 
generalized absence of specific regulation on this field.  
Table 4-1 summarizes prior empirical evidence on the association between mandatory 
guidance and level of disclosure concerning environmental information. Amongst early 
contributions, it is worth noting the study conducted by Barth et al. (1997) concerning 
the case of electric utility (as an environmentally sensitive and regulated industry). 
According to Verrecchia’s (1991) model, firms with greater potential benefits from 
disclosure tend to disclose more. With this in mind, Bart et al. (1997) hold that, all else 
equal, to the extent that utility firms can pass their environmental costs on to consumers, 
they achieve greater benefits from disclosure than other firms. Additionally, the authors 
argue that it is also plausible that utilities face lower costs associated with revealing 
information to competitors, than firms within other sectors. Actually, when analyzing 
factors influencing firm’s decisions to disclose mandatory information about 
environmental liabilities, for a sample of 257 US firms, from 1989 to 1993, findings 
confirm this hypothesis, and Barth et al. (1997, p. 60) conclude with an important 
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implication to the present research: all else equal, “...utilities will disclose more about 
their environmental liabilities (than other firms) because they ultimately pass these costs 
on to consumers through higher rates”. 
Table 4-1: Previous empirical evidence on the association between mandatory guidance 
and level of mandatory environmental disclosure 
Positive association between mandatory guidance and level of mandatory environmental disclosure 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Barth et al. (1997) 257 US firms 1989-1993 
 Bebbington (1999) 550 Danish firms 1999 
 Larrinaga et al. (2002) 70 Spanish firms 1997-1999 
 Frost (2007) 71 Australian firms 1997-2000 
 Llena et al. (2007) 51 Spanish firms 1992/4|2001/2 
 Seah and Tarca (2006) 174 firms from Australia, Canada, UK, US 2003 
 Criado-Jiménez et al. (2008) 78 Spanish firms 2001-2003 
 Acerete et al. (2011) 21 Spanish firms 1997-2000 
 Barbu et al. (2014) 114 firms from France, Germany, UK 2007 
Not proven Fallan and Fallan (2009) 822 annual reports of firms listed in Oslo 
Stock Exchange | 34 to 60 firms per year 
1987-2005 
 Peters and Romi (2013) 300 US firms 1996-2005 
Not proven: mixed results, contrary signal or not statistically significant association (p>0,05). 
Later, when testing the effectiveness of a standard which requires all the Spanish firms 
to include environmental disclosures in their financial statements8, Larrinaga et al. 
(2002) find that, despite an increase of environmental disclosures in the notes to the 
annual accounts, heterogeneity persists both in terms of quantity and quality of 
information. On this view, Larrinaga et al. (2002) conclude that the compliance level 
was low and the firms who were reporting some environmental information neglect 
those aspects of the regulation that were not in their interest to reveal. The authors point 
out that these results do not support the arguments in favor of compulsory standards as a 
factor of increasing bad news in the annual reports (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). 
Moreover, grounded on Owen et al.’s (1997) theoretical distinction between 
administrative and institutional reforms, Larrinaga et al. (2002) conclude that the 
Spanish standard on environmental disclosure was not enough to enable new 
accountability relationships and to empower stakeholders. 
                                                             
8 In Spain, the first regulation concerning environmental mandatory disclosure in the annual accounts was 
issued in March of 1998 through the adapted Plan General de Contabilidad for electric utilities (RD 
437/98). In the same year, similar dispositions were issued for a number of economic sectors such as 
water supply, sewage industry and road transport facilities. In 2000, the Ministry of Justice issues some 
forms of financial statements including environmental disclosure requirements intended for all Spanish 
firms. In 2002, following the Recommendation EC (2001), the ICAC issued a specific standard, the 2002 
ICAC Resolution (ICAC, 2002), extending the requirement for disclosing environmental accounting 
information in financial statements to all Spanish firms. 
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Following the Recommendation EC (2001), the Spanish accounting standard-setting 
body issued a new standard (ICAC, 2002), extending the requirement for disclosing 
environmental information in the annual accounts to all Spanish firms. When evaluating 
disclosure by 51 large firms operating in Spain, Llena et al. (2007) conclude that for the 
first year in which the new environmental accounting standard was in force (2002), a 
significant increase of environmental disclosures in the notes to the annual accounts 
occurred. However, heterogeneity in both the level and the quality of disclosure 
persisted. In particular, Llena et al. (2007) point out that mandatory disclosure in the 
annual accounts seems biased towards more good news (expenses and investments) 
rather than bad news (provisions and contingencies). Later, when evaluating 
environmental disclosure in the annual accounts of Spanish toll motorway 
concessionaires, from 1999 to 2007, Acerete et al. (2011) find low levels of disclosure 
and compliance among sample firms, and as a result the authors conclude that sample 
firms had adopted environmental reporting regulations merely as an administrative 
reform.  
Also, a survey of the extent of compliance with the revised standard (ICAC, 2002) was 
carried by Criado-Jiménez et al. (2008). The results suggest that progressive and 
improved regulation enhance the level and the quality of environmental disclosure, 
namely on bad news. But the study also shows the persistence of a significant level of 
non-compliance from 2001 to 2003. Criado-Jiménez et al. (2008) conclude that 
disclosure was used to manage the public impression of the environmental performance 
of the firm, namely reporting good news rather than bad news, disclosing ritual 
information, and selecting the information to be disclosed in each reporting media. In 
the same line, when examining if decisions regarding mandatory disclosure are made 
strategically, Alexander et al. (2011) conclude that firms are less likely to disclose when 
the event represents bad news. Overall, evidence seems consistent with the hypothesis 
of strategic non-compliance to mandatory requirements, when disclosures would 
include negative news and the expected costs of subsequent detection are low. 
Notwithstanding, in the light of the impression management approach, Criado-Jiménez 
et al. (2008) posit that concealment strategies confirm the strength of regulation rather 
than its weakness, because, in response to more strict regulation, firms cannot simply 
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dismiss the norm. On the contrary, they are compelled to accept it, although 
symbolically. The authors point out that concealing non-compliance is not the same as 
acquiescence, but it also differs from dismissal and, in that sense, such strategy can be 
used by firms to attain legitimacy, although denying to stakeholders some of the 
information that the standard intended to assure. According to Criado-Jiménez et al. 
(2008) further regulation is likely to attract the attention of more powerful stakeholders, 
and therefore is a potential driver of more effective environmental disclosure.  
Likewise, authors such as Gray et al. (2006), Deegan and Rankin (1996, 1997), Owen et 
al. (1997), Freedman and Jaggi (2005, 2011), Frost (2007), and Peters and Romi (2013) 
are in favor of mandatory guidance establishing strict environmental disclosure 
requirements. The rationale is that when standards are poorly designed, and the 
expectations as to its enforcement are low, empirical evidence confirms that a dismissal 
strategy is likely to occur. On this view, when analyzing the impact of the introduction, 
in 1998, of mandatory environmental reporting guidelines in Australia, Frost (2007) 
notice that, although there was a significant increase in disclosure, the variation both in 
the presentation, and in the extent of information, suggests considerable differences 
regarding management interpretation of the standard. Also, when examining firms’ 
adherence to US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated disclosures of 
environmental sanctions, from 1996 to 2005, Peters and Romi (2013) find prevalence of 
non-compliance and remark that simply creating additional reporting regulation will not 
necessarily lead to real change in disclosure, unless such requirements are either clearly 
monitored or delineated to remove management discretion.  
In Portugal, the first accounting standard on environmental matters (DC 29 
Environmental Matters) was issued following the Recommendation EC (2001). Da 
Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán (2010) examine the influence of this new Portuguese 
standard, considering a sample of large firms, from 2002 to 2004. Since in this period it 
was still not in force9, the aim of the research was to evaluate the impact of its approval 
on the firms’ decision to voluntarily disclose environmental information in their annual 
                                                             
9 This accounting standard (DC 29 Environmental Matters, superseded by NCRF 26), establishing the 
obligation for Portuguese firms to disclose environmental information in their annual accounts and 
regulating the information to be included their annual reports, was issued in 2002 but, actually, it only 
came into force in 2006. 
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reports, by comparing levels of disclosure prior to, and immediately after, its issuance. 
Findings indicate that, despite the low level of disclosure from 2002 to 2004, the extent 
of environmental information has increased, as well as the number of firms making such 
releases. Da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán (2010) assume that this change in 
disclosure behavior, between 2002 and 2004, illustrates that the coming standard was 
starting to have an impact, even before entering into force, which is in line with Criado-
Jiménez et al.’s (2008) assertion that further regulation is a potential driver of 
disclosure, namely because it is likely to attract the attention of powerful stakeholders. 
In contrast, when exploring the development of environmental disclosure during periods 
of voluntarism and during periods with changed statutory requirements in Norwegian 
firms, from 1987 to 2005, Fallan and Fallan (2009) conclude that enforced regulations 
have merely a significant immediate effect on mandatory disclosure, but ultimately 
firms do not fully comply with such requirements. On view of this, the authors argue 
that no statutory regulations are needed to make firms increase and adapt their 
environmental disclosure to the demands from their stakeholders, and to legitimate their 
existence towards society. Nonetheless, Fallan and Fallan (2009) also admit that those 
authors who support mandatory guidance may claim that, at least, a minimum of 
comparable information is more likely to be ensured by regulations.  
At EU level, when analyzing environmental mandatory disclosures by firms complying 
with IFRS, for a sample of 114 French, German, and UK firms included in the Stoxx 
600, Barbu et al. (2014) point out that environmental disclosures imposed by IFRS 
increase with firm size, just like voluntary environmental disclosures. Furthermore, 
Barbu et al. (2014) notice that the level of compliance varies across countries, 
suggesting that the level of environmental information in the annual reports increases 
with the intensity of the environmental disclosure constraints in the country where the 
firm is located. In view of this, Barbu et al. (2014) assume that application of IFRS is 
affected by the reporting practices that prevailed in firms’ home-country prior to IFRS 
adoption. Overall, these outcomes are in line with Nobes (2006, 2008), and Kvaal and 
Nobes (2010) suggesting that national accounting patterns are likely to continue 
influencing financial reporting behavior under IFRS, namely due to differences in 
national guidance and legal systems. 
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De facto accounting harmony under mandatory guidance 
With regard to de facto (material) disclosure harmony, literature dealing with the impact 
of firm-specific characteristics on corporate mandatory disclosure is scarce10. On this 
subject, it is worth noting a study conducted by Rahman et al. (2002) for a sample of 
146 Australian and New Zealand listed firms, in 1993, examining measurement criteria 
and disclosure practices concerning mandatory as well as non-mandatory items, in the 
annual accounts. 
Based on accounting disclosure literature, Rahman et al. (2002) predict that firms larger 
in size and with high levels of decentralization are more likely to have greater need to 
use a variety of accounting policies and to release additional information. Therefore, the 
authors hypothesized higher diversity of disclosure among larger firms. On the contrary, 
regarding leverage and ownership concentration, a positive sign was predicted for the 
association with disclosure practice harmony. Additionally, Rahman et al. (2002) 
predict that disclosure practice harmony is not independent of industry.  
As expected, results show that the association between disclosure practice harmony and 
firm-specific characteristics is more frequent for voluntary than for mandatory 
disclosure. With respect to voluntary disclosure categories, almost all outcomes confirm 
predictions (the single exception is the connection between leverage and disclosure 
practice harmony where a non-significant wrong signal association was found). 
Differently, as regards to mandatory disclosure categories, Rahman et al. (2002) only 
find evidence that disclosure practice harmony is not independent from industry 
affiliation or the level of decentralization within the firm, being that the other results 
concerning mandatory information do not corroborate the authors’ predictions. 
Building on prior investigation, the present study intends to evaluate the “disciplinarian 
effect” of mandatory guidance over the harmony in, and the level of carbon financial 
disclosure among EU-15 firms. 
 
 
                                                             
10 Refer to Ali (2005) for a review of empirical research on international accounting harmonization. 
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4.4. Previous empirical evidence on disclosure and de facto accounting harmony 
due to voluntary processes 
The increasing extent of corporate voluntary environmental disclosure in the last 
decades is well documented in prior research11, and in line with disclosure theories, 
findings indicate that firms with different characteristics are likely to adopt different 
disclosure strategies. 
In general, both within-country and cross-country studies indicate that the level of 
voluntary environmental disclosure is significantly associated with firm-specific 
characteristics such as size, industry type, listing status, international activity, 
ownership structure, profitability, and financial leverage. However, only size and 
affiliation in industries with high environmental impact are consistently reported as 
being positively associated with the level of voluntary environmental disclosure. With 
regard to other firm characteristics, findings are mixed as discussed in sections 4.4.1. to 
4.4.5. 
4.4.1. Firm size 
Firm size and level of voluntary disclosure 
Generally, prior research reports a direct relationship between firm’s size and the level 
of voluntary environmental disclosure (refer to Table 4-2), and a number of theoretical 
arguments have been settled in support of this evidence (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 
pp. 250-251). However, it is not absolutely clear what the size variable really measures, 
as results might well correspond to an aggregate effect of diverse firm-specific features 
correlated with dimension. As advanced by Ball and Foster (1982, p. 191) firm size 
cannot be regarded as an independent firm-specific characteristic because it could be 
“…used to proxy for many (apparently) different and competing constructs…” such as 
competitive advantages, economics of scale in information production, management 
ability and advice, wider ownership base, political costs, media attention, analysts 
coverage, or public visibility. 
                                                             
11 Refer to Mathews (1984, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004), Gray et al. (1995a), Berthelot et al. (2003), and 
Parker (2005) for detailed review of theoretical and empirical research on social and environmental 
disclosure. 
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Table 4-2: Previous empirical evidence on the association between size and level of 
voluntary environmental disclosure 
Positive association between firm’s size and level of voluntary environmental disclosure (VED) 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Ness and Mirza (1991) 131 UK firms 1984 
 Patten (1991) 128 US firms 1985 
 Patten (1992) 21 US firms 1989 
 Deegan and Gordon (1996) 197 Australian firms 1980-1991 
 Hackston and Milne (1996) 47 New Zealand firms 1992 
 Moneva and Llena (1996) 47 Spanish firms 1992 
 Adams et al. (1998) 150 firms from 6 European countries 1992 
 Neu et al. (1998) 330 Canadian firms 1982-1991 
 Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999) 95 UK firms 1996 
 Cormier and Magnan (1999) 33 Canadian firms 1986-1993 
 Alnajjar (2000) 500 US firms 1990 
 Bewley and Li (2000) 188 Canadian firms 1993 
 Archel and Lizarraga (2001) 56 Spanish firms 1995-1998 
 Cormier and Gordon (2001) 3 Canadian electric utility firms 1985-1996 
 Gray et al. (2001) 100 UK firms 1988-1995 
 Patten (2002) 131 US firms 1990 
 Archel (2003) 68 Spanish firms 1994-1998 
 Bichta (2003) 2 Greek firms Nov97-Feb98 
 Cormier and Magnan (2003) 50 French firms 1992-1997 
 García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) 112 Spanish firms 1991-1995 
 Elijido-Ten (2004) 40 Malaysian firms 1999-2001 
 Cormier et al. (2005) 76 German firms 1992-1998 
 Freedman and Jaggi (2005) 120 firms from Europe, America, Asia 2000-2002 
 Gao et al. (2005) 33 Hong Kong listed firms 1993-1997 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Boesso and Kumar (2007) 72 Italian and US firms 2002 
 Van Staden and Hooks (2007) 32 New Zealand firms 2003 
 Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 43 Portuguese firms AR03/Web04 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Haddock-Fraser and Fraser (2008) 166 UK firms 2005 
 Stanny and Eli (2008) US S&P 500 firms 2007 
 Reid and Toffel (2009) 524 US firms 2006-2007 
 Reverte (2009) 46 Spanish firms 2005-2006 
 Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) 274 firms from 16 European countries 2007 
 Da Silva M. and Aibar-G. (2010) 109 Portuguese firms 2002-2004 
 Freedman and Jaggi (2011) 510 firms from EU, America, Asia 2006 
 Mahadeo et al. (2011) 165 firms from Mauritius Island 2004-2007 
 Rupley et al. (2012) 127 US  firms 2000-2005 
 Salama et al. (2012) 169 US firms 1999 
 Setyorini and Ishak (2012) 183 Indonesian listed firms 2005-2009 
 Choi et al. (2013) 100 Australian firms 2006-2008 
 Stanny (2013) US S&P 500 firms 2006-2008 
Not proven Cowen et al. (1987) US Fortune 500 firms 1978 
 Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) 23 US firms 1973 
 Roberts (1992) 130 US firms 1981-1986 
 Faisal et al. (2012) 125 firms from 24 countries 2009 
Not proven: mixed results, contrary signal or not statistically significant association (p>0,05). 
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Most of previous studies looks at disclosure in a single country context (refer to Table 
4-2), being that some of them (Stanny and Eli, 2008; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Choi et al., 
2013; Stanny, 2013) address voluntary disclosure related to carbon emissions. In 
general, findings are consistent with existing literature on voluntary disclosure 
suggesting that firms with higher visibility and subject to more scrutiny and public 
pressure due to their size tend to provide additional information. 
With regard to multi-country studies dealing with voluntary environmental disclosure 
and firms’ size, it is worth noting the work of Adams et al. (1998) by its scope. Unlike 
most of the studies at that time, rather than looking at the disclosures made by firms in a 
single nation, it covers firms domiciled in six European countries (France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), allowing to evaluate the impact of country of 
domicile on the environmental disclosure decision. On the basis of the 1992 annual 
reports from 150 European firms, the authors conclude that, although the amount and 
the nature of information disclosed vary significantly across Europe, large firms are 
significantly more likely to disclose all types of corporate social information than small 
ones, in each and every one of the six countries under review.  
Since the work of Adams et al. (1998) some multi-country studies have been conducted 
on this subject (e.g., Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; 
Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010; Faisal et al., 2012). Generally, evidence suggests a 
positive association between firm’s size and level of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. However, when examining disclosure practices in a global context for a 
sample of 2009 sustainability reports from 125 firms belonging to 24 countries (of 
which 14 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), Faisal et al. 
(2012) do not find a statistically significant relationship with size. The authors offer no 
particular explanation for this dissenting result, although remarking some differences 
between their findings and past literature, namely by reporting that, when compared 
with firms domiciled in Anglo-Saxon countries, large global firms from emerging 
markets communicate higher, not lower, levels of sustainability data.  
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Firm size and de facto accounting harmony of voluntary disclosure 
While literature dealing with the impact of firm-specific characteristics on the level of 
voluntary disclosure is substantial, research on their implications for comparability of 
firms’ accounts is scarce, as described by Ali (2005, 2006). When examining 
accounting practice harmony and firm characteristics, for a sample of 146 Australian 
and New Zealand firms, in 1993, Rahman et al. (2002) find strong evidence that de 
facto (material) accounting disclosure harmony is associated with firm characteristics, 
especially when the harmony of regulations (de jure) is weak or when there is no 
enforced guidance. 
In particular, Rahman et al. (2002) predict a negative association between firms’ size 
and disclosure practice harmony (measured by the Jaccard coefficient). Based on 
accounting disclosure literature, the authors argue that large firms have a greater need 
for using a variety of accounting policies and are more likely to disclose additional 
information. Therefore, Rahman et al. (2002) assume higher variability of accounting 
disclosure practices among large firms, than among small ones, and their findings do 
confirm a significant negative association between size and harmony of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual accounts. 
Later, to evaluate international accounting harmonization, taking into consideration 
firm-specific characteristics, firm’s operating circumstances, and country of domicile, 
Jaafar and McLeay (2007) examine harmony of accounting policy choice for a sample 
of 706 European firms from 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK). The annual 
reports for the years 1991, 1995 and 1999 were analyzed concerning three items: 
inventory costing, goodwill, and depreciation of fixed assets. Based on a hierarchy of 
nested linear logistic models, Jaafar and McLeay (2007) conclude that, despite the 
weight of country differences, size is significant in explaining accounting policy choice 
for each one of the three selected items, in all the EU-13 Member States. Consequently, 
their findings suggest that large firms’ choices differ from those of the smaller firms. 
However, Jaafar and McLeay’s (2007) research design do not allow further conclusions 
about the relative level of harmony within each group of firms. 
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4.4.2. Industry affiliation 
Industry affiliation and level of voluntary disclosure 
Together with size, industry is the most common variable in order to explain levels of 
voluntary environmental disclosure, either in single-country or multi-country contexts.  
In this respect, when explaining the disclosure of social and environmental information 
in the annual reports of UK firms, Gray et al. (2001, p. 348) argue that a model for 
satisfactory prediction of the level of voluntary disclosure will necessarily require an 
“industry-related corporate characteristic” as an explanatory variable.  
With regard to cross-country evidence, when analyzing factors influencing corporate 
environmental and social disclosures in four European countries (Finland, Norway, 
Spain and Sweden), Halme and Huse (1997) conclude that industry appears to be the 
most important factor in explaining environmental disclosure in annual reports. In the 
same vein, when identifying factors influencing corporate environmental and social 
disclosures in six European countries (France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK), Adams et al. (1998, p. 2) underline the impact of firm-specific 
characteristics such as industry affiliation by stating that with “... increasing 
globalization of business and international harmonization of accounting standards, 
country- and culture-specific factors may weigh less than corporate- and industry-
specific factors”. 
Later, when analyzing the web sites of the 200 largest multinational firms, in 2002, Jose 
and Lee (2007) conclude that firms in industries that have a large environmental 
footprint provide more environmental disclosures, than firms in less pollutant industries. 
More recently, when investigating the institutional determinants of corporate 
environmental and social disclosures in sixteen European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), Jackson and Apostolakou (2010, p. 387) 
identify a “very strong and robust influence of sectoral-level factors” in explaining 
environmental disclosure practices. 
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Table 4-3: Previous empirical evidence on the association between industry affiliation and 
level of voluntary environmental disclosure 
Positive association between affiliation in high environmental impact industries and level of VED 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Cowen et al. (1987) US Fortune 500 firms 1978 
 Ness and Mirza (1991) 131 UK Firms 1984 
 Hackston and Milne (1996) 47 New Zealand firms 1992 
 Patten (1991) 128 US firms 1985 
 Patten (1992) 21 US firms 1989 
 Roberts (1992) 130 US firms 1981-1986 
 Gamble et al. (1995) 234 US firms 1986-1991 
 Niskala and Pretes (1995) 75 Finnish firms 1987-1992 
 Deegan and Gordon (1996) 197 Australian firms 1980-1991 
 Gamble et al. (1996) 276 firms from 27 countries 1989-1991 
 Hackston and Milne (1996) 47 New Zealand firms 1992 
 Moneva and Llena, (1996) 47 Spanish firms 1992 
 Li et al. (1997) 49 Canadian firms 1982-1992 
 Halme and Huse (1997) 140 firms from 4 European countries 1992 
 Adams et al. (1998) 150 firms from 6 European countries 1992 
 Neu et al. (1998) 330 Canadian firms 1982-1991 
 Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999) 95 UK firms 1996 
 Cormier and Magnan (1999) 33 Canadian firms 1986-1993 
 Bewley and Li (2000) 188 Canadian firms 1993 
 Archel and Lizarraga (2001) 56 Spanish firms 1995-1998 
 Gray et al. (2001) 100 UK firms 1988-1995 
 Patten (2002) 131 US firms 1990 
 Archel (2003) 68 Spanish firms 1994-1998 
 Cormier and Magnan (2003) 50 French firms 1992-1997 
 García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) 112 Spanish firms 1991-1995 
 Gao et al. (2005) 33 Hong Kong listed firms 1993-1997 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Boesso and Kumar (2007) 72 Italian and US firms 2002 
 Cho and Patten (2007) 100 US firms 2001 
 Jose and Lee (2007) 200 multinational firms 2002 
 Van Staden and Hooks (2007) 32 New Zealand firms 2003 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Haddock-Fraser and Fraser (2008) 166 UK firms 2005 
 Aerts and Cormier (2009) 158 US and Canadian firms 2002 
 Reverte (2009) 46 Spanish firms/ 2005-2006 
 Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) 274 firms from 16 European countries 2007 
 Freedman and Jaggi (2011) 510 firms from EU, America, Asia 2006 
 Faisal et al. (2012) 125 firms from 24 countries 2009 
 Hrasky (2012) 50 Australian firms 2005 and 2008 
 Rupley et al. (2012) 127 US firms 2000-2005 
 Salama et al. (2012) 169 US firms 1999 
 Choi et al. (2013) 100 Australian firms 2006-2008 
Not proven Fekrat et al. (1996) 168 firms from 18 countries 1991 
 Freedman and Jaggi (2005) 120 firms from Europe, America, Asia  2000-2002 
 Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 43 Portuguese firms AR03/Web04 
 Stanny and Eli (2008) US S&P 500 firms 2007 
 Reid and Toffel (2009) 524 US firms 2006-2007 
 Da Silva M. and Aibar-G. (2010) 109 Portuguese firms 2002-2004 
Not proven: mixed results, contrary signal or not statistically significant association (p>0,05). 
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Overall, empirical research suggests that, either as a response to public pressure, or to 
avoid further regulation, firms pertaining to industries with high environmental impact 
(environmentally sensitive industries) tend to disclose more environmental information 
than firms operating in less pollutant activities (refer to Table 4-3).  
In particular, a number of studies remark the influence of sector regulations on 
corporate disclosure in high environmental impact industries. The underlying 
assumption is that, due to their higher pollution propensity, those activities are generally 
subject to a wide variety of environmental regulations and, consequently, firms 
operating in those industries are more used to comply with more demanding 
requirements. As described by Jackson and Apostolakou (2010, p. 374), because of their 
impact on the environment and the attention they motivate among various stakeholders, 
high sensitive industries are more regulated and therefore firms within these industries 
will tend to adopt more organized and explicit environmental disclosure policies, either 
as a result of their own reaction to public pressure or because they are compelled to do 
so by governmental measures. However, with regard to corporate disclosure on GHG 
emissions, past research shows mixed results.  
When examining voluntary information related to climate change and carbon emissions 
in annual reports and sustainability reports of 100 Australian firms, from 2006 to 2008, 
Choi et al. (2013) point out industry as a significant determinant of disclosure, and 
remark that, in response to the increased social and political pressures, sample firms in 
the carbon-intensive industries seem more likely to provide additional information on 
GHG emissions. Concurrently, instead of focusing in industry affiliation, Cowan and 
Deegan (2011) consider the quantities of pollution emissions, adjusted by the size of 
corporation, to measure firms’ environmental impact, when evaluating corporate 
reaction to Australia’s first national emission reporting scheme, for a sample of 25 
firms, from 1998 to 2000. Again, results show a significant positive relationship 
between the quantities of pollution emissions (adjusted by firms’ size), and voluntary 
release of information on GHG emissions in annual reports. 
In contrast, when identifying factors associated with disclosure of information about the 
current and the expected effects of climate change, in 2007, by a sample of US S&P 500 
 - 88 - 
firms, to institutional investors through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)12, in 2007, 
Stanny and Eli (2008) do not find a significant positive relation between disclosure and 
affiliation in carbon intensive industries. The authors offer no explanation for this 
unexpected result, being that sample size, due to the low rate of responding firms, may 
be a possible reason.  
On the other hand, when examining, for a sample of 524 US firms, if firms that have 
been targeted by shareholder actions on environmental issues are more likely to publicly 
disclose information to the CDP, in 2006 and 2007, Reid and Toffell (2009) conclude 
that, compared to firms that had not been targeted by shareholder resolutions, firms that 
had been targeted, and were in environmentally sensitive industries are more likely to 
provide information. However, Reid and Toffell (2009) find no significant differences, 
between the environmentally sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive industries, in 
how other explanatory variables, rather than shareholders resolutions targeting, affected 
firms’ propensity to respond to the CDP questionnaire. 
With regard to multi-country studies, when analyzing GHG disclosures, in 2000, by 120 
firms domiciled in Europe, Asia, and North and South America, Freedman and Jaggi 
(2005) notice that all the four industries in the sample (auto, oil, energy, and chemicals) 
show a positive and statistically significant relation with the disclosure index. The 
authors assume that all activities that are potentially impacted by the Kyoto Protocol are 
likely to provide extensive pollution disclosures, but do not identify significant 
differences between the industries covered by their study.  
Later, when evaluating GHG disclosures, in 2006, by a sample of 510 firms domiciled 
in the EU, Japan, Canada, India or the United States, Freedman and Jaggi (2011) also 
use industry as a control variable (encompassing chemicals, utilities, materials, oil & 
gas, and consumer durables & capital goods). Regression results show positive and 
statistically significant relation between the disclosure index and each industry group, 
with the exception of consumer durables & capital goods. The authors offer no further 
                                                             
12 Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is an international not-for-profit organization working to motivate 
companies to disclose their impacts on the environment and take action to reduce them. Given the lack of 
public information about the effects of climate change, institutional investors have asked information 
from companies through the CDP. The CDP questionnaire and the status of each firm’s response are 
available at https://www.cdproject.net/. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
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explanation for this evidence, being that in both studies (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 
2011) the highest positive coefficients are the ones related to energy and utilities, 
respectively. 
Industry affiliation and de facto accounting harmony of voluntary disclosure 
With regard to de facto (material) accounting harmony, empirical research generally 
examines the harmony of accounting practices by comparing if firms in different 
countries adopt similar policies. Otherwise, instead of comparing the accounting 
methods used by firms in different countries, Peill (2000) gather sample firms by 
industry type and then compare harmony levels across industries. The study analyzes 
seven accounting measurement practices (goodwill, inventory costing, fixed assets, 
foreign currency translation, deferred taxation, and consolidation methods) of firms 
from EU-12 Member States, for the years 1987 to 1997. To measure the degree of 
harmony, Peill (2000) adopt two methods: the chi-square test, and the I index. Largely, 
results suggest a substantially higher harmonization among international industries, than 
at the country level.  
Since then, consistent with the assumption that industry background is a significant 
determinant in explaining accounting policy choice and disclosure, empirical research 
conducted by Rahman et al. (2002), Jaafar and McLeay (2007), and Jones and Finley 
(2011) confirm that the level of practice harmony is not independent of industry.  
Also, when investigating the institutional determinants of corporate environmental and 
social disclosures in sixteen European countries, although not intending to directly test 
accounting harmony, Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) remark that harmony is likely to 
occur at industry level, since sector-level institutions may be very important in 
explaining the diffusion of minimum standards for corporate social responsibility. After 
all, firms operating in the same industry face common legitimization challenges, are 
affected by similar sectorial regulations, and tend to imitate competitors’ behavior either 
at national or international level. 
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4.4.3. Foreign listing and international activity 
Internationalization and level of voluntary disclosure 
A process of internationalization takes place when a firm operates in, or depends upon, 
foreign markets (Tarca, 2004; Bansal, 2005). So, irrespective of the location of 
facilities, internationalization can occur through the capital markets, according to the 
firm’s listing status, or, through the markets of products and services rendered by each 
firm, according to the geographical location of its customers.  
In general, literature suggests that firms acting globally are deemed to disclose more 
information due to the increased complexity of operations and organizational structure, 
the larger number of rules and regulations to observe, and the dependency on the 
approval of a broader and diverse range of stakeholders. Notwithstanding, prior research 
on the association between internationalization and voluntary environmental disclosure 
shows contrasting results (refer to Table 4-4). 
Table 4-4: Previous empirical evidence on the association between international activity, 
foreign listing, and level of voluntary environmental disclosure  
Positive association between international activity/foreign listing and level of VED 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Stanny and Eli (2008) US S&P 500 firms 2007 
 Stanny (2013) US S&P 500 firms 2006-2008 
Not proven Fekrat et al. (1996) 168 firms from 18 countries 1991 
 Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 43 Portuguese firms AR03/Web04 
 Reverte (2009) 46 Spanish firms 2005-2006 
 Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) 274 firms from 16 European countries 2007 
Not proven: mixed results, contrary signal or not statistically significant association (p>0,05). 
When examining social responsibility disclosure by 43 Portuguese listed firms, Branco 
and Rodrigues (2008) introduce “international experience”, measured by the percentage 
of sales outside Portugal to total sales, as a determinant of disclosure. However, results 
suggest a non-significant relation between disclosure and international sales. 
On the other hand, when analyzing the determinants of social responsibility disclosure 
by 46 Spanish listed firms, Reverte (2009) uses international listing, measured by the 
number of foreign stock exchanges in which the firm is listed, as an explanatory 
variable. Findings suggest that, although sample firms disclosing more information are 
listed on a higher number of foreign stock markets, the difference is not statistically 
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significant (at a 5% level) when comparing the group of firms with a disclosure rating 
higher than the median with firms disclosing lower than the median. 
In a multi-country context, when investigating the institutional determinants of 
corporate environmental and social disclosures in sixteen European countries, Jackson 
and Apostolakou (2010) initially included in the analysis the percentage of foreign sales 
to total sales as well as foreign assets as a proportion of total assets. However, none of 
the two variables proved to be a significant determinant of disclosure. The authors offer 
as a plausible reason that most of the sample firms were highly internationalized 
showing therefore a low degree of variability. Hence, Jackson and Apostolakou (2010, 
p. 380) assume that the existing sample of firms did not allow a strong empirical test, 
and choose not to include those variables in their final results. 
With regard to corporate disclosure on GHG emissions, when examining factors 
associated with disclosure by a sample of US S&P 500 firms, in 2007, Stanny and Eli 
(2008) consider that US firms that conduct business in countries that have ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol will be subject to increased scrutiny, and because most of the 
industrialized countries except the US ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the authors predict 
that firms with higher foreign sales face a higher climate risk and will therefore be more 
likely to deliver information on this issue. Results support this hypothesis, suggesting 
that US firms subject to more scrutiny because of their foreign sales are more likely to 
respond to the Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire. 
Likewise, when analyzing disclosure on GHG emissions by a sample of US S&P 500 
firms, for the years 2006 to 2008, Stanny (2013) uses the level of foreign operations, 
measured by the percentage of international sales to total sales, as a control variable. 
The author predicts that firms with higher levels of domestic operations compared to 
foreign operations are less likely to be subject to foreign GHG regulations, and therefore 
less probable to have a GHG measurement system in place. Results do confirm this 
hypothesis, suggesting that the disclosing firms are more likely to have a higher 
percentage of international sales. 
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Internationalization and de facto accounting harmony of voluntary disclosure 
Although international activity and foreign listing may be associated with more 
disclosure, the internationalization of firms is pointed out in literature as a possible 
driver of voluntary harmonization, on the grounds that firms acting internationally tend 
to adopt accounting policies that improve communication with users in several 
countries. In that extent, additional disclosure may not imply greater dissimilarity of 
information if firms converge to best disclosure practices to legitimize their activities in 
front of a global audience. On view of this, authors like Meek and Saudagaran (1990), 
Emenyonu (1993), Thorell and Whittington (1994), Cairns (1997), and Meek and 
Thomas (2004) discuss whether multinational firms, supposedly aimed at improving 
communication with users in several countries, may be one of the motivating factors for 
international accounting harmonization. However, empirical studies on this subject offer 
contrary evidence (e.g., Emenyonu and Gray, 1992, 1996; Emenyonu, 1993; Gray et al., 
1995b; Emenyonu and Adhikari, 1998; Cañibano and Mora, 2000; Khanna et al., 2004; 
Jaafar and McLeay, 2007; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). 
Considering that internationalization of capital markets provides a reason for global 
accounting harmony, Emenyonu (1993) examines if 413 large listed firms, from five 
leading economies (France, Germany, Japan, UK, US) differ in the use and disclosure 
of measurement accounting policies, for the 1990/91 financial year. After dividing the 
sample into multi-listed and domestic listed firms, and calculate the I index to quantify 
the level of harmony, Emenyonu (1993) concludes that the differences between the 
practices of multi-listed and domestic listed firms are minor. 
On the other hand, focused on the harmony of accounting measurement practices in 
1989 annual reports of 78 large firms from France, Germany and UK, Emenyonu and 
Gray (1992) notice significant differences between countries in respect of all the 
practices evaluated, being that the I index, used to quantify harmony, reveals a range of 
low values. Later, Emenyonu and Gray (1996) examine the extent to which the 
accounting measurement and associated disclosure practices of 293 large listed firms 
based in five developed stock market countries (France, Germany, Japan, UK, US) have 
become more harmonized internationally. Considering the changes occurred over the 20 
year period from 1971/72 to 1991/92, Emenyonu and Gray (1996, p. 278) conclude that 
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progress has been quite modest and international accounting harmonization has 
remained an “elusive goal”. Similar conclusions were presented by Emenyonu and 
Adhikari (1998) when evaluating harmony in selected accounting measurement 
practices of large firms from France, Germany, Japan, UK, and US, for the 1990/91 
financial year. 
However, authors such as Gray et al. (1995b), Cañibano and Mora (2000), Land and 
Lang (2002), and Khanna et al. (2004) suggest that firms operating internationally may 
be involved in a process of spontaneous harmonization, since de facto (material) 
accounting harmonization appears to occur among them despite the existing gaps in de 
jure (formal) accounting harmonization at international level.  
In particular, with the intent to evaluate if there has been greater harmony in the 
accounting practices of firms operating globally, over the five-year period from 1991/2 
to 1996/7, Cañibano and Mora (2000) examine annual reports of 85 firms whose shares 
were traded internationally (global players). The firms were selected from 13 European 
countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK), their financial statements were evaluated 
with regard to four items (deferred taxation, goodwill, leasing and foreign currency 
translation), and the C index was computed to measure the level of harmony. Cañibano 
and Mora (2000, p. 367) find a higher value for the C index in the second period, 
concluding that a “process of spontaneous harmonization of European ‘global players’ 
went on in the 1990s”. 
Finally, when examining harmonization of accounting policy choice, in the years of 
1991, 1995 and 1999, for a sample of 706 firms from 13 European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, UK), Jaafar and McLeay (2007) consider listing status as a predictor of 
financial reporting practices. Regression results corroborate that the exposure to 
international capital markets is a significant determinant of accounting policy choice 
across the EU-13 Member States. Therefore, findings suggest that accounting choices of 
multi-listed firms are likely to differ from those of the domestic listed firms. However, 
Jaafar and McLeay’s (2007) research design does not allow further conclusions about 
the relative level of harmony within each group of firms. 
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4.4.4. Ownership concentration and foreign ownership 
Ownership structure and level of voluntary disclosure 
Authors like Archambault and Archambault (2003) also justify enhanced voluntary 
disclosure in multi-listed firms, by a probable relationship between foreign listing and 
ownership dispersion. In the extent that agency conflicts are more likely to occur in 
firms with more dispersed ownership, literature identify ownership structure as a 
determinant of a firm’s disclosure policy, being that in a widely held firm, voluntary 
disclosure can act as a tool to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Accordingly, empirical research suggests that ownership dispersion across many 
shareholders contributes to increased pressure for voluntary disclosure (Ullmann, 1985), 
and, in order to reduce information asymmetry, widely held firms are expected to 
disclose more information than firms with concentrated ownership (Prencipe, 2004). 
With this in mind, Archambault and Archambault (2003, p. 181) argue that multi-listed 
firms are more like to produce additional disclosure, as ownership dispersion is likely to 
increase with the number of stock exchanges on which a firm is listed. 
Literature also predicts that the relationship between internationalization and voluntary 
disclosure is conditioned by the legal environment in a firm’s home-country. When 
examining the effects of internationalization and legal environment on voluntary 
disclosure practices of 643 non-US multinational firms from 30 countries (of which 11 
belong to the EU-15), Webb et al. (2008) provide evidence that the effects of 
internationalization are most pronounced for firms from weak legal environments (code-
law countries). The rationale is that internationalization can increase the benefits of 
disclosure by exposing firms from weaker legal environments to new markets where 
disclosure is more highly valued. When those firms start to operate in foreign markets, 
where their disclosures are likely to be regarded as less credible, they need to provide 
enhanced information to build trust and to improve their reputation.  
With regard to environmental information, although not directly testing the association 
between foreign ownership and disclosure, authors such as Fekrat et al. (1996), and 
Gamble et al. (1996) notice differences in the nature of the environmental disclosure, 
depending on the firm’s country of ultimate ownership. On this regard, Gamble et al. 
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(1996, p. 314) document that the nationality of the parent company affects both the 
extent and the content of its subsidiaries’ environmental disclosures, being that firms 
domiciled in a country with high level of “social conscience and/or developed capital 
markets” tend to provide more voluntary disclosure. However, since then, empirical 
research on this area provides contrary evidence (refer to Table 4-5).  
Table 4-5: Previous empirical evidence on the association between ownership 
concentration, foreign ownership, and level of voluntary environmental disclosure 
PANEL A: Negative association between ownership concentration and level of VED 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Patten (1992) 21 US firms 1989 
 Cormier and Magnan (1999) 33 Canadian firms 1986-1993 
 Cormier and Gordon (2001) 3 Canadian electric utility firms 1985-1996 
 Cormier and Magnan (2003) 50 French firms 1992-1997 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 447 UK firms 2000 
Not proven Roberts (1992)  130 US firms 1981-1986 
 Halme and Huse (1997) 140 firms from 4 European countries 1992 
 Cormier et al. (2005) 76 German firms 1992-1998 
 Aerts et al. (2008) 682 firms from Europe, North America 2002 
PANEL B: Positive association between foreign ownership and level of VED 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Moneva and Llena (2000)  70 Spanish firms 1992-1994 
 Cormier and Magnan (2003) 50 French firms 1992-1997 
Not proven Archel (2003) 68 Spanish firms 1994-1998 
 Cormier et al. (2005) 76 German firms 1992-1998 
 Da Silva M. and Aibar-G. (2010) 43 Portuguese firms AR03/Web04 
Not proven: mixed results, contrary signal or not statistically significant association (p>0,05). 
When analyzing the environmental reporting practices, from 1992 to 1994, in the annual 
reports of 160 firms operating in Spain, Moneva and Llena (2000) find no global 
differences between the environmental information disclosed by firms with a Spanish 
parent company and those with a foreign parent company. Nevertheless, over the 
research period, in some particular areas, such as quantitative and financial information, 
as well as disclosure of environmental expenses and investments, firms with a foreign 
parent company disclosed more than other sample firms. So, the authors conclude that 
there is evidence that a firm with a foreign parent provides more quantitative 
environmental information, possibly due to the circumstances (e.g., institutional 
framework) in the parent company’s home-country. In contrast, when analyzing 
environmental disclosures made in the annual reports, from 2002 to 2004, by a sample 
of 109 firms operating in Portugal, da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán (2010) find no 
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statistically significant differences between the level of environmental information 
disclosed by sample firms with a foreign parent company and the domestically owned 
firms. 
On the other hand, considering that information costs incurred by a firm’s shareholders 
are likely to enhance the extent of its environmental disclosure, Cormier et al. (2005) 
use both foreign ownership and concentrated ownership as explanatory variables, when 
analyzing environmental disclosure, from 1992 to 1998, among a sample of 55 German 
firms. With regard to concentrated ownership, the authors predict a negative relation 
with environmental disclosure, and results confirm that firms with concentrated 
ownership are significantly less likely to make voluntary environmental disclosures. 
Similar findings are presented by authors such as Patten (1992), Cormier and Magnan 
(1999, 2003), Cormier and Gordon (2001), and Brammer and Pavelin (2006, 2008). 
Concerning foreign ownership, Cormier et al. (2005) made no directional predictions. 
Often, literature admits a positive relation between foreign ownership and the extent of 
environmental disclosure. However, Cormier et al. (2005) claim that, since 
environmental concerns are higher in Germany than in many other countries, a negative 
relationship may also be expected. Actually, Cormier et al. (2005) find a significant 
negative association between foreign ownership and level of disclosure. 
Finally, although not directly testing foreign ownership, Freedman and Jaggi (2005, 
2011) analyze disclosure on GHG emissions, in 2000, by firms domiciled in countries 
that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol compared to others. The authors conclude that 
multinational firms that operate in countries that ratified the Protocol, but have their 
home offices in countries that did not, are associated with lower disclosure. That is, 
even though firms from non-ratifying countries are required to meet the Protocol’s 
demands if they operate in Protocol ratifying countries, evidence suggests that they do 
not release detailed information voluntarily. In view of this, Freedman and Jaggi (2005, 
pp. 228-229) remark that “...even the most sophisticated users of financial statements 
are not likely to have a proper understanding of the impact of global warming on the 
firm’s performance. In order to improve pollution disclosures for investment decisions, 
lack of voluntarism may lead regulators to consider mandatory disclosure 
requirements”. 
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Ownership structure and de facto accounting harmony of voluntary disclosure 
With regard to de facto (material) accounting harmony, when examining a sample of 
146 Australian and New Zealand firms, in 1993, Rahman et al. (2002) predict a positive 
association between ownership concentration and accounting disclosure harmony. 
Based on accounting disclosure literature, the authors argue that firms with lower 
shareholder concentration are deemed to disclose more, and therefore it is expected that 
they have greater variability of information in comparison with firms with higher 
concentrated ownership structure. Results display a positive association between 
ownership concentration and harmony of voluntary disclosure, only at a 10% 
significance level. 
Overall, further investigation is needed for a better understanding of the effects of firms’ 
internationalization over the harmony in, and the level of accounting disclosure, under 
no mandatory guidance. Present research aims at shedding light on this matter. 
4.4.5. Financial condition 
Financial condition and level of voluntary disclosure 
Other firm-specific characteristics such as profitability and financial leverage are also 
commonly investigated. However, literature shows contrary results on their association 
with voluntary environmental disclosure (refer to Table 4-6). 
As regards profitability, authors like Deegan and Gordon (1996), Cormier and Magnan 
(1999), and Stanny and Eli (2008) find a positive relationship between environmental 
disclosure and financial performance. A common argument in favor of this hypothesis is 
that profitable firms are more exposed to political pressure and public scrutiny, and 
therefore they are supposed to use more voluntary disclosure in order to decrease 
political costs and to avoid further regulation (Reid and Toffel, 2009; Stanny and Ely, 
2008). Concurrently, according to signaling theory, more profitable firms have 
incentives to use voluntary disclosure to distinguish themselves from less lucrative 
firms in order to raise capital on the best available terms (Cormier and Magnan, 1999, 
2003). So, more profitable firms can be expected to voluntarily disclose more 
accounting information. 
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Table 4-6: Previous empirical evidence on the association between profitability, leverage 
and level of voluntary environmental disclosure  
PANEL A: Positive association between profitability and level of VED 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Roberts (1992) 130 US firms 1981-1986 
 Deegan and Gordon (1996) 197 Australian firms 1980-1991 
 Cormier and Magnan (1999) 33 Canadian firms 1986-1993 
 Stanny and Eli (2008) US S&P 500 firms 2007 
Not proven Cowen et al. (1987) US Fortune 500 firms 1978 
 Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) 23 US firms 1973 
 Hackston and Milne (1996) 47 New Zealand firms 1992 
 Moneva and Llena (1996) 47 Spanish firms 1992 
 Neu et al. (1998) 330 Canadian firms 1982-1991 
 Archel and Lizarraga (2001) 56 Spanish firms 1995-1998 
 Patten (2002) 131 US firms 1990 
 Archel (2003) 68 Spanish firms 1994-1998 
 Cormier and Magnan (2003) 50 French firms 1992-1997 
 García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) 112 Spanish firms 1991-1995 
 Elijido-Ten (2004) 40 Malaysian firms 1999-2001 
 Cormier et al. (2005) 76 German firms 1992-1998 
 Freedman and Jaggi (2005) 120 firms from Europe, America, Asia 2000-2002 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Aerts et al. (2008) 682 firms from Europe, North America 2002 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 43 Portuguese firms AR03/Web04 
 Aerts and Cormier (2009) 158 US and Canadian firms 2002 
 Reverte (2009) 46 Spanish firms 2005-2006 
 Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) 274 firms from 16 European countries 2007 
 Da Silva M. and Aibar-G.(2010) 109 Portuguese firms 2002-2004 
 Mahadeo et al. (2011) 165 firms from Mauritius Island 2004-2007 
 Faisal et al. (2012) 541 firms from 24 countries 2009 
 Rupley et al. (2012) 127 US  firms 2000-2005 
 Salama et al. (2012) 169 US firms 1999 
 Choi et al. (2013) 100 Australian firms 2006-2008 
PANEL B: Negative association between financial leverage and level of VED 
 Author(s) Sample Period 
Proven Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) 23 US firms 1973 
 Cormier and Magnan (1999) 33 Canadian firms 1986-1993 
 Cormier and Magnan (2003) 50 French firms 1992-1997 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 447 UK firms 2000 
Not proven Roberts (1992) 130 US firms 1981-1986 
 Archel and Lizarraga (2001) 56 Spanish firms 1995-1998 
 Elijido-Ten (2004) 40 Malaysian firms 1999-2001 
 Cormier et al. (2005) 76 German firms 1992-1998 
 Freedman and Jaggi (2005) 120 firms from Europe, America, Asia  2000-2002 
 Aerts et al. (2008) 682 firms from Europe, North America 2002 
 Branco and Rodrigues (2008) 43 Portuguese firms AR03/Web04 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 447 UK firms 2000 
 Aerts and Cormier (2009) 158 US and Canadian firms 2002 
 Reverte (2009) 46 Spanish firms 2005-2006 
 Mahadeo et al. (2011) 165 firms from Mauritius Island 2004-2007 
 Faisal et al. (2012) 541 firms from 24 countries 2009 
 Choi et al. (2013) 100 Australian firms 2006-2008 
Not proven: mixed results, contrary signal or not statistically significant association (p>0,05). 
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Likewise, in the context of the agency and political cost theories, Ness and Mirza 
(1991) points out that management in very profitable firms is likely to provide more 
detailed information in order to support their own position and compensation. In this 
regard, using return on assets as a proxy of bonus plan, Setyorini and Ishak (2012) 
confirm that, all else equal, environmental disclosure increases when the degree of 
firms’ bonus plan increases. 
Literature also suggests that it might simply be that profitable firms have the necessary 
economic means to produce additional disclosure. Authors like Hackston and Milne 
(1996), and Pirsch et al. (2007) argue that high earning rates allow managers enough 
ability to move funds towards environmental programs what could explain a positive 
association between profitability and environmental policy and disclosure. In reverse, in 
firms with less economic resources, managers probably will be more focused on 
activities that have a more immediate effect on profit rather than on the production of 
voluntary disclosure (Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992). 
However, most of prior empirical studies do not identify profitability as a significant 
determinant of voluntary environmental disclosure (Table 4-6 | Panel A).  
In general, research on the association between financial performance and 
environmental disclosure has been inconclusive as to whether the relationship is 
positive, negative or even neutral. In view of this, authors like Roberts (1992) suggest 
that corporate social responsibility disclosure might be related to lagged profits, while 
Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) advance that prior literature’s mixed results (when describing 
the interrelations between environmental disclosure, environmental performance, and 
economic performance) may be due to the fact that researchers have not considered 
these functions to be jointly determined. Then, based on a simultaneous equations 
models approach, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) conclude that good environmental 
performance is significantly associated with good economic performance, and also with 
more extensive quantifiable environmental disclosure.  
Differently, Neu et al. (1998) point out that, from a legitimacy theory perspective, 
profitability can be regarded to be either positively or negatively related to 
environmental disclosure. On one hand, in profitable periods, environmental disclosures 
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would aim at convince those stakeholders with environmental concerns that the firm’s 
profit has not been at the expense of the environment. On the other hand, in less 
profitable periods, environmental disclosures would aim at either distracting attention 
from the weak financial results or convincing financial stakeholders that current 
environmental investments will result in long-term benefits. 
With regard to GHG emissions, when examining voluntary information in annual 
reports and sustainability reports of 100 Australian firms, from 2006 to 2008, Choi et al. 
(2013) do not find a significant association between profitability, measured by return on 
assets, and level of disclosure. In a multi-country context, focusing disclosures, in 2000, 
by 120 firms domiciled in Europe, Asia, and North and South America, Freedman and 
Jaggi (2005) reach similar results. 
Concerning to financial leverage, within the context of the agency theory, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that more highly leveraged firms are more likely to disclose 
voluntary information in order to reduce their agency costs and, as a result, their cost of 
capital. Thus, voluntary disclosures can be expected to increase with leverage. In 
contrast, Ball (1995) suggests that the association will be negative. Based on the 
signaling literature, the author argues that financing through equity requires greater 
disclosure than financing through debt, as it requires more dissemination of information. 
As a consequence, firms having higher debt would be disclosing less information in 
terms of both amount and variety. 
Although some studies confirm a negative association between leverage and level of 
voluntary environmental disclosure, vast majority shows mixed results or non-
significant association (refer to Table 4-6 | Panel B). Facing this lack of conclusiveness, 
authors like Branco and Rodrigues (2008), and Aerts and Cormier (2009) test the 
relationship without making any a priori assumption about the sign. Otherwise, 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) predict a negative association between leverage and 
environmental disclosure, sustaining that a low degree of leverage ensures that creditor 
stakeholders will exert less pressure over management to restrain social and 
environmental activities that are not perceived as directly enhancing firms’ financial 
performance. When analyzing a sample of UK firms, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 
confirm this assumption. Later, when conducting a study over a similar sample of UK 
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firms, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) introduce a one-year lag between the dependent and 
independent variables, but regression results show no significant association between 
leverage and environmental disclosure.  
On the other hand, when analyzing environmental disclosure by Canadian (Cormier and 
Magnan, 1999) or French firms (Cormier and Magnan, 2003), the authors predict that 
firms in good financial condition will choose to disclose more than firms in poor 
financial condition (measured by return on assets and leverage). In particular, Cormier 
and Magnan (1999, 2003) assume that for highly indebted firms the disclosure of 
prospective environmental liabilities conveys probable future costs, leading to concerns 
from their creditors about firm’s performance. In contrast, the release of such 
information by firms in good financial condition can signal that they are well prepared 
to face environmental obligations and are willing to do so. As regards profitability, 
Cormier and Magnan (1999, 2003) show contrary evidence, but for leverage both 
studies support a negative association with disclosure.  
Notwithstanding, in a multi-country context, when examining environmental disclosure 
by firms domiciled in Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands) and North 
America (Canada, US), in 2002, Aerts et al. (2008) hypothesized that, since 
environmental disclosure may allow investors to better assess a firm’s overall financial 
obligations, additional information may actually weaken a firm’s stock market position 
if it is already highly indebted. Hence, the authors predict a negative relation between 
leverage and environmental disclosure. However, regression results show a non-
significant association. 
With regard to disclosure on GHG emission, when studying voluntary information in 
annual reports and sustainability reports of 100 Australian firms, from 2006 to 2008, 
Choi et al. (2013) do not find a significant association between leverage and level of 
disclosure. In a multi-country context, focusing GHG emission disclosure, in 2000, by 
120 firms domiciled in Europe, Asia, and North and South America, Freedman and 
Jaggi (2005) present similar results. 
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Financial condition and de facto accounting harmony of voluntary disclosure 
Authors such as Dong and Stettler (2011, p. 293) suggest that prior literature does not 
allow to formulate a priori assumptions about the sign or the association between 
financial condition (profitability, leverage) and the level of voluntary disclosure, neither 
predict its relationship with harmony of accounting practices. In the same line, Rahman 
et al. (2002), and Jaafar and McLeay (2007) do not include any profitability measure 
when analyzing accounting practice harmony.  
However, as regards leverage, when examining a sample of 146 Australian and New 
Zealand firms, in 1993, Rahman et al. (2002) hypothesized that firms having higher 
equity would be disclosing more information, and as a result a greater variety of 
disclosure is expected when financing through equity is higher in comparison to 
financing through debt. So, the authors predict that leverage is positively associated 
with the level of practice harmony. However, Rahman et al. (2002) find a wrong signal 
non-significant association between leverage and harmony of voluntary disclosure, not 
confirming their prediction. 
Final synthesis 
Next table summarizes main results from prior research on the association between 
firm-specific characteristics and either the level of voluntary environmental disclosure 
or de facto (material) accounting harmony in voluntary disclosure. 
Table 4-7: Synthesis of previous empirical evidence on the association between firm-
specific characteristics and level of voluntary environmental disclosure or de facto 
accounting harmony in voluntary disclosure 
 Level of voluntary Harmony in 
 environmental disclosure voluntary disclosure 
Firm-specific 
characteristics 
Predicted 
Association 
Predicted 
sign Results 
Predicted 
Association 
Predicted 
sign Results 
Size Yes + √ Yes - √ 
Industry affiliation ESI Yes + √ Yes None √ 
Internationalization Yes +/- Mixed Yes -/+ Mixed 
Ownership concentration Yes - Mixed Yes + Not proven 
Foreign ownership Yes +/- Mixed --- --- --- 
Profitability Yes +/- Mixed --- --- --- 
Leverage Yes -/+ Mixed Yes + Not proven 
√ Results generally confirm association and predicted sign at least for p<0,05. 
ESI - Environmental sensitive industries. 
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5. Evaluating the “disciplinarian effect” of standards and markets on 
the level of carbon financial disclosure 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory background, 
affiliation in carbon intensive industries, and international exposure, over the level of 
carbon financial disclosure, addressing in particular if the type of guidance in home 
country acts as moderator of firm-level relationships between internationalization and 
level of disclosure. 
5.1. Introduction 
As discussed in previous chapter, determinants of corporate disclosure encompass 
regulatory background, and firm-specific characteristics such as the affiliation in 
industries with high environmental impact or the exposure to international markets.  
With regard to regulatory background, literature suggests that management uses 
discretion not only under unregulated contexts but also when facing mandatory 
guidance on disclosure items. However, limited attention has been given in past 
research to analyze disclosure under mandatory regimes. In the present study, the 
issuance of mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances, for firms 
linked to the Spanish allowances allocation plan, allows the analysis of disclosure in 
response to both mandatory and non-mandatory guidance, expanding prior research. 
Beside regulatory influences, firm-specific characteristics such as affiliation in 
industries with high environmental impact, and international activity are single out in 
literature as putting additional pressure on firms to provide more environmental 
information. Notwithstanding, prior research shows mixed results when dealing with the 
internationalization of firms. The present investigation intends to reassess the 
association between internationalization and environmental disclosure, both in regulated 
and unregulated contexts. 
Overall, the aim of this study is to shed light on areas where previous investigation is 
scarce (disclosure under mandatory guidance) or showed mixed results (the relationship 
between internationalization and level of disclosure), focusing in particular the 
following research questions:  
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1. Does mandatory guidance lead to increased levels of disclosure on GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts? 
2. Does mandatory guidance exert a “disciplinarian effect” both in the dissemination 
of qualitative information (soft disclosure) as well as quantitative information 
(hard disclosure) related to GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts? 
3. Does national guidance, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, exert a 
significant influence over disclosure practices on GHG emission allowances in the 
annual accounts of EU-15 firms applying IFRS? 
4. Are firms operating in high carbon intensive and regulated industries more likely 
to provide further disclosure on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts, 
than other firms? 
5. Is internationalization a driver of disclosure? Can we rely on spontaneous 
movements among firms acting globally to enhance disclosure on GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 formalizes 
hypotheses for investigation. Section 5.3 describes data and research methodology. The 
final section presents and discusses empirical results. 
5.2.  Hypotheses 
The present study covers disclosure on GHG emission allowances in annual accounts of 
EU-15 listed firms under the following scenarios (described in section 2.2.2): 
A. No specific guidance on how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual 
accounts (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, 
and United Kingdom). 
B. Guidance in home-country on how to report GHG emission allowances in the 
annual accounts, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, of which: 
B1. Without detailed guidelines on disclosure items (Austria, Belgium, France, 
and Germany). 
B2. With detailed guidelines on disclosure items (Finland, and Portugal). 
C. Mandatory guidance in home-country on how to report GHG emission allowances 
in the annual accounts, with detailed guidelines on disclosure items (Spain). 
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As concerns voluntary disclosure, authors like da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán 
(2010), and Choi et al. (2013) notice that non-mandatory guidance seems to have a 
positive effect on firms’ decisions to voluntarily release environmental information in 
their annual reports. Concurrently, some strands of international accounting research 
suggest that domestic accounting standards in EU Member States, in spite of no longer 
applying for the consolidated statements of listed firms since 2005, may continue to 
affect their reporting practices (Nobes, 2006, 2008; Kvaal and Nobes, 2010; Barbu et 
al., 2014). In particular, when examining environmental disclosure by firms complying 
with IFRS, Barbu et al. (2014) identify the intensity of the environmental disclosure 
constraints in the country where the firm is located as a key factor to explain increased 
levels of environmental information in the annual reports.  
In general, most of multi-country studies examining European firms under IFRS do not 
consider discrepancies among national accounting guidance. However, the evidence 
reported by Barbu et al. (2014) suggests that home-country guidance may be a relevant 
constraint to the process of de facto (material) accounting harmonization within EU. In 
the extent that national guidance, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, 
continue to exert a significant influence on their disclosure practices, differences 
between countries are probable to remain, in spite of the compulsory use of IFRS for the 
consolidated statements of listed firms since 2005. 
Nobes (2006) had already advanced several arguments (including inertia) explaining 
why the pre-IFRS dissimilarities are likely to have a significant effect on the reporting 
practices of EU firms applying IFRS. Building on prior investigation, this study predicts 
that, in the light of legitimacy theory and institutional theory, national guidance namely 
issued after 2005 and not applicable to firms under IFRS since then is expected to 
influence their disclosure practices, especially when dealing with issues not covered by 
IFRS, and not conflicting with them. According to legitimacy theory (Deegan, 2002; 
O’Donovan, 2002; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), firms under IFRS are compelled 
(by legitimacy-seeking behaviors) to reveal as much information as their competitors, 
including those applying local guidance. Concurrently, in line with institutional theory, 
when an organization anticipates that conformity with social expectations (even though 
set out by non-mandatory rules) will enhance social fitness, a process of voluntary 
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diffusion, through imitation, is more likely to occur, than under no guidance (Oliver, 
1991). Therefore, higher levels of disclosure are expected among firms domiciled in 
countries where national guidance was issued, though not mandatory for entities under 
IFRS, than among firms domiciled in countries where no guidance on accounting for 
GHG emission allowances was provided. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is put 
forward: 
H1: The level of carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms 
domiciled in countries where national guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances was issued, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, than among 
firms domiciled in countries where no specific guidance was provided. 
On the other hand, literature on mandatory disclosure suggests that regulations to be 
effective must be clearly delineated (Frost, 2007; Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Peters 
and Romi, 2013). Expanding prior research, this study assumes that, in the light of 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory, the same is likely to apply to non-mandatory 
guidance. The rationale is that, national guidance establishing detailed benchmarks for 
disclosure, though not mandatory, helps to inform the public opinion on disclosure best 
practices, and contributes to raise awareness among stakeholders about the relevant 
information to be provided in the annual accounts. Moreover, detailed benchmarks are 
likely to boost stakeholders’ perception that lack of critical information may well 
correspond to bad news. As a consequence, detailed guidance, though not mandatory, is 
expected to exert pressure for additional disclosure by firms looking for stakeholders’ 
approval, and not wanting to incur the costs of bad reputation. Accordingly, to test if not 
mandatory detailed guidance is an incentive for voluntary adoption of higher levels of 
carbon financial disclosure, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
H2: The level of carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms 
domiciled in countries where national guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, comprises detailed requests 
for disclosure, than among firms domiciled in countries where not mandatory guidance 
does not specify detailed requests for disclosure. 
As regards mandatory disclosure, previous research shows that, although not ensuring 
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full compliance, mandatory guidance enhances the level of environmental information 
(Larrinaga et al., 2002; Llena et al., 2007; Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Acerete et al., 
2011). In accordance with agency theory and proprietary costs theory (Dye, 1985; 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), a firm’s optimal level of disclosure is achieved when 
the marginal cost of disclosure is equal to its marginal benefit. As described by Seah 
and Tarca (2006), under mandatory guidance, costs of disclosure are likely to be greater 
because, to avoid possible penalties, more proprietary information is revealed which 
could damage a firm’s wealth and reputation, and benefits of disclosure are potentially 
superior because compulsory information has more credibility namely when it is 
certified. So, under a mandatory regime, both the costs and the benefits of release 
potentially increase, changing the equilibrium point, and expanding the level of a firm’s 
disclosure. Likewise, on view of stakeholder theory and institutional theory, mandatory 
guidance is likely to draw the attention of more powerful stakeholders, and therefore is 
a potential driver of further environmental information (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008), 
being that when institutional pressures are enacted by means of legal regulations, the 
greater the likelihood of organizational acquiescence (Oliver, 1991). Therefore, to 
investigate whether higher levels of disclosure are more likely to occur under mandatory 
guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances, than under no mandatory 
regime, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
H3: The level of carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms 
under mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances, than among 
firms under no mandatory regime. 
However, mandatory guidance does not prevent strategic withholding of environmental 
information (Barth et al., 1997; Larrinaga et al., 2002; Mobus, 2005; Frost, 2007; 
Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Alexander et al., 2011; Peters and Romi, 2013). As 
suggested by Oliver (1991), the appearance of conformity rather than conformity itself 
is often sufficient for the attainment of legitimacy. In view of this, concealment tactics 
to manage an impression of compliance with regulations may well take the form of 
ritualism (Oliver, 1991), meaning that, in spite of growing levels of disclosure, firms 
fail to disclose those elements of regulations that are not consistent with the interests of 
their most powerful stakeholders (Adams et al., 1995; Neu et al., 1998; Larrinaga et al., 
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2002; Llena et al., 2007). In particular, under mandatory guidance, disclosure biased 
towards more good news and ritual information (rather than bad news and accurate 
information) is identified by Criado-Jiménez et al. (2008) as a strategy to manage the 
public impression of the environmental performance of the firm. Notwithstanding, prior 
evidence also suggests that, although not ensuring full compliance, mandatory guidance 
is more likely to cause a significant increase of disclosure, namely for those items that 
firms are less willing to reveal (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008). 
In general, past research on quality of discretionary disclosure or examining whether 
firms comply (or not) with the more demanding aspects of regulations, is based upon 
the distinction between bad news and good news (e.g., Deegan and Gordon, 1996; 
Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008) or hard disclosure and soft disclosure (e.g., Clarkson et al., 
2008; Cormier et al., 2009). 
Related literature defines bad news as information about activities having a negative 
impact on society or failures in attempts to overcome social problems, whereas good 
news represent information about corporate activities having a positive impact upon 
society (Deegan and Gordon, 1996, p. 63). As admitted by, amongst others, Bewley and 
Li (2000, p. 206), there is a great deal of subjectivity when classifying disclosure into 
good news and bad news, because ultimately the positive or negative nature of the 
information varies according the different perspectives of each group of stakeholders. 
For instance, costs incurred as a result of fines and penalties may be bad news to 
corporate environmental stakeholders “but be the least costly option for the firm given 
its present operations and financial condition. Hence, they could be ‘good’ news to 
shareholders” (Bewley and Li, 2000, p. 221). Also, capital expenditures for pollution 
control may be good news for environmental stakeholders, but may represent cash 
outflows with no expected economic benefit from shareholder’s perspective.  
Differently, Clarkson et al. (2008) distinguish between hard and soft disclosure1. Hard 
disclosure consists of objective and verifiable information that cannot be easily 
mimicked by poor environmental performers (quantitative-verifiable information), 
                                                             
1 This distinction was first applied by Clarkson et al. (2008) to the items included in the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) sustainability reporting guidelines, and then extended by other researchers (e.g., Cormier 
et al., 2009) to corporate social and environmental information disclosed in other reporting forms. 
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while soft disclosure comprises not easily verifiable claims to be committed to the 
environment (qualitative or declarative information). This division allows to evaluate 
the nature of disclosure avoiding the subjectivity of the classification into good news 
and bad news, pointed out by, amongst others, Bewley and Li (2000). In Clarkson et 
al.’s (2008) distinction the underlying assumption to evaluate disclosure is that 
quantitative information is more objective, informative and credible than qualitative 
information (Hutton et al., 2003; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Cho and Patten, 2007; 
Cormier et al., 2009). On one hand, by revealing more precise and verifiable 
information, proprietary costs resulting from quantitative disclosure are likely to be 
higher than for qualitative disclosure, and to the extent that quantitative information is 
deemed to contain more proprietary information, investors may perceive quantitative 
information to be more credible (Cho and Patten, 2007; Cormier et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, as it increases the ex-post verifiability of the information disclosed, 
quantitative disclosure is more objective and informative to stakeholders (Al-Tuwaijri et 
al., 2004). Accordingly, the potential relevance and usefulness of quantitative 
information is generally perceived to be higher than that of qualitative disclosure (Aerts 
et al., 2006). 
Following Cormier et al. (2009), the present study adopts the distinction between 
qualitative (soft) disclosure and quantitative (hard) disclosure to test if, in spite of 
probable concealment strategies, mandatory guidance exerts a “disciplinarian effect” on 
the dissemination of more quantitative-verifiable (objective, informative and credible) 
information on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is put forward: 
H4: The level of carbon financial disclosure on quantitative items is predicted to be 
higher among firms under mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances, than among firms under no mandatory regime. 
As summarized in Figure 5-1, hypotheses H1 to H4 test the “disciplinarian effect” of 
accounting standards over the level of carbon financial disclosure, namely on hard 
news. Then, regulatory influences coming from industry affiliation are also investigated. 
As their activities are more likely to damage the environment, firms belonging to 
industries with high environmental impact face more strict regulations, are subject to 
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further scrutiny, and are predicted to have higher political costs. So, in accordance with 
Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978, 1990) hypothesis, those firms are expected to provide 
more information in order to avoid pressure from governmental regulatory bodies, to 
reduce the possibility of adverse political actions by other pressure groups, and 
therefore to mitigate expected political costs. Also, from legitimacy theory standpoint, 
firms in more polluting activities are deemed to offer higher levels of environmental 
disclosure, given their greater need of legitimizing with society. Likewise, in the lens of 
institutional theory, firms in environmentally sensitive industries might have more to 
gain by voluntarily release environmental information and “…choosing themselves - in 
other words, controlling - the standards by which they have to comply rather than leave 
this responsibility to the state”, as advanced by Jackson and Apostolakou (2010, p. 374). 
In several EU countries, industries identified as the most polluting (chemical, electric 
utility, pulp & paper, metal industries) has been subject to national environmental 
programs requiring the disclosure of specific information since the mid 60’s of last 
century (Halme and Huse, 1997, p. 142). As those firms are perceived as pollutants long 
ago, they have been motivated to disclose their environmental actions since then. As a 
result, they have created routines to collect and treat environmental information before 
others, being that the routine is a significant predictor of environmental disclosure, as 
pointed out by, amongst others, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), Cormier et al. (2005), Aerts 
et al. (2006), Brouhle and Harrington (2009), and Stanny (2013). 
With regard to industries covered by EU-ETS, the electricity sector is the most 
important both in terms of allowances granted and shortfall of allowances (Solier and 
Jouvet, 2011). In fact, the efficiency of EU-ETS in providing incentives for the 
transformation towards a low-carbon economy depends on whether CO2 costs may be 
passed through to electricity prices, or not (Reinaud, 2007; EC, 2012), because when 
producers pass-through those costs to electricity prices they transmit signals of carbon 
costs to the economy, in the line with EU-ETS’ aim. For utility firms, CO2 is an 
additional cost component to electricity generation, whether allowances are granted for 
free or paid for, and economic theory states that in a competitive market the pass-
through of CO2 prices in electricity prices is inevitable (Reinaud, 2007; EC, 2012). As a 
generator holds allowances, production of CO2-emitting electricity contends with the 
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possibility to sell the unused allowances. This opportunity cost of CO2 allowances 
equals the CO2 market price and is incorporated in producers’ decisions to generate 
electricity. Whether, or not, the full opportunity cost of allowances is passed through 
electricity prices depends on several elements, including market structure, contractual 
arrangements between governments and power generators2, and regulatory 
frameworks3. 
When examining disclosure of environmental liabilities by firms operating in 
environmentally sensitive and regulated industries, Bart et al. (1997) conclude that 
utility firms tend to disclose more information about their environmental liabilities, than 
other firms, because they ultimately pass these costs on to consumers through higher 
rates. In the same vein, authors such as Moneva and Llena (1996), Gao et al. (2005), 
Boesso and Kumar (2007), Brammer and Pavelin (2008), and Aerts and Cormier (2009) 
find evidence that firms in the utility sector tend to disclose more environmental 
information than other firms. More recently, research focused on GHG emission 
disclosure (Choi et al., 2013) suggests that firms operating in the most carbon intensive 
industries, including not only utilities, but also basic materials, transportation, and oil & 
gas (European Commission, 2003, 2009; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2006) are more 
likely to disclose information on GHG emissions. Hence, to investigate if the level of 
carbon financial disclosure tends to be higher among firms operating in more carbon 
intensive industries, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
H5: Ceteris paribus, the level of carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher 
among firms operating in more carbon intensive industries, than among other firms. 
Another determining factor sometimes pointed out in literature as enhancing corporate 
disclosure is the internationalization of firms. 
                                                             
2 For instance, in Portugal different regimes coexist depending on kind and legal status of power 
generators. During EU-ETS’ first period, with regard to power stations under the costs of maintaining 
contractual balance (CMEC - Centrais sob o regime dos custos de manutenção do equilíbrio contratual) it 
was established that CO2 costs will be paid by consumers. For power stations under market system, each 
producer was able to define its strategy and reflect, or not, the cost of CO2 in the electricity prices (ERSE, 
2010, 2012). Since 2008, more specified regimes on pass-through carbon costs to consumers are stated in 
Decree No 11210/2008, of April 17, 2008, regarding the optimization of management mechanism of CO2 
emission allowances. 
3 Across the EU there is no single electricity market, but several markets and several regulatory 
frameworks (for detail see EASAC, 2006). 
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With regard to the internationalization through capital markets, related literature 
suggests that foreign listing is a significant determinant of voluntary disclosure. From 
the agency theory standpoint, firms listed on foreign stock exchanges have greater 
agency costs, and as a result they are more likely to use additional disclosure to limit the 
monitoring and the agency costs resulting from the existence of a greater variety of 
shareholders. In particular, for foreign shareholders it may be difficult to obtain 
information about the firm from alternative sources. So, when a large portion of a firm’s 
shareholders is foreign, it becomes efficient to increase environmental disclosure (e.g., 
Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Webb et al., 2008). In the same line, according to signaling 
theory and cost of capital theory, firms listed on foreign stock exchanges may expect 
that higher levels of disclosure are perceived as good signals by the market, being 
therefore motivated to release additional disclosure in order to reduce cost of capital, 
especially when depending on fund raising in foreign markets (e.g., Cooke, 1989, 1991; 
Meek and Gray, 1989; Aerts et al., 2008).  
Also, related literature points out that multinational firms are deemed to disclose more 
information due to the larger number of rules and regulations to observe, the increased 
complexity of operations and organizational structure, and the dependency on the 
approval of a broader and diverse range of stakeholders. In particular, when examining 
factors influencing voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of US and European 
multinational corporations, Meek et al. (1995) notice that firms participating in 
international capital markets tend to disclose significantly more voluntary financial 
information, than firms registered only in domestic markets. 
But even firms not listed in foreign stock exchanges may have incentives to disclose 
more if they operate internationally. The internationalization of firms’ operations may 
enhance voluntary disclosure because, beyond the requests faced at domestic markets, 
firms have to deal with the pressure and the needs for further information of a wider 
range of stakeholders (foreign customers, suppliers, labor unions and governmental and 
non-governmental bodies). Beside, firms operating in more than one geographical area 
tend to have better managerial control systems because of the greater complexity of 
their operations. As a result, they are expected to prepare higher extent of disclosure 
(e.g., Zarzeski, 1996; Rahman et al., 2002; Cahan et al., 2005; Webb et al., 2008). 
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Notwithstanding, prior research on the association between internationalization and 
voluntary environmental disclosure shows contrasting results (Branco and Rodrigues, 
2008; Stanny and Eli, 2008; Reverte, 2009; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010; Stanny, 
2013). In particular, authors such as Thorell and Whittington (1994), Cormier et al. 
(2005), and Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) advance that a positive or a negative 
relationship between internationalization and level of disclosure may be expected, 
namely depending on the relative degree of environmental awareness in home-country 
when compared with those foreign markets to which the firm is exposed.  
To reassess the association between the exposure to foreign markets and the level of 
disclosure, this study considers internationalization through capital markets and through 
the markets of products and services where external customers are located, being the 
latter evaluated by the weighting of two different measures of international exposure: 
the intensity (percentage) of sales outside the country of domicile; and the variety 
(number) of markets where foreign customers are located. 
As regards listing status, foreign listed firms in the sample are registered mainly in US 
stock exchanges, a country that did not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and where, over the 
research period, there was a lack of specific accounting guidance on how to report GHG 
emissions in the annual accounts. Consequently, despite the exposure to a broader range 
of stakeholders, EU-15 firms listed abroad may not face additional pressures to enhance 
carbon financial disclosure, when compared with firms registered only in domestic 
markets. In these circumstances, a significant positive association between foreign 
listing and carbon financial disclosure would provide strong evidence of the existence 
of a spontaneous movement among firms participating in international capital markets 
to improve accounting practices, as suggested by Cañibano and Mora (2000), and 
Khanna et al. (2004). Accordingly, to test if internationalization through the capital 
markets exerts a strong “disciplinarian effect” over foreign-listed firms, enhancing the 
level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in their annual accounts, irrespective 
of the regulatory background or environmental awareness in host countries, the 
following hypothesis is put forward: 
H6: Ceteris paribus, the level of carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher 
among foreign listed firms, than among firms listed only in domestic stock exchanges. 
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Considering the internationalization through the markets of products and services where 
customers are located, a significant positive association between foreign sales and 
disclosure would provide strong evidence of the existence of a voluntary movement 
among firms operating internationally to improve communication with stakeholders.  
However, according to institutional theory, the lack of international consensus regarding 
either the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol or the appropriate accounting model for 
emissions trading schemes, may not favor a process of voluntary release of carbon 
financial disclosure by EU-15 multinational firms. As predicted by Oliver (1991), when 
rules or norms are not broadly diffused or supported by society, organizations are less 
likely to respond to institutional pressures because their social validity is questioned, 
and, consequently, voluntary diffusion is less likely to occur. For EU-15 firms operating 
globally, international environment may be perceived as fragmented in the extent that 
values, norms and practices concerning the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and the 
appropriate accounting model for emissions trading schemes are not broadly diffused or 
widely validated among host countries. So, international pressures may be seen as less 
convincing or weaker than domestic constraints, and the fragmentation of international 
environment may lead to organizational skepticism (Oliver, 1991, p. 159) about the 
strategic utility of carbon financial disclosure as a tool to manage a multiplicity of 
foreign stakeholders. Therefore, to investigate if internationalization through foreign 
sales exerts a strong “disciplinarian effect” over firms operating globally, by enhancing 
the level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in their annual accounts, 
irrespective of the regulatory background or environmental awareness in host countries, 
the following hypothesis is put forward: 
H7a: Ceteris paribus, the level of carbon financial is predicted to be higher among 
firms with more exposure to foreign markets, than among firms operating mainly in 
domestic markets. 
On the other hand, in line with Webb et al. (2008), the effects of internationalization are 
expected to be more pronounced for EU-15 firms under no mandatory regime (when 
compared with firms under mandatory guidance), because those firms most probably 
face the scrutiny of foreign markets where carbon financial disclosure is more valued 
than in home-country.  
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In particular, to improve reputation in external markets, firms with higher international 
exposure have more incentives to follow non-mandatory guidance in home-country, 
than firms operating mainly in domestic markets. Moreover, in accordance with 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory, by calling the public attention to the relevant 
information to be provided in the annual accounts, home-country guidance 
recommending clear benchmarks for disclosure, though non-mandatory, is more likely 
to put pressure for further information (Frost, 2007; Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Peters 
and Romi, 2013), namely on entities applying IFRS (Barbu et al., 2014). As a result, not 
mandatory detailed guidance is an incentive for the release of higher levels of 
disclosure, especially among those firms seeking to build trust in front of a broader 
range of stakeholders. Therefore, to investigate if non-mandatory guidance establishing 
detailed items for disclosure underpins a positive relationship between the degree of 
internationalization and the level of voluntary disclosure, the following hypothesis is 
put forward: 
H7b: The increment in the level of carbon financial disclosure among firms with more 
exposure to foreign markets, when compared with firms operating mainly in domestic 
markets, is predicted to be higher under not mandatory detailed guidance (scenario 
B2), than under any other type of guidance in home-country on how to report GHG 
emission allowances (scenarios A | B1 | C). 
Figure 5-1 summarizes the hypotheses (H1 to H7b) to test the existence of a 
“disciplinarian effect” of standards and markets over the level of carbon financial 
disclosure.  
The analysis comprises, as control variables, firm’s size, ownership concentration, 
profitability and leverage, on the grounds of being firm-specific characteristics usually 
pointed out in literature as significant predictors of voluntary disclosure (refer to section 
4.4). Additionally, considering that national business systems are likely to affect firms’ 
strategic choices, namely in the ways in which they communicate with stakeholders 
(Midttun et al., 2006; Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011; Carnevale et al., 2012; Faisal et 
al., 2012), the influence of institutional environment in firms’ home-country is also 
included in the analysis to check the robustness of results. 
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Figure 5-1: Synthesis of the hypotheses testing the “disciplinarian effect” of standards 
and markets on the level of carbon financial disclosure 
 
H6: Ceteris paribus, Foreign_Listed firms > Domestic_Listed firms
Ceteris paribus, the level of disclosure is predicted to be higher among foreign listed firms, than among firms listed only 
in domestic stock exchanges.
H7a: Ceteris paribus, High Foreign Sales&Markets > Low Foreign Sales&Markets
Ceteris paribus, the level of disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms with more exposure to foreign markets, 
than among firms operating mainly in domestic markets.
H5: Ceteris paribus, High carbon intensive industries  > Other industries
Ceteris paribus, the level of disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms operating in more carbon intensive 
industries, than among other firms.
NOT MANDATORY GUIDANCE
Scenario B
Not_Mand_Guid
NOT DETAILED
Scenario B1
NMND_Guid
H2: NMD_Guid > NMND_Guid
The level of disclosure is predicted to be 
higher among firms domiciled in 
countries where national guidance, 
though not mandatory for entities under 
IFRS, comprises detailed requests for 
disclosure, than among firms domiciled 
in countries where not mandatory 
guidance does not specify detailed 
requests for disclosure.
H3: Mand_Guid > Not_Mand_Guid or No_Guid
The level of disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms under mandatory guidance, 
than among firms under no mandatory regime.
H1: Not_Mand_Guid > No_Guid
The level of disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms domiciled in 
countries where national guidance was issued, though not mandatory for entities 
under IFRS, than among firms domiciled in countries where 
no guidance was provided.
H5: Hypothesis testing industry effects on the level of disclosure
H6 to H7b: Hypotheses testing the “disciplinarian effect” of markets on the level of disclosure
DETAILED
Scenario B2
NMD_Guid
H1 to H4: Hypotheses testing the “disciplinarian effect” of accounting standards on the level of disclosure
NO GUIDANCE
Scenario A
No_Guid
MANDATORY GUIDANCE
(detailed)
Scenario C
Mand_Guid
H4: Quantitative disclosure under Mand_Guid > Quantitative disclosure under Not_Mand_Guid or No_Guid
The level of quantitative disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms under mandatory guidance 
than among firms under no mandatory regime.
H7b: (∆ High | Low FS&Markets) under NMD_Guid > (∆ High | Low FS&Markets) under Mand_Guid , NMND_Guid or No_Guid
The increment in the level of disclosure of firms with more exposure to foreign markets, when compared with firms 
operating mainly in domestic markets, is predicted to be higher under not mandatory detailed guidance, than under any 
other type of guidance in home-country.
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5.3. Data and method 
5.3.1. Sample 
The initial working list of entities operating installations covered by EU-ETS was 
obtained from the EC Climate Action website4. The selected sample was then restricted 
to listed firms with registered address in those Member States (EU-15) that share a 
common agreement under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce GHG emissions. Firms were 
excluded when not covered by both the Supplementary Commitment Period (2005-
2007), and the First Commitment Period (2008-2012) or when allowances initially 
allocated were revoked before the end of the correspondent trading period. Next table 
summarizes sample breakdown by country of domicile and by industry using the 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) classification system. 
Table 5-1: Sample breakdown by country of domicile and by industry 
Industry Oil & Gas Basic Industrials Consumer Goods Utilities Other
Country Materials & Services n %
Austria 1 2 3 1 2 0 9 5,4
Belgium 0 4 2 1 0 1 8 4,7
Denmark 0 1 2 4 0 1 8 4,7
Finland 1 5 1 1 1 0 9 5,4
France 2 1 6 5 3 0 17 10,1
Germany 0 5 5 6 3 3 22 13,1
Greece 2 1 1 0 1 0 5 3,0
Ireland 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 2,4
Italy 3 0 5 4 4 0 16 9,5
Netherlands 1 3 3 2 0 0 9 5,4
Portugal 1 1 4 0 1 0 7 4,2
Spain 2 10 7 1 2 0 22 13,1
Sweden 0 5 4 3 0 0 12 7,1
United Kingdom 3 2 2 6 3 4 20 11,9
n 16 40 46 36 20 10 168
% 9,5 23,8 27,4 21,4 11,9 6,0 100,0
Total 
Total
 
As described in Annex I, final sample comprises 168 listed firms from fourteen EU 
countries, being that in Luxembourg no firm has fulfilled the selection criteria. The 
research covers an eight-year period, from 2005 to 2012, amounting to 1 344 firm-year 
observations. The selection of the beginning period has been due to the start of the first 
trading period of EU-ETS in 2005. 
For the purpose of confirming the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of accounting 
standards, sample firms were classified according to the type of formal guidance in 
home-country (no guidance, not mandatory guidance, mandatory guidance), and the 
                                                             
4 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
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type of requests on disclosure items (detailed versus not detailed), arriving at four 
categories (no guidance, not-mandatory not-detailed guidance, not-mandatory detailed 
guidance, and mandatory (detailed) guidance), as summarized in the next table. 
Table 5-2: Sample breakdown by type of guidance in home-country 
Type of guidance 
(2005-2012) 
Country Firm-year observations 
       N % 
No Guidance Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, UK 
592 44,0 
Not Mandatory Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Portugal 
576 42,9 
of which:    
Not Mandatory Not Detailed Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany 
448 77,8 
Not Mandatory Detailed Finland, Portugal 128 22,2 
Mandatory (detailed) Spain 176 13,1 
Total  1 344 100,0 
Additionally, for the purpose of testing the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of 
markets, sample firms were labelled according two dimensions: entities acting 
internationally (i) through the stock markets, according to the firm’s listing status; or, 
(ii) through the markets of products and services rendered by each firm, according to the 
geographical location of its customers. 
Concerning the listing status, firms whose shares were listed in more than one stock 
exchange, the domestic and at least one foreign stock market, were classified as foreign 
listed firms, irrespective of their percentage of sales to foreign markets, as described in 
Tables 5-6 and 5-7. Regarding the internationalization through the markets of products 
and services, firms were evaluated according both the intensity of sales outside the 
country of domicile and the variety of markets where foreign customers are located. 
This procedure intends to overcome the fact that the percentage of foreign sales does not 
capture, by itself, the diversity of markets to which the firms is exposed. So, the level of 
internationalization was assigned through a composite measure weighting the 
percentage of sales to foreign markets by the relative number of foreign reportable 
geographical segments, for each firm, arriving at variable Foreign Sales & Markets 
described in Tables 5-6 and 5-7. 
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5.3.2. Data collection 
Data, from 2005 to 2012, was hand-collected from firms’ websites and stock 
exchanges’ websites. Annual reports were downloaded directly from firms’ websites. 
Each firm’s annual report was read, and data concerning to its accounting policy choice, 
as well as attached disclosure in other explanatory notes on GHG emission allowances, 
were collected in order to compute a disclosure index for each year under review.  
The percentage of sales to foreign markets and the number of geographical segments 
were computed from the disclosure note on “operating segments” in the financial 
statements, assuming as foreign all markets outside the country in which the firm is 
registered.  
Regarding to geographical segments, the number of segments reported by each firm was 
first collected. Then, considering that for some firms the reporting units for 
geographical segments are continents or regions while other firms report on a country-
by-country basis, an adjusted measure was adopted to assure consistency in evaluating 
the exposure to different foreign markets. The adjustment consisted in reclassifying the 
segments reported by each firm according to the following categories: 0) country of 
firm’s domicile; 1) other European countries; 2) America; 3) Africa; 4) Asia; and 5) 
Rest of the World. It should be noted that a finer discrimination would be of interest. 
However, firms’ annual reports do not provide further detailed comparable information 
on this matter. 
Also, total assets, total debt, turnover, and net profit were collected in order to evaluate 
firms’ size, profitability and leverage. When the reporting currency unit was not the 
euro, the conversion was made by applying the relevant exchange rates at the balance 
sheet date.  
Finally, industrial sector classification, listing status, and ownership structure were 
assessed through “company profile” provided either in stock exchange websites or 
firms’ websites, and checked in the annual reports as needed. 
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5.3.3. Data analysis 
The aim of the analysis is to examine the effect of firm-level and country-level 
explanatory variables on carbon financial disclosure, and to test if the explanatory 
variables at the country-level (type of guidance) serve as moderators of the firm-level 
relationships between the degree of internationalization and the level of disclosure. As 
described earlier, the sample consists of repeated observations, over the course of eight 
years, for 168 firms domiciled in fourteen EU countries, featuring a structure that is 
commonly known in literature as a multilevel or hierarchical structure. In view of this, 
multilevel (hierarchical) models were estimated to test the hypotheses formulated earlier 
in section 5.2.  
In past research, multistage data were often examined using conventional multiple 
regression analysis5 with a dependent variable measured at the firm-level and a set of 
predictors from different levels of analysis (e.g., firm-level and country-level 
explanatory variables). However, treating all available data at one single stage, suffers 
from conceptual and statistical problems as discussed by, amongst others, Goldstein 
(1986), Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), Willett et al. (1998), Singer and Willett (2003), 
Rabe‐Hesketh and Skrondal (2004, 2008), and Hox (2010). From a conceptual 
perspective, the problem consists of analyzing the data at one level, and drawing 
conclusions at another level. From a statistical point of view, if data from subunits (e.g., 
firms) are aggregated into fewer higher level units (e.g., countries), information is lost, 
and the statistical analysis loses power. On the other hand, if data are disaggregated 
ordinary statistical tests treat all the disaggregated values as independent information 
from a larger sample leading to “... many spuriously ‘significant’ results”, as discussed 
by Hox (2010, p. 5). 
Ordinary least squares regression methods assume independence and homoscedasticity 
of residuals. However, in longitudinal data the residuals tend to be autocorrelated and 
heteroscedastic, and the violation of these assumptions results in biased standard errors. 
Although there are general accepted procedures to correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, the problem of condensing in a single level of analysis variables 
                                                             
5 Refer to Bryan and Jenkins (2013) for a detailed review of regression modelling approaches to 
modelling individual and country effects from multilevel country data. 
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from different hierarchical stages still remains. In multilevel problems, there are not 
only individuals clustered within groups, but there are also variables measured at all 
available levels. In view of this, “Combining variables from different levels in one 
statistical model is a different and more complicated problem than estimating and 
correcting for design effects” (Hox, 2010, p. 6). As a consequence, hierarchical models 
are more appropriate than conventional multiple regressions to examine multilevel data 
because they are designed to analyze variables from different levels simultaneously, 
using a statistical model that includes the various dependencies. 
The multilevel regression model is a hierarchical linear regression model, with a 
dependent variable defined at the lowest level (usual the individual), and explanatory 
variables at all existing levels. In longitudinal designs, which is a particular case of 
multilevel models, the repeated measures (occasions) within individuals are the lowest 
level. Then, the individual level becomes the second level, being possible to add a third 
or higher levels of analysis (Goldstein, 1986; Singer and Willet, 2003; Hox, 2010). 
In the present study, a three‐level model is applied in which the hierarchical structure of 
the data assumes the country as the outmost level (the third level), the firms as the 
second‐level, and the repeated observations over time (occasions) as the first‐level units. 
That is to say, the model considers repeated measurements nested within firms that are 
clustered within different countries. An important implication of this structure is that 
measurements within the same country are correlated, and that measurements within the 
same firm are correlated even further. Multilevel models (variance component models 
or random coefficient models) are designed to model and estimate such within-cluster 
correlations. 
The advantages of using multilevel models to analyze repeated measures data are 
pointed out by, amongst others, Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), Willett et al. (1998), 
Singer and Willett (2003), and Hox (2010). As stated by Willett et al. (1998, p. 395), 
the flexibility of this statistical model provides researchers with more powerful ways of 
answering their research questions. For instance, by specifying varying regression 
coefficients at the occasion level, multilevel models allow different trajectories for each 
individual (individual growth modeling), by specifying a specific structure for the 
variances and covariances at either level of analysis, multilevel models allow the 
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covariances between the repeated measures to be modeled as well, and by simply 
adding time-varying or time-constant explanatory variables, multilevel models allow to 
model both the average group development, and the individual development. 
In multilevel models the parameters (regression coefficients and variance components) 
are commonly estimated using Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods. The ML method is 
a general estimation procedure which produces estimates for the population parameters 
that maximize the probability of observing the data that are actually observed, given the 
model (Eliason, 1993). An advantage of the ML estimation method is that estimates 
have three desirable properties: they are asymptotically unbiased (consistent); 
asymptotically normally distributed; and asymptotically efficient. In large samples these 
properties are likely to hold, in small samples they hold only approximately6. 
Two different likelihood functions are currently used: the Full ML (FML), and the 
Restricted ML (RML). In practice the differences between the two methods are 
generally minor (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Hox, 1998, 2010), being that RML should, 
in theory, lead to better estimates, especially when the number of groups is small (Brye 
and Raudenbush, 1992; Longford, 1993). However, one disadvantage of RML, when 
compared to FML, is that the likelihood ratio test cannot be used to compare two 
models with different fixed effects specifications, only the differences in the random 
part (the variance components) can be evaluate. Aiming at to control if differences 
between the estimates are actually trivial (as suggested by previous literature), models 
were estimated using both RML and FML functions, being the latter used to perform 
overall likelihood ratio (LR) tests. 
From the likelihood function, a statistic called the deviance can be computed as minus 
two times the value of the log likelihood (where the likelihood is the value of the ML 
function at convergence). In general, models with a lower deviance fit better than 
models with a higher deviance. If a smaller model is a subset of (nested in) a larger 
model, the difference between the two deviances can be tested against a chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters 
                                                             
6 How large a sample must be to assure these properties is a question that does not have a straightforward 
answer. Long (1997) recommends a minimum of 100 individuals, while Snijders and Bosker (1999) 
admit a minimum of 30. Refer to Hox (2010, pp. 233-237) for a discussion of sample sizes and accuracy 
of estimates in multilevel models. 
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estimated in each model. This procedure was used to test whether a more general model 
fits significantly better than a simpler model. It was also applied to test the significance 
of random effects by comparing the deviance of a model containing the additional 
variances and covariances to the deviance of the same model without these particular 
random terms. As regard to the significance of fixed effects (regression coefficients), it 
was evaluated with individual Wald tests (i.e., the parameter estimate was divided by its 
standard error, and the result was referred to the standard normal distribution). 
The strategy for building the model consisted in a bottom-up approach, as illustrated in 
Table 5-3. It is the most common procedure in multilevel modelling (Hox, 2008, pp. 55-
56), and starts by analyzing the simplest possible model (the null model or intercept-
only model). Then, explanatory variables are added, on a step-by-step basis, to test the 
hypothesis H1 to H7b formulated earlier. In the first step, the intercept only model gives 
an estimate of the intraclass correlation (the proportion of the variance explained by the 
grouping structure in the population), and a value of the deviance (the degree of misfit 
of the model). In the following steps, those benchmarks are used to assess the 
contribution of each parameter that is added, and to test the improvement in the 
adjustment of the model (i.e., the decrease of model misfit). Then, the decision of which 
regression coefficients or co(variances) are to keep in the model is based on the 
significance tests, the change in the deviance, and the changes in the variance 
components.  
Following previous literature (Hox, 2010, p. 55), final models (Model 5-5.1 to Model 
5.6.2) are as parsimonious as possible, including only those parameters that are of 
special interest for the present investigation or have proven their worth in previous 
research. The estimation was made using version 12.0 of the software STATA. 
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Table 5-3: Model specification following a bottom-up approach 
Step 1
Model 5-0: Null model with 2 hierarchical levels
DISCt i = β00 + ɛt i + µ0i
Model 5-1: Null model with 3 hierarchical levels
DISCt ij = γ000 + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Step 2
Model 5-2.1: Model 5-1 plus Time (linear trend)
DISCt ij = γ000 + γ100 Yeart ij + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Model 5-2.2: Model 5-1 plus Time (quadratic trend)
DISCt ij = γ000 + γ100 Yeart ij + γ200 Year_sqrt ij + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Step 3
Model 5-3: Model 5-2.2 plus time-varying covariates and level-2 predictors
DISCt ij = γ000 + γ100 Yeart ij + γ200 Year_sqrt ij + γ300 FS&Mt ij + γ400 FListt ij +
            + γ010 Indij +
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Step 4
Model 5-4: Model 5-3 plus level-3 predictors
DISCt ij = γ000 + γ100 Yeart ij + γ200 Year_sqrt ij + γ300 FS&Mt ij + γ400 FListt ij +
            + γ010 Indij +
            + γ001 Mand_Guidj + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + 
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Step 5
Model 5-5.1: Model 5-4 plus cross-level interactions and random slopes at level-2 (FS&M)
DISCt ij = γ000 + γ100 Yeart ij + γ200 Year_sqrt ij + γ300 FS&Mt ij + γ400 FListt ij + 
            + γ010 Indij +
            + γ001 Mand_Guidj + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + 
            + γ101 Yeart ij x Mand_Guidj + γ301 FS&Mt ij x Mand_Guidj +  
            + γ102 Yeart ij x NMD_Guidj + γ302 FS&Mt ij x NMD_Guidj +
            + γ103 Yeart ij x NMND_Guidj + γ303 FS&Mt ij x NMND_Guidj +
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j + µ3ij FS&Mt ij 
Model 5-5.2: Model 5-5.1 with DIFRSt ij (IFRS disclosure index) as the dependent variable
Model 5-5.3: Model 5-5.1 with DQuantt ij (Quantitative disclosure index) as the dependent variable
Model 5-5.4: Model 5-5.1 with DQualitt ij (Qualitative disclosure index) as the dependent variable
Step 6
Model 5-6.1: Model 5-5.1 plus control variables (Size | OwC | CME | MME)
DISCt ij = γ000 + γ100Yeart ij + γ200Year_sqrt ij + γ300FS&Mt ij + γ400FListt ij + γ500Sizet ij + γ600OwCt ij+
            + γ010 Indij +
            + γ001 Mand_Guidj + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + γ004 CMEj + γ005 MMEj
            + γ101 Yeart ij x Mand_Guidj + γ301 FS&Mt ij x Mand_Guidj +
            + γ102 Yeart ij x NMD_Guidj + γ302 FS&Mt ij x NMD_Guidj +
            + γ103 Yeart ij x NMND_Guidj + γ303 FS&Mt ij x NMND_Guidj +
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j + µ3ij FS&Mt ij
Model 5-6.2: Model 5-6.1 with DIFRSt ij (IFRS disclosure index) as the dependent variable  
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where: 
Subscripts t i j represent measurement occasion, firm, and country, respectively. 
DISC represents the firm’s disclosure index, covering the items related to GHG 
emission allowances within IFRS and Resolution ICAC (2006). 
DIFRS represents the firm’s disclosure index covering the items related to GHG 
emission allowances only within IFRS. 
DQuant represents the firm’s disclosure index covering only quantitative (hard) 
information related to GHG emission allowances within IFRS and Resolution 
ICAC (2006). 
DQualit represents the firm’s disclosure index covering only qualitative (soft) 
information related to GHG emission allowances within IFRS and Resolution 
ICAC (2006). 
Year represents the time variable that indicates the measurement occasion. 
FS&M is a level-1 time-varying covariate representing the degree of internationalization 
of the firm according to the intensity of foreign sales and the variety of foreign markets. 
FList is a level-1 time-varying covariate representing internationalization through 
capital markets, according to the firm’s listing status. 
Ind is a level-2 time-invariant predictor representing the firm’s industry affiliation. 
Mand_Guid, NMD_Guid, NMND_Guid are level-3 explanatory variables representing 
type of guidance, on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts, in each country: 
Mand_Guid - Mandatory Guidance; NMD_Guid - Not Mandatory Detailed Guidance; 
NMND_Guid - Not Mandatory Not Detailed Guidance (being No_Guid - No Guidance 
the omitted category). 
Size, OwC are control variables (level-1 time-varying covariates) representing the firm’s 
size and ownership concentration, respectively. 
MME, CME are level-3 control variables representing the type of business system in 
each country: MME - Mixed Market Economies; CME - Coordinated Market 
Economies (being LME - Liberal Market Economies the omitted category). 
ɛti, µ0i, ɛtij, µ0ij, µ3ij FS&Mtij, 00j represent random error terms. 
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The dependent variable (disclosure index) 
For the purpose of measuring firms’ level of disclosure, a disclosure index 
(dichotomous, unweighted, and adjusted for non-applicable items) has been constructed. 
First, the content analysis technique was applied to firms’ annual reports, which were 
comprehensively analyzed, as described further. In accordance with the Resolution 
ICAC (2006), the analysis covers all the relevant items listed in the general provisions 
of previous standards (IAS 38, IAS 37, IAS 20), and additional information required by 
Article 9th of ICAC (2006). The list totals 34 items grouped as follows: 
General provisions within IFRS 13  
of which    
IAS 38 6   
IAS 37 5   
IAS 20 2   
Resolution ICAC (2006) additional note 21  
Total disclosure items 34  
The detailed components of the index are presented in Annex II.  
Following related literature, each issue in the checklist is treated as a dummy variable 
(dichotomously). A score of one is assigned to an item if it is disclosed and a score of 
zero otherwise. In assigning the score for each item, its applicability to each firm was 
taken into account.  
Concerning accounting policy choice, the related income statement and balance sheet 
notes were checked to assure that declarations in the accounting policy note were being 
interpreted correctly. If a firm’s accounting policy was not stated and could not be 
determined from other disclosure note, the firm was included in the “not disclosed” 
category. It should be noted that all firms in the sample operate installations under EU-
ETS. Therefore, the sample comprises no “non-applicable” cases on the topic of 
accounting policy. As regards the information to be provided in other explanatory notes 
to the annual accounts, whenever data concerning contingent liabilities, and costs with 
fines or penalties related to GHG emissions was missing, the distinction between “non-
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applicable” and “non-disclosure” cases was based upon the statements made in the 
correspondent sustainability or environmental reports about those same issues7. 
Then, for each firm, a total score is calculated as equaling the unweighted sum of the 
relevant (applicable) items for that firm. Here, the implied assumption is that each item 
is equally important for all user groups. Although some disclosures might be of more 
importance than others (Cooke, 1989; Adams et al., 1998), to assign different weight to 
various items would introduce more subjectivity and might lead to a greater bias than 
the one resulting from the unweighted scoring approach (Gray et al., 1995b) selected for 
this study. Finally, a percentage is computed, for each area as well as for the checklist as 
a whole, according to the following expression: 
 
where:  
DISCi represents the level of disclosure (disclosure index) for firm i  
m is the maximum number of relevant (applicable) items that firm i may disclose 
dj is a dummy variable equaling 1 if item j is disclosed, and 0 otherwise. 
Tables 5-4 and 5-5 summarize descriptive statistics for the dependent variable. Items 
directly related to disclosure on GHG emission allowances within IFRS, and those 
introduced by ICAC (2006) were analyzed either separately (DIFRS, DICAC) or as a 
whole (DISC). Additionally, following Cormier et al. (2009), the whole set of headings 
was rearranged into two different subgroups, according to the nature of the information 
they convey. The items covering quantitative (hard) information were combined into a 
single disclosure index (DQuant) to measure the level of more objective, informative, 
and credible disclosure. The remaining items were pooled into another index (DQualit) 
to capture the level of merely declarative (soft) disclosure. The detailed components of 
each index are presented in Annex II. 
                                                             
7 Namely, Indicators EC2 (Financial implications and other risks and opportunities for the organization’s 
activities due to climate change), and EN28 (Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-
monetary sanctions for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations) required by GRI’s G3.1 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. 
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Table 5-4: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, over 2005-2012 
PANEL A PANEL B
% Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
592 44,0 Overall disclosure index (DISC)  0,12 0,19 0,00 0,74
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS) 0,13 0,22 0,00 0,85
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)  0,11 0,20 0,00 0,86
Disclosure on quantitative items (DQuant) 0,05 0,12 0,00 0,62
Disclosure on qualitative items (DQualit) 0,22 0,33 0,00 1,00
576 42,9 Overall disclosure index (DISC)  0,33 0,27 0,00 0,85
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS) 0,37 0,29 0,00 1,00
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)  0,30 0,28 0,00 0,90
Disclosure on quantitative items (DQuant) 0,18 0,22 0,00 0,81
Disclosure on qualitative items (DQualit) 0,56 0,40 0,00 1,00
448 Overall disclosure index (DISC)  0,27 0,25 0,00 0,85
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS) 0,32 0,27 0,00 0,92
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)  0,24 0,26 0,00 0,86
Disclosure on quantitative items (DQuant) 0,14 0,19 0,00 0,71
Disclosure on qualitative items (DQualit) 0,49 0,39 0,00 1,00
128 Overall disclosure index (DISC)  0,52 0,24 0,00 0,85
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS) 0,54 0,30 0,00 1,00
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)  0,51 0,25 0,00 0,90
Disclosure on quantitative items (DQuant) 0,34 0,25 0,00 0,81
Disclosure on qualitative items (DQualit) 0,81 0,31 0,00 1,00
176 13,1 Overall disclosure index (DISC)  0,75 0,19 0,00 1,00
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS) 0,79 0,23 0,00 1,00
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)  0,73 0,18 0,00 1,00
Disclosure on quantitative items (DQuant) 0,65 0,27 0,00 1,00
Disclosure on qualitative items (DQualit) 0,91 0,12 0,00 1,00
1 344 100,0 Overall disclosure index (DISC)  0,29 0,31 0,00 1,00
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS) 0,32 0,33 0,00 1,00
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)  0,27 0,31 0,00 1,00
Disclosure on quantitative items (DQuant) 0,19 0,27 0,00 1,00
Disclosure on qualitative items (DQualit) 0,45 0,42 0,00 1,00
Full sample
Mandatory Guidance
Not Mandatory Guidance
of which:
B1 Not Mandatory Not Detailed
B2 Not Mandatory Detailed
Scenario C
Firm-year observations
Scenario A 
No Guidance
Scenario B 
 
DISC: Overall disclosure index, covering the items related to GHG emission allowances within 
IFRS and Resolution ICAC (2006). 
DIFRS: IFRS disclosure index, covering the items related to GHG emission allowances only 
within IFRS. 
DICAC: ICAC disclosure index, covering only the items added by Resolution ICAC (2006). 
DQuant: Quantitative disclosure index, covering only quantitative information related to GHG 
emission allowances within IFRS and ICAC (2006). 
DQualit: Qualitative disclosure index, covering only qualitative information related to GHG 
emission allowances within IFRS and ICAC (2006). 
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Over the research period, the index (DISC) mean for the whole sample was of 0,29. 
Higher levels of disclosure are observed among firms under mandatory guidance, where 
mean reached a score of 0,75. Moreover, the level of disclosure for firms domiciled in 
countries where national guidance was issued, though not mandatory for firms under 
IFRS, reached a mean of 0,33, more than doubling the mean of 0,12 observed among 
firms domiciled in countries where no specific guidelines on accounting for GHG 
emission allowances were provided. When performing the non-parametric Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney (WMW) test to compare subsamples, results indicate that these 
differences are statistically significant to a level of significance of 1%. Thus far, in line 
with prior research (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 
2010) results suggest that, though not ensuring full compliance, formal guidance 
increases the level of environmental disclosure in the annual accounts. 
Additionally, a more in-depth analysis of firms domiciled in countries where not 
mandatory guidance was delivered (Table 5-4 | scenario B) shows that, where national 
guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances includes specific requests on 
disclosure items (Table 5-4 | scenario B2), the disclosure index has a mean of 0,52, 
while where no specific requests on disclosure items were set out (Table 5-4 | 
scenario B1), the observed average equals only 0,27. When performing the WMW test 
to compare subsamples, results indicate that differences are statistically significant to a 
level of significance of 1%. Hence, exploratory analysis seems in line with previous 
research (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Peters and Romi, 2013) suggesting that higher 
levels of disclosure are more likely to occur when guidance is clearly delineated.  
Also, the annual evolution of the disclosure index under mandatory guidance seems 
consistent with Deegan’s (2002) assertion that, at least, a minimum of information is 
ensured by regulations. The Resolution ICAC (2006) was issued in 8 February 2006, 
entering into force on the day following that of publication in the Official State Bulletin. 
As the standard was delivered in early 2006, some firms may have it applied to 2005 
accounts. So, already in this first year the level of disclosure by Spanish firms was 
significantly higher than in any other subsample (Table 5-5). Full effects of the standard 
came in 2006, leading to an increase of the disclosure index, being that, from there on, 
no cases of non-disclosure were registered among firms under mandatory guidance. 
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Table 5-5: Descriptive statistics for the overall disclosure index (DISC), by year 
Type of guidance
% Year Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
592 44,0 2005 0,10 0,19   0,00 0,74
2006 0,11 0,18   0,00 0,74
2007 0,12 0,19   0,00 0,74
2008 0,12 0,19   0,00 0,74
2009 0,12 0,19 0,00 0,74
2010 0,12 0,19 0,00 0,74
2011 0,12 0,19 0,00 0,74
2012 0,12 0,19   0,00 0,74
576 42,9 2005 0,28 0,26   0,00 0,74
2006 0,33 0,28   0,00 0,85
2007 0,33 0,28   0,00 0,85
2008 0,33 0,27   0,00 0,85
2009 0,35 0,27   0,00 0,85
2010 0,34 0,27   0,00 0,85
2011 0,34 0,27   0,00 0,85
2012 0,34 0,27 0,00 0,85
of which:
448 2005 0,25 0,24   0,00 0,71
2006 0,28 0,25   0,00 0,79
2007 0,28 0,25   0,00 0,79
2008 0,27 0,25   0,00 0,82
2009 0,27 0,25   0,00 0,82
2010 0,28 0,25   0,00 0,82
2011 0,29 0,26   0,00 0,85
2012 0,29 0,26 0,00 0,85
128 2005 0,40 0,29   0,00 0,74
2006 0,53 0,27   0,00 0,85
2007 0,52 0,28   0,00 0,85
2008 0,54 0,23   0,00 0,85
2009 0,55 0,22   0,00 0,85
2010 0,55 0,22   0,00 0,85
2011 0,55 0,22   0,00 0,85
2012 0,55 0,22 0,00 0,85
176 13,1 2005 0,66 0,26   0,00 1,00
2006 0,76 0,16 0,44 1,00
2007 0,75 0,17 0,38 1,00
2008 0,76 0,16 0,38 1,00
2009 0,77 0,18 0,32 1,00
2010 0,77 0,18 0,32 1,00
2011 0,77 0,18 0,32 1,00
2012 0,77 0,18 0,32 1,00
1 344 100,0 2005 0,25 0,29   0,00 1,00
2006 0,29 0,31   0,00 1,00
2007 0,29 0,31   0,00 1,00
2008 0,30 0,30   0,00 1,00
2009 0,30 0,31   0,00 1,00
2010 0,30 0,31   0,00 1,00
2011 0,30 0,31   0,00 1,00
2012 0,30 0,31   0,00 1,00
Full sample
B2 Not Mandatory Detailed
Scenario C
Mandatory Guidance
Scenario A 
No Guidance
Scenario B 
Not Mandatory Guidance
B1 Not Mandatory Not Detailed
Firm-year observations
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Notwithstanding, the descriptive statistics for the disclosure index, on an item-by-item 
basis (Annex III | Annex IV), suggest that mandatory guidance doesn’t give rise to a 
similar increase in all headings. Over 2005-2012, under mandatory guidance, the 
highest mean score (0,99) corresponds to the description of the “valuation methods 
applied”, while the lowest mean value (0,23) regards to “fines and contingent 
liabilities”.  
Furthermore, when considering the release on quantitative (monetary and non-
monetary) versus qualitative (declarative) information (Table 5-4 | DQuant vs DQualit), 
patterns of disclosure reveal that, on average, quantitative items show lower levels of 
disclosure than those headings addressing qualitative information, for all and each one 
of the scenarios under review. In particular, for firms under mandatory guidance, the 
average level of disclosure concerning quantitative data (0,65) is 26 percentage points 
lower than the one observed for qualitative information (0,91). 
The independent variables 
According to the hypotheses formulated in section 5.2, the independent variables are 
time, internationalization, industry affiliation, and type of guidance in home-country. 
Additionally, size, profitability, leverage, ownership concentration and institutional 
environment were considered as control variables. Tables 5-6 and 5-7 summarize the 
proxies for these explanatory variables and their descriptive statistics. Correlation 
matrices are presented in Annex V. 
Table 5-6: Definitions and proxies of the independent variables  
Variables Definitions and proxies 
Time 
Year 
 
Ordinal variable, labeled from 0 to 7, representing the 
years 2005 to 2012, respectively. 
Internationalization 
Foreign_Listing 
(FList) 
 
 
Dummy variable capturing internationalization trough 
capital markets. Equals 0 for firms listed only in domestic 
stock exchanges, and 1 for firms listed in both domestic 
and foreign stock exchanges. 
Foreign Sales & Markets 
(FS&M) 
Continuous variable representing percentage of sales to 
foreign markets weighted by the relative number of 
foreign reportable geographical segments. 
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Industry affiliation 
Industry 
(Ind) 
 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for the more carbon 
intensive industries (utilities | oil&gas | basic materials), 
and 0 otherwise (industrials | consumer goods&services | 
other) (Stanny and Ely, 2008; Choi et al., 2013) 
Type of guidance 
No Guidance 
(No_Guid) 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for countries where no 
specific guidance on how to report GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts was delivered, and 0 
otherwise (the omitted category). 
Not-Mandatory Guidance 
(Not_Mand_Guid) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for countries where 
national guidance on how to report GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts is not mandatory for 
firms under IFRS, and 0 otherwise. 
Mandatory Guidance 
(Mand_Guid) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for countries where 
national guidance on how to report GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts (covering specific 
requests on disclosure items) is mandatory for firms under 
IFRS, and 0 otherwise. 
Alternately Not-Mandatory Guidance is divided into two categories: 
Not-Mandatory Detailed 
(NMD_Guid) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for countries where 
national guidance on how to report GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts, not mandatory for 
firms under IFRS, includes specific requests on disclosure 
items, and 0 otherwise. 
Not-Mandatory Not-Detailed 
(NMND_Guid) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for countries where 
national guidance on how to report GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts, not mandatory for 
firms under IFRS, does not include specific requests on 
disclosure items, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
Size 
 
 
Size measured by natural logarithm of total assets at the 
end of fiscal year (Choi et al., 2013). 
 Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Profitability measured by return on assets 
(Choi et al., 2013). 
Leverage 
(LEV) 
Leverage measured by percentage of total debt to book 
value of equity (Choi et al., 2013). 
Ownership Concentration 
(OwC) 
 
Dummy variable that equals 0 if no investor or related 
investors own more than 20% of a firm’s votes; and 1 
otherwise (Aerts et al., 2008). 
Institutional environment 
 
Types of business system  
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Carnevale et al., 2012) 
Coordinated Market Economies 
(CME) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and 0 
otherwise. 
Mixed Market Economies 
(MME) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, and 0 otherwise. 
Liberal Market Economies 
(LME) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for Ireland and UK, and 0 
otherwise (the omitted category). 
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Table 5-7: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables, over 2005-2012 
PANEL A
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign Sales (%)   68,1   26,2   0,0   99,0
Foreign Sales&Markets (%)   46,7   26,8   0,0   99,0
Assets (M€)  24 528  44 960   59  369 992
LnAssets   8,8   1,8   4,1   12,8
Turnover (M€)  17 925  39 932   62  470 171
LnTurnover   8,5   1,7   4,1   13,1
Return on Assets (%)   4,6   6,0 (  42,1)   32,6
Leverage   2,4   4,2   0,2   116,9
PANEL B
Non-continuous variables N %
Foreign-Listing
0 Only domestic stock exchanges 1 117 83,1
1 Foreign stock exchanges 227 16,9
Industry
0 Industrials, Consumer G&S, Other 736 54,8
1 Utilities, Oil&Gas, Basic Materials 608 45,2
Ownership concentration
0 Less than 20% of votes 620 46,1
1 20% of votes or more 724 53,9
Type of Guidance
        No Guidance 592 44,0
        Not Mandatory Guidance 576 42,9
           of which:
           Not Mandatory Not Detailed Guidance 448 77,8
           Not Mandatory Detailed Guidance 128 22,2
        Mandatory Guidance  176 13,1
Institutional environment
        Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 616 45,8
        Mixed Market Economies (MME) 536 39,9
        Liberal Market Economies (LME) 192 14,3
1 344 100,0Firm-year observations  
As presented in Table 5-7, the sample comprises a great variety of firms, in terms of 
their dimension, level of internationalization and financial condition (measured by 
return on assets and leverage). 
With regard to size, measure by total assets, full sample ranges from a minimum of 59 
to a maximum of € 369 992 million, arriving at a mean of € 24 528 million. Considering 
turnover, great variability is also observed. Mean is of € 17 925 million, whereas 
standard deviation amounts to € 39 932 million.  
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Concerning internationalization through foreign sales, the proportion of income from 
foreign sales to total sales, ranges from 0 to 99,0%, for the whole sample, leading to a 
mean of 68,1% (Table 5-7 | Panel A). Among subsamples (Annex VI to Annex X), the 
highest mean rate of international sales (72,0%) is observed for firms under scenario B 
(Not Mandatory Guidance), and the lowest (52,3%) is registered by firms in scenario C 
(Mandatory Guidance). With respect to variety of foreign markets, about 71,6% of the 
whole sample firms operates in three or more geographical segments outside the 
country of domicile. Among subsamples, this percentage ranges from 59,6%, in 
scenario C (Mandatory Guidance), to 75,2% in scenario B (Not Mandatory Guidance).  
After weighting the percentage of foreign sales by the relative number of foreign 
reportable geographical segments (arriving at variable Foreign Sales & Markets), the 
observed mean drops to 46,7%, for the whole sample (Table 5-7 | Panel A). Among 
subsamples (Annex VI to Annex X), the lowest mean rate of international exposure 
(27,9%) is observed for firms under scenario C (Mandatory Guidance). Within not 
mandatory guidance (scenario B), the degree of internationalization ranges from 48,5% 
in scenario B2 (Not Mandatory Detailed) to 51,7% in scenario B1 (Not Mandatory Not 
Detailed). Finally, under no guidance (scenario A) mean is of 48,2%. 
As regards financial condition, assessed by return on assets and leverage, means are 
respectively of 4,6% and 2,4, for the entire sample (Table 5-7 | Panel A). Among 
subsamples (Annex VI to Annex X), greatest variability is registered for firms under 
scenario A (No Guidance), where means for profitability and leverage equal 5,5% and 
2,8, and standard deviations are of 6,9% and 6,0, respectively. 
Considering listing status, great majority (83,1%) of firms in the whole sample is listed 
only in domestic stock markets (Table 5-7 | Panel B). This percentage rises to 90,9% 
under scenario C (Annex X), which means that from the 22 sample firms (176 firm-year 
observations) domiciled in Spain, only 2 (16 firm-year observations) were listed abroad. 
Regarding industry affiliation, industrials’ firms are the most represented in the whole 
sample (27,4%), followed by basic materials (23,8%), consumer goods & services 
(21,4%), utilities (11,9%), oil&gas (9,5%), and miscellaneous (6%) (Table 5-1). The 
more carbon intensive industries (utilities, oil & gas, and basic materials) represent 
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45,2% of the whole sample, whereas the remaining activities (industrials, consumer 
goods & services, and miscellaneous) total 54,8% (Table 5-7 | Panel B). The underlying 
notion of carbon intensity follows the guidelines by the EU-ETS (EC, 2003, 2009), and 
is consistent with prior research on environmental disclosure (e.g., Stanny and Ely, 
2008; Choi et al., 2013). 
When assessing ownership concentration, no investor or related investors owned more 
than 20% of a firm’s voting rights, in about 46,1% of the whole sample firms (Table 5-7 
| Panel B). Distribution among subsamples (Annex VI to Annex X) varies from 38,2%, 
in scenario B (Not Mandatory Guidance), to 53,9%, in scenario A (No Guidance). 
With regard to institutional environment, firms with headquarters in Liberal Market 
Economies (Ireland, and UK) represent 14,3% of the whole sample, firms domiciled in 
Mixed Market Economies (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) have a relative 
weight of 39,9%, and firms in Coordinated Market Economies (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden) amount to 45,8% (Table 5-7 | 
Panel B). As mentioned earlier, the underlying notion of institutional similarities and 
differences across countries is based on varieties of capitalism approach proposed by 
Hall and Soskice (2001), and followed by previous investigation on environmental 
disclosure (Carnevale et al., 2012). 
5.4. Results and conclusions 
This section presents the results corresponding to the bottom-up strategy described in 
Table 5-3.  
The first step consists of analysing a model with no explanatory variables. This 
intercept-only model gives an estimate of the intraclass correlation (the proportion of the 
variance explained by the grouping structure in the population), and a value of the 
deviance (the degree of misfit of the model). In the following steps, those benchmarks 
are used to assess the contribution of each parameter that is added, and to test the 
improvement in the adjustment of the model. A comprehensive analysis of estimation 
results is presented in the last step. In the intermediate stages, only those parameters that 
justify the choice of model to follow are analyzed. 
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Step 1 - The intercept-only model 
Estimation results presented in Table 5-8 corresponds to a null model with only two 
hierarchical levels: repeated measurements (level-1) nested within firms (level-2). 
Table 5-8: Estimation results for Model 5-0 - the null model with 2 hierarchical levels 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Coef. Std. Error
Intercept  0,2911 ***  ( 0,0230)
Estimate Std. Error Variance components:
Firm level
Variance (_cons)  0,0878  ( 0,0097) 
Variance (Residual)  0,0054  ( 0,0002) 
Log likelihood 1 193,6
Deviance  -2 387,2
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets 
Model 5-0:
DISCti = β00 + ɛti + µ0i
Dependent variable - Overall disclosure index (DISC)
Model 5-0
Within firms
RANDOM PART
Between firms
Null model
(Intercept-only model )
 
Considering the fixed part of Model 5-0, the intercept of 0,2911 is simply the estimate 
of the average disclosure index across all firms and occasions. As regards the random 
part, Model 5-0 estimates the repeated measurements (level-1) variance (residual) as 
0,0054, and the firm-level (level-2) variance (_cons) as 0,0878. This estimates the total 
disclosure index variance as 0,0932 (0,0054 + 0,0878), and indicates that the intraclass 
correlation at firm-level is estimated as 0,9421 (0,0878 / 0,0932). 
Bearing in mind that the intraclass correlation designates the proportion of the variance 
explained by the grouping structure in the population, Model 5-0 shows that about 94% 
of the variance of the disclosure index is variance between firms, and only about 6% is 
variance within firms (across occasions). 
However, this first model does not take into account country of domicile dependencies, 
since it assumes that all firms are independent. The addition of a random intercept for 
countries leads to Model 5-1 (Table 5-9) where a correlation between firms from the 
same country is allowed. Also, by introducing a third level for countries, three variance 
components are now estimated: residuals at level-1; random intercept at level-2; and 
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random-intercept at level-3. As a consequence, Model 5-1 disaggregates variance 
between firms into two parameters: variance between countries and variance within 
countries. 
Table 5-9: Estimation results for Model 5-1 - the null model with 3 hierarchical levels 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Coef. Std. Error
Intercept  0,2767 ***  ( 0,0567)
Estimate Std. Error Variance components:
Country level
Variance (_cons)  0,0410  ( 0,0167) 
Firm level
Variance (_cons)  0,0370  ( 0,0043) 
Variance (Residual)  0,0054  ( 0,0002) 
Log likelihood 1 247,6
Deviance  -2 495,3
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets 
Model 5-1:
 DISCtij = γ000 + ɛtij + µ0ij + u00j
Dependent variable - Overall disclosure index (DISC)
Model 5-1
Null model
(Intercept-only model )
RANDOM PART
Between countries
Within countries
Within firms
 
Model 5-1 estimates the repeated measures variance as 0,0054 (level-1), the firm-level 
variance as 0,0370 (level-2), and the country-level variance as 0,0410 (level-3). This 
estimates the total disclosure index variance as 0,0834 (0,0054 + 0,0370 + 0,0410). 
Accordingly, the estimates of intraclass correlation are as follows:  
- Between countries is estimated as 0,4916 (0,0410/0,0834) 
- Within countries is estimated as 0,4437 (0,0370/0,0834) 
- Within firms (across occasions) is estimated as 0,0647 (0,0054/0,0834) 
Thus, the addition of a random intercept for countries revealed that about 53% 
(0,4916 / (0,4916 + 0,4437)) of the variance between firms was due to the country of 
domicile. Considering this relative weight of the variance between countries, a three 
level model seems more appropriate than the first one comprehending only two levels, 
and the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test confirms a significant (p<0,001) improvement in 
model fit, when comparing Model-1 with Model 5-0. As a consequence, a three level 
hierarchy is kept from here onwards. 
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Step 2 - The time variable is added to the model 
In the second step, the time variable (Year) was added, as a linear trend, with the same 
coefficient for all firms (Table 5-10 | Model 5-2.1).  
Table 5-10: Estimation results for Model 5-2.1 and Model 5-2.2 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0054 ***  ( 0,0009)  0,0169 ***  ( 0,0031)
 - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)
 0,2577 ***  ( 0,0568)  0,2462 ***  ( 0,0568)
RANDOM PART Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level
Variance (_cons)  0,0410  ( 0,0167)  0,0410  ( 0,0167)
Firm level
Variance (_cons)  0,0370  ( 0,0043)  0,0370  ( 0,0043)
Variance (Residual)  0,0052  ( 0,0002)  0,0051  ( 0,0002)
Log likelihood 1 267,2 1 274,6
Deviance  -2 534,4  -2 549,1
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets
Model 5-2.1: 
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + ɛtij + µ0ij + u00j
Model 5-2.2:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + ɛtij + µ0ij + u00j
Year
Year_sqr
Intercept
Dependent variable - Overall disclosure index (DISC)
Model 5-2.1 Model 5-2.2 
Model 5-1 plus Model 5-1 plus
Time (linear trend) Time (quadratic trend)
 
Entering the variable Year has lead to a significant improvement in model fit (p<0,001), 
and decreased the occasion level variance from 0,0054 to 0,0052 which means that time 
explains about 4% ((0,0054 - 0,0052) / 0,0054) of the disclosure index variance within 
firms (across occasions). Regression estimates indicate that, on average, the disclosure 
index is of 0,2577 at the first occasion (2005), and increases by 0,0054 on each 
succeeding year. However, a systematic linear growth in the disclosure index does not 
seem a realistic assumption. It should be noted that, in longitudinal designs, it is 
important to model the time variable appropriately, because “the specification of ‘the 
effects of time’ describes the shape of the underlying development trajectory” (Willett 
et al., 1998, pp. 414-420). So, alternately, a quadratic (curvilinear) trend was also 
considered (Table 5-10 | Model 5-2.2). 
As anticipated, the LR test indicate that, by adding variable Year_sqr, Model 5-2.2 
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offers a significantly better fit than the previous one (2 = 14,73, df = 1, p<0,001), and 
estimation results suggest that, on average, the disclosure index is of 0,2462 at the first 
year (2005), growing at decreasing rates, from there on, following the expression 
0,0169 Year – 0,0016 Year_sqr, where Year equals 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 from 2005 to 2012, 
respectively. 
Step 3 - Time-covariates and level-2 explanatory variables are added to the model 
In the third step, time-varying covariates (Foreign Sales & Markets, Foreign Listing), 
and level-2 time-invariant predictor (Industry) are added, arriving at Model 5-3 (Table 
5-11). This procedure was done on a variable-by-variable basis. The corresponding 
intermediate models are reported in Annex XI.  
Table 5-11: Estimation results for Model 5-3 and Model 5-4 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0167 ***  ( 0,0031)  0,0167 ***  ( 0,0031)
 - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)  - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)
 0,0022  ( 0,0366)  0,0010  ( 0,0362)
 - 0,1062 ***  ( 0,0310)  - 0,1023 ***  ( 0,0304)
 0,1993 ***  ( 0,0283)  0,1961 ***  ( 0,0277)
 0,5719 ***  ( 0,0759)
 0,3394 ***  ( 0,0674)
 0,1602 ***  ( 0,0487)
 0,1738 ***  ( 0,0517)  0,0351  ( 0,0332)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level
Variance (_cons)  0,0316  ( 0,0129)  0,0034  ( 0,0020)
Firm level
Variance (_cons)  0,0291  ( 0,0034)  0,0296  ( 0,0034)
Variance (Residual)  0,0051  ( 0,0002)  0,0051  ( 0,0002)
Log likelihood 1 302,4 1 315,1
Deviance  -2 604,7  -2 630,2
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets | countinuous predictors centered 
Model 5-3:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ010 Indij +
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Model 5-4:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ010 Indij +
            + γ001 Mand_Guidj + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + 
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Not_Mand_Not_Detailed_Guidance (NMND_Guid)
Year
Year_sqr
FSales&Markets (FS&M)
FListing (FList)
Industry (Ind)
Mandatory_Guidance (Mand_Guid)
Not_Mand_Detailed_Guidance (NMD_Guid)
Intercept
RANDOM PART
Dependent variable - Overall disclosure index (DISC)
Model 5-3 Model 5-4
Model 5-2.2 plus Model 5-3 plus
 Time-varying covariates & Level-3 explanatory variables 
Level-2 explanatory variables
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The LR test indicates a significant improvement in model fit (2 = 55,58, df = 3, 
p<0,001), and, as expected,  comparison  between  the variance components of Model 
5-2.2 and Model 5-3, indicate that entering time-varying covariates, and level-2 time-
invariant predictor has decreased the occasion level variance, and the variance at firm-
level, by 1% and 22%, respectively. It is worth noting that, at firm-level, the major 
contribution for the proportion of variance explained is due to industry affiliation. 
In this stage, control variables (Size, OwC, ROA, Lev) were added to the model, as 
reported in Annex XII. In line with, amongst others, Cormier et al. (2005), Freedman 
and Jaggi (2005), and Choi et al. (2013), estimation results suggest that financial 
condition adds no significant contribution in explaining level of carbon financial 
disclosure. In view of this, variables ROA and Lev were removed from the model. As 
regards size and ownership concentration, the LR test showed a small although 
significant improvement in model fit. Hence, for the sake of parsimony, control 
variables Size and OwC are kept out of the model until the last stage when they will be 
introduced again just to check the robustness of results. 
Step 4 - Level-3 explanatory variables are added to the model 
In the fourth step, variables representing the type of national guidance were added to the 
model. Two alternate classifications were considered, as described earlier in Table 5-6. 
The first one comprehends three categories (no guidance, not mandatory guidance, and 
mandatory guidance). The second makes a distinction between detailed and not detailed 
guidance on disclosure items, arriving at four groups (no guidance, not mandatory not 
detailed guidance, not mandatory detailed guidance, and mandatory (detailed) 
guidance). The last one provided a significantly better adjustment (p<0,05), and for that 
reason it was the taxonomy kept in Model 5-4 (Table 5-11). 
By entering variables representing national type of guidance, the LR test indicates a 
significant improvement in model fit (2 = 25,46, df = 3, p<0,001), and comparisons 
between the variance components of Model 5-3 and Model 5-4, show that, the estimate 
of the variance between countries has decreased by around 89% (0,0316  0,0034). 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the new estimate (0,0034) when compared to its standard 
error (0,0020) suggests that the remaining unexplained variance is no longer significant. 
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In this stage, control variables capturing the institutional environment in each country 
(CME, MME, LME) were also considered, as reported in Annex XIII. A further 
decrease in the estimate of the variance between countries has occurred 
(0,0034  0,0013). However, according to the LR test, an improvement in model fit is 
only to admit at a 10% level (2 = 5,39, df = 2, p<0,10). In view of this, for the sake of 
parsimony, those variables are kept out of the model until the last stage when they will 
be introduced again to check the robustness of results.  
Additionally, an alternative approach was also conducted by estimating a three-level 
model where, in the outmost stage, the criterion for grouping sample firms was the 
institutional environment in home-country (instead of the country of origin). Estimation 
results (Annex XIII) confirm that, regarding disclosure, the effects of national guidance 
are superior to those of institutional environment. That is to say, before entering 
variables representing the type of guidance in each country, the estimate variance 
between the three sorts of institutional environments (CME, MME, LME) is of 0,0200. 
When adding type of guidance, the estimate variance decreased to 0,0026. Furthermore, 
the magnitude of this new estimate is small relative to its standard error (0,0029), 
suggesting that, after considering national guidance, the remaining unexplained variance 
between the three types of institutional environments is no longer significant. 
Step 5 - Cross-level interactions and random slopes are added to the model 
To investigative whether national guidance serve as moderator of firm-level 
relationships between the level of disclosure and the exposure to foreign markets, a set 
of cross-level interactions between type of guidance, and explanatory variables Year, 
and FSales&Markets were added to the model. At the same time, random slopes were 
allowed, at firm-level, for the exposure to foreign markets (FSales&Markets), leading to 
Model 5-5.1 (Table 5-12). The underlying hypothesis is that the effects of 
internationalization may vary across groups, which is consistent with prior literature 
(Thorell and Whittington, 1994; Cormier et al., 2005; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010) 
admitting either a positive or a negative relationship between internationalization and 
disclosure, depending on the relative degree of environmental awareness in the country 
of domicile and in those foreign markets where customers are located.  
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Table 5-12: Estimation results for Model 5-5.1 and Model 5-5.2 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0155 ***  ( 0,0031)  0,0179 ***  ( 0,0035)
 - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)  - 0,0019 ***  ( 0,0004)
 - 0,0415  ( 0,0543)  - 0,0765  ( 0,0596)
 - 0,0265  ( 0,0365)  - 0,0045  ( 0,0412)
 0,1863 ***  ( 0,0308)  0,2082 ***  ( 0,0346)
 0,5633 ***  ( 0,0857)  0,5863 ***  ( 0,0801)
 0,3599 ***  ( 0,0746)  0,3499 ***  ( 0,0740)
 0,1539 ***  ( 0,0531)  0,2095 ***  ( 0,0503)
 0,0062 **  ( 0,0029)  0,0043  ( 0,0033)
 0,1941  ( 0,1656)  0,2305  ( 0,1821)
 0,0069 **  ( 0,0030)  0,0051  ( 0,0034)
 0,4672 ***  ( 0,1796)  0,5702 ***  ( 0,1981)
 - 0,0007  ( 0,0019)  - 0,0047 **  ( 0,0021)
 0,0728  ( 0,1261)  - 0,0430  ( 0,1379)
 0,0327  ( 0,0360)  0,0317  ( 0,0356)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level 
 0,0038  ( 0,0024)  0,0022  ( 0,0020)
Firm level (unstructured)
 0,1567  ( 0,0425)  0,1734  ( 0,0456)
 0,0279  ( 0,0039)  0,0383  ( 0,0053)
 0,0158  ( 0,0105)  0,0278  ( 0,0135)
Variance (Residual)  0,0044  ( 0,0002)  0,0056  ( 0,0002)
Log likelihood 1 358,6 1 200,7
Deviance  -2 717,3  -2 401,4
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets | countinuous predictors centered 
Model 5-5.1:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ010 Indij +
             + γ001 Mand_Guid j + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + 
             + γ101 Yeartij x Mand_Guidj + γ301 FS&Mtij x Mand_Guidj + 
             + γ102 Yeartij x NMD_Guidj + γ302 FS&Mtij x NMD_Guidj +
             + γ103 Yeartij x NMND_Guidj + γ303 FS&Mtij x NMND_Guidj + 
             + ɛtij + µ0ij + u00j + µ3ij FS&Mtij 
Model 5-5.2: Model 5-5.1 with DIFRStij (IFRS disclosure index) as the dependent variable
Model 5-5.1
Covariance (FSales&Markets, _cons)
random slopes at level-2 (FS&M) 
Year x NMND_Guid
FSales&Markets x NMND_Guid
Intercept
RANDOM PART
Variance ( _cons)
Not_Mand_Detailed_Guidance (NMD_Guid)
Year x Mand_Guid
Variance (_cons)
Model 5-5.2
Model 5-4 plus Model 5-5.1 with
cross-level interactions & IFRSs disclosure index (DIFRS)
as the dependent variable
Dependent variable
Overall disclosure index (DISC) IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS)
FSales&Markets x Mand_Guid
Year x NMD_Guid
FSales&Markets x NMD_Guid
Year
Mandatory_Guidance (Mand_Guid)
Not_Mand_Not_Detailed_Guidance (NMND_Guid)
Year_sqr
FSales&Markets (FS&M)
FListing (FList)
Industry (Ind)
Variance (FSales&Markets)
 
Thus far, the estimate of the variance within countries has decreased by approximately 
25% (0,0370  0,0279). In this stage, other possibilities for random effects, and 
interaction terms (namely comprising variable FListing) were also considered, but none 
of the alternatives offered a further significant contribution in explaining the remaining 
variance within countries. It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this study to 
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design a model that fully explains carbon financial disclosure. The analysis is focused 
on shedding light on areas where prior research is scarce (disclosure under mandatory 
guidance) or showed mixed results (the effect of internationalization on disclosure). An 
attempt to reassess these questions is provided by Model 5-5.1 (Table 5-12).  
Additionally, to evaluate if main inferences also apply to the disclosure index covering 
the items related to GHG emission allowances only within IFRS, Model 5-5.1 was run 
with  the IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS)  as the dependent variable, leading to Model 
5-5.2. As reported in Table 5-12, main outcomes remained unchanged. In view of this, 
from here onwards, only the results for the overall disclosure index (DISC) are 
discussed. Also, it should be noted that all the results presented below remain valid after 
introducing control variables (Size, OwC, CME, MME), as reported in Annex XIV. 
Hypotheses H1 to H4 examine whether formal guidance enhances the level of carbon 
financial disclosure.  
Estimation results suggest that, under no guidance, the average disclosure index (DISC), 
in 2005, for low carbon intensive firms, listed only in domestic stock exchanges, and 
with average exposure to foreign markets is of 0,0327 (intercept), an estimate not 
significantly different from zero (Table 5-12 | Model 5-5.1). That is, under no guidance, 
firms operating mainly in domestic markets and pertaining to less carbon intensive 
industries are not likely to voluntarily release information on GHG emission allowances 
in their annual accounts. Furthermore, evidence indicates that, under no guidance, only 
high carbon intensive firms are likely to provide a significant (although quite modest) 
level of disclosure (Table 5-12 | Model 5-5.1 | 0,1863, p<0,001). 
Stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory posit that disclosure is an instrument to 
manage or to handle the information needs of various stakeholders, and under no 
guidance firms have chances to differentiate themselves by releasing information 
voluntarily. However, the extent of voluntary disclosure will depend on managers’ 
motivation to do so. In the light of proprietary costs theory, managers take into account 
not only the benefits of disclosure but also inherent costs (including proprietary costs), 
and do not disclose when costs outweigh benefits (Dye, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991). On this view, results suggest that for firms pertaining to less carbon intensive 
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industries (that is, not specially fostered by scrutiny and public pressure due to their 
activities), the benefits to use financial information on GHG emission allowances as a 
legitimizing tool are not enough to cover the costs of such disclosure. Release on GHG 
emissions embodies information about corporate activities having a negative impact 
upon environment (Clarkson et al., 2008). As a consequence, under no guidance, firms 
operating in low carbon intensive industries do not have enough incentives to publish 
voluntarily carbon financial disclosure because that would have meant exposing the 
pursuit of polluting activities, when they are not perceived as severe pollutants by 
society, and institutional pressures to disclose are low. Otherwise, high carbon intensive 
firms, facing a legitimacy threat due to their activities, have more to gain by providing 
voluntarily disclosure, namely because in the case of high GHG emitters the absence of 
such information is more likely to be interpreted, by stakeholders, as bad news. So, in 
line with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) model, findings confirm that high carbon 
intensive firms with greater potential benefits from disclosure on GHG emissions tend 
to disclose more. Notwithstanding, under no guidance, even high carbon intensive firms 
do not exhibit high levels of disclosure (Table 5-12 | Model 5-5.1 | 0,1863, p<0,001). 
The continued absence of specific accounting guidance on this matter may be perceived 
by firms as meaning that financial information on GHG emission allowances is not 
particularly valued by society, being that, in accordance with institutional theory, when 
there is a low degree of social pressure, firms’ anticipated legitimacy gains are lower 
(Oliver, 1991), and, thus, high levels of corporate disclosure are less likely to occur. 
With regard to the explanatory variables representing not mandatory guidance, either 
detailed or not detailed, both coefficients (NMD_Guid | NMND_Guid) show a positive 
association with the level of disclosure (p<0,01), implying that, on average, the 
disclosure index is significantly higher, than under no guidance (Table 5-12 | Model 
5.5-1). These results allow the non-rejection of hypothesis H1 stating that the level of 
carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms domiciled in countries 
where national guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances was issued, 
though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, than among firms domiciled in countries 
where no specific guidance on how to report emission allowances in the annual 
accounts was provided. As predicted, results are consistent with prior evidence from da 
Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán (2010), and Choi et al. (2013), suggesting that 
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formal guidance in home-country, though not mandatory for entities applying IFRS, is a 
driver of additional release. 
When considering not mandatory guidance that includes detailed demands on disclosure 
items (NMD_Guid), on average, the disclosure index (for low carbon intensive firms, 
listed only in domestic stock exchanges, and with average exposure to foreign markets) 
is expected to be higher, than under no guidance, by 0,3599 (p<0,001), in 2005 (Table 
5-12 | Model 5.5-1). In turn, when examining the scenario of not mandatory guidance 
that does not include detailed demands on disclosure (NMND_Guid), the estimated 
difference to the scenario of no guidance comes down to 0,1539 (p<0,01). Also, direct 
comparison between those two scenarios (NMD_Guid | NMND_Guid) confirms a 
statistically significant difference in favor of detailed guidance by 0,2060 (0,3599-
0,1539), p<0,01). These results allow the non-rejection of hypothesis H2 stating that the 
level of carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms domiciled in 
countries where national guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances 
specifies detailed requests for disclosure, than under no detailed benchmarks.  
Also, findings are in line with prior research on mandatory guidance (Criado-Jiménez et 
al., 2008; Peters and Romi, 2013) pointing out that regulations are more effective when 
clearly delineate disclosure items to be reported, and expand prior investigation, by 
suggesting that the same applies to non-mandatory guidance. In particular, Criado-
Jiménez et al. (2008) argue that, in view of impression management strategies, 
concealment of information confirms the strength of regulation rather than its weakness, 
in the sense that, in response to more strict regulation, firms cannot simply dismiss the 
norm. On the contrary, they are compelled to accept it, although symbolically. Present 
research expands Criado-Jiménez et al.’s (2008) assertion, by providing evidence that 
firms are also constrained to respond to non-mandatory guidance. Formal guidance, 
even not mandatory, is likely to boost stakeholders’ perception that lack of critical 
information may well correspond to bad news. As a consequence, the risk of bad 
reputation for holding information tends to be higher, than under no guidance. 
Accordingly, results suggest that firms are likely to react to non-mandatory guidance by 
releasing additional disclosure, especially when it clearly delineates the items to be 
provided in the annex (Table 5-12 | Model 5.5-1 | 0,3599, p<0,001). 
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As regards the scenario of mandatory guidance, the coefficient of variable Mand_Guid 
indicates that, on average, the disclosure index (for low carbon intensive firms, listed 
only in domestic stock exchanges, and with average exposure to foreign markets) is 
expected to be higher, than under no guidance, by 0,5633, in 2005, and this difference is 
significant at 1% level (p<0,001) (Table 5-12 | Model 5-5.1). Comparisons with the 
scenario of not mandatory guidance also confirm (p<0,01) that the level of disclosure is 
greater among firms under mandatory guidance, than among firms under no mandatory 
regime on how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts, as 
formulated in hypothesis H3. In accordance with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) 
model, a firm’s optimal level of disclosure is achieved when the marginal cost of 
disclosure is equal to its marginal benefit. As described by Seah and Tarca (2006), 
under mandatory guidance, costs of disclosure are likely to be greater because, to avoid 
possible penalties, more proprietary information is revealed which could damage a 
firm’s wealth and reputation, and benefits of disclosure are potentially superior because 
compulsory information has more credibility especially when it is certified. As a 
consequence, under a mandatory regime, both the costs and the benefits of release 
potentially increase, changing the equilibrium point, and expanding the level of a firm’s 
disclosure. Results corroborate this hypothesis, showing that mandatory guidance is 
significantly associated with higher levels of disclosure (when compared with any other 
scenario under review). 
When examining the trend over the eight-year period (2005-2012), regression estimates 
suggest a quite modest growth trajectory by decreasing rates (following the expression 
0,0155 Year – 0,0016 Year_sqr, for firms under no guidance, where Year equals 
0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7, from 2005 to 2012, respectively). However, once again, firms under 
detailed guidance (mandatory or not mandatory) are likely to perform better than other 
sample firms, as indicated by the coefficients of the interaction terms Year x 
Mand_Guid (0,0062, p<0,05), and Year x NMD_Guid (0,0069, p<0,05) (Table 5-12 | 
Model 5.5-1). Overall, for these two scenarios, findings indicate upper starting values 
for the disclosure index, in 2005, and small but significantly higher growth all over the 
period. Concerning guidance that is not mandatory and not detailed (NMND_Guid), the 
estimate for the disclosure index at the starting point (2005) is significantly higher than 
the one associated with no guidance (0,1539, p<0,01), but the trajectory over the eight-
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year period is not statistically different, as indicated by the non-significant coefficient of 
the interaction term Year x NMND_Guid (Table 5-12 | Model 5.5-1). In summary, those 
two scenarios (Mand_Guid, NMD_Guid) that are associated with higher levels of 
disclosure in 2005, also feature more favorable developments over the eight-year 
period. 
Altogether, findings allow the non-rejection of hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 suggesting 
that accounting standards, even those not mandatory for entities under IFRS, have a 
significant positive impact on the level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in 
the annual accounts, being that major improvements on the disclosure index are likely 
to occur under mandatory guidance followed by the case of not mandatory guidance 
comprehending detailed demands for disclosure items. These results are consistent with 
previous investigation indicating a noteworthy impact of standards on the level of 
disclosed environmental information (e.g., Deegan and Rankin, 1996, 1997; Owen et 
al., 1997; Larrinaga et al., 2002; Llena et al., 2007; Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Barbu 
et al., 2014), and are in line with stakeholder theory and institutional theory.  
From stakeholder theory standpoint, disclosure is a strategic response to manage or to 
handle stakeholders’ demand for information, in order to obtain their approval. In the 
extent that formal guidance, even not mandatory, is likely to rise stakeholder awareness 
of the risks, and the associated mitigation efforts, that GHG emissions pose to firms, it 
contributes to increase their quest of information, and, in order to respond to greater 
stakeholders’ pressure, management is encouraged to disclose more than under no 
guidance, especially when formal guidance comprises detailed dispositions on items to 
be reported in the annex. In particular, by enhancing stakeholders’ perception of 
relevant information concerning GHG emission allowances, mandatory guidance is 
more likely to compel firms to expand the level of disclosure, not only to respond to the 
information needs of more aware stakeholders but also to avoid the costs of bad 
reputation that would be derived from simply ignore the norm. 
Likewise, the importance of formal guidance (mandatory or non-mandatory) as a driver 
of additional disclosure is in line with institutional theory. Under enforced guidance, 
organizations are made more aware of public interests and are less likely to respond 
defiantly because the consequences of noncompliance are “more tangible and often 
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more severe” (Oliver, 1991, p. 168), than under no guidance. Notwithstanding, from 
institutional theory standpoint, institutional pressures may occur not only by means of 
legal regulation and enforcement but also by voluntary diffusion.  
On one hand, as anticipated by Oliver (1991), when rules or norms are broadly diffused 
and supported, organizations are more likely to acquiesce to institutional pressures 
because their social validity is largely unquestioned. On this view, findings suggest that 
EU-15 firms domiciled in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol and issued formal 
guidance on how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts appear to 
perceive that disclosure of financial information concerning GHG emission allowances 
would be important for their public image, as the efforts in meeting Protocol’s targets 
and the release of information on costs of carbon are valued by society. In these 
circumstances, institutional theory predicts a low degree of organizational resistance 
towards mandatory guidance, and results confirm that, even not ensuring full 
acquiescence, mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances is 
significantly associated with less withholding of information, than any other scenario 
under review.  
On the other hand, in the case of guidance not mandatory for firms applying IFRS, a 
process of voluntary diffusion seems to be in place, at country level, with firms under 
IFRS following their home-country guidance intended only for entities under national 
GAAP. That is, in line with Oliver’s (1991) prediction, evidence corroborates that when 
firms anticipate that conformity with social expectations, even though set out by non-
mandatory guidance, will enhance social fitness, a process of voluntary diffusion, 
through imitation, is more likely to occur, than under no guidance. 
These outcomes have important implications for regulatory bodies aimed at enhance the 
comparability of financial information within EU. Extending the hypothesis formulated 
by, amongst other, Nobes (2006, 2008), Kvaal and Nobes (2010), and Barbu et al. 
(2014), pointing out that, despite the adoption of IFRS since 2005, international 
differences are likely to survive due to pre-IFRS dissimilarities, this study suggests that 
even national guidance issued after 2005, and not intended for firms under IFRS since 
then, strongly impact their disclosure practices. As mentioned earlier (step 4), 
regression estimates indicate that about 53% of the variance between firms is due to the 
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country of domicile. However, when entering variables representing the type of national 
guidance, the estimate of the variance between countries decreases by more than 89%, 
and the estimate of the remaining unexplained variance is no longer significant.  
In addition, estimation results (reported in Annex XIII) indicate that the effects of 
national guidance (over the level of carbon financial disclosure) are superior to those of 
institutional environment (CME, MME, LME). As described earlier (step 4), after 
entering variables representing the type of guidance in each country, the remaining 
unexplained variance between those three types of institutional environment is no 
longer significant. Largely, results indicate that national guidance, though not 
mandatory, exerts a major influence on disclosure practices of EU-15 firms applying 
IFRS. Consequently, discrepancies among national legal requirements are able to 
penalize the comparability of firms’ accounts and inhibit the process of de facto 
(material) accounting harmonization within EU, in spite of the compulsory use of the 
same set of standards (IFRS) for the consolidated statements of listed firms since 2005. 
Then, to evaluate if mandatory guidance has a “disciplinarian effect” on the 
dissemination of qualitative (soft) disclosure as well as quantitative (hard) disclosure on 
GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts (as formulated in hypothesis H4), 
Model 5-5.1 was run separately for the disclosure index on quantitative (monetary and 
non-monetary) items (DQuant) and qualitative (declarative) items (DQualit), leading to 
Model 5-5.3 and Model 5-5.4, respectively (Table 5-13).  
When considering quantitative disclosure (DQuant), estimation results indicate that, 
under no guidance, the average disclosure index for low carbon intensive firms, listed 
only in domestic stock exchanges, and with average exposure to foreign markets is not 
significantly different from zero (Table 5-13 | Model 5.5-3). With regard to qualitative 
disclosure (DQualit) the estimate shows a significant but small increase to 0,0957 
(p<0,10) (Table 5-13 | Model 5.5-4). As expected, firms under no guidance, are not 
likely to reveal sensitive items on GHG emission allowances (quantitative-verifiable 
data supposedly containing more proprietary information) and even the level of 
disclosure on more general statements (qualitative disclosure) is quite low. 
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Table 5-13: Estimation results for Model 5-5.3 and Model 5-5.4 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0120 ***  ( 0,0033)  0,0208 ***  ( 0,0044)
 - 0,0015 ***  ( 0,0004)  - 0,0019 ***  ( 0,0006)
 - 0,0061  ( 0,0504)  - 0,0520  ( 0,0709)
 - 0,0414  ( 0,0332)  - 0,0381  ( 0,0516)
 0,1363 ***  ( 0,0276)  0,2655 ***  ( 0,0457)
 0,5511 ***  ( 0,0695)  0,6383 ***  ( 0,1230)
 0,2509 ***  ( 0,0616)  0,4996 ***  ( 0,1076)
 0,0764 *  ( 0,0430)  0,2841 ***  ( 0,0767)
 0,0120 ***  ( 0,0031)  - 0,0049  ( 0,0042)
 0,3076 **  ( 0,1565)  0,3086  ( 0,2095)
 0,0081 **  ( 0,0032)  0,0059  ( 0,0043)
 0,2262  ( 0,1641)  0,7652 ***  ( 0,2321)
 0,0008  ( 0,0020)  - 0,0051 *  ( 0,0027)
 0,0715  ( 0,1171)  0,0942  ( 0,1666)
 - 0,0016  ( 0,0299)  0,0957 *  ( 0,0523)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level 
 0,0021  ( 0,0016)  0,0077  ( 0,0051)
Firm level (unstructured)
 0,1293  ( 0,0389)  0,1689  ( 0,0611)
 0,0214  ( 0,0032)  0,0676  ( 0,0087)
 0,0045  ( 0,0089)  0,0135  ( 0,0180)
Variance (Residual)  0,0050  ( 0,0002)  0,0091  ( 0,0004)
Log likelihood 1 313,3  877,9
Deviance  -2 626,7  -1 755,8
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets | countinuous predictors centered 
Model 5-5.1:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ010 Indij +
             + γ001 Mand_Guid j + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + 
             + γ101 Yeartij x Mand_Guidj + γ301 FS&Mtij x Mand_Guidj + 
             + γ102 Yeartij x NMD_Guidj + γ302 FS&Mtij x NMD_Guidj +
             + γ103 Yeartij x NMND_Guidj + γ303 FS&Mtij x NMND_Guidj + 
             + ɛtij + µ0ij + u00j + µ3ij FS&Mtij 
Model 5-5.3: Model 5-5.1 with DQuanttij (Quantitative disclosure index) as the dependent variable
Model 5-5.4: Model 5-5.1 with DQualittij (Qualitative disclosure index) as the dependent variable
Year_sqr
FSales&Markets (FS&M)
FListing (FList)
Industry (Ind)
Mandatory_Guidance (Mand_Guid)
Not_Mand_Detailed_Guidance (NMD_Guid)
Variance (_cons)
Covariance (FSales&Markets, _cons)
RANDOM PART
Dependent variable
Quantitative disclosure (DQuant) Qualitative disclosure (DQualit)
Model 5-5.3 Model 5-5.4
Model 5-5.1 with Model 5-5.1 with
Variance ( _cons)
Variance (FSales&Markets)
Not_Mand_Not_Detailed_Guidance (NMND_Guid)
Year x Mand_Guid
FSales&Markets x Mand_Guid
Year x NMD_Guid
FSales&Markets x NMD_Guid
Year x NMND_Guid
FSales&Markets x NMND_Guid
Intercept
(DQuant) as the dependent variable
Year
Quantitative disclosure index Qualitative disclosure index
(DQualit) as the dependent variable
 
As mentioned before, disclosures on GHG emissions are critical in the sense that they 
convey information about activities having a negative impact on environment. Thus, 
under no guidance, firms operating in low carbon intensive industries do not have 
enough incentives to release voluntarily carbon financial disclosure because that would 
have meant bring out the pursuit of polluting activities, when they are not perceived as 
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severe pollutants by society, and institutional pressures to disclose are low. Otherwise, 
firms pertaining to more carbon intensive industries, subject to further scrutiny and 
public pressure due to their activities, tend to legitimize themselves by releasing 
voluntarily more information, but, as expected, the increase is more pronounced for 
qualitative (soft) disclosure (Table 5-13 | Model 5-5.4 | 0,2655, p<0,001), than for 
quantitative (hard) disclosure (Table 5-13 | Model 5-5.3 | 0,1363, p<0,001). 
When examining the other three scenarios (Mand_Guid, NMD_Guid, NMND_Guid) 
disclosure levels are, on average, significantly higher than under no guidance, especially 
for qualitative disclosure (p<0,001). In particular, when considering the release of 
qualitative items (DQualit), under mandatory guidance, in 2005, the disclosure index 
(for low carbon intensive firms, listed only in domestic stock exchanges, and with 
average exposure to foreign markets) is expected to be higher, than under no guidance, 
by 0,6383 (p<0,001) (Table 5-13 | Model 5.5-4). As concerns to quantitative disclosure 
(DQuant), the difference (between mandatory guidance and no guidance) drops to 
0,5511 (p<0,001) (Table 5-13 | Model 5.5-3). From an impression management 
standpoint (Oliver, 1991; Neu et al., 1998), evidence seems consistent with the 
hypothesis of concealment strategies in response to the Resolution ICAC (2006). That 
is, in spite of enhancing the level of disclosure, mandatory guidance is far from ensuring 
full compliance, especially for quantitative-verifiable data containing more proprietary 
information. On the other hand, higher levels of disclosure for qualitative items than for 
quantitative items on GHG emission allowances, are in line with prior literature 
pointing out that firms exercise discretion under mandatory guidance, by selecting the 
information to be disclosed and ignoring the more demanding aspects of regulation that 
are not in their interest to expose. 
Notwithstanding, comparisons between the scenarios of mandatory and not mandatory 
detailed guidance, reveal that, on average, under mandatory guidance, the disclosure of 
less informative items (DQualit) is expected to be higher by 0,1387 ((0,6383-0,4996), 
p<0,10) (Table 5-13 | Model 5.5-4), than among not mandatory detailed guidance, while 
the improvement in the disclosure index on more informative items (DQuant) rises to 
0,3002 ((0,5511-0,2509), p<0,001) (Table 5-13 | Model 5.5-3). Similarly, comparisons 
between mandatory guidance and not mandatory guidance without detailed requests for 
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disclosure indicate upsurges of 0,3542 ((0,6383-0,2841), p<0,01) and 0,4747 ((0,5511-
0,0764), p<0,001) for qualitative and quantitative items, respectively. So, although not 
ensuring full compliance, mandatory guidance seems to exert a significant 
“disciplinarian effect” on the dissemination of more quantitative-verifiable items 
precisely the kind of disclosure that firms are less willing to reveal as it conveys more 
proprietary information. On this view, findings confirm hypothesis H4 stating that the 
level of quantitative (hard) disclosure is likely to be higher among firms under 
mandatory guidance, than among firms under no mandatory regime on how to report 
GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. These outcomes are important for 
regulatory bodies aimed at enhance utility and relevance of financial statements. It is 
essential that firms provide quantitative (monetary and non-monetary) disclosure on 
their efforts and achievements in reducing GHG emissions, namely to assist investors in 
assessing the trade-off between risk and return (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011), to 
provide the information that users need to project future cash flows (EFRAG, 2012), 
and to evaluate firms’ environmental and financial performances. To this end, 
mandatory guidance is needed because, otherwise, the level of quantitative disclosure 
on GHG emission allowances is predicted to be significantly lower.  
Hypothesis H5 examines whether affiliation in more carbon intensive and regulated 
industries is positively associated with the level of carbon financial disclosure. 
Estimation results strongly confirm this assumption. As discussed earlier, among all the 
firm-level predictors, variable representing affiliation in carbon intensive industries 
(Industry) is the one that added the major contribution in explaining within countries 
variance (step 2), and exhibits the strongest association with the level of disclosure. 
According to Model 5-5.1 (Table 5-12), the estimate for the coefficient of variable 
Industry suggests that, on average, the disclosure index for firms working in more 
carbon intensive industries is expected to be greater by 0,1863 (p<0,001), than for firms 
operating in less carbon intensive activities. Exploratory models developed in the 
intermediate steps of the analysis (with interaction terms between industry affiliation 
and type of guidance) confirm that this advantage stands for all the scenarios under 
review. Therefore, results allow the non-rejection of H5, admitting that more carbon 
intensive industries tend to publish higher levels of carbon financial disclosure.  
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These findings are in line with previous evidence from Cowan and Deegan (2011), and 
Choi et al. (2013), suggesting that in response to either increased social and political 
pressures or due to strict regulations, firms in high carbon intensive industries are more 
likely to provide additional disclosure on GHG emissions. In accordance with 
stakeholder theory, outcomes corroborate that, all else equal, firms perceived as high 
GHG emitters by society are more likely to use disclosure as a legitimizing tool in front 
of various stakeholders, namely providing more credible (quantitative-verifiable) 
information (Table 5-13 | Model 5.5-3 | 0,1363, p<0,001) than firms operating in low 
carbon intensive activities. Likewise, in the lens of institutional theory, the more an 
organization anticipates that conformity will enhance social fitness, the less a dismissal 
strategy is likely to occur. Results confirm this hypothesis suggesting that high carbon 
intensive firms (for which a greater legitimacy reward is perceived to be attainable from 
the conformity to mandatory or non-mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG 
emission allowances) are more likely to conform to institutional pressures (or, at least, 
disguise nonconformity), by means of higher levels of disclosure, than firms operating 
in less pollutant activities. In the same vein, according to agency theory and proprietary 
costs theory, high GHG emitters, facing a legitimacy threat due to their activities, have 
more to gain by providing voluntarily information on GHG emission allowances, and, 
in line with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) model, results confirm that, all else 
equal, high carbon intensive firms (with greater potential benefits from carbon financial 
disclosure) tend to disclose more. 
Hypotheses H6 to H7b deal with the impact of firms’ internationalization on the level of 
carbon financial disclosure. 
With regard to internationalization through the capital markets (H6), the non-significant 
estimate for the coefficient of variable FListing (Table 5-12 | Model 5.5-1) means that, 
under no guidance, foreign listed firms are not associated with higher levels of carbon 
financial disclosure. Additionally, exploratory models developed in the intermediate 
steps of the analysis (with interaction terms between listing status and type of guidance) 
indicate that there are no significant differences in the disclosure index between foreign 
listed firms and domestic listed firms, for all the scenarios under consideration. 
Consequently, evidence does not support hypothesis H6 stating that the level of carbon 
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financial disclosure is likely to be higher among foreign listed firms, than among firms 
registered only in domestic stock exchanges. 
These results are not dissenting from the assumption made by, amongst other, Thorell 
and Whittington (1994), and Cormier et al. (2005), that a positive or a negative 
relationship between internationalization and level of disclosure may be expected, 
depending on the relative degree of environmental awareness in home-country and in 
those foreign markets to which the firm is exposed. Actually, in line with Jackson and 
Apostolakou (2010), evidence from this study suggests that, for EU-15 sample firms, 
internationalization may not be a significant driver of carbon financial disclosure, since 
the vast majority of multi-listed firms in the sample are registered in US stock 
exchanges, a country that did not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and where there was a 
lack of specific accounting guidance on how to report GHG emission allowances in the 
annual accounts, over the research period. In view of this, despite the exposure to a 
broader range of stakeholders, EU-15 firms listed in US stock exchanges are not 
deemed to face additional pressure to enhance carbon financial disclosure.  
Considering the internationalization through the markets of products and services where 
customers are located, the non-significant estimate for the coefficient of variable 
FSales&Markets (Table 5-12 | Model 5.5-1) means that, under no guidance, 
international exposure exerts no direct influence on the level of carbon financial 
disclosure. Thus far, evidence does not support hypothesis H7a stating that, ceteris 
paribus, the level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts is 
likely to be higher among firms with greater exposure to foreign markets, than among 
firms operating mainly in domestic markets. Notwithstanding, estimation results allow 
admitting that the association between the level of disclosure and the exposure to 
foreign markets is intermediate by the type of guidance in firms’ home-country. In 
particular, according to the interaction term FSales&Markets x NMD_Guid (Table 5-
12 | Model 5.5-1), under not mandatory detailed guidance, a further increase in the 
disclosure index is estimated at 0,4672 percentage points (p<0,01) for every percentage 
point of increase in the level of exposure to foreign markets. 
As underlined when analyzing hypotheses H1 to H3, results are consistent with prior 
research (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010) 
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stating that formal guidance, though not mandatory for firms under IFRS, encourages 
additional disclosure most probably because it is likely to attract the attention of more 
powerful stakeholders. Furthermore, findings indicate that the overall effect depends on 
the clearness with which the items to be reported are delineated. Again, the small and 
non-significant estimate for the interaction term FSales&Markets x NMND_Guid (Table 
5-12 | Model 5.5-1) confirms that, as regards the difference between more or less 
internationalized firms, there are no significant changes when comparing the scenario of 
no guidance with the scenario where not mandatory guidance does not specify 
disclosure items. Also, according to the estimate of the interaction term 
FSales&Markets x Mand_Guid (Table 5-12 | Model 5.5-1), when considering the case 
of mandatory guidance, there are no significant changes in the level of disclosure, as 
regards the difference between high and low exposure to foreign markets. Accordingly, 
evidence suggests that only the scenario of not mandatory guidance comprehending 
detailed items to be reported in the annex trigger a positive relationship between the 
degree of internationalization and the level of carbon financial disclosure. Therefore, 
results support hypothesis H7b stating that the increment in the level of disclosure of 
firms with larger exposure to foreign markets, when compared with firms operating 
mainly in domestic markets, is predicted to be higher under not mandatory detailed 
guidance, than under any other type of guidance in home-country on how to report 
GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts.  
In summary, thus far, outcomes indicate that mandatory guidance is associated with the 
major upward movement of the disclosure index (0,5633, p<0,001), for any degree of 
international exposure, whereas not mandatory detailed guidance trigger additional 
disclosure for firms with larger exposure to foreign markets (Table 5-12 | Model 5.5-1). 
Namely, when compared with the scenario of no guidance on how to report GHG 
emission allowances in the annual accounts, not mandatory detailed guidance is 
associated with an upward movement of the disclosure index by 0,3599 (p<0,001) for 
firms with average exposure to foreign markets, and an additional increase (decrease) of 
0,4672 percentage points (p<0,01) for every percentage point of increase (decrease) in 
the degree of exposure to foreign markets. 
Notwithstanding, a more in-depth analysis reveals that, under not mandatory detailed 
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guidance, the increased level of disclosure of the most internationalized firms only 
applies to qualitative disclosure. According to Model 5-5.4 (Table 5-13), when 
considering the release of qualitative items (DQualit), the interaction term 
FSales&Markets x NMD_Guid indicates that international exposure is significantly 
associated with higher levels of release (0,7652, p<0,01). Otherwise, as regards 
quantitative data (DQuant), estimation results coming from Model 5-5.3 (Table 5-13) 
indicate that the interaction term FSales&Markets x NMD_Guid is not statistically 
significant.  
Furthermore, under mandatory guidance (where, on average, levels of disclosure are the 
highest among all the scenarios under review), outcomes suggest that firms with greater 
exposure to foreign markets, although not providing a greater level of disclosure, tend to 
differentiate themselves by providing significantly more (0,3076, p<0,05) quantitative 
information, as indicated by the interaction term FSales&Markets x Mand_Guid in 
Model 5.5-3 (Table 5-13). That is, when considering the nature of disclosure, outcomes 
point out that, under not mandatory detailed guidance, firms operating internationally 
tend to provide more qualitative disclosure while under mandatory guidance are more 
likely to enhance quantitative disclosure. On one hand, outcomes confirm that 
disclosure strategies biased towards less informative items are more likely to occur 
under not mandatory guidance, than under mandatory guidance. On the other hand, 
findings allow to admit that the overall improvement on carbon financial disclosure 
among firms operating on the international stage seems to be triggered by guidance in 
firms’ home-country.  
Altogether, results indicate that internationalization through sales is not likely to exert, 
de per se, a significant “disciplinarian effect” on the level of carbon financial disclosure. 
In this regard, it should be noted that it was not possible to accurately identify the 
characteristics of the target markets of each of the firms in the sample, namely in terms 
of their adherence to the Kyoto Protocol and accounting guidance on GHG emission 
allowances, because firms’ disclosure on operating segments is often aggregate by 
regions or continents instead of single countries. Nevertheless, most of sample firms 
operate in other EU-15 countries that have ratified the Protocol and issued guidance on 
accounting for GHG emission allowances. As a result, it would be plausible to admit 
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that, for firms under no guidance in home-country, internationalization through sales 
would be associated with more pressure to disclose coming from foreign stakeholders in 
countries where information on GHG emissions is more encouraged or valued. 
However, consistent with evidence provided earlier by Freedman and Jaggi (2005, 
2011), this study supports that multinational firms may not have strong incentives to 
make further disclosure on GHG emission allowances unless such information is 
recommended, or requested, by the country of their home-office. 
In the lens of institutional theory (Oliver, 1991), the lack of international consensus 
regarding either the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol or the appropriate accounting 
model for GHG emission allowances, do not favor a process of voluntary release of 
costs of carbon by EU-15 multinational firms. Despite the worldwide public concern 
over climate change and the need to limit GHG emissions, some skepticism has 
surrounded Protocol’s application namely due to the heavier burden it imposes on the 
developed countries. As advanced by Drezner (2001, p. 74), “objections in the US about 
the Kyoto Protocol’s costs of implementation, the distribution of costs (between 
countries), and the lack of enforcement measures have made implementation unlikely”.  
Moreover, Canada, a country that was active in the negotiations that led to the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997, decided to withdraw in 2012. Two key motives were invoked by the 
Government of Canada. The first was primarily tied to economic reasons. Canada’s 
Kyoto target was a 6% reduction of GHG emissions by 2012 compared to 1990 (base 
year) levels. However, during this period an increased by more than 18% has occurred. 
As a consequence, the Government of Canada argue that “To fulfill its obligations 
under the Protocol, Canada would have had to purchase a significant and costly amount 
of international credits using funds that could be invested here, in Canada, on domestic 
priorities, including the environment”8. The second reason was mainly political in 
nature and calls into question the effectiveness of the Protocol: “From an environmental 
perspective, the Kyoto Protocol has not served the international community well in 
meeting the real challenges of global climate change or effectively engaging all major 
economies. The Protocol only covers countries responsible for a small, and increasingly 
                                                             
8 Statement available on the official web site of the Government of Canada, 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&n=EE4F06AE-1&xml=EE4F06AE-13EF-453B-
B633-FCB3BAECEB4F&offset=3&toc=show. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
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smaller, percentage of global emissions and, as a consequence, is not an effective 
vehicle for addressing the global challenge of climate change. Importantly for Canada, 
the United States, which is Canada’s biggest economic trading partner and is 
responsible for nearly 20% of global emissions, is not covered by the Kyoto Protocol”9. 
In the same vein, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2009, p. 1) claims that an 
effective global strategy would require “leadership by the US, and commitments and 
action by the world’s major economies”. 
As formulated by Oliver (1991), when rules or norms are not broadly diffused and 
supported by society, organizations are less likely to respond to institutional pressures 
because their social validity is questioned. Extending Oliver’s (1991) hypotheses to an 
international environment, the absence of generally accepted beliefs regarding GHG 
emissions trading schemes and their appropriate accounting framework, at international 
level, implies that a wider range of foreign stakeholders does not necessarily compel 
EU-15 firms acting globally to voluntarily enhance disclosure on GHG emission 
allowances. In these circumstances, this study suggests that only national guidance in 
the firm’s home-country is capable to trigger a positive relationship between 
internationalization and disclosure. On this view, outcomes indicate that, with regard to 
carbon financial disclosure, two different institutional levels may be identified as 
exerting different degrees of incentives and pressures on EU-15 firms to disclose costs 
of carbon, as summarized in Table 5-14.  
The first is the national level where the signature of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
implementation of EU-ETS (“the world’s most far-reaching GHG reduction policy”, 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2009, p. 5), may be perceived by EU-15 firms 
as meaning that carbon financial disclosure is valued by society, and, therefore, is more 
likely to be used as a legitimization tool in order to feat social expectations.  
The second is the international level where, due to the lack of consensus regarding the 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and the absence of generally accepted guidance on 
accounting for GHG emissions trading schemes, the expectations of a multiplicity of 
                                                             
9 Statement available on the official web site of the Government of Canada, 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&n=EE4F06AE-1&xml=EE4F06AE-13EF-453B-
B633-FCB3BAECEB4F&offset=3&toc=show. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
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foreign constituents may be perceived as fragmented and less consistent than domestic 
constraints and, consequently, are not able to put forth, by themselves, further pressure 
on EU-15 firms exposed to external markets to enhance carbon financial disclosure.  
Table 5-14: Disclosure strategies of EU-15 firms operating in foreign markets 
International environment 
(2005 – 2012) 
Type of guidance  
in home-country 
Strategic responses of EU-15 firms 
operating in foreign markets 
F 
 R
  A
  G
  M
  E
  N
  T
  E
  D
 
VALUES, NORMS,  
AND PRACTICES 
regarding the commitment 
to the Kyoto Protocol and 
specific accounting 
guidance to report 
emissions trading  
schemes are  
NOT BROADLY 
DIFFUSED OR  
WIDELY VALIDATED 
among host countries. 
No Guidance 
Not Mandatory Not Detailed 
ORGANIZATIONAL SKEPTICISM 
about the strategic utility of carbon 
financial disclosure as a tool to manage a 
multiplicity of foreign stakeholders 
INHIBITS IMPROVEMENT.  
Not Mandatory Detailed 
GUIDANCE FAVORS the improvement 
of the overall level of disclosure by means 
of more QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURE. 
Mandatory 
GUIDANCE FAVORS the improvement 
of disclosure by means of more 
QUANTITATIVE DISCLOSURE, 
although not enhancing the overall level of 
disclosure. 
On one hand, where national guidance was issued, institutional pressures for EU-15 
firms (to control GHG emissions and to disclose costs of carbon) tend to be more 
pronounced at domestic level than internationally. So, foreign sales are not likely to 
exert, de per se, a significant “disciplinarian effect” on the level of disclosure, and 
ultimately the likelihood of EU-15 firms to respond to a multiplicity of foreign 
stakeholders with further carbon financial disclosure is triggered by guidance in firm’s 
home-country. In view of greater organizational dependencies from national authorities 
as regards the allocation of (free) allowances, the control of actual GHG emissions, and 
the definition of reduction targets, findings are consistent with Oliver’s (1991) 
prediction that, when facing a multiplicity of foreign constituents, organizations will be 
expected to acquiesce more readily to institutional pressures when the organization is 
greatly dependent on the source of these pressures. Also, in accordance with stakeholder 
theory, EU-15 firms acting globally are expected to conform primarily to domestic 
constraints especially when detailed requests are set out by local guidance and, 
therefore, further stakeholders’ pressure is perceived and greater legitimacy rewards are 
attainable, at national level.  
In turn, when there is no specific guidance in the firm’s home-country or when existing 
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guidelines do not specify disclosure items, the lack of international consensus as regards 
the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and the divergent positions of regulatory bodies 
concerning the need for a specific accounting model for emissions trading schemes 
seem to lead to organizational skepticism (Oliver, 1991, p. 159) about the strategic 
utility of carbon financial disclosure as a tool to manage a multiplicity of foreign 
stakeholders. 
In summary, considering all the above mentioned outcomes about the impact of firms’ 
internationalization over the level of carbon financial disclosure, evidence allows to 
admit that, for EU-15 firms engaged in internationalization processes, the type of 
guidance in home-country and the nature of international pressures when compared with 
domestic constraints are predictive factors of carbon financial disclosure, as 
summarized in Table 5-15. 
With regard to the internationalization through the capital markets, for EU-15 firms 
(domiciled in countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol) the internationalization through 
the quotation in US stock exchanges (a country that has not ratified the Protocol) does 
not seem to exert further pressure (in addition to the existing in firms’ home-country) to 
release carbon financial disclosure.  
In the lens of stakeholder theory and institutional theory, results suggest that, as foreign 
listed firms realize that this particular information is not broadly valued by their foreign 
stakeholders, to be accountable to a wider stakeholder audience is not enough to 
motivate, by itself, higher levels of disclosure on GHG emission allowances. 
Accordingly, as international pressures coming from the host country (US) are lower 
than domestic constraints, internationalization is not likely to exert, de per se, a 
significant “disciplinarian effect” over the level of disclosure, and evidence corroborates 
that disclosure strategies of EU-15 firms listed abroad are not significantly different 
from those of EU-15 firms listed only in domestic stock exchanges. 
As regards the internationalization through sales, evidence allows admitting that 
international pressures to disclose costs of carbon are not perceived by firms as more 
convincing than domestic constraints, due to multiplicity and fragmentation of foreign 
constituents. Extending the hypotheses formulated by Oliver (1991) to an international 
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environment, EU-15 firms operating globally are expected to respond primarily to 
domestic institutional pressures from which (perceived) organizational dependencies are 
predicted to be higher, namely as regards the allocation of (free) allowances and the 
control of GHG emissions. Therefore, their disclosure strategies are primarily driven by 
guidance in home-country, and follow general patterns of disclosure identified earlier. 
That is, under not mandatory detailed guidance the improvement is more likely to occur 
by means of more qualitative disclosure while the release of quantitative disclosure is 
more likely to occur under mandatory guidance. 
Table 5-15: Disclosure strategies of EU-15 firms engaged in internationalization processes 
Internationalization Through capital markets 
(due to the quotation mainly in  
US stock exchanges) 
 
Through foreign sales 
(due to intensity of foreign sales and 
variety of foreign markets) 
 
International 
pressures to disclose 
costs of carbon 
when compared 
with domestic 
constraints 
For EU-15 firms listed in US stock 
markets (a country that did not 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and 
where there is a lack of specific 
accounting guidance on emissions 
trading schemes), international 
pressures coming from the host 
country (US) are LOWER than 
domestic constraints. 
 
For EU-15 firms operating globally, 
international pressures are 
FRAGMENTED as values, norms 
and practices concerning either the 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol or 
specific accounting guidance for 
emissions trading schemes are not 
broadly diffused or widely validated 
among host countries. 
 
Disclosure 
strategies of  
EU-15 firms 
engaged in 
internationalization 
processes 
When international pressures are 
LOWER than domestic constraints, 
internationalization through the 
capital market is not likely to exert, 
de per se, a significant “disciplinarian 
effect” on the level of disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
When international pressures are 
FRAGMENTED, internationalization 
through sales is not likely to exert, de 
per se, a significant “disciplinarian 
effect” on the level of disclosure, 
being that strategic responses are 
primarily driven by domestic 
constraints from which (perceived) 
organizational dependencies are 
predicted to be higher. 
 
 Hence, disclosure strategies of EU-15 
firms listed abroad are NOT 
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT 
from those of EU-15 firms listed only 
in domestic stock exchanges. 
Hence, disclosure strategies of EU-15 
firms with higher exposure to foreign 
markets are TRIGGERED BY 
GUIDANCE IN HOME-
COUNTRY, and follow general 
patterns of disclosure: Not Mandatory 
Detailed Guidance tends to encourage 
more qualitative disclosure, while 
Mandatory Guidance is more likely to 
enhance quantitative disclosure. 
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Final synthesis 
Next table summarizes main results on the effects of regulatory background, affiliation 
in carbon intensive industries, and exposure to foreign markets, over mandatory or 
voluntary disclosure on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts of EU-15 
listed firms. 
Table 5-16: Summary of results on the “disciplinarian effect” of standards and markets on 
the level of carbon financial disclosure 
Explanatory  
Variables | 
Hypotheses 
 
Predicted 
sign 
No 
Guidance 
Scenario A 
Not-Mandatory 
Not-Detailed 
Scenario B1 
Not-Mandatory 
Detailed 
Scenario B2 
Mandatory 
Guidance 
Scenario C 
 Results on the association with the overall disclosure index (DISC) 
Guidance | H1 H2 H3 + Not 
significant 
√√ √√ √√ 
Industry | H5 + √√ √√ √√ √√ 
Internationalization      
Foreign-Listing | H6 + (i) Not 
significant 
(i) Not 
significant 
(i) Not 
significant 
(i) Not 
significant 
Foreign Sales & 
Markets | H7a H7b + 
 (ii) Not 
significant 
(ii) Not 
significant 
√ (ii) Not 
significant 
 Results on the association with the disclosure index on quantitative data (DQuant) 
Guidance | H4 + Not 
significant 
√− √√ √√ 
Industry  √√ √√ √√ √√ 
Internationalization 
Foreign Sales & 
Markets 
 
 
(ii) Not 
significant 
 
(ii) Not 
significant 
 
(ii) Not 
significant 
 
√ 
 Results on the association with the disclosure index on qualitative data (DQualit) 
Guidance + √− √√ √√ √√ 
Industry  √√ √√ √√ √√ 
Internationalization 
Foreign Sales & 
Markets 
 
 
(ii) Not 
significant 
 
(ii) Not 
significant 
 
√√ 
 
(ii) Not 
significant 
√√ Estimation results confirm association and predicted sign (p<0,01). 
√ Estimation results confirm association and predicted sign (p<0,05). 
√− Estimation results confirm association and predicted sign (p<0,10). 
(i) On average, the differences between the level of disclosure for firms listed in foreign stock exchanges 
and firms listed only in domestic markets are not significant. 
(ii) On average, the differences between the level of disclosure for firms with higher exposure to foreign 
markets and firms with lower exposure to foreign markets are not significant. 
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6. Evaluating the “disciplinarian effect” of standards and markets on 
de facto accounting harmonization in carbon financial disclosure 
This chapter provides empirical evidence aiming at evaluate whether formal guidance 
or the internationalization of firms lead to de facto accounting harmonization in carbon 
financial disclosure. 
6.1. Introduction 
Prior literature on international accounting harmonization suggests that, in general, 
harmonization of practices may arise from two different forces: institutional 
accomplishments to harmonize international financial reporting standards; and, 
voluntary movements by firms towards similar practices, independently from the 
harmonization of accounting regulations.  
As discussed in previous chapter, although not ensuring full compliance, formal 
guidance on how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts is a 
significant driver of additional disclosure. Given that comparability is an essential 
condition for the information to be useful, this study will now attempt to evaluate the 
effectiveness of such guidance in promoting de facto (material) accounting 
harmonization of carbon financial disclosure, by comparing levels of harmony among 
firms under mandatory guidance in home-country, with levels of harmony among firms 
under no mandatory regime. 
With regard to the internationalization of firms, in general, the results discussed in 
previous chapter do not allow admitting its association with additional disclosure. 
However, internationalization is sometimes pointed out in related literature as a possible 
driver of voluntary harmonization, on the grounds that firms operating internationally 
tend to adopt disclosure practices that improve communication with users in several 
countries. With this in mind, the present investigation intends to evaluate if, despite not 
enhancing the level of disclosure, the globalization of capital markets and the 
internationalization of firms’ operations are features associated with a minimum of 
comparable information on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. 
In summary, the aim of present research is twofold: to confirm the existence of a 
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“disciplinarian effect” of formal guidance; and, to test the existence of a “disciplinarian 
effect” of markets, both concerning harmonization in carbon financial disclosure. The 
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 formalizes hypotheses for 
investigation. Section 6.3 describes data and research methodology. The final section 
presents and discusses empirical results. 
6.2. Hypotheses 
The harmonization of practices through the harmonization of accounting standards is 
one goal of regulatory bodies. When this aim is achieved de jure (formal) harmonization 
leads to de facto (material) harmonization. But the existence of formal harmonization 
does not assure, by itself, the comparability of accounting information (van der Tas, 
1992; Emenyonu and Gray, 1992; Emenyonu, 1993; Cairns, 1997; Emenyonu and 
Adhikari, 1998; Nobes, 1998; Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; 
Barbu et al., 2014). Even when compliance with regulations is legally required, firms 
may not comply if it is perceived that the consequences of non-compliance are not 
serious (Tay and Parker, 1990; Oliver, 1991). So, the diversity of practices may subsist 
despite the existence of standardized rules. Moreover, formal harmonization may lead to 
material disharmonization (Archer et al., 1995; Aisbitt, 2001) especially when standards 
evolve allowing for more options or when mandatory disclosure depends on the 
management evaluation as to materiality (Lainez et al., 1999; Cole et al., 2012).  
Notwithstanding, the more institutional pressures to disclose are “entrenched in a legal 
or regulatory apparatus” (Oliver, 1991, pp. 167-168), the less likely it is that 
organizations will resist to those pressures. In particular, by emphasizing benchmarks 
for disclosure, mandatory guidance makes organizations more aware of public interests 
and less likely to respond defiantly because the consequences of withholding 
information are more tangible and often more severe, than under no mandatory regime. 
In view of greater incentives for firms to comply with compulsory requests, more 
comparable information is expected under mandatory guidance, than under no 
mandatory regime. Hence, in line with institutional theory, this study anticipates that 
mandatory guidance is more likely to enhance harmony in carbon financial disclosure, 
than any other type of regulatory background under consideration (not mandatory 
guidance or no guidance), as formulated in the following hypothesis: 
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H1: The level of harmony in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher 
among firms under mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances, 
than among firms under no mandatory regime. 
As regards voluntary disclosure, in line with da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán 
(2010), Choi et al. (2013), and Barbu et al. (2014), the results in previous chapter 
suggest that national guidance not required for entities under IFRS exerts a positive 
effect on the firms’ level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in their annual 
accounts. Matters now assess whether, under not mandatory guidance, increased levels 
of carbon financial disclosure are accompanied by greater harmony of firms’ accounts 
or if, on the contrary, they are associated with greater dispersion, namely because, in 
view of impression management strategies, firms tend to disclose only those aspects that 
are in line with the interests of their most powerful stakeholders, and conceal those that 
aren’t of interest to reveal.  
Previous research (Rahman et al., 2002) on de facto (material) disclosure harmony 
predicted that, in general, high levels of voluntary disclosure tend to be associated with 
lower levels of harmony in disclosure. However, according to stakeholder theory, due to 
legitimacy-seeking behaviors, firms under IFRS are compelled to reveal as much 
information as their competitors, namely those applying local guidance. Moreover, from 
institutional theory standpoint, when an organization anticipates that conformity with 
social expectations (even though set out by non-mandatory rules) will enhance social 
fitness, voluntary diffusion, through imitation, is more likely to occur, than under no 
guidance (Oliver, 1991). So, in line with stakeholder theory and institutional theory, this 
study anticipates that higher levels of harmony are expected among firms domiciled in 
countries where formal guidance was issued, though not mandatory for entities under 
IFRS, than among firms domiciled in countries where no guidance on accounting for 
GHG emission allowances was provided, as formulated in the following hypothesis: 
H2: The level of harmony in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher 
among firms domiciled in countries where national guidance on accounting for GHG 
emission allowances was issued, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, than 
among firms domiciled in countries where no specific guidance was provided. 
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Furthermore, as regards not mandatory guidance, outcomes from previous chapter 
suggest that guidance comprehending detailed benchmarks for the items to be reported 
are more likely to enhance the level of carbon financial disclosure, than not mandatory 
guidance that does not specify detailed demands for disclosure. In line with stakeholder 
theory and institutional theory, national guidance establishing detailed benchmarks for 
disclosure, though not mandatory, make organizations more aware of social 
expectations, help to inform the public opinion on disclosure best practices, and 
contribute to raise awareness among stakeholders about the relevant information to be 
provided in the annual accounts. Moreover, detailed benchmarks are likely to boost 
stakeholders’ perception that lack of critical information may well correspond to bad 
news. As a consequence, by exerting further pressure for the release of a particular 
information (specific items), detailed guidance is more likely to reduce management 
discretion than guidance without detailed demands for disclosure. Hence, this study 
anticipates higher levels of harmony in carbon financial disclosure under not mandatory 
detailed guidance, than under not mandatory guidance that does not specify detailed 
demands for disclosure, as formulated in the following hypothesis: 
H3: The level of harmony in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher 
among firms domiciled in countries where national guidance on accounting for GHG 
emission allowances, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, comprises detailed 
requests for disclosure, than among firms domiciled in countries where not mandatory 
guidance does not specify detailed requests for disclosure. 
The non-rejection of hypotheses H1 to H3 would confirm that formal guidance, even 
not mandatory for entities under IFRS, exerts a “disciplinarian effect” over the harmony 
in carbon financial disclosure.  
Another sort of regulatory influence may come from industry affiliation. Within EU-
ETS, the EC has adopted guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions 
according to which firms have to report their actual emissions and assure independent 
verification of their reports (refer to section 2.1). In addition, high GHG emitters, such 
as power generators, face further sector-level regulations addressing GHG emissions 
due to its operations. Hence, due to greater scrutiny and institutional pressure, this study 
anticipates that when there is no mandatory regime on accounting for GHG emission 
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allowances, higher levels of harmony are more likely to occur among more carbon 
intensive industries, than among less pollutant activities. Also, harmony in disclosure is 
more likely to occur at industry level because firms operating in the same industry face 
common legitimization challenges, are affected by similar sector-level regulations, and 
tend to imitate competitors’ behavior either at national or international level (Jackson 
and Apostolakou, 2010). Accordingly, the following hypotheses are put forward: 
H4a: In the context of no mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances, the level of harmony in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be 
higher among firms operating in more carbon intensive industries, than among other 
firms. 
H4b: In the context of no mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances, the level of harmony in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be 
higher within industries, than between industries. 
On the other hand, the lack of formal guidance does not necessarily imply the diversity 
of practices. Some research (van der Tas, 1988; Tay and Parker, 1990; Cañibano and 
Mora, 2000; Aisbitt, 2001) suggests that convergence of practices may occur by means 
of voluntary harmonization when most firms consider that it is of their convenience. 
Namely, the globalization of capital markets and the internationalization of firms’ 
operations are singled out in the literature as factors that may lead to voluntary 
harmonization. In this regard it should be noted that past research shows mixed results 
(Emenyonu, 1993; Thorell and Whittington, 1994; Emenyonu and Gray, 1996; 
Emenyonu and Adhikari, 1998; Land and Lang, 2002; Cañibano and Mora, 2000; Jaafar 
and McLeay, 2007), and findings discussed in previous chapter do not identify 
internationalization, by itself, as a significant determinant of the level of carbon 
financial disclosure.  
However, despite not enhancing the level of disclosure, the internationalization of 
firms’ operations may induce, at least, a minimum of comparable information. The 
rationale is that firms operating globally are likely to disclose at least as much 
information as their competitors, and due to legitimacy-seeking behaviors all of them 
are willing to improve communication with users in several countries. Therefore, to 
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evaluate whether international exposure is likely to enact harmony in carbon financial 
disclosure, either the internationalization through the capital markets or through foreign 
sales are considered. 
First, to investigate the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of capital markets on 
harmony in carbon financial disclosure, the following two hypotheses are proposed: 
H5a: In the context of no mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances, the level of harmony in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be 
higher among foreign listed firms, than among firms listed only in domestic stock 
exchanges. 
H5b: In the context of no mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances, the level of harmony in carbon financial disclosure increases over time 
among foreign listed firms, as they converge to best disclosure practices. 
Then, to investigate the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” coming from the markets 
of products and services to which the firm is exposed when operating internationally, 
the following two hypotheses are proposed: 
H6a: Considering firms not listed on foreign stock exchanges, in the context of no 
mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances, the level of harmony 
in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms with above-
average exposure to foreign markets, than among firms with below-average exposure to 
foreign markets. 
H6b: Considering firms not listed on foreign stock exchanges, in the context of no 
mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances, the level of harmony 
in carbon financial disclosure increases over time among firms with above-average 
exposure to foreign markets, as they converge to best disclosure practices. 
The non-rejection of hypotheses H5a to H6b would suggest that, even without 
mandatory guidance on how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts, 
harmony in carbon financial disclosure may be induced by means of a “disciplinarian 
effect” of markets. 
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Figure 6-1: Synthesis of the hypotheses testing the “disciplinarian effect” of standards and 
markets on the harmony in carbon financial disclosure 
 
H2: Not_Mand_Guid > No_Guid
The level of harmony is predicted to be higher among firms domiciled in countries where 
national guidance was issued, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, than among 
firms domiciled in countries where 
no guidance was provided.
NOT MANDATORY GUIDANCE
Scenario B
Not_Mand_Guid
H1 to H3: Hypotheses testing the “disciplinarian effect” of accounting standards on harmony in disclosure
NO GUIDANCE
Scenario A
No_Guid
MANDATORY GUIDANCE
(detailed)
Scenario C
Mand_Guid
H1: Mand_Guid > Not_Mand_Guid or No_Guid
The level of harmony is predicted to be higher among firms under mandatory guidance than among firms under no mandatory regime.
H3: NMD_Guid > NMND_Guid
The level of harmony is predicted to be 
higher among firms domiciled in 
countries where national guidance, 
though not mandatory for entities under 
IFRS, comprises detailed requests for 
disclosure, than among firms domiciled 
in countries where not mandatory 
guidance does not specify detailed 
requests for disclosure.
NOT DETAILED
Scenario B1
NMND_Guid
DETAILED
Scenario B2
NMD_Guid
H4a: High carbon intensive industries > Other industries
In the context of no mandatory guidance, the level of harmony is predicted to be higher 
among firms operating in more carbon intensive industries, than among other firms. 
H4a to H4b : Hypotheses testing industry effects on harmony in disclosure
H5a: Foreign_Listed firms > Domestic_Listed firms
In the context of no mandatory accounting guidance, the level of harmony is 
predicted to be higher among foreign listed firms, than among firms listed only in 
domestic stock exchanges.
H5a to H6b: Hypotheses testing the “disciplinarian effect” of markets on harmony in disclosure
H5b: Foreign_Listed firms t > Foreign_Listed firms t-1
In the context of no mandatory accounting guidance, the level of harmony increases 
over time among foreign listed firms, as they converge to best disclosure practices.
H6a: FSales&Markets_AbAv > FSales&Markets_BlAv
In the context of no mandatory accounting guidance, the level of harmony is 
predicted to be higher among firms with an above-average exposure to foreign 
markets, than among firms with below-average exposure to foreign markets.
H6b: FSales&Markets_AbAv t > FSales&Markets_AbAv t-1
In the context of no mandatory accounting guidance, the level of harmony increases 
over time among firms with an above-average exposure to foreign markets, as they 
converge to best disclosure practices.
H4b: Within industries > Between industries
In the context of no mandatory guidance, the level of harmony is predicted to be higher 
within industries, than between industries. 
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6.3. Data and method 
6.3.1. Sample 
As described in section 5.3.1, the final sample comprises 168 listed firms from fourteen 
EU countries, and research covers an eight-year period, from 2005 to 2012, amounting 
to 1 344 firm-year observations. 
For the purpose of confirming the “disciplinarian effect” of formal guidance on de facto 
(material) disclosure harmony, sample firms were classified according to the same two 
criteria followed in previous chapter (Table 5.3). The first one comprehends three 
categories (no guidance, not mandatory guidance, and mandatory guidance). The second 
makes a distinction between detailed and not-detailed guidance on disclosure items, 
arriving at four groups (no guidance, not mandatory not detailed guidance, not 
mandatory detailed guidance, and mandatory (detailed) guidance).  
Then, for the purpose of testing a possible “disciplinarian effect” of markets on de facto 
(material) disclosure harmony, those 146 sample firms under no mandatory regime were 
organized according two dimensions: entities acting on the international stage (i) 
through the capital markets, according to the firm’s listing status; or, (ii) through the 
markets of products and services rendered by each firm, according to the geographical 
location of its customers. Concerning the listing status, 26 firms whose shares were 
listed in more than one stock exchange, the domestic and at least one foreign stock 
market, were classified as foreign listed (Table 6-1 | Foreign-Listed), irrespective of 
their percentage of sales to external markets. Regarding the internationalization of the 
firms’ operations through foreign sales, the classification of the remaining 120 firms 
was based on both the intensity of sales outside the country of domicile of each firm and 
the variety of markets where its foreign customers are located. This procedure intends to 
overcome the fact that the percentage of foreign sales does not capture, de per se, the 
diversity of markets to which the firm is exposed. So, the level of internationalization 
was evaluated through a composite measure weighting the percentage of sales to foreign 
markets by the relative number of foreign reportable geographical segments, for each 
firm (arriving at variable Foreign Sales & Markets described earlier in Table 5-7). 
Subsequently, these 120 firms listed only in domestic markets were classified in two 
different categories depending on whether their level of internationalization was higher 
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or lower to the sample average, throughout the eight-year period. Table 6-1 summarizes 
sample composition according to the aforementioned criteria (Panel A) and shows the 
descriptive statistics by type of guidance, listing status and level of internationalization 
(Panel B). 
Table 6-1: Sample composition and descriptive statistics by type of guidance, listing status, 
and internationalization through sales 
PANEL A PANEL B
% Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
176 13,1 Foreign Sales (%) 52,3 19,7 10,0 94,0
Foreign Sales & Markets (%) 27,9 16,1 6,0 91,0
Foreign Sales & Markets_average  (%) 27,9 15,0 9,3 80,9
Assets (M€)  13 811  22 805   113  97 016
LnAssets 7,9 1,9 4,7 11,5
Turnover (M€)  7 015  12 672   62  57 740
LnTurnover 7,4 1,8 4,1 11,0
Return on Assets (%) 3,5 4,9 (  28,7) 14,5
Leverage 2,1 1,8 0,3 10,6
208 15,5 Foreign Sales (%) 84,7 13,2 43,0 99,0
Foreign Sales & Markets (%) 65,6 21,2 9,8 99,0
Foreign Sales & Markets_average  (%) 65,6 21,2 11,7 99,0
Assets (M€)  71 903  71 643  4 446  369 992
LnAssets 10,7 1,0 8,1 12,8
Turnover (M€)  61 025  81 629  2 134  470 171
LnTurnover 10,4 1,1 7,7 13,1
Return on Assets (%) 6,5 5,8 (  21,9) 23,3
Leverage 2,29 1,63 0,45 10,2
480 35,7 Foreign Sales (%) 85,2 11,2 27,0 99,0
Foreign Sales & Markets (%) 69,2 12,3 21,6 95,0
Foreign Sales & Markets_average  (%) 69,2 11,4 51,7 95,0
Assets (M€)  16 319  23 234   149  142 945
LnAssets 8,9 1,4 5,0 11,9
Turnover (M€)  11 984  16 940   185  127 220
LnTurnover 8,6 1,3 5,2 11,8
Return on Assets (%) 4,7 5,9 (  42,1) 32,6
Leverage 1,9 1,4 0,3 11,1
480 35,7 Foreign Sales (%) 49,5 27,1 0,0 93,0
Foreign Sales & Markets (%) 23,0 14,9 0,0 65,0
Foreign Sales & Markets_average  (%) 23,0 14,3 0,0 47,9
Assets (M€)  16 115  39 552   59  256 906
LnAssets 8,1 1,7 4,1 12,4
Turnover (M€)  9 189  16 832   85  132 093
LnTurnover 8,0 1,6 4,4 11,6
Return on Assets (%) 3,9 6,3 (  33,3) 26,9
Leverage 3,1 6,6 0,2 116,9
1 344 100,0 Foreign Sales (%)   68,1   26,2   0,0   99,0
Foreign Sales & Markets (%)   46,7   26,8   0,0   99,0
Foreign Sales & Markets_average  (%)   46,7   26,5   0,0   99,0
Assets (M€)  24 528  44 960   59  369 992
LnAssets   8,8   1,8   4,1   12,8
Turnover (M€)  17 925  39 932   62  470 171
LnTurnover   8,5   1,7   4,1   13,1
Return on Assets (%)   4,6   6,0 (  42,1)   32,6
Leverage   2,4   4,2   0,2   116,9
Firm-year observations
Full sample
Mandatory Guidance
No Mandatory Guidance
Foreign-Listed
FSales&Markets_Above Average
FSales&Markets_Below Average
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In summary, combining listing status and level of international activity, three categories 
are considered to group those sample firms under no mandatory guidance on how to 
report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. The first group comprises 26 
firms listed in both domestic and foreign stock exchanges (Table 6-1 | Foreign-Listed), 
totaling 208 firm-year observations. The second group comprehends 60 firms listed 
only in domestic markets and whose level of internationalization, over the eight-year 
period, is above the sample average (Table 6-1 | FSales&Markets_Above Average), 
totaling 480 firm-year observations. Finally, the third group consists of 60 domestic 
listed firms whose level of internationalization, over the eight-year period, is lower than 
the sample average (Table 6-1 | FSales&Markets_Below Average), totaling 480 firm-
year observations. 
6.3.2. Data analysis 
a) The T index 
The T index, introduced by Taplin (2004), was employed to measure harmony in carbon 
financial disclosure. The T index seems to be the most appropriate method as it brings 
together all of the required properties to quantify comparability of accounts (Cole et al., 
2009; Mustata et al., 2011). Indices technique to compare accounting policy choices by 
firms was introduced in accounting research by van der Tas (1988). Taplin (2004) 
developed further this methodology by extending the H, C and I indices proposed by 
van der Tas (1988), as well as other variants that have emerged in literature since then, 
to a flexible framework comprising most of the previous indices, either directly or by 
retaining their desirable properties, and allowing the researcher to form a specific index 
with the desired characteristics for a particular analysis (refer to section 3.2). 
The T index equals the probability that two firms randomly selected, with replacement, 
have accounts that are comparable, ranging from 0, when all firms have financial 
statements non-comparable to each other, to 1, when all firms have financial statements 
that are comparable to each other.  
The flexibility in the T index comes from the possibility to specify which accounting 
methods are comparable, and to give distinct weights for comparisons between firms 
belonging to two different countries (refer to section 3.2.2). This is achieved by 
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specifying two coefficients: the coefficient of comparability between accounting 
method k and accounting method l (αkl), and the coefficient of comparability between 
firms in countries i and j (βij). Based on prior literature, Taplin (2004) identified the 
main criteria to arrive at a specific index within this framework: (1) the weight given to 
firms or countries; (2) the international focus: within country; between country; or 
overall; (3) the treatment of multiple accounting policies; (4) the treatment of non-
disclosure. The first two criteria determine the coefficients βij (refer to Table 3-2), and 
the last two criteria determine the coefficients αkl (refer to Table 3-1). 
Although the specification of the T index is designed to address the comparability 
among countries, this index can also be used to quantify harmony in other units of 
analysis, as pointed out by Taplin (2006). In particular, comparisons based on countries 
may not be the most appropriate when firms are multi-listed in several countries. So, in 
this research, instead of focusing comparisons on a country-by-country basis, the T 
index is used to measure the harmony among different groups of firms sorted according 
the relevant criteria to test research questions: type of guidance, industry affiliation, 
listing status, and level of exposure to international markets.  
Along the study five sets of indices are presented, covering the period 2005-2012: 
- The first set measures the level of harmony among the firms pertaining to the 
same group, by using only data for each group, separately. 
- The second set measures harmony at EU-15 level (T overall) by treating all firms 
in the sample as belonging to the same nation irrespective of their country of 
origin within the EU (Table 3-2 | option 2a: overall international focus) and giving 
equal weight to each firm in the sample (Table 3-2 | option 1a). 
- Finally, when analyzing levels of harmony by industry, another three sets of 
indices are computed, by assuming the three sorts of international focus allowed 
in the T index: overall (Table 3-2 | option 2a), within industries (Table 3-2 | option 
2b), and between industries (Table 3-2 | option 2c), giving (in all cases) equal 
weight to each industry in the sample (Table 3-2 | option 1b). 
Annex XV shows the correspondent βij coefficients matrices arising out of all the 
options under consideration. 
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Prior literature usually evaluates harmony in disclosure regarding a minimum of 
comparable information (refer to section 3-2). In the present research, among the items 
included in the disclosure index (DISC), three topics were selected as the minimum 
level of information necessary for users to evaluate firms’ performance in terms of 
GHG emissions and to project future cash flows (EFRAG, 2012, § 37): 
A. GHG emission allowances granted at no cost, or below market (informing about 
granted allowances and the gains they represent to the firm). 
B. GHG emissions made during the year (informing about the cost of pollution that 
the firm bears due to its activities). 
C. Excess or shortfall of GHG emission allowances at year-end (informing whether 
EU-ETS targets were accomplished, or not, and how the firm can face its 
surrendering obligation). 
As described in the next table, for each topic four possible treatments are considered:  
(i) Not disclosed. 
(ii) Disclosed only in physical units (CO2 tones). 
(iii) Disclosed only in currency units. 
(iv) Disclosed both in physical and in currency units. 
To better evaluate comparability of information for users, instead of measuring harmony 
on an item-by-item basis (i.e. presenting a set of indices for each topic separately), this 
study considers an aggregate approach summarizing comparability in a single index for 
all the topics under review. To the best of my knowledge, the present analysis innovates 
by considering an aggregate approach to measure accounting disclosure harmony. 
In order to achieve a single disclosure index, the 4 possible treatments for each one of 
the 3 headings were aggregated, arriving at a total of 64 possible treatments (disclosure 
methods), as described in Annex XVI. In this regard, it should be noted that T index is 
not affected by possible zero frequencies for some of those 64 disclosure methods. On 
the contrary, results would be impaired if fewer disclosure methods were considered 
than those actually applied by firms (Taplin, 2006). 
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Table 6-2: Possible disclosure methods for minimum comparable information 
Nº Description
4 Not disclosed  
Disclosed only in physical units (CO2 tones)
Disclosed only in currency units 
Disclosed both in physical and in currency units 
4 Not disclosed  
Disclosed only in physical units (CO2 tones)
Disclosed only in currency units 
Disclosed both in physical and in currency units 
4 Not disclosed  
Disclosed only in physical units (CO2 tones)
Disclosed only in currency units 
Disclosed both in physical and in currency units 
Aggregate approach (A&B&C) Possible treatments on an aggregate approach
64 Disclosure methods
Possible  treatments on an item-by-item basisDisclosure items
C. Excess or shortfall of GHG emission
allowances at year-end
or below market (2005-2007 | 2008-2012)
Allowances&Emissions&Position at year-end
A. GHG emission allowances granted at no cost
B. GHG emissions made during the year
 
Then, for estimating the coefficients of comparability between disclosure methods, this 
study explores the flexibility of the T index that comes from allowing fractional 
comparability between accounting methods (Table 3-1 | option 3c) with αkl assuming a 
value on the continuum from zero (completely incomparable) to one (completely 
comparable). So, the option to allocate different levels of comparability to disclosure 
methods, according to the degree of information provided by each method, is used to 
assure that harmonization towards a more informative policy gets a higher score. To 
assign relative levels of comparability proportionate to the information provided by 
each disclosure method the following procedure was established: 
i) identification of the most informative method (MIM). 
ii) computation of the maximum number of comparable items under MIM. 
iii) allocation of relative degrees of comparability by reference to this maximum, 
according to the following expression: 
 
where: 
αkl,MIM is the relative coefficient of comparability between disclosure methods k and l, by 
reference to the most informative disclosure method MIM. 
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Finally, this study assumes that non-disclosure is comparable to nothing (Table 3-1 | 
option 4c). In this regard, it should be noted that the sample comprises no “not-
applicable” cases, since all firms were covered by EU-ETS over the eight-year period 
under review. Annex XVII shows the αkl,MIM matrix (64 x 64) describing the 
comparability between all the 64 disclosure methods under consideration. 
b) The T index adjusted to control for industry effects 
A firm attribute generally associated with accounting policy choice and disclosure is the 
sector of operations (Peill, 2000; Jaafar and McLeay, 2007). In line with previous 
research, the results discussed in section 5.4 afford the assumption that industry is a 
significant determinant of carbon financial disclosure. Hence, it is reasonable to assume 
that the assessment of differences in the levels of harmony focused only on 
“unadjusted” T indices may be misleading when comparing subsamples with dissimilar 
industry composition.  
In empirical research, a common approach to solve this kind of problem consists in 
selecting paired subsamples in order to form groups of firms with similar 
characteristics. Unfortunately, in most of empirical studies on accounting 
harmonization, available data set is not large enough to allow selecting only those 
observations that will preserve relative weight of industries in every subsample. 
Furthermore, such a procedure would imply to remove some observations pertaining to 
over-represented industries and, hence, to neglect the information they convey.  
So, an alternative approach was developed in this study to control for industry effects, 
within the T index framework. The procedure consists on producing adjustments to 
subsamples simulating for all groups an industry composition similar to that of the 
control group. This method has the advantage of preserving sample size, as it does not 
require the arbitrary exclusion of some observations. Instead of removing from the 
subsamples some of the firms belonging to the over-represented industries, this 
procedure is able to retain all the observations in every group, because the adjustments 
are not to be produced in the number of observations but in their relative weight when 
computing the proportion of firms applying each disclosure method. Detailed 
explanation of this technic is presented in a methodological note in the Appendix. 
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In the present research, both the EU-ETS incidence by industry, as well as the relative 
weight of industries in each subsample to be analyzed, are diversified enough to justify 
controlling industry effects. So, whenever appropriate, adjustments to subsamples were 
produced, by simulating for all groups an industry composition similar to that of the 
control group (H1 to H3 - firms under mandatory guidance | H5a to H6b -  foreign-listed 
firms), in order to compute the corresponding adjusted T indices. To the best of my 
knowledge, the present analysis innovates by exploring the flexibility of the T index to 
control for industry effects. 
c) Statistical inference 
The T index was computed for an eight-year period to quantify the level of harmony 
from 2005 to 2012. Statistical analysis was performed according to two different 
procedures: non-parametric and parametric technics. 
The first one consists on using non-parametric tests of hypotheses to examine, 
separately, the differences on the level of harmony between groups, and the changes 
over time (trend) in each group.  
To test differences in the T index between different groups of firms or different 
industries, the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test was applied. The 
hypothesis H0 was formulated as follows: “The T index distribution for Group i is the 
same as that for Group j”. Rejection of H0 would point to a difference in the shapes of 
the two distributions or to a difference in their centres of location.  
To test differences in the T index over time, the Spearman correlation coefficient was 
performed. Following Murphy (2000), this statistic is used to test for trend between a 
bivariate sample of (Xi,Yi) pairs, where Xi is the fiscal year and Yi is the T index. Here, 
the hypothesis H0 states the following: “There is no monotonic association between the 
year and the level of harmony, as measured by the T index, for the eight-year period, 
2005-2012”. Rejection of H0 would imply that the level of harmony has changed. An 
increasing trend would indicate that harmonization occurred. A decreasing trend would 
indicate that disharmonization occurred. However, it should be noted that Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient is a measure of a monotonic relationship between paired data, 
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and thus a non-significant outcome does not necessarily imply that there is no 
relationship between the variables, it only denotes that there is no monotonic 
correlation. 
The second approach is the parametric alternative and consists on regression analysis. 
Unlike most of prior studies that assess harmony of accounting practices in a single year 
or in two different points in time, the present investigation fully covers an eight-year 
period, what allows conducting regression analysis to test jointly trends on 
harmonization and differences in the level of harmony between subsamples. Some 
researchers (e.g., van der Tas, 1992b; Pierce and Weetman, 2002) have applied 
regression analysis to evaluate harmonization trends. The present study develops further 
this methodology, by testing together differences over time and between groups of 
firms, through the following set of least square dummy variable regressions:  
 (Model 6-1) 
 (Model 6-2) 
where: 
TIndex i represents the level of harmony, measured by the T index, for Group i. 
Di represents a set of dummy variables that equal 1 for the observations belonging to 
Group i, and 0 otherwise. Since the categories are exhaustive and the binary dummies 
are mutually exclusive, the model includes n-1 groups of firms. 
Year is an ordinal variable, labeled from 0 to 7, representing the effort of harmonization 
from 2005 to 2012, respectively. 
ᶓi, φi represent the residuals.  
The first equation (Model 6-1) takes the degree of harmony, measured by the T index, 
as the dependent variable, and the independent variables are the groups of firms that 
emerged from the classification by type of guidance, industry, listing status, and 
international activity presented in section 6.3.1. For each group, repeated observations 
over an eight-year period, 2005-2012, were considered.  
A set of dummy variables (Di), equaling 1 for the observations belonging to Group i 
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and 0 otherwise, allows to achieve estimates for each group. Since the categories are 
exhaustive and the binary dummies are mutually exclusive, the model includes n-1 
groups, omitting the baseline category. Therefore, when considering firms sorted by: 
- Type of guidance (No_Guidance, Not_Mandatory Guidance, Mandatory_Guidance), 
the omitted category is No_Guidance (the baseline group). 
- Industry (Utilities, Oil&Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Goods&Services), the omitted category is the utility sector (the baseline group). 
- Listing status and level of internationalization through sales (Foreign Listed, 
FSales&Markets_AbAv, FSales&Markets_BlAv), the omitted category is Foreign 
Listed (the baseline group). 
Accordingly, the estimates for the n-1 groups of firms included in the model are 
provided, in each case, by reference to the omitted category (the baseline group). So, in 
Model 6-1, the intercept (α0) is the coefficient of the dropped dummy, playing a role of 
a reference point. It represents the average level of harmony, over the period 2005-2012, 
among firms in the category whose dummy variable is not in the equation. The other 
coefficients (α1i) represent the average difference in the level of harmony between this 
baseline category and Group i, over the eight-year period.  
The t-statistic for coefficients α1i tests the null hypothesis of differences between the 
baseline category and Group i are equal to zero. To examine differences between other 
possible pairs of groups and test its significance, linear combinations of parameters α1i, 
and the correspondent t-statistics, are performed. 
The second equation (Model 6-2) consists on regression analysis of the T index as a 
function of time, to allow for trend testing. This equation is intended to evaluate 
differences in the efforts towards harmonization over the eight-year period 2005-2012, 
and, consistently with the hypotheses formulated in section 6.2, its specification allows 
the dummies to have different slopes and intercepts for the different groups of firms. 
That is to say, it is reasonable to expect that different groups exhibit different levels of 
harmony in 2005, and show dissimilar evolution along the period under consideration. 
Accordingly, in Model 6-2: 
 - 180 - 
- The intercept (β0) represents the average level of harmony among the baseline 
category, in 2005. 
- The coefficients of the dummies (β1i) represent the average difference in the level of 
harmony between the baseline category and Group i, in 2005. 
- The coefficient of variable Year (β2) represents the slope (trend over 2005-2012) for 
the baseline category; and 
- The coefficients of the interaction terms (β3i) represent the average difference in the 
slope between the baseline category and Group i, over the 2005-2012 period.  
The t-statistics for the parameters of the dummies (β1i), and for the parameters of the 
interaction term (β3i) test the null hypothesis of no differences between the baseline 
group and Group i, regarding to the level of harmony in 2005, and to the harmonization 
effort from 2005 to 2012, respectively. Additionally, linear combinations of coefficients 
β1i and β3i and the correspondent t-statistics are used to examine differences between 
other possible pairs of groups, and to test its significance. 
Detection of heteroscedasticity was performed, and the standard errors and the co-
variances of the estimators of the coefficients were therefore corrected. Accordingly, the 
t-statistics were amended.  
The estimation was made by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method using version 
12.0 of the software STATA. The coefficient of determination (R-squared) is reported 
as an indicator of the quality of the adjustment. 
For verifying that the residuals are normally distributed, which is another important 
assumption for inference, the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data is applied, and 
whenever the null hypothesis is rejected for a p-value less than 5%, inference is based 
only on non-parametric tests that do not require the normality of data.  
It is widely recognized that deciding to use parametric procedures in preference to non-
parametric technics should be based on considerations of its relative power and 
efficiency. For any given significance level, the most powerful test is the parametric 
procedure, if residuals are normally distributed. On the other hand, when there are 
departures from normality the non-parametric tests can have a power advantage. In the 
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present study, both methodologies are conducted according to the existing 
characteristics in the data to be analysed: whenever residuals are normally distributed, 
statistical inference is based on parametric procedures; otherwise, only the results of the 
non-parametric technics are considered for hypotheses testing. However, it should be 
noted that, in the present case, both methodologies lead to similar statistical inference. 
6.4. Results and conclusions 
Hypotheses H1 to H3 address whether formal guidance enhances the level of harmony 
in carbon financial disclosure. 
To test these hypotheses, firms were grouped according to the type of guidance on 
accounting for GHG emission allowances they face in their home-country (Spain: 
mandatory guidance | Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Portugal: 
guidance not mandatory for entities under IFRS | Other EU-15 Member States: no 
specific guidance). Then, T indices were computed, and Spearman correlation 
coefficient, WMW tests and regression analysis were performed. Along with the 
harmony among firms pertaining to each group, this study also evaluates harmony in 
carbon financial disclosure at EU-15 level (T overall) by treating all firms in the sample 
as belonging to the same nation irrespective of their country of origin, and giving equal 
weight to each firm in the sample. Relative frequencies of disclosure methods are 
reported in Annex XVIII. Findings are summarized in Table 6-3. 
With regard to the harmony in carbon financial disclosure at EU-15 level, the 
probability that two firms randomly selected have accounts that are comparable (T 
overall) ranges from, 0,0350, in 2005, to 0,0557, in 2012. This improvement in the T 
index is essentially due to a decrease in cases of non-disclosure (ND), from 63%, in 
2005, to 58%, in 2012 (Annex XVIII | DM 64), and an increase in the number of firms 
disclosing all the items classified as minimum information required for users to 
compare firms’ carbon financial disclosures, from 5%, in 2005, to 8%, in 2012 (Annex 
XVIII | DM 1). When evaluating this upward movement in the T index, Spearman 
correlation coefficient test confirms a significant (p<0,05) positive trend along the eight 
years under review (Table 6-3 | Panel A). 
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Table 6-3: Summary of results by type of guidance 
 
PANEL A: T index by type of guidance, T overall and Spearman correlation results  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 r
0,3805 0,5723 0,5630 0,5923 0,6023 0,6023 0,6023 0,6023 0,9132 ***
0,0344 0,0617 0,0593 0,0558 0,0555 0,0569 0,0569 0,0569 0,0732
0,0044 0,0047 0,0047 0,0058 0,0080 0,0070 0,0070 0,0070 0,8051 **
International focus
Overall 0,0350 0,0544 0,0528 0,0532 0,0563 0,0557 0,0557 0,0557 0,7563 **
Mandatory_Guidance
1344 firm-year observations
No_Guidance
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
Not_Mandatory _Guid
 
 
 
PANEL B: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney to test differences in the T index by type of guidance  
3,396 *** 3,396 ***
3,381 ***
*** Significant at 1%. 
Not_Mandatory_Guid
Mandatory_Guidance
Not_Mandatory _Guid
No_Guidance
 
 
 
PANEL C: Estimation results for Model 6-1 (Baseline category: No_Guidance) 
Number of obs = 24
Independent variables Coef. R^2
Mandatory_Guid D1  0,5586  20,79 ***
Not_Mandatory_Guid D2  0,0486  16,09 ***
Intercept (No_Guidance)  0,0061  12,80 ***
0,97 344,71 ***
D1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Mandatoty_Guidance, and 0 otherwise.
D2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Not_Mandatoty_Guidance, and 0 otherwise.
Model 6-1: T Indexi = α0 + S  α1i Di + ɛi             
Hypothesis H0 Coef.
α11 - α12 = 0  0,5100  18,87 ***
t-statistic
*** Reject H0 for a significance level of 1%.
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. *** Significant at 1%.
Dependent variable - T Index
t-statistic F-statistic
 
Over the research period, firms under mandatory guidance show the lowest rates of ND, 
dampening from 14%, in 2005, to 5%, in 2012 (Annex XVIII | DM 64). With regard to 
firms domiciled in countries where local guidance is not required for entities under 
IFRS, frequency of ND ranges from 58%, in 2005, to 50%, in 2012 (Annex XVIII | DM 
64). Among the group of firms with registered address in countries where no guidance 
was delivered, ND reached the highest occurrences equaling around 82% along the 
eight-year period (Annex XVIII | DM 64). On the other hand, with regard to the most 
informative disclosure method (DM 1), the highest incidence is observed among firms 
under mandatory guidance, growing from 27%, in 2005, to 45%, in 2012 (Annex XVIII 
| DM 1). In the opposite pole lies the group of firms with no guidance in home-country, 
where zero cases of full disclosure were observed in 2012 (Annex XVIII | DM 1). 
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Computation of T index indicates that, in 2005, the probability that two Spanish firms 
(under mandatory guidance) randomly selected have accounts that are comparable (T 
index) equaled 0,3805 (Table 6-3 | Panel A). Over the period under review, harmony 
has increased among this group of firms reaching a score of 0,6023, in 2012, being that 
the highest growth was observed in 2006. This evolution seems to be consistent with the 
issuance of the Resolution ICAC (2006) in 8 February 2006, entering into force on the 
day following that of publication in the Official State Bulletin. As the standard was 
issued in early 2006, some firms may have it applied to 2005 accounts. So, already in 
this first year the level of harmony among Spanish firms was considerably higher than 
in any other subsample (Table 6-3 | Panel B). Full effects of the standard came in 2006 
leading to an increase in the T index to 0,5723 in that year. In fact, from there on, more 
than 40% of the Spanish firms have applied the most informative disclosure method 
(DM 1), and no cases of non-disclosure (DM 64) were registered, which explains a T 
index of 0,6023, in 2012. Accordingly, computation of Spearman correlation coefficient 
test indicates a significant (p<0,01) growth trend in the harmony of carbon financial 
disclosure, from 2005 to 2012 (Table 6-3 | Panel A). 
Considering the firms belonging to countries where national guidance was provided, 
though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, the probability that two randomly 
selected firms have accounts that are comparable went from 0,0344, in 2005, to 0,0569, 
in 2012 (Table 6-3 | Panel A). However, this upward movement was not consistent 
(monotonic) all over the period, being that Spearman correlation coefficient does not 
recognize a significant growth trend among this group (Table 6-3 | Panel A). Regarding 
the firms under no guidance, despite the positive trend on harmony among them (Table 
6-3 | Panel A), the levels of harmony remained the weakest of all subsamples, moving 
from 0,0044, in 2005, to 0,0070, in 2012 (Table 6-3 | Panel A). 
Comparisons between subsamples (Mand_Guid | Not_Mand_Guid | No_Guid) indicate 
that, over the eight-year period (2005-2012), levels of harmony among firms under 
mandatory guidance are higher than levels of harmony among any other scenario under 
consideration, and that these differences are statistically significant at a level of 1% 
(Table 6-3 | Panel B | Panel C). Actually, both the non-parametric WMW tests (3,396, 
p<0,001), and the parametric tests coming from Model 6-1 (0,5586, p<0,001 | 0,5100, 
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p<0,001) indicate that, under mandatory guidance the level of harmony in carbon 
financial disclosure, over the eight-year period, is significantly higher than in any other 
scenario under review. 
Considering the differences in industry composition among subsamples, adjusted T 
indices were computed, by simulating for the two subsamples that were disclosing in a 
voluntary basis (Not_Mand_Guid | No_Guid) an industry composition similar to that of 
the group of firms under mandatory guidance. Adjusted relative frequencies are reported 
in Annex XIX. After controlling for industry effects, main outcomes remained 
unchanged, as reported in Table 6-4. That is, over the research period, levels of 
harmony among firms under mandatory guidance are, on average, significantly higher 
than among other sample firms (p<0,001). 
Table 6-4: Summary of results by type of guidance, after control for industry effects 
 
PANEL A: Adjusted T index by type of guidance and Spearman correlation results  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 r
0,3805 0,5723 0,5630 0,5923 0,6023 0,6023 0,6023 0,6023 0,9132 ***
0,0424 0,0707 0,0685 0,0646 0,0646 0,0656 0,0656 0,0656 0,0732
0,0087 0,0104 0,0094 0,0106 0,0141 0,0129 0,0129 0,0129 0,8051 **
1344 firm-year observations
Mandatory_Guidance
Not_Mandatory _Guid_adj
No_Guidance_adj
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.  
 
 
PANEL B: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney to test differences in the adjusted T index by type of guidance 
3,396 *** 3,396 ***
3,381 ***
*** Significant at 1%. 
Not_Mand_Guid_adj No_Guidance_adj
Mandatory_Guidance
Not_Mand _Guid_adj
 
 
 
PANEL C: Estimation results for Model 6-1 (Baseline category: No_Guidance_adjusted) 
Number of obs = 24
Independent variables Coef. R^2
Mandatory_Guid D1  0,5532  20,59 ***
Not_Mandatory_Guid_adj D2  0,0520  16,40 ***
Intercept (No_Guidance_adj)  0,0115  16,61 ***
0,97 344,57 ***
D1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Mandatoty_Guidance, and 0 otherwise.
D2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Not_Mandatoty_Guidance_adjusted, and 0 otherwise.
Model 6-1: Adj T Indexi = α0 + S  α1i Di + ɛi             
Hypothesis H0 Coef.
α11 - α12 = 0  0,5012  18,54 ***
Dependent variable - Adjusted T Index
t-statistic F-statistic
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. *** Significant at 1%.
t-statistic
*** Reject H0 for a significance level of 1%.  
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Largely, findings allow the non-rejection of the hypothesis H1 stating that mandatory 
guidance is associated with higher levels of harmony in carbon financial disclosure. 
Consistent with institutional theory, results corroborate that, as the consequences of 
non-compliance are perceived as more severe than under no mandatory regime, 
mandatory guidance makes organizations more likely to acquiesce to their requests for 
information, leading to higher levels of harmony in carbon financial disclosure, than 
any other scenario under review. 
Hypothesis H2 addresses whether formal guidance, though not mandatory for entities 
under IFRS, promotes the harmony in carbon financial disclosure. 
Comparisons between subsamples disclosing in a voluntary basis (Not_Mand_Guid | 
No_Guid) indicate that, over the eight-year period (2005-2012), levels of harmony in 
carbon financial disclosure among firms with not mandatory guidance in home-country 
(Not_Mandat_Guid) are higher than those arising from the group of firms domiciled in 
countries where no guidance was provided (No_Guid), and those differences are 
significant at 1% level (Table 6-3 | Panel B | Panel C). 
Computation of T index indicates that, in 2005, the probability that two firms with not 
mandatory guidance in home-country have accounts that are comparable (T index) 
equaled 0,0344 (Table 6-3 | Panel A). It should be noted that, despite the degree of 
harmony be low within this group of firms, it is significantly higher than the level of 
0,0044 observed, in the same year, among firms with no guidance on accounting for 
GHG emission allowances, (Table 6-3 | Panel A). 
Over the period under review, harmony has increased among firms with not mandatory 
guidance in home-country reaching a score of 0,0569, in 2012 (Table 6-3 | Panel A). 
The highest growth was observed in 2006, when the T index arrives at a maximum of 
0,0617. This evolution seems to be consistent with the issuance of not mandatory 
guidance in most countries only in late 2005. So, full effects of formal guidance take 
place in 2006 leading to an increase in the T index in that year. In fact, from there on, a 
slight fall in the T index occurred which explains why, over the eight-year period, the 
Spearman correlation coefficient, although positive, is not statistically significant for 
this group of firms (Table 6-3 | Panel A).  
 - 186 - 
Notwithstanding, either WMW tests (Table 6-3 | Panel B) or estimation results for 
coefficient of variable D2 in Model 6-1 (Table 6-3 | Panel C) indicates that, on average, 
from 2005 to 2012, harmony among firms under not mandatory guidance in home-
country is expected to be higher than among firms under no guidance, and difference is 
statistically significant at 1% level. Additionally, when evaluating the adjusted T indices 
results remained unchanged (Table 6-4). Therefore, findings allow the non-rejection of 
the hypothesis H2 stating that formal guidance, although not required for entities under 
IFRS, is associated with higher levels of harmony in carbon financial disclosure, when 
compared with the scenario of no specific guidance on how to report GHG emission 
allowances in the annual accounts.  
This is a departure from Rahman et al.’s (2002) prediction that higher levels of 
voluntary disclosure are generally associated with lower comparability of firms’ 
accounts. Contrarily, evidence from this study indicates that when increased disclosure 
is induced by formal guidance, even not mandatory, higher (not lower) levels of 
harmony in disclosure are likely to occur. In the lens of institutional theory, when an 
organization anticipates that conformity with social expectations (even though set out 
by not mandatory rules) will enhance social fitness, a process of voluntary diffusion, 
through imitation, is more likely to take place, than under no guidance. Accordingly, as 
anticipated, results show significantly higher levels of harmony (along with higher 
levels of disclosure) among firms domiciled in countries where national guidance was 
issued, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, than among firms in countries 
where no guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances was provided. 
Hypothesis 3 addresses whether not mandatory detailed guidance is more likely to 
enhance harmony in carbon financial disclosure, than not mandatory guidance that does 
not specify detailed demands for disclosure. Findings are summarized in Table 6-5, 
where firms with some guidance in home-country, though not mandatory for entities 
under IFRS, are classified into two subgroups according to the detail on items to be 
reported in annual accounts that were set out by national guidance (Not_Mandatory 
Detailed Guidance | Not_Mandatory Not_Detailed Guidance). Relative frequencies of 
disclosure methods are reported in Annex XX. 
Comparisons between subsamples under no mandatory regime (No_Guid | Not_Mandat 
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Detailed_Guid | Not_Mand Not_Detailed_Guid) indicate that, over the period 2005-
2012, levels of harmony among firms with detailed guidance in home-country 
(Not_Mandat Detailed_Guid) are higher than those arising from any other group of 
firms disclosing in a voluntary basis (Not_Mandat Not_Detailed_Guid | No_Guidance), 
and those differences are significant at 1% level (Table 6-5 | Panel B | Panel C).  
Table 6-5: Summary of results by detail of guidance on disclosure items 
 
PANEL A: T index by detail on disclosure items and Spearman correlation results  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 r
Not_Mandatory _Guidance 0,0344 0,0617 0,0593 0,0558 0,0555 0,0569 0,0569 0,0569 0,0732
of which:
Detailed_Guidance 0,0866 0,2272 0,2148 0,2064 0,2064 0,2064 0,2064 0,2064 - 0,1091
Not_Detailed_Guidance 0,0245 0,0342 0,0331 0,0311 0,0306 0,0320 0,0320 0,0320 0,0732
No_Guidance 0,0044 0,0047 0,0047 0,0058 0,0080 0,0070 0,0070 0,0070 0,8051 **
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
1168 firm-year observations
 
 
 
PANEL B: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney to test differences in the T index by detail on disclosure items 
3,422 *** 3,422 ***
3,381 ***
Not_Mandat_Detailed_Guid
Not_Mandat_Not_Detailed_Guid
Not_Mandat_Not_Detailed_Guid
*** Significant at 1%. 
No_Guidance
 
 
 
PANEL C: Estimation results for Model 6-1 (Baseline category: No_Guidance) 
Number of obs = 24
Independent variables Coef. R^2
Not_Mandatory_Detailed_Guid D2a  0,1890  12,02 ***
Not_Mandatory_Not_Detailed_Guid D2b  0,0251  22,08 ***
Intercept (No_Guidance)  0,0061  12,80 ***
0,92 312,66 ***
D2a is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Not_Mandatoty_Detailed_Guidance, and 0 otherwise.
D2b is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Not_Mandatoty_Not_Detailed_Guidance, and 0 otherwise.
Model 6-1: T Indexi = α0 + S  α1i Di + ɛi             
Hypothesis H0 Coef.
α12a - α12b = 0  0,1639  10,41 ***
t-statistic
*** Reject H0 for a significance level of 1%.
Dependent variable - T Index
t-statistic F-statistic
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. *** Significant at 1%.
 
In 2005, the probability that two randomly selected firms with detailed guidance in 
home-country, though not mandatory, have accounts that are comparable (T index) 
equaled 0,0866 (Table 6-5 | Panel A). Throughout the period under review, harmony has 
increased among this group of firms reaching a score of 0,2064, in 2012 (Table 6-4 | 
Panel A). The highest growth was observed in 2006, when the T index arrives at a 
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maximum of 0,2272. Over the period under consideration, either WMW tests (Table 6-5 
| Panel B) or estimation results coming from Model 6-1 (Table 6-5 | Panel C) indicate 
that harmony among the group of firms with detailed guidance in home-country 
(Not_Mandat_Detailed_Guid) is significantly higher (p<0,001), than the one observed 
among firms domiciled in countries where guidance does not specify detailed demands 
on disclosure items.  
Largely, findings allow the non-rejection of the hypothesis H3 stating that the level of 
harmony in carbon financial disclosure is predicted to be higher among firms domiciled 
in countries where national guidance, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, 
comprises detailed demands for disclosure, than among firms domiciled in countries 
where not mandatory guidance does not specify detailed demands on the items to be 
reported in the annual accounts. In line with institutional theory and stakeholder theory, 
accounting guidance outlining detailed benchmarks for disclosure, though not 
mandatory, helps to inform the public opinion on disclosure best practices, and 
contributes to raise stakeholders’ perception that lack of critical information may well 
correspond to bad news. As a consequence, firms (not wanting to incur the costs of bad 
reputation) tend to follow non-mandatory benchmarks to respond to a major search of 
information by stakeholders. So, as anticipated, results allow admitting that not 
mandatory detailed guidance is significantly associated with higher levels of harmony in 
carbon financial disclosure (along with higher levels of disclosure), when compared 
with not mandatory guidance that does not specify detailed demands for disclosure. 
Then, to investigate whether, under no mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG 
emission allowances, higher levels of harmony are likely to occur in carbon intensive 
and regulated industries (H4), the T index was computed by industrial sectors, being 
that, beside the level of harmony among firms pertaining to the same industry (obtained 
from data for each industry separately), T index within industries (Table 3-2 | option 1b, 
2b), T index between industries (Table 3-2 | option 1b, 2c), and T overall (Table 3-2 | 
option 1b, 2a) were also computed, giving equal weight to each industry in the sample. 
Afterwards, Spearman correlation coefficient, WMW tests and regression analysis were 
performed. Relative frequencies of disclosure methods are reported in Annex XXI. 
Findings are summarized in Table 6-6. 
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Table 6-6: Summary of results by industry 
 
PANEL A: T index by industry, T Within, T Between, T Overall and Spearman correlation results  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 r
0,0535 0,1019 0,0926 0,0756 0,1044 0,0926 0,0926 0,0926  0,2283
0,0485 0,0544 0,0519 0,0850 0,0961 0,0961 0,0961 0,0961  0,9132 ***
0,0246 0,0450 0,0406 0,0444 0,0476 0,0476 0,0476 0,0476  0,8625 ***
0,0237 0,0247 0,0277 0,0197 0,0179 0,0179 0,0179 0,0179 - 0,8371 ***
0,0003 0,0023 0,0016 0,0029 0,0029 0,0029 0,0029 0,0029  0,8456 ***
0,0017 0,0017 0,0017 0,0017 0,0017 0,0017 0,0017 0,0017
Within 0,0200 0,0292 0,0284 0,0269 0,0296 0,0287 0,0287 0,0287  0,7563 **
Between 0,0024 0,0039 0,0037 0,0038 0,0042 0,0042 0,0042 0,0042  0,7563 **
Overall 0,0154 0,0247 0,0237 0,0232 0,0253 0,0248 0,0248 0,0248  0,7563 **
Utilities 
Consumer Goods&Services
1168 firm-year observations
Industrials
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
Other industries
Oil&Gas
Basic Materials
 
 
 
PANEL B: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney to test differences in the T index by industry 
Utilities 0,533 3,411 *** 3,398 *** 3,424 *** 3,620 ***
3,411 *** 3,411 *** 3,437 *** 3,620 ***
3,198 *** 3,437 *** 3,620 ***
3,437 *** 3,620 ***
2,565 **
T Within 3,275 ***
International focus T Between
Consumer Goods&Services
Industrials
Oil&Gas
Materials
Other
industries
Basic Materials
Industrials
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
Oil&Gas Basic
Goods&Services
Consumer
 
 
 
PANEL C: Estimation results for Model 6-1 (Baseline category: Utilities) 
Number of obs = 40
Independent variables Coef. R^2
Oil&Gas D4  - 0,0102  - 1,04
Basic Materials D5  - 0,0451  - 7,00 ***
Industrials D6  - 0,0673  - 11,28 ***
Consumer Goods&Services D7  - 0,0859  - 14,77 ***
Intercept (Utilities)  0,0882  15,19 ***
0,88 167,99 ***
D4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to Oil&Gas, and 0 otherwise.
D5 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to Basic Materials, and 0 otherwise.
D6 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to Industrials, and 0 otherwise.
D7 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to Consumer Goods&Services, and 0 otherwise.
Model 6-1: T Indexi = α0 + S  α1i Di + ɛi             
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
Dependent variable - T index
t-statistic F-statistic
 
In general, from 2005 to 2012, the average levels of harmony among utility firms are 
higher than those observed among firms in any other industry, and differences are 
statistically significant to a level of significance of 1%. The only exception is the 
comparison between Utilities and Oil & Gas, where Oil & Gas shows a lower level of 
harmony, but differences between these two industries (the most carbon intensive in the 
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whole sample) are not statistically significant (Table 6-6 | Panel B | Panel C). In 
addition, to test the existence of an intra-industry “disciplinarian effect” coming from 
sector-level regulations, comparison of T index within and between industries was 
performed. Consistent with Peill (2000), Jaafar and McLeay (2007), and Jackson and 
Apostolakou (2010), higher levels of harmony are likely to occur within industries, than 
between in industries, and differences are significant at 1% level (Table 6-6 | Panel B).  
In summary, findings allow not reject the hypothesis H4 stating that higher levels of 
harmony are likely to occur among more carbon intensive and regulated industries. On 
one hand, these results have important implications for future research, by confirming 
that comparisons between subsamples with different industry composition must be 
validated through the assessment of the adjusted T index, in order to control for industry 
effects. On the other hand, they are consistent with institutional theory and stakeholder 
theory, admitting that high carbon intensive firms have created routines to collect and 
treat information, and will tend to adopt more organized and explicit carbon financial 
disclosure policies, either as a result of their own reaction to public pressure or because 
they are compelled to do so by sector-level regulations. Overall, evidence suggests that 
firms operating in the same industry face common legitimization challenges, are 
affected by similar regulations, and tend to imitate competitors’ behavior either at 
national or international level, implying that harmony is more likely to occur within 
industries, than between industries. 
Next, to test the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of capital markets over harmony 
in carbon financial disclosure, hypotheses H5a and H5b examine whether, in the context 
of no mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances, levels of 
harmony among foreign listed firms are higher than among firms registered only in 
domestic stock exchanges, and whether those levels increase over time as foreign listed 
firms converge to best disclosure practices. Relative frequencies of disclosure methods 
are reported in Annex XXII. Findings are summarized in Table 6-7. 
Findings indicate that, from 2005 to 2012, more than 80% of the foreign listed firms did 
not disclose any of the items classified as the minimum information required for users 
to compare firms’ carbon financial disclosures (Annex XXII | DM 64). Accordingly, 
over the period under review, the probability that two randomly selected foreign listed 
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firms have accounts that are comparable is equal or minor than 0,0118 (Table 6-7 | 
Panel A). This score corresponds to the lowest level of harmony observed in all and 
each of the sample groups, and either WMW tests (Table 6-7 | Panel B) or regression 
estimates (Table 6-7 | Panel C) suggest that the differences between foreign listed firms 
and any other sample group are statistically significant at 1% level. 
Also, regression estimates show that, in 2005, the lowest level of harmony was 
observed among foreign listed firms, and coefficients of variables D9 and D10, in 
Model 6-2, indicate that the difference between this group and other firms disclosing on 
a voluntary basis were statistically significant in this first year (Table 6-7 | Panel D).  
Furthermore, from there on, no progresses on the level of harmony were observed 
among foreign listed firms. On the contrary, harmony significantly decreased among 
this group, over the period under consideration, as indicated by Spearman correlation 
coefficient (Table 6-7 | Panel A), and coefficient of variable Year in Model 6-2 (Table 
6-7 | Panel D). Accordingly, either WMW tests (Table 6-7 | Panel B) or coefficients of 
variables D 9 and D10 coming from Model 6-1 (Table 6-7 | Panel C) indicate that, on 
average, levels of harmony among foreign listed firms show the poorest performance 
along the research period (p<0,001). 
In summary, results do not allow confirming the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of 
capital markets (H5a, H5b) over harmony in carbon financial disclosure. Conversely, 
foreign listed firms display the poorest level of harmony of all, in 2005, and show no 
signs of progress towards harmonization from 2005 to 2012. 
Finally, to test the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” over harmony in carbon 
financial disclosure coming from the external markets of products and services to which 
the firm is exposed, hypotheses H6a and H6b examine if, considering entities listed only 
in domestic stock exchanges and disclosing under no mandatory regime (on accounting 
for GHG emission allowances), levels of harmony among firms with greater exposure to 
foreign markets are higher than those observed among firms operating mainly in 
domestic markets, and if those levels of harmony increase over time as firms operating 
internationally converge to best disclosure practices. Relative frequencies of disclosure 
methods are reported in Annex XXII. Findings are summarized in Table 6-7.  
 - 192 - 
Table 6-7: Summary of results by listing status and internationalization through sales 
 
PANEL A: T index by listing status and foreign sales, T overall, and Spearman correlation results  
1168 firm-year observations 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 r
Foreign-Listed 0,0118 0,0076 0,0081 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 - 0,8456 ***
FSales&Markets_AbAv 0,0167 0,0270 0,0290 0,0256 0,0245 0,0245 0,0245 0,0245 - 0,2029
FSales&Markets_BlAv 0,0172 0,0345 0,0305 0,0380 0,0464 0,0449 0,0449 0,0449 0,8051 **
Overall 0,0154 0,0247 0,0237 0,0232 0,0253 0,0248 0,0248 0,0248 0,7563 **
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.  
 
PANEL B: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney to test differences in the T index by listing status and foreign sales 
- 3,437 *** - 3,422 ***
FSales&Markets_AbAv - 2,653 **
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
FSales&Markets_BlAv
Foreign-Listed
FSales&Markets_AbAv
 
 
PANEL C: Estimation results for Model 6-1 (Baseline category: Foreign-Listed) 
Number of obs = 24
Independent variables Coef. R^2
 FSales&Markets_AbAv D9  0,0194  10,86 ***
FSales&Markets_BlAv D10  0,0325  8,58 ***
Intercept (Foreign-Listed)  0,0051 4,07 ***
0,83 78,13 ***
D9 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_AbAv, and 0 otherwise.
D10 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_BlAv, and 0 otherwise.
Model 6-1: T Indexi = α0 + S  α1i Di + ɛi             
Hypothesis H0 Coef.
α1 9 - α1 10 = 0  - 0,0131  - 3,46 ***
** Reject H0 for a significance level of 5%.
Dependent variable - T index
t-statistic F-statistic
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. *** Significant at 1%.
t-statistic
 
 
PANEL D: Estimation results for Model 6-2 (Baseline category: Foreign-Listed) 
Number of obs = 24
Independent variables Coef. R^2
 FSales&Markets_AbAv D9  0,0137  3,44 ***
FSales&Markets_BlAv D10  0,0129  2,76 **
D9 x Y  0,0016  2,06 *
D10 x Y  0,0063  5,56 ***
Year (Foreign_Listed) Y  - 0,0013  - 4,26 ***
Intercept (Foreign-Listed)  0,0096 7,22 ***
0,96 196,08 ***
D9 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_AbAv, and 0 otherwise.
D10 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_BlAv, and 0 otherwise.
Year (Y) is an ordinal variable labeled from 0 to 5 representing the effort of harmonization from 2005 to 2010.
Model 6-2: T Indexi = β0 + S  β1i Di + β2 Year + S β3i Di Year + ji
Hypotheses H0 Coef.
 0,0009  0,15
 - 0,0047  - 3,72 ***
Reject H0 for a significance level of: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
FSales&Markets_AbAv x Year
FSales&Markets_BlAv x Year
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
β1 9 - β1 10 = 0
β3 9 - β3 10 = 0
t-statistic
t-statistic F-statistic
Dependent variable - T index
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When evaluating the differences in the T index between the two subsamples 
(FS&Markets_AbAv | FS&Markets_BlAv) either WMW tests (Table 6-7 | Panel B), or 
regression estimates (Table 6-7 | Panel C) suggest that there is a statistically significant 
difference between firms acting internationally and those operating mainly in domestic 
markets. However, contrary to prediction (H6a), levels of harmony observed among 
firms acting internationally are, on average, lower than those registered among firms 
with less exposure to foreign markets. 
Among the group comprising firms with higher exposure to foreign markets 
(FSales&Markets_AbAv), regression estimates (Table 6-7 | Panel D) show that, in 
2005, the level of harmony was higher than among firms with smaller international 
activity (FSales&Markets_BlAv), but linear combination of parameters D9 and D10 
coming from Model 6-2, indicate that differences between these two groups are not 
statistically significant in this first year. Moreover, from there on, progresses in the level 
of harmony were sharper among firms more dedicated to domestic markets, as indicated 
by Spearman correlation coefficient (Table 6-7 | Panel A), and linear combination of 
parameters D9 x Y and D10 x Y coming from Model 6-2 (Table 6-7 | Panel D). 
Accordingly, along the eight-year period, levels of harmony in carbon financial 
disclosure show a poorer performance among firms with higher international exposure 
through sales, than among firms with lower international activity. 
So, evidence does not allow confirming a “disciplinarian effect” over harmony in 
carbon financial disclosure coming from the foreign markets in which the firm operates. 
In particular, unlike formulated in hypotheses H6a and H6b, from 2005 to 2012, firms 
operating mainly in domestic markets seem to reach higher levels of harmony and more 
progress towards harmonization than firms with higher exposure to foreign markets. 
Additionally, considering differences in industry composition among the groups 
(Foreign-Listed, FSales&Markets_AbAv, FSales&Markets_BlAv), adjusted T indices 
were computed, by simulating for the two subsamples listed only in domestic stock 
exchanges an industry composition similar to that of the group comprising foreign listed 
firms. Adjusted relative frequencies of disclosure methods are reported in Annex XXIII. 
Findings are summarized in Table 6-8. 
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Table 6-8: Summary of results by listing status and internationalization through sales, 
after control for industry effects  
 
PANEL A: Adjusted T index by listing status and foreign sales, and Spearman correlation results  
1168 firm-year observations 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 r
Foreign-Listed 0,0118 0,0076 0,0081 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 -0,8456 ***
0,0162 0,0263 0,0278 0,0235 0,0228 0,0228 0,0228 0,0228 - 0,2029
0,0089 0,0173 0,0150 0,0207 0,0252 0,0239 0,0239 0,0239 0,8051 **
FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj
FSales&Markets_BlAv_adj
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.  
 
PANEL B: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney to test differences in the adjusted T index by listing status and 
foreign sales 
 
- 3,437 ***  3,315 ***
FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj - 0,637
FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj
Foreign-Listed
Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
FSales&Markets_BlAv_adj
 
 
PANEL C: Estimation results for Model 6-1 (Baseline category: Foreign-Listed) 
Number of obs = 24
Independent variables Coef. R^2
 FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj D9  0,0180  9,67 ***
FSales&Markets_BlAv_adj D10  0,0150  6,76 ***
Intercept (Foreign-Listed)  0,0051 4,07 ***
0,78 52,08 ***
D9 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj, and 0 otherwise.
D10 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_BlAv_adj, and 0 otherwise.
Model 6-1: T Indexi = α0 + S  α1i Di + ɛi             
Hypothesis H0 Coef.
α1 9 - α1 10 = 0  0,0030  1,32
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. *** Significant at 1%.
t-statistic
Reject H0 for a significance level of: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
Dependent variable - Adjusted T index
t-statistic F-statistic
 
 
PANEL D: Estimation results for Model 6-2 (Baseline category: Foreign-Listed) 
Number of obs = 18
Independent variables Coef. R 2^
 FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj D9  0,0130  3,29 ***
FSales&Markets_BlAv_adj D10  0,0033  1,21
D9 x Y  0,0015  1,82 *
D10 x Y  0,0033  5,54 ***
Year (Foreign_Listed) Y  - 0,0012  - 4,08 ***
Intercept (Foreign-Listed)  0,0095 6,85 ***
0,91 86,65 ***
D9 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj, and 0 otherwise.
D10 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for observations belonging to FSales&Markets_BlAv_adj, and 0 otherwise.
Year (Y) is an ordinal variable labeled from 0 to 5 representing the effort of harmonization from 2005 to 2010.
Model 6-2: Adjusted T Indexi = β0 + S β1i Di + β2 Year + S β3i Di Year + j i
Hypothesis H0 Coef.
 0,0097  2,23 **
 - 0,0018  - 1,99 *
t-statistic F-statistic
FSales&Markets_BlAv_adj x Year
β1 9 - β1 10 = 0
β3 9 - β3 10 = 0
FSales&Markets_AbAv_adj x Year
t-statistic
Reject H0 for a significance level of: ** 5% | * 10%.
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported. Significant at: *** 1% | ** 5% | * 10%.
Dependent variable - Adjusted T index
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Among foreign listed firms, the score of the adjusted T index remains the lowest all 
subsamples, and either WMW tests (Table 6-8 | Panel B) or regression estimates (Table 
6-8 | Panel C) suggest that the differences between foreign listed firms and any other 
sample group are statistically (p<0,001) significant. 
With regard to firms listed only in domestic stock markets, linear combination of 
parameters D9 and D10 coming from Model 6-2 (Table 6-8 | Panel D), point out a 
significant (0,0097 | p<0,05) difference in the adjusted T index in favor of firms 
operating internationally, in 2005. However, from there on, progress on the level of 
harmony was sharper among firms with less exposure to foreign markets, as indicated 
by linear combination of parameters D9 x Y and D10 x Y (- 0,0018 | p< 0,10). As a 
result, over the eight-year period, differences between firms acting internationally and 
those with lower exposure to foreign markets, after adjusting for industry effects, are 
not statistically significant as indicated by either WMW tests (Table 6-8 | Panel B), or 
linear combination of parameters D9 and D10 coming from Model 6-1 (Table 6-8 | 
Panel B).  
In line with results from previous chapter, for EU-15 firms (domiciled in countries that 
signed the Kyoto Protocol), the internationalization through the quotation in US stock 
exchanges (a country that has not ratified the Protocol) does not seem to exert further 
pressure (in addition to the existing in firms’ home-country) to converge to similar 
disclosure practices on GHG emission allowances. In the lens of stakeholder theory and 
institutional theory, results indicate that, as foreign listed firms realize that this 
particular information is not broadly valued by their foreign stakeholders, to be 
accountable to a wider stakeholder audience is not a determinant factor significant 
enough to motivate, by itself, higher levels of harmony in carbon financial disclosure.  
As regards the internationalization through sales, due to multiplicity and fragmentation 
of foreign constituents, international pressures to disclose costs of carbon are not 
perceived by EU-15 firms as more convincing than domestic constraints. Consequently, 
firms’ disclosure strategies are primarily driven by domestic guidance. As discussed in 
previous chapter, consistent with stakeholder theory and institutional theory, when there 
is no specific guidance in the firm’s home-country or when existing guidance does not 
specify disclosure items, firms’ skepticism about the strategic utility of carbon financial 
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disclosure as a tool to manage a multiplicity of foreign stakeholders inhibits the 
improvement of disclosure. On the other hand, when there is not mandatory detailed 
guidance in the firm’s home-country, an improvement of disclosure among EU-15 firms 
with higher level of exposure through foreign sales is likely to occur, but only by means 
of more qualitative items. So, as regards the harmony in carbon financial disclosure 
concerning the quantitative items under review (classified as the minimum information 
required for users to compare firms’ carbon financial disclosures) results indicate that, 
under no mandatory regime, differences between firms with higher exposure to foreign 
markets and those with lower exposure to foreign markets, are not statistically 
significant. 
Largely, evidence does not allow confirming the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” 
over harmony in carbon financial disclosure coming from either capital markets or the 
markets of products and services where foreign customers are located. 
Final synthesis 
Next table summarizes main results on the effects of formal guidance and exposure to 
foreign markets, over the harmony in carbon financial disclosure among EU-15 listed 
firms. 
Table 6-9: Summary of results on the “disciplinarian effect” of standards and markets 
over the harmony in carbon financial disclosure 
Explanatory  
Variables | Hypotheses 
Predicted 
sign 
Statistical inference on the association 
with the T index 
Guidance | H1 H2 H3 + √√ 
Industry | H4a H4b + √√ 
Internationalization   
Foreign listing | H5a H5b  + Not proven 
International activity | H6a H6b + Not proven 
√√ Statistical inference confirms association and predicted sign (p<0,01). 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of the main research findings and their implications, 
major contributions and limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research. 
In 2005, the European Union launched the EU-ETS as a policy instrument to mitigate 
global climate change. The scheme is based on the “cap and trade” principle, according 
to which there is a “cap”, or limit, on the total amount of GHG that can be emitted by 
the installations under the system. Within this cap, firms that operate such installations 
receive emission allowances (also called emission rights) that can be spent or traded, as 
needed. The limit on the total number of allowances available ensures that they have a 
market value, being their price determined by supply and demand. Since carbon dioxide 
(CO2) is the principal greenhouse gas, this is known as the “carbon market”.  
The purpose of EU-ETS is to generate a price signal, the carbon price, strong enough to 
drive investment, production and consumption decisions towards a low-carbon 
economy. Within this policy, carbon financial accounting and reporting could be an 
important tool to reduce emissions by clearly releasing costs of carbon to stakeholders 
so that they could incorporate this information in strategic decision-making. However, 
EU-15 firms under IFRS have no mandatory guidance on how to report emission 
allowances in their annual accounts. The only exception is Spain, where national 
accounting dispositions on emission allowances are mandatory to entities operating 
installations linked to the Spanish allowances allocation plan, regardless if they draw up 
their financial statements under national GAAP or under IFRS. 
Accounting for GHG emission allowances raises two central questions: what are the 
appropriate recognition and measurement models for allowances held and for the 
obligation to deliver allowances. In IFRIC 3, withdrawn by the IASB in 2005, the 
consensus was that a “cap and trade” scheme gives rise to an asset for allowances held, 
a government grant for allowances issued for less than their fair value, and a liability for 
the obligation to deliver allowances measured at market price at year-end. In particular, 
under the cost model provided by this Interpretation, allowances granted at no cost are 
measured at fair value at grant date while the liability to deliver allowances is measured 
at fair value at the year-end. This mixed measurement leads to the appearance in the 
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income statement of a profit or loss due to changes in allowances’ market price during 
the period.  
Since the launch of EU-ETS, in 2005, the majority of allowances were granted for free. 
Consequently, the valuation of those allowances at fair value at grant date, instead of a 
nominal amount (IAS 20, § 23) of nil value, would have a significant impact in the 
accounts of the firms under the scheme. Additionally, the recognition of assets and 
liabilities with different valuation bases would produce volatility of results for these 
firms, especially if intensive carbon emitters. These two aspects lead to lobbying for the 
withdrawal of IFRIC 3 (Bebbington and Larrinaga-González, 2008) and for the 
recognition and reporting of the net position with respect to emission allowances. 
According to this approach, only purchased allowances would have an impact on the 
balance sheet, and a liability is recognized merely to the extent that actual emissions 
exceed licenses allocated free of charge.  
Due to the lack of specific guidance, divergent accounting practices have emerged 
following the withdrawal of IFRIC 3 (PwC and IETA, 2007; Lovell et al., 2010; Black, 
2013; Haupt and Ismer, 2013; Giner, 2014). Their implications may be significant not 
only for the financial position and performance reported in the annual accounts, but also 
on how a firm may decide to manage GHG emission allowances. In view of this, the 
information provided in the explanatory notes is of major importance for users to 
evaluate firms’ performance in terms of carbon emissions. According to Lovell and 
Mackenzie (2011, p. 727) some firms under the scheme have advocated a readiness for 
clear guidance from standard-setting bodies “so that companies can be fairly compared 
with their competitors, creating a level playing field”. As described by Giner (2014, 
p. 47), the majority of firms have been following a net approach on accounting for GHG 
emission allowances according to which “if some conditions are met, carbon remains 
invisible” in firms’ accounts. 
The relevance of carbon financial accounting is increasing as the scope of EU-ETS 
expands (either directly through the inclusion of more sectors in the scheme, or 
indirectly through the inclusion of other GHG), and the EU-ETS third trading period 
(2013-2020) brought again into discussion the need for formal guidance on accounting 
for emission allowances (ANC, 2012; EFRAG, 2012).  
 - 199 - 
Concurrently, some literature on international accounting harmonization supports that 
the diversity or the absence of accounting standards does not necessarily imply the 
diversity of practices. In particular, the globalization of capital markets and the 
internationalization of firms are singled out in literature as factors that may lead to 
voluntary harmonization (Emenyonu, 1993; Cañibano and Mora, 2000; Rahman et al., 
2002). In turn, some research suggests that national accounting standards, in spite of no 
longer applying to the consolidated statements of EU listed firms since 2005, may 
explain some continued dissimilarities in their reporting practices (Nobes, 2006, 2008; 
Kvaal and Nobes, 2010), namely on the level of environmental disclosure (Barbu et al., 
2014). However, most of multi-country studies examining disclosure practices of EU 
firms applying IFRS do not consider discrepancies in national accounting guidance. 
Moreover, as regards harmonization studies, while numerous research has been 
conducted on the harmonization of measurement practices, investigation concerned with 
the harmonization of disclosure is scarce (Emenyonu and Gray, 1996; Ali, 2006). 
Against this background, this study fills a gap in literature in two different ways: 
primarily, by linking international accounting harmonization with environmental 
disclosure; additionally, taking into consideration the existing accounting guidance, in 
firms’ home-country, mandatory, or not, for entities under IFRS. The aim is twofold: to 
confirm the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of accounting standards; and, to test 
the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of markets, both concerning disclosure on 
GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts (carbon financial disclosure). 
Acknowledging that, in general, high harmony levels are more likely to occur when 
there is low release of information (Rahman et al., 2002), the analysis focus both the 
level of disclosure and the level of harmony (in disclosure), in order to fully evaluate the 
“disciplinarian effect” of standards and markets on the dissemination of further and 
more comparable information on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts.  
In addition, regulatory influences coming from industry affiliation are also considered. 
At EU level, high carbon intensive firms are subject to further sector-level regulations 
on their emissions. Therefore, they face more scrutiny and institutional pressure (Stanny 
and Ely, 2008) and are more likely to have created routines to collect and treat 
information on GHG emission allowances, than less pollutant activities, being that 
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routine is a significant predictor of environmental disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Cormier et al., 2005; Aerts et al., 2006; Brouhle and Harrington, 2009; and Stanny, 
2013). On the other hand, harmony is likely to occur at industry level, since sector-level 
institutions play a key role in the diffusion of minimum standards for corporate social 
responsibility (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Bearing this in mind, this study tests 
industry effects over the harmony in, and the level of carbon financial disclosure. 
In order to accomplish the study objectives, a sample of 168 EU-15 listed firms, 
covered by EU-ETS, was considered over an eight-year period (2005-2012), amounting 
to 1 344 firm-year observations. 
To examine the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of accounting guidance, sample 
firms were classified according to the type of guidance they face in home-country on 
how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts: under no specific 
guidance (scenario A); under guidance, though not mandatory for entities under IFRS 
(scenario B); under mandatory guidance (scenario C). Additionally, a distinction 
between detailed and not detailed guidance on disclosure items was made, arriving at 
four scenarios (A - no guidance | B1 - not mandatory not detailed guidance | B2 - not 
mandatory detailed guidance | C - mandatory (detailed) guidance). 
To test the existence of a “disciplinarian effect” of markets, sample firms under no 
mandatory regime on accounting for GHG emission allowances were organized 
according two dimensions: entities acting internationally (i) through the capital markets, 
according to the firm’s listing status; or, (ii) through the markets of products and 
services rendered by each firm, according to the geographical location of its customers. 
For the purpose of measuring firms’ level of disclosure, a disclosure index 
(dichotomous, unweighted, and adjusted for non-applicable items) has been constructed. 
Then, a set of multilevel (hierarchical) models were estimated to examine the effects of 
firm-level and country-level explanatory variables on carbon financial disclosure, and to 
test if the explanatory variables at the country-level (type of guidance) serve as 
moderators of the firm-level relationships between internationalization and disclosure.  
For the purpose of measuring harmony (comparability) of firms’ accounts, T indices 
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(Taplin, 2004) were computed for different groups of firms (sorted according the 
relevant criteria to test research questions), as well as for the whole sample to evaluate 
harmony of disclosure practices at EU-15 level (T overall). In all cases, to assure that 
the harmonization towards a more informative policy gets a higher score, different 
levels of comparability are allocated to different disclosure methods in accordance with 
the extent of information provided by each method. Also, it should be added that this 
study offers innovative contributions to the research area of accounting harmonization 
measurement in several ways.  
First, unlike most of prior studies that assess harmony of accounting practices in a 
single year or in two different points in time, the present investigation fully covers an 
eight-year period, what allows conducting regression analysis to test jointly trends on 
harmonization and differences in the level of harmony between subsamples.  
Second, a technique was developed to control for industry effects within the T index. 
Since EU-ETS incidence varies across industries, and industry was identified as a 
significant predictor of disclosure, the assessment of differences in the levels of 
harmony focused only on “unadjusted” T indices (Taplin, 2004) could be misleading 
when comparing subsamples with dissimilar industry composition. So, a technique was 
developed to compute an adjusted T index, in order to control for industry effects. This 
method has the advantage of preserving sample size, as it does not require the arbitrary 
exclusion of some observations. To the best of my knowledge, this procedure innovates 
by exploring the flexibility of the T index to control for industry effects.  
Third, unlike previous research that measures harmony on an item-by-item basis (i.e., 
presenting a separate index for each item of disclosure), this study considers an 
aggregate approach, by summarizing in a single T index the comparability of all the 
items classified as minimum information required to evaluate firms’ performance in 
terms of GHG emissions and to project future cash flows (EFRAG, 2012). To the best 
of my knowledge, the present analysis innovates by incorporating in a single T index 
the measurement of disclosure harmony for all the topics under consideration. 
Consistent with prior investigation on environmental disclosure (Deegan, 2002; 
Cormier et al., 2005; Chen and Roberts, 2010), a multi-theoretical framework is 
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adopted to address research questions, assuming that corporate disclosure is an outcome 
of management’s assessment of economic incentives, public pressures, and institutional 
constraints. It is beyond the scope of this study to fully investigate patterns of disclosure 
across different national institutional environments. However, considering that macro-
level factors (e.g., culture, form of equity market, or sociopolitical variables) are likely 
to affect the ways in which firms communicate with stakeholders (Midttun et al., 2006; 
Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011; Carnevale et al., 2012; Faisal et al., 2012), the 
influence of institutional environment in firms’ home-country is also incorporated in the 
analysis when examining levels of carbon financial disclosure among EU-15 firms. 
Findings allow admitting that mandatory guidance exerts a significant “disciplinarian 
effect” over carbon financial disclosure, by improving both the harmony in, and the 
level of disclosure on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. On average, 
over the eight-year period, the disclosure index, and the T index reached significantly 
higher scores under mandatory guidance (scenario C), than among all and each one of 
the other scenarios under review. 
The positive association between mandatory guidance and level of disclosure is 
consistent with prior literature. In accordance with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) 
model, a firm’s optimal level of disclosure is achieved when the marginal cost of 
disclosure is equal to its marginal benefit. As described by Seah and Tarca (2006), 
under mandatory guidance, costs of disclosure are likely to be greater because, to avoid 
possible penalties, more proprietary information is revealed which could damage a 
firm’s wealth and reputation, and benefits of disclosure are potentially superior because 
compulsory information has more credibility especially when it is certified. As a result, 
under a mandatory regime, both the costs and the benefits of release potentially 
increase, changing the equilibrium point, and expanding the level of a firm’s disclosure. 
Likewise, on the view of stakeholder theory, mandatory guidance is a potential driver of 
disclosure, because it is likely to attract the attention of powerful stakeholders, putting 
further pressure on firms to disclose more. On the other hand, in line with stakeholder 
theory and institutional theory, findings also suggests that, by compelling firms to 
follow mandatory benchmarks, mandatory guidance is more likely to enhance the 
harmony in carbon financial disclosure, than non-mandatory regimes. 
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Additionally, a more in-depth analysis on the nature of disclosure (quantitative versus 
qualitative) reveals that, although not ensuring full compliance, mandatory guidance 
seems to exert the major “disciplinarian effect” on the dissemination of quantitative 
(hard) items, precisely the kind of disclosure that firms are less willing to reveal as it 
conveys more proprietary information (Cho and Patten, 2007; Cormier et al., 2009). 
These outcomes are important for regulatory bodies aimed at enhance utility and 
relevance of financial statements. It is essential that firms provide quantitative 
(monetary and non-monetary) disclosure on their efforts and achievements in reducing 
GHG emissions, namely to assist investors in assessing the trade-off between risk and 
return (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011), to provide the information that users need to 
project future cash flows (EFRAG, 2012), and to evaluate firms’ environmental and 
financial performances. To this end, evidence suggests that mandatory guidance is 
needed because, otherwise, the level of carbon financial disclosure, especially on 
quantitative items, is predicted to be significantly lower.  
As expected, in the opposite pole lies the scenario of no guidance on how to report 
GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts (scenario A), where the level of 
disclosure and the level of harmony are the weakest (p<0,01) of all the scenarios under 
consideration. In the intermediate position is the case of local guidance not mandatory 
for entities applying IFRS (scenario B).  
Then, a thorough analysis of scenario B (not mandatory guidance) allows admitting that 
the level of disclosure and the level of harmony are likely to be higher among firms 
domiciled in countries where national guidance on accounting for GHG emission 
allowances specifies detailed requests for disclosure items (scenario B2), than under not 
mandatory guidance that does not set out detailed dispositions for disclosure (scenario 
B1). These outcomes are not dissenting from previous research on mandatory guidance 
(e.g., Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Peters and Romi, 2013) pointing out that regulations 
are more effective when they clearly delineate disclosure items to be reported, and 
expand prior investigation, by suggesting that the same applies to non-mandatory 
guidance. From stakeholder theory standpoint, local guidance establishing detailed 
benchmarks for disclosure, though non-mandatory, help to inform the public opinion on 
disclosure best practices, and contribute to raise awareness among stakeholders about 
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the relevant information to be provided in the annual accounts. Moreover, detailed 
benchmarks are likely to boost stakeholders’ perception that lack of critical information 
may well correspond to bad news. As a consequence, detailed guidance, though not 
mandatory, may exert pressure for additional disclosure by firms looking for 
stakeholders’ approval, and not wanting to incur the costs of bad reputation. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that, even for the scenarios of non-mandatory 
guidance (scenario B1 | scenario B2), higher levels of disclosure are associated with 
higher levels of harmony. This is a departure from Rahman et al.’s (2002) prediction 
that additional information is generally associated with lower comparability of firms’ 
accounts. Contrarily, evidence from this study indicates that when increased disclosure 
is induced by formal guidance, even not mandatory, higher (not lower) levels of 
harmony in disclosure are likely to occur. 
Altogether, findings suggest that accounting standards, even those not mandatory for 
firms under IFRS, have a significant positive impact over carbon financial disclosure, 
being that major improvements on the disclosure index and in the T index are likely to 
occur under mandatory guidance followed by the scenario of not mandatory guidance 
comprehending detailed benchmarks for disclosure. These results are consistent with 
previous research indicating a noteworthy impact of standards on the level of disclosed 
environmental information (e.g., Deegan and Rankin, 1996, 1997; Owen et al., 1997; 
Larrinaga et al., 2002; Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Barbu et al., 2014), and are in line 
with stakeholder theory and institutional theory.  
From stakeholder theory standpoint, disclosure is a strategic response to manage or to 
handle stakeholders’ demand for information, in order to obtain their approval. In the 
extent that formal guidance, even not mandatory, is likely to rise stakeholder awareness 
of the risks, and the associated mitigation efforts, that GHG emissions pose to firms, it 
contributes to increase their quest of information. As a consequence, in order to respond 
to greater stakeholders’ pressure, management is encouraged to disclose more than 
under no guidance, especially when accounting standards specify detailed dispositions 
on items to be reported in the annex. In particular, when comparing all the scenarios 
under review, evidence allows admitting that mandatory guidance (enhancing 
stakeholders’ perception of the relevant information concerning GHG emission 
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allowances) is more likely to compel EU-15 firms to expand the level of carbon 
financial disclosure, most probably to respond to the information needs of more aware 
stakeholders, as well as, to avoid the costs of bad reputation that would be derived from 
simply ignore the norm. 
Likewise, the importance of formal guidance (mandatory or non-mandatory) as a driver 
of additional disclosure is in line with institutional theory. Under mandatory guidance, 
organizations are made more aware of public interests and are less likely to respond 
defiantly because the consequences of noncompliance are “more tangible and often 
more severe” (Oliver, 1991, p. 168), than under no mandatory regime. On the other 
hand, from institutional theory standpoint, institutional pressures may occur not only by 
means of legal regulation and enforcement but also by a process of voluntary diffusion. 
As anticipated by Oliver (1991), when rules or norms are broadly diffused and 
supported, organizations are more likely to acquiesce to institutional pressures because 
their social validity is largely unquestioned. On this view, findings suggest that EU-15 
firms domiciled in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol and issued formal guidance 
on how to report GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts appear to perceive 
that disclosure of financial information concerning GHG emission allowances would be 
important for their public image, as the efforts in meeting Protocol’s targets and the 
release of information on costs of carbon are valued by society. In these circumstances, 
institutional theory predicts a low degree of organizational resistance towards 
mandatory guidance, and results confirm that, even not ensuring full acquiescence, 
mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances is significantly 
associated with less withholding of information, than any other scenario under review.  
As regards to the case of guidance not mandatory for firms applying IFRS, a process of 
voluntary diffusion seems to be in place, at country level, with firms under IFRS 
following their home-country guidance intended only for entities under national GAAP. 
That is, in line with Oliver’s (1991) prediction, evidence indicates that when firms 
anticipate that conformity with social expectations, even though set out by non-
mandatory guidance, will enhance social fitness, a process of voluntary diffusion, 
through imitation, is more likely to occur, than under no guidance. Hence, as predicted, 
results show significantly higher levels of harmony along with higher levels of 
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disclosure among firms domiciled in countries where national guidance was issued, 
though not mandatory for entities under IFRS, than among firms domiciled in countries 
where no guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances was provided. 
These outcomes have important implications for regulatory bodies aimed at enhance the 
comparability of financial reporting within EU. Expanding the assumption formulated 
by Nobes (2006, 2008), Kvaal and Nobes (2010), and Barbu et al. (2014), this study 
suggests that disclosure practices of EU-15 firms applying IFRS are likely to be affected 
by domestic guidance not intended for them. Consequently, cross country differences 
within EU-15 are probable to remain, in spite of the compulsory use of IFRS for the 
consolidated statements of listed firms since 2005. Actually, unlike most of multi-
country studies that ignore discrepancies in national accounting guidance when 
examining European firms under IFRS, this study expands prior research, by showing 
that national guidance is the most significant predictor in explaining variance between 
countries, at EU-15 level. In particular, after adding to the model the explanatory 
variables representing national guidance, the remaining unexplained variance between 
countries is no longer significant. Furthermore, estimation results also indicate that the 
effects of national guidance are superior to those of institutional environment (type of 
business system). Largely, results indicate that national guidance, though not 
mandatory, exerts a major influence on disclosure practices of EU-15 firms applying 
IFRS. Consequently, discrepancies among national legal requirements are able to 
penalize the comparability of firms’ accounts and inhibit the process of de facto 
(material) accounting harmonization within EU, in spite of the compulsory use of the 
same set of standards (IFRS) for the consolidated statements of listed firms since 2005. 
As regards industry affiliation, evidence confirms the prediction that higher levels of 
disclosure and harmony are more likely to occur in high carbon intensive industries, 
than in low carbon intensive industries. In fact, among all the firm-level predictors, 
industry affiliation is the one that added the major contribution in explaining within 
countries variance, and exhibits the strongest association with the level of carbon 
financial disclosure. In addition, results point out that convergence of practices is likely 
to occur at industry level, since harmony in disclosure is significantly higher within 
industries, than between industries. 
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These findings are in line with previous evidence from Cowan and Deegan (2011), and 
Choi et al. (2013), suggesting that in response to either increased social and political 
pressures or due to strict sector-level regulations, firms in high carbon intensive 
industries are more likely to provide additional disclosure on GHG emissions. In 
accordance with stakeholder theory, outcomes corroborate that, all else equal, firms 
perceived as high GHG emitters by society are more likely to use disclosure as a 
legitimizing tool in front of various stakeholders, namely providing more quantitative 
(hard) disclosure than firms operating in low carbon intensive activities. Likewise, in 
the lens of institutional theory (Oliver, 1991), the more an organization anticipates that 
conformity will enhance social fitness, the less a dismissal strategy is likely to occur. 
Results confirm this hypothesis suggesting that high carbon intensive firms (for which a 
greater legitimacy reward is perceived to be attainable from the conformity to 
mandatory or non-mandatory guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances) 
are more likely to conform to institutional pressures, by means of higher levels of 
disclosure, than firms operating in less pollutant activities. In the same vein, according 
to agency theory and proprietary costs theory, high GHG emitters, facing a legitimacy 
threat due to their activities, have more to gain by providing voluntarily information on 
GHG emission allowances, and, in line with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) model, 
results suggest that, all else equal, high carbon intensive firms (with greater potential 
benefits from carbon financial disclosure) tend to disclose more. 
On the other hand, findings support Jackson and Apostolakou’s (2010) assumption that 
harmony is likely to occur at industry level, since firms operating in the same industry 
face common legitimization challenges, are affected by similar sectorial regulations, and 
tend to imitate competitors’ behavior either at national or international level. In 
particular, these outcomes have important implications for future research on the area of 
accounting harmonization measurement, by confirming that comparisons between 
subsamples with different industry composition must be validated through the 
assessment of adjusted T indices, in order to control for industry effects. 
Another determining factor pointed out in literature as enhancing corporate disclosure is 
the internationalization of firms. However, extending the hypotheses formulated by 
Oliver (1991) to an international environment, the lack of international consensus 
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regarding either the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol or the appropriate accounting 
model for emissions trading schemes, do not favor a process of voluntary dissemination 
of carbon financial disclosure by EU-15 multinational firms. As advanced by Oliver 
(1991), when rules and norms are not broadly diffused or supported by society, 
organizations are less likely to respond to institutional pressures because their social 
validity is questioned, and, consequently, voluntary diffusion is unlikely. In line with 
Oliver’s (1991) prediction, results indicate that firms’ internationalization, through the 
capital markets or through foreign sales, is not able to put forth, by itself, a 
“disciplinarian effect” over carbon financial disclosure. 
With regard to the internationalization through the capital markets, it should be noted 
that almost all foreign listed firms in the sample are registered in US stock exchanges. 
Consequently, for EU-15 firms (domiciled in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol) 
the internationalization through the quotation in US stock exchanges (a country that has 
not ratified the Protocol) does not seem to exert further pressure (in addition to the 
existing in firms’ home-country) to enhance carbon financial disclosure. In the lens of 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory, results suggest that, as foreign listed firms 
realize that this particular information is not broadly valued by their foreign 
stakeholders, to be accountable in front of a wider stakeholders audience is not enough 
to motivate, by itself, higher levels of harmony or higher levels of disclosure on GHG 
emission allowances. That is, as international pressures coming from the host country 
(US) are lower than domestic constraints, internationalization through capital markets is 
not likely to exert, de per se, a significant “disciplinarian effect” over carbon financial 
disclosure. So, when considering either the harmony in, or the level of carbon financial 
disclosure, results indicate that, ceteris paribus, EU-15 firms listed abroad are not likely 
to perform significantly different than EU-15 firms listed only in domestic markets. 
As regards the internationalization through foreign sales, findings allow admitting that, 
ultimately, the improvement on the level of carbon financial disclosure among firms 
operating internationally is triggered by the type of guidance in their home-country. As 
advanced by Drezner (2001), despite the worldwide public concern over climate change 
and the need to limit GHG emissions, some skepticism has surrounded Protocol’s 
application, being that the heavier burden it imposes on developed countries allegedly 
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led to the lack of engagement of major GHG emitters. Actually, EU-ETS is the largest 
system in operation and, outside the EU, only three other emissions trading schemes 
were initiated, over the research period, at national level, being one of them on a 
voluntary basis. In view of this, results suggest that, due to multiplicity and 
fragmentation of foreign stakeholders (lack of broadly diffused or widely validated 
values, norms and practices concerning emissions trading schemes), international 
pressures to disclose costs of carbon are not perceived by EU-15 firms as more 
convincing than domestic constraints. Hence, extending Oliver’s (1991) assumptions to 
an international environment, EU-15 firms operating globally are deemed to respond 
primarily to domestic institutional pressures, from which organizational dependencies 
are deemed to be higher, namely as regards the allocation of free allowances or the 
control of GHG emissions.  
Accordingly, disclosure strategies of EU-15 firms exposed to foreign markets are 
primarily driven by guidance in home-country. That is, following general patterns of 
disclosure identified earlier, under not mandatory detailed guidance the improvement on 
the level of disclosure is more likely to occur by means of more qualitative information 
while the release of quantitative data is more likely to take place under mandatory 
guidance. In turn, when there is no specific guidance in the firm’s home-country or 
when existing guidance does not specify the items to be disclosed, firms’ skepticism 
about the strategic utility of carbon financial disclosure as a tool to manage a 
multiplicity of foreign stakeholders seems to inhibit further improvements on the level 
of disclosure among EU-15 firms with higher international activity. Hence, all else 
equal, the levels of disclosure among them are not significantly different from those of 
EU-15 firms operating mainly in domestic markets. Moreover, when analyzing 
harmony in carbon financial disclosure, results indicate that, under no mandatory 
regime, differences between firms with higher exposure to foreign markets and those 
with lower exposure to foreign markets are not statistically significant. 
Overall, considering the harmony in, and the level of carbon financial disclosure among 
EU-15 firms, although some progresses were registered along the research period, we 
arrive at 2012 with 64 sample firms (38%) not disclosing any information on GHG 
emission allowances in their annual accounts, and only 13 firms (8%) releasing all the 
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items classified as minimum information required to assist investors in assessing the 
trade-off between risk and return (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011), and to project 
future cash flows (EFRAG, 2012). In particular, with regard to harmony at EU-15 level, 
the probability that two firms randomly selected have accounts that are comparable 
(T overall) ranges from, 3,5%, in 2005, to 5,6%, in 2012. Currently, both firms and 
standard-setting bodies are more conscientious of the urgent need for mandatory 
guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances in order to enable comparability 
of financial statements (Lovell and Mackenzie, 2011; ANC, 2012; EFRAG, 2012; 
Giner, 2014). Results confirm this view, by suggesting that we cannot rely on a possible 
“disciplinarian effect” of markets to compel EU-15 firms to disclose further or more 
comparable information on GHG emission allowances in the annual accounts. 
Until now, the orientation in most countries has been to encourage firms to make 
environmental disclosures instead of mandate them (Choi et al., 2013; Giner, 2014). As 
regards carbon financial disclosure, this study shows that, in the absence of mandatory 
guidance, completeness and comparability of disclosure are likely to be significantly 
lower. Findings are in line with earlier evidence (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005, 2011; 
Cowan and Deegan, 2011; Choi et al., 2013), and have important implications for 
regulators, firms, and stakeholders.  
For regulators, results may help develop guidance targeting particular information or 
activities of greatest importance to stakeholders and where firms could not be relied on 
to make voluntary disclosures. In particular, outcomes support the need for mandatory 
guidance with detailed benchmarks for disclosure (not depending on managements’ 
assessment of materially), as regards quantitative items (monetary and non-monetary) 
informing about (i) the costs of pollution that the firm bears due to its activities, (ii) the 
value that granted allowances represent and its relative weight to the overall costs of 
production, (iii) the impact of progressive reductions of free allowances started in the 
third trading period of EU-ETS, (iv) how far EU-ETS targets were accomplished, or 
not, (v) how the firm can face its surrendering obligation, (vi) possible capital 
expenditures to limit or to reduce future GHG emissions, as well as (vii) fines and 
contingent liabilities related to GHG emissions.  
For firms, evidence points out that mandatory guidance would provide a fairer basis to 
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inform stakeholders about the risks and the opportunities related to carbon emissions, 
leading to a proper accountability of their strategies to mitigate global warming when 
compared with competitors.  
For environmental stakeholders with a growing concern with global warming, results 
help to understand how mandatory guidance is more likely to outline costs of carbon to 
society and, hence, to contribute to more environmentally responsible decision-making. 
Third trading period of EU-ETS, which started in 2013 and will last for eight years, has 
brought a greater scope and complexity to the system. Instead of free allocation of GHG 
emission allowances, auctioning will be the default method. Acknowledging that in the 
first two trading periods (2005-2007 | 2008-2012) power generators have been able to 
pass on the notional cost of GHG emission allowances to customers even when they 
received them for free1, for the power generation sector the general rule after 2013 is 
that EU-15 operators no longer receive any free allowances but have to buy them. As 
regards to sectors other than power generation, the EU-ETS legislation sets the goal of 
phasing out free allocation completely by 2027. This means that, as firms have to buy 
an increasing proportion of GHG emission allowances through auctions, quantitative 
(monetary and non-monetary) disclosure informing about existing GHG emission 
allowances granted at no cost is necessary for users to project future cash flows. 
Concurrently, efforts are being made at EU level to regulate the mechanisms that ensure 
the efficiency of the scheme or control for its consequences. In particular, considering 
that costs of carbon are passed on by electricity producers in their prices, EU-ETS 
regards the possibility for Member States to provide governmental aid to firms in 
sectors at significant risk of loss of market share to non-EU competitors due to the 
higher electricity prices (“carbon leakage”) (EC, 2012). 
In this context, results point out that mandatory guidance is needed for entities to 
communicate more objective, credible, and comparable information on their risks and 
efforts to mitigate global warming resulting from carbon emissions, to make visible the 
costs of carbon to society, and ultimately to lead investment, production and 
consumption decisions towards a low-carbon economy, in line with EU-ETS’ aim.  
                                                             
1 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/index_en.htm. Last accessed on 19 July 2014. 
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite being consistent with theories based upon 
the concept of organizational legitimacy, the above mentioned results must be taken 
with restraint.  
The first obvious limitation of this study is that of scope. The number of countries used 
for this analysis is limited to EU-15 Member States, and even within these countries the 
study covers just a sample of firms under EU-ETS. Therefore, any attempt to generalize 
or extrapolate the results of this study outside this context should be made with caution. 
The examination of larger samples, different sets of countries, and other accounting 
disclosure issues are needed to confirm research findings. 
Also, further research is needed to evaluate interactions between regulatory background 
and internationalization of firms’ operations. To that end, a finer identification of 
geographical location of external customers and/or facilities would be of interest to 
check the robustness of results. In the present investigation data collection was 
primarily based on firms’ annual reports that do not provide exhaustive comparable 
information on this matter, being this another limitation of this research.  
Finally, current changes in international institutional environment, as well as, in 
domestic guidance on accounting for emissions trading schemes give opportunity for 
future research in this area. At international level, since 2012, a number of emissions 
trading schemes were initiated worldwide, namely within the US where policy on global 
warming seems to have started to change (Simnett et al., 2009). More recently, at 
national level, some more guidance on accounting for GHG emission allowances was 
issued among EU-15 countries. Hence, there are opportunities for further investigation 
on how firms respond to changes in home-country guidance; how domestic accounting 
standards, not intended for firms under IFRS, are likely to influence their disclosure 
practices and interfere with comparability of firms’ accounts within the EU; and how 
shifts in the relative weight of international pressures when compared with domestic 
constraints are likely to affect disclosure strategies of firms acting in foreign markets. 
 
 - 213 - 
Appendix: Methodological note on how to control for industry effects 
within the T index framework 
For illustrative purposes, admit that, for a particular item, three alternative accounting 
policies (or methods) are available (A, B, C), and that the relative frequency with which 
firms pertaining to industry S apply each one of the methods is as follows: A: 50%; B: 
30%; C: 20%; while among firms belonging to industry Z the relative frequencies are A: 
10%; B: 20%; C: 70%.  
Consider a sample composed of 300 firms, half of each industry, and three subsamples 
with different industry composition, as described in the next table. 
Table A-1: Sample composition - Illustrative example (IE) 
n % n % n % n %
Industry S 50 0,50 80 0,67 20 0,25 150 0,50
Industry Z 50 0,50 40 0,33 60 0,75 150 0,50
Total 100 1,00 120 1,00 80 1,00 300 1,00
TotalGroup 1 Group 2 Group 3
 
According to the profile of accounting policy choices among industries S and Z, it is 
expected that, in Group 1, the number of firms using accounting policy A equals 30 
(0,5x50+0,1x50), the number of firms applying accounting policy B equals 25 
(0,3x50+0,2x50), and the number of firms using accounting policy C is of 45 
(0,2x50+0,7x50). In Group 2, the expected frequencies of accounting policies A, B, and 
C are 44 (0,5x80+0,1x40), 32 (0,3x80+0,2x40) and 44 (0,2x80+0,7x40), respectively. 
Similarly, in Group 3, the expected number of firms applying each accounting policy 
are 16 (0,5x20+0,1x60), 18 (0,3x20+0,2x60), and 46 (0,2x20+0,7x60) (Table A-2). 
To measure harmony, T indices (Taplin, 2004) are computed for each group of firms, by 
using only data for each group separately, as well as for the entire sample (T overall | 
Table 3-2 | option 2a), giving equal weight to each firm in the sample (Table 3-2 | 
option 1a), and assuming that firms using the same accounting policy are completely 
comparable with each other while firms using different policy choices are completely 
non-comparable with each other (Table 3-1 | option 3a). Results are presented in the 
next table. 
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Table A-2: Sample composition, T index by group of firms, and T overall (IE) 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Overall
 Accounting Policy A
Industry S 25 40 10 75
Industry Z 5 4 6 15
∑ AP_A 30 44 16 90
 Accounting Policy B
Industry S 15 24 6 45
Industry Z 10 8 12 30
∑ AP_B 25 32 18 75
 Accounting Policy C
Industry S 10 16 4 30
Industry Z 35 28 42 105
∑ AP_C 45 44 46 135
Total 100 120 80 300
 T index 0,355 0,340 0,421 0,355  
Comparisons between subsamples indicate that the highest level of harmony is observed 
among Group 3 where T index equals 0,421 ((16/80)2+(18/80)2+(46/80)2), while firms 
belonging to Group 2 show the lowest level of harmony with a T index of 
0,340 ((44/120)2+(32/120)2+(44/120)2). With regard to Group 1, whose industry 
composition is similar to that one of the full sample, level of harmony equals T overall 
and is of 0,355 ((30/100)2+(25/100)2+(45/100)2). In fact, results are related with the 
industry composition of each subsample and will be of interest to control for industry 
effects. That is, to evaluate the relative levels of harmony allowing for similar industry 
configuration for all groups. 
Acknowledging that, in general, the underlying distribution in the population is 
unknown, sample adjustments in order to achieve a composition similar to that one 
existing in the entire population cannot be performed. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
control for industry effects by choosing a control group, and then produce adjustments 
in the remaining subsamples in order to attain similar industry composition in all 
groups. For illustrative purposes, Group 1 is selected as the control group, but it should 
be noted that similar conclusions would be achieved if any other group had been 
chosen, because, as explained later, after adjusting for industry effects, what will be of 
interest are not the levels of harmony among each group of firms but their relative 
scores.  
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In the illustrative example (Table A-1 | Table A-2), industries S and Z are over 
represented, in Groups 2 and 3, respectively, by comparison with the control group 
(Group 1). 
In Group 2, 80 firms pertain to industry S, and when computing unadjusted T index, the 
weight given to each one was of 0,0083(3) (80/120/80). To achieve in Group 2 a 
composition similar to that one observed in the control group, the number of firms 
pertaining to industry S must total 60 (50/100x120), and, therefore, when computing an 
adjusted T index, the weight given to each one must equal 0,00625 (60/120/80). 
Consequently, by applying in Group 2 an adjustment factor of 0,75 (60/80 or 
0,00625/0,0083(3)) to each observation belonging to industry S, it is possible to 
encompass all the 80 firms included in the initial sample, not neglecting the information 
they convey but “compressing” it. On the other hand, in Group 2, the adjustment factor 
for observations related do industry Z will be as of 1,5 (50/100x120/40) to correct for 
their under-representation among this subsample.  
Similarly, in Group 3, the adjustment factor for each observation pertaining to industry 
Z will be as of 0,67 (50/100x80/60), in order to retain all the 60 firms pertaining to this 
industry but correct their relative weight as if they were 40 (50/100x80). Finally, the 
adjustment factor to correct frequency of industry S in Group 3 will be as of 2 
(50/100x80/20). 
For the computation of the adjusted T indices, the proportions of firms applying each 
accounting method are based on these absolute adjusted frequencies. Table A-3 
summarizes subsample composition and T indices, after the adjustments to control for 
industry effects. 
According to the adjusted T indices (Table A-3), levels of harmony among subsamples 
are equal to each other (0,355), meaning that the differences observed when analyzing 
unadjusted T indices, in the previous stage, were due to dissimilarities in the subsamples 
with regard to industry composition.  
It should be noted that the score of the adjusted T index will depend on the subsample 
that is chosen as the control group. If Group 2 or Group 3 have been picked as the 
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control group, instead of Group 1, results for the adjusted T indices would be of 0,340 
and 0,421, respectively, for all subsamples. So, the levels of harmony would be 
different but inference regarding comparisons between subsamples would be 
unchanged, because for comparative purposes, the absolute levels are not relevant, what 
matters are relative scores. That is to say, regardless of the subsample that it is selected 
as the control group, this procedure will always arrive to adjusted T indices equal to 
each other, for all subsamples in this illustrative example, confirming that, in the present 
case, differences in the levels of harmony when considering unadjusted T indices were 
due to dissimilarities in their industry composition. 
Table A-3: Sample composition and T indices after adjusting for industry effects (IE) 
G2_Unadj Adj_Factor G2_Adj G3_Unadj G3_Adj Total_Unadj Total_Adj
(1) (2) (1) x (2) (3) (4) (3) x (4)
25 40 0,75 (i) 30 10 2 (iii) 20 75 75
5 4 1,50 (ii) 6 6 0,67 (iv) 4 15 15
30 44 36 16 24 90 90
15 24 0,75 (i) 18 6 2 (iii) 12 45 45
10 8 1,50 (ii) 12 12 0,67 (iv) 8 30 30
25 32 30 18 20 75 75
10 16 0,75 (i) 12 4 2 (iii) 8 30 30
35 28 1,50 (ii) 42 42 0,67 (iv) 28 105 105
45 44 54 46 36 135 135
100 120 120 80 80 300 300,0
T index 0,355 0,340 0,421 0,355
T index_adjusted 0,355 0,355 0,355
Group
Group 1
Control 
Group 2 Group 3 Overall
Adj_Factor
(i) 50/100x120/80 = 0,75 | (ii) 50/100x120/40 = 1,5 | (iii) 50/100x80/20 = 2 | (iv) 50/100x80/60 = 0,66(6) 
Accounting Policy A
Accounting Policy B
Accounting Policy C
Total
Industry Z
∑ AP_A
Industry S
Industry Z
∑ AP_B
Industry S
Industry Z
∑ AP_C
Industry S
 
The adjustment factors computed in the previous example, for each industry in every 
subsample under adjustment, are based on the relation between the original number of 
observations and the number of observations corresponding to the weight as of the 
control group. So, when some groups comprise zero occurrences for some industries, a 
different approach to control for industry effects has to be applied.  
For illustrative purposes, consider the sample composition presented in the next table, 
where Group 3 includes no observations for firms belonging to industry S.  
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Table A-4: Sample composition with zero frequencies of industry S in Group 3 (IE) 
n % n % n % n %
Industry S 50 0,50 80 0,67 0 0,00 130 0,43
Industry Z 50 0,50 40 0,33 80 1,00 170 0,57
Total 100 1,00 120 1,00 80 1,00 300 1,00
TotalGroup 1 Group 2 Group 3
 
In this scenario, factor adjustments for non-zero occurrences of industries S and Z are 
computed as mentioned in the previous example. With regard to zero frequencies of 
industry S in Group 3, they must be replaced by the ones that would be expected if the 
composition of this subsample was similar to that one observed in the control group. 
Considering that in the control group the number of firms pertaining to industry S 
applying accounting policy A is of 25, the expected number of firms applying this 
accounting policy in Group 3 amount to 20 (80x25/100). Likewise, the expected 
number of firms from industry S applying accounting policies B and C, in Group 3, 
equals 12 (80x15/100), and 8 (80x10/100), respectively.  
As expected, after adjusting for industry effects, levels of harmony among subsamples 
are equal to each other and similar to the ones obtained in the previous illustrative 
example (0,355), as shown in the next table. 
Table A-5: Sample composition, and T indices after adjusting for industry effects, in the 
case of zero frequencies of industry S in Group 3 (IE) 
G2_Unadj G2_Adj G3_Unadj Total_Unadj Total_Adj
Group (1) (2) (1) x (2) (3) (4)
25 40 0,75 (i) 30 0 --- 20 (iv) 65 75
5 4 1,50 (ii) 6 8 0,5 (iii) 4 17 15
30 44 36 8 24 82 90
15 24 0,75 (i) 18 0 --- 12 (v) 39 45
10 8 1,50 (ii) 12 16 0,5 (iii) 8 34 30
25 32 30 16 20 73 75
10 16 0,75 (i) 12 0 --- 8 (vi) 26 30
35 28 1,50 (ii) 42 56 0,5 (iii) 28 119 105
45 44 54 56 36 145 135
100 120 120 80 80 300 300
T index 0,355 0,340 0,540 0,368
T index_adjusted 0,355 0,355
Group 3 OverallGroup 1
Control Adj_Factor G3_Adj
0,355
Group 2
Adj_Factor
Accounting Policy A
Accounting Policy B
Accounting Policy C
Industry S
Industry Z
Industry Z
∑ AP_C
Total
(i) 50/100x120/80 = 0,75 | (ii) 50/100x120/40 = 1,5 | (iii) 50/100x80/80 = 0,5 | (iv) 80x25/100 =20 | (v) 80x15/100 = 12 | (vi) 80x10/100 = 8  
∑ AP_A
Industry S
Industry Z
∑ AP_B
Industry S
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In summary, the procedure introduced in this study to control for industry effects within 
the T index framework is the following: 
1. Identification, in each subsample, of the firms belonging to each industry and the 
accounting policy (method) they are applying. 
2. Selection, among subsamples, of a control group (CG) suited to the aim of the study. 
3. Introduction of adjustments in the remaining subsamples (Gj) simulating for all 
groups an industry composition similar to that of the control group, which involve: 
a. For non-zero frequency cases concerning industry composition, apply to every 
industry in each group the following adjustment factor: 
 
where: 
Adj Factor SiGj is the adjustment factor for industry Si in the group Gj. 
b. For zero-frequency cases concerning industry composition, replace zero 
frequencies by the ones that would be expected if the industry composition of the 
subsample under adjustment was similar to that one of the control group: 
 
where: 
Adj Freq Si Gj,APk is the expected number of firms from industry Si applying 
accounting policy k in the subsample Gj when simulating an industry composition 
for Gj similar to that one of the control group. 
SiCG,APk/∑SCG is the proportion of firms from industry Si in the control group that 
use accounting policy k. 
∑SGj is the total number of firms (for all industries) in the subsample Gj. 
4. Computation of adjusted T indices based on the proportion of firms applying each 
accounting policy (method) in each group considering their absolute adjusted 
frequencies. 
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Annex I: List of sample firms 
1/2 
Austria France (cont.)
1 AGRANA Beteiligungs AG 42 Esso SAF
2 EVN AG 43 Gascogne SA
3 Lenzing AG 44 GDF Suez SA
4 Mayr-Melnhof Karton AG 45 Lafarge SA
5 OMV AG 46 Michelin SA
6 Semperit AG Holding 47 Peugeot SA
7 Verbund AG 48 Renault SA
8 Voestalpine AG 49 Sanofi-Aventis SA
9 Wienerberger AG 50 Total SA
Belgium 51 Vicat SA
10 Agfa-Gevaert NV Germany
11 Fluxys SA 52 Aurubis AG
12 NV Bekaert SA 53 BASF SE
13 PinguinLutosa NV 54 Bayer AG
14 Solvay SA 55 BMW AG
15 Tessenderlo Chemie NV 56 Daimler AG
16 UCB SA 57 E.ON AG
17 Umicore SA 58 EnBW Energie Baden - Württemberg AG
Denmark 59 Fresenius SE
18 Arkil Holding A/S 60 HeidelbergCement AG
19 Brødene Hartmann A/S 61 Henkel AG & Co. KGaA
20 Carlsberg A/S 62 Hochtief AG
21 Danisco A/S 63 Infineon Technologies AG
22 Egetæpper A/S 64 MAN SE
23 Harboes Brewery A/S 65 Merck KGaA
24 Novo Nordisc A/S 66 RWE AG
25 Novozymes A/S 67 Salzgitter AG 
Finland 68 Südzucker AG
26 Atria Plc 69 Thyssenkrupp AG
27 Fortum Oyj 70 Villeroy & Boch AG
28 Kemira Oyj 71 VolksWagem AG
29 Metso Corporation 72 Wacker Chemie AG
30 Neste Oil Corporation 73 Wincor Nixdorf AG
31 Outokumpu  Oyj Greece
32 Rautaruukki Corporation 74 Hellenic Petroleum SA
33 Stora Enso Oyj 75 Motor Oil (Hellas) SA
34 UPM-Kymmene Corporation 76 Public Power Corporation SA
France 77 SIDENOR SA
35 Alstom SA 78 Titan Cement Company SA
36 AREVA SA Ireland
37 Arkema SA 79 CRH plc
38 Bonduelle SA 80 Elan Corporation plc
39 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain SA 81 Glanbia plc
40 Danone SA 82 Kerry Group plc
41 EDF - Électricité de France SA (cont.)  
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Annex I: List of sample firms 
2/2 
Italy Spain (cont.)
83 ACEA SpA 126 Iberpapel Gestión SA
84 Buzzi Unicem SpA 127 Miquel y Costas & Miquel SA
85 Cementir Holding SpA 128 Papeles e Cartones de Europa SA
86 Enel SpA 129 Repsol YPF SA
87 Eni SpA 130 Sacyr Vallehermoso SA
88 ERG SpA 131 Sniace SA
89 FIAT SpA 132 Tubacex SA
90 HERA - Holding Energia Risorse Ambiente SpA 133 Tubos Reunidos SA
91 Italcementi SpA 134 Uralita SA
92 La Doria SpA 135 Vidrala SA
93 Parmalat SpA 136 Viscofan SA
94 Piaggio & C. SpA Sweden
95 Reno de Medicis SpA 137 AarhusKarlshamn AB 
96 Saras SpA 138 AB Electrolux
97 Snam SpA 139 AB Volvo
98 TREVI – Finanziaria Industriale SpA 140 ABB Ltd
Netherlands 141 Boliden AB 
99 Akzo Nobel NV 142 Höganäs AB
100 Crown Van Gelder NV 143 Holmen AB
101 EADS NV 144 Rottneros AB
102 Heineken NV 145 Sandvik AB
103 Royal DSM NV 146 Scania AB
104 Royal Dutch Shell NV 147 SSAB AB
105 Royal Philips Electronics NV 148 Swedish Match AB
106 Royal Ten Cate NV United Kingdom
107 STMicroelectronics NV 149 Associated British Foods Plc
Portugal 150 AstraZeneca Plc
108 Altri SGPS SA 151 BAE Systems Plc
109 CIMPOR - Cimentos de Portugal SGPS SA 152 Balfour Beatty Plc
110 EDP - Energias de Portugal SA 153 BAT Plc
111 Galp Energia SGPS SA 154 BG Group Plc
112 Portucel - Empresa Produtora de Pasta e Papel SA 155 BHP Billiton Plc
113 Semapa - Soc. de Investimento e Gestão SGPS SA 156 BP Plc
114 Sonae Indústria SGPS SA 157 BT Group Plc
Spain 158 Centrica Plc
115 Acciona SA 159 Croda International Plc
116 Acerinox SA 160 Diageo Plc
117 CAF - Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles SA 161 GlaxoSmithKline Plc
118 CPV - Cementos Portland Valderrivas, SA 162 Imperial Tobacco Group Plc
119 Ebro Foods SA 163 National Grid Plc
120 Endesa SA 164 Next Plc
121 Ercros SA 165 Premier Foods Plc
122 FCC - Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas SA 166 Severn Trent Plc
123 Gas Natural SDG SA 167 Tullow Oil Plc
124 Grupo Empresarial ENCE SA 168 Unilever Plc
125 Iberdrola SA  
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Annex II: Components of the disclosure index 
 
COMPONENTS OF THE DISCLOSURE INDEX
Qualit Total
Items listed in the  general provisions of previous standards (IAS 38 | IAS 37 | IAS 20) 7 6 13
Accounting policy (IAS 1, §8-e), §103, §108) 1 1
Fair value initially recognised at grant date (IAS 38, §122-c)) 1 1
Carrying amount (IAS 38, §122-c)) 1 1
Measurement after recognition - cost model or revaluation model  (IAS 38, §122-c)) 1 1
Gross carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period (IAS 38, §118-c)) 1 1
Reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period (IAS 38, §118-e)) 1 1
Accounting policy (IAS 1, §8-e), §103, §108) 1 1
Description of the nature of the obligation (IAS 37, §85-a)) 1 1
Indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of those outflows (IAS 37, §85-b))  1 1
Carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period (IAS 37, §84-a)) 1 1
1 1
IAS 20 Government grants - GHG emission allowances granted at no cost or below market
1 1
The nature and extent of government grants recognised in the financial statements (IAS 20, §39-b)) 1 1
Additional summary note in accordance with Article  9th of ICAC Resolution (2006) 14 7 21
Valuation methods and methods applied in charging to profit or loss the emissions made during the year 1 1
GHG emission allowances granted under NAP - Declarative information 1 1
1 1
GHG emission allowances granted under NAP for each year - Physical units 1 1
GHG emission allowances granted under NAP - Currency units 1 1
GHG emissions made during the year - Declarative information 1 1
GHG emissions made during the year - Physical units 1 1
GHG emissions made during the year - Currency units 1 1
GHG emission allowances acquired during the year - Declarative information 1 1
GHG emission allowances acquired during the year - Physical units 1 1
GHG emission allowances acquired during the year - Currency units 1 1
GHG emission allowances sold during the year - Declarative information 1 1
GHG emission allowances sold during the year - Physical units 1 1
GHG emission allowances sold during the year - Currency units 1 1
Excess or shortfall of GHG emission allowances - Declarative information 1 1
Excess or shortfall of GHG emission allowances - Physical units 1 1
Excess or shortfall of GHG emission allowances - Currency units 1 1
Costs incurred as a result of fines or penalties related to greenhouse gas emissions 1 1
Contingent liabilities related to greenhouse gas emissions 1 1
Futures contracts for the acquisition of GHG emission allowances 1 1
Installations or group of facilities covered by EU-ETS 1 1
TOTAL SCORE 21 13 34
IAS 37 Provisions - Provision for GHG emissions
Score if disclosed
Accounting policy, includind methods of presentation in the financial statements (IAS 20, §39-a))
GHG emission allowances granted under NAP for the period 2005-7 | 2008-12 - Physical units
Reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period (IAS 37, §84-c), §84-d))
Information to be provided in accordance with ICAC Resolution (2006)
IAS 38 Intangible assets - GHG emission allowances
Quant
 
 
 - 254 - 
Annex III: Descriptive statistics for the main headings of the disclosure 
index, over 2005-2012 - scenarios A, B, C 
 
Disclosure index Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
0,13 0,22 0,00 0,85
of which:
IAS 38 0,12 0,21 0,00 1,00
IAS 37 0,15 0,25 0,00 1,00
IAS 20 0,14 0,23 0,00 0,50
0,11 0,20   0,00 0,86
of which:
Valuation methods applied 0,25 0,43 0,00 1,00
Allowances granted 0,10 0,22 0,00 1,00
Emissions made 0,10 0,22 0,00 1,00
Allowances acquired 0,10 0,24 0,00 1,00
Allowances sold 0,12 0,26 0,00 1,00
Excess/shortfall of allowances 0,05 0,15 0,00 0,67
Fines&Contingent liabilities 0,04 0,13 0,00 0,50
Other 0,13 0,25 0,00 0,87
0,12 0,19   0,00 0,74
0,37 0,29 0,00 1,00
of which:
IAS 38 0,34 0,31 0,00 1,00
IAS 37 0,40 0,30 0,00 1,00
IAS 20 0,38 0,29 0,00 1,00
0,30 0,28   0,00 0,90
of which:
Valuation methods applied 0,59 0,49   0,00 1,00
Allowances granted 0,31 0,32   0,00 1,00
Emissions made 0,29 0,32   0,00 1,00
Allowances acquired 0,28 0,34   0,00 1,00
Allowances sold 0,32 0,37   0,00 1,00
Excess/shortfall of allowances 0,25 0,33   0,00 1,00
Fines&Contingent liabilities 0,08 0,21   0,00 1,00
Other 0,32 0,33   0,00 1,00
0,33 0,27   0,00 0,85
0,79 0,23 0,00 1,00
of which:
IAS 38 0,83 0,29 0,00 1,00
IAS 37 0,69 0,21 0,00 1,00
IAS 20 0,90 0,24 0,00 1,00
0,73 0,18   0,00 1,00
of which:
Valuation methods applied 0,99 0,11   0,00 1,00
Allowances granted 0,89 0,21   0,00 1,00
Emissions made 0,80 0,23   0,00 1,00
Allowances acquired 0,72 0,25   0,00 1,00
Allowances sold 0,74 0,26   0,00 1,00
Excess/shortfall of allowances 0,77 0,24   0,00 1,00
Fines&Contingent liabilities 0,23 0,42   0,00 1,00
Other 0,62 0,22   0,00 1,00
0,75 0,19   0,00 1,00
Overall disclosure index (DISC)  
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS)
               Scenario B - Not Mandatory Guidance
Overall disclosure index (DISC)  
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS)
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)
              Scenario A - No Guidance
IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS)
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)
Overall disclosure index (DISC)  
 Scenario C - Mandatory Guidance
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Annex IV: Descriptive statistics for the main headings of the disclosure 
index, over 2005-2012 - scenarios B1, B2 
 
Disclosure index Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
0,32 0,27 0,00 0,92
of which:
IAS 38 0,29 0,27 0,00 1,00
IAS 37 0,35 0,29 0,00 1,00
IAS 20 0,34 0,28 0,00 1,00
0,24 0,26   0,00 0,86
of which:
Valuation methods applied 0,52 0,50 0,00 1,00
Allowances granted 0,23 0,28 0,00 1,00
Emissions made 0,22 0,29 0,00 1,00
Allowances acquired 0,23 0,32 0,00 1,00
Allowances sold 0,25 0,33 0,00 1,00
Excess/shortfall of allowances 0,21 0,31 0,00 1,00
Fines&Contingent liabilities 0,07 0,18 0,00 0,50
Other 0,26 0,31 0,00 1,00
0,27 0,25   0,00 0,85
0,54 0,30 0,00 1,00
of which:
IAS 38 0,53 0,36 0,00 1,00
IAS 37 0,57 0,31 0,00 1,00
IAS 20 0,50 0,29 0,00 1,00
0,51 0,25   0,00 0,90
of which:
Valuation methods applied 0,84 0,37   0,00 1,00
Allowances granted 0,58 0,30   0,00 1,00
Emissions made 0,55 0,29   0,00 1,00
Allowances acquired 0,47 0,31   0,00 1,00
Allowances sold 0,59 0,35   0,00 1,00
Excess/shortfall of allowances 0,40 0,32   0,00 1,00
Fines&Contingent liabilities 0,12 0,28   0,00 1,00
Other 0,54 0,30   0,00 1,00
0,52 0,24   0,00 0,85
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)
Overall disclosure index (DISC)  
                      Not Mandatory Detailed  Guidance
IFRS disclosure  index (DIFRS)
                    Scenario B2
IFRS disclosure  index (DIFRS)
ICAC disclosure index (DICAC)
Overall disclosure index (DISC)  
                    Not Mandatory Not Detailed Guidance
                    Scenario B1
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Annex V: Pearson correlations’ matrices  
 
Assets ROA LEV OwC
FListing 0,2590 *
0,0000
Industry -0,2076 * -0,0147
0,0000 0,5896
Assets 0,1942 * 0,4589 * 0,1299 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
LnAssets 0,3098 * 0,4925 * 0,0475 * 0,6894 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0817 0,0000
ROA 0,1404 * 0,1472 * 0,0346 0,0368 0,1204 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,2046 0,1773 0,0000
LEV -0,1161 * -0,0157 -0,1316 * 0,0558 * 0,0878 * -0,0251
0,0000 0,5656 0,0000 0,0407 0,0013 0,3580
OwC -0,1612 * -0,1246 * 0,0824 * -0,1661 * -0,1690 * -0,1351 * -0,0996 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0003
Assets ROA LEV OwC
DISC -0,2593 * -0,1334 * 0,4399 * -0,0747 * -0,1168 * -0,1038 * -0,1281 * 0,1582 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0062 0,0000 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000
DIFRS -0,2457 * -0,1139 * 0,4448 * -0,0795 * -0,1243 * -0,1020 * -0,1197 * 0,1640 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0035 0,0000 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000
DICAC -0,2581 * -0,1428 * 0,4103 * -0,0795 * -0,1243 * -0,1020 * -0,1197 * 0,1640 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0035 0,0000 0,0002 0,0000 0,0000
DQuant -0,2356 * -0,1295 * 0,3797 * -0,0915 * -0,1792 * -0,0879 * -0,1043 * 0,0978 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0008 0,0000 0,0013 0,0001 0,0003
DQualit -0,2483 * -0,1201 * 0,4346 * -0,0431 -0,0299 -0,1091 * -0,1328 * 0,1997 *
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,1138 0,2735 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000
PANEL B - Correlations of the dependent and independent variables
PANEL A - Correlations of the independent variables
FListing
FListing
FSales&Markets Industry LnAssets
FSales&Markets Industry LnAssets
* Correlation is significant at 5% level (2-tailed). 
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Annex VI: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables, over 
2005-2012 - scenario A  
 
PANEL A
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign Sales (%)   68,9   30,0   0,0   99,0
Foreign Sales&Markets (%)   48,2   29,5   0,0   99,0
Assets (M€)  22 865  45 801   59  369 992
LnAssets   8,7   1,8   4,1   12,8
Turnover (M€)  19 432  51 135   85  470 171
LnTurnover   8,5   1,8   4,4   13,1
Return on Assets (%)   5,5   6,9 (  42,1)   32,6
Leverage   2,8   6,0   0,2   116,9
PANEL B
Non-continuous variables N %
Foreign-Listing
0 Only domestic stock exchanges 472 79,7
1 Foreign stock exchanges 120 20,3
Industry
0 Industrials, Consumer G&S, Other 360 60,8
1 Utilities, Oil&Gas, Basic Materials 232 39,2
Ownership concentration
0 Less than 20% of votes 319 53,9
1 20% of votes or more 273 46,1
Institutional environment
        Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 232 39,2
        Mixed Market Economies (MME) 168 28,4
        Liberal Market Economies (LME) 192 32,4
 592 100,0Firm-year observations
               Scenario A
              No Guidance
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Annex VII: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables, over 
2005-2012 - scenario B  
 
PANEL A
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign Sales (%) 72,0 21,7   6,0   98,0
Foreign Sales&Markets (%)   51,0   24,0   1,8   94,0
Assets (M€)  29 494  48 417   112  309 644
LnAssets   9,1   1,6   4,7   12,4
Turnover (M€)  19 709  30 756   147  200 061
LnTurnover   8,9   1,5   5,0   12,1
Return on Assets (%)   3,9   5,0 (  28,8)   25,4
Leverage   2,1   1,7   0,4   18,4
PANEL B
Non-continuous variables N %
Foreign-Listing
0 Only domestic stock exchanges 485 84,2
1 Foreign stock exchanges 91 15,8
Industry
0 Industrials, Consumer G&S, Other 312 54,2
1 Utilities, Oil&Gas, Basic Materials 264 45,8
Ownership concentration
0 Less than 20% of votes 220 38,2
1 20% of votes or more 356 61,8
Institutional environment
        Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 384 66,7
        Mixed Market Economies (MME) 192 33,3
        Liberal Market Economies (LME) 0 0,0
 576 100,0Firm-year observations
                Scenario B
     Not Mandatory Guidance
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Annex VIII: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables, over 
2005-2012 - scenario B1  
 
PANEL A
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign Sales (%) 72,1 21,8   6,0   98,0
Foreign Sales&Markets (%)   51,7   22,6   1,8   92,0
Assets (M€)  35 617  53 132   112  309 644
LnAssets   9,3   1,6   4,7   12,4
Turnover (M€)  23 726  33 721   147  200 061
LnTurnover   9,1   1,5   5,0   12,1
Return on Assets (%)   3,9   4,7 (  28,8)   23,6
Leverage   2,1   1,5   0,4   11,1
PANEL B
Non-continuous variables N %
Foreign-Listing
0 Only domestic stock exchanges 360 80,4
1 Foreign stock exchanges 88 19,6
Industry
0 Industrials, Consumer G&S, Other 264 58,9
1 Utilities, Oil&Gas, Basic Materials 184 41,1
Ownership concentration
0 Less than 20% of votes 182 40,6
1 20% of votes or more 266 59,4
Institutional environment
        Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 312 69,6
        Mixed Market Economies (MME) 136 30,4
        Liberal Market Economies (LME) 0 0,0
 448 100,0
                Scenario B1
           Not Mandatory Not Detailed Guidance
Firm-year observations  
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Annex IX: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables, over 
2005-2012 - scenario B2  
 
PANEL A
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign Sales (%) 71,8 21,6   16,0   96,0
Foreign Sales&Markets (%)   48,5   28,4   3,2   94,0
Assets (M€)  8 062  9 053   290  42 628
LnAssets   8,5   1,0   5,7   10,7
Turnover (M€)  5 649  4 918   148  18 644
LnTurnover   8,2   1,1   5,0   9,8
Return on Assets (%)   3,8   5,7 (  10,9)   25,4
Leverage   2,2   2,3   0,4   18,4
PANEL B
Non-continuous variables N %
Foreign-Listing
0 Only domestic stock exchanges 125 97,7
1 Foreign stock exchanges 3 2,3
Industry
0 Industrials, Consumer G&S, Other 48 37,5
1 Utilities, Oil&Gas, Basic Materials 80 62,5
Ownership concentration
0 Less than 20% of votes 38 29,7
1 20% of votes or more 90 70,3
Institutional environment
        Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 72 56,2
        Mixed Market Economies (MME) 56 43,8
        Liberal Market Economies (LME) 0 0,0
 128 100,0Firm-year observations
                Scenario B2
           Not Mandatory Detailed Guidance
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Annex X: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables, over 
2005-2012 - scenario C 
 
PANEL A
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign Sales (%) 52,3 19,7   10,0   94,0
Foreign Sales&Markets (%)   27,9   16,1   6,0   91,0
Assets (M€)  13 811  22 805   113  97 016
LnAssets   7,9   1,9   4,7   11,5
Turnover (M€)  7 015  12 672   62  57 740
LnTurnover   7,4   1,8   4,1   11,0
Return on Assets (%)   3,5   4,9 (  28,7)   14,5
Leverage   2,1   1,8   0,3   10,6
PANEL B
Non-continuous variables N %
Foreign-Listing
0 Only domestic stock exchanges 160 90,9
1 Foreign stock exchanges 16 9,1
Industry
0 Industrials, Consumer G&S, Other 64 36,4
1 Utilities, Oil&Gas, Basic Materials 112 63,6
Ownership concentration
0 Less than 20% of votes 81 46,0
1 20% of votes or more 95 54,0
Institutional environment
        Coordinated Market Economies (CME) 0 0,0
        Mixed Market Economies (MME) 176 100,0
        Liberal Market Economies (LME) 0 0,0
 176 100,0
                Scenario C
        Mandatory Guidance
Firm-year observations  
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Annex XI: Estimation results for Model 5-3A and Model 5-3B (step 3 
intermediate models including time-varying covariates, on a variable-
by-variable basis) 
 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0173 ***  ( 0,0031)  0,0169 ***  ( 0,0031)
 - 0,0017 ***  ( 0,0004)  - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)
 - 0,0286  ( 0,0381)  - 0,0212  ( 0,0383)
 - 0,1151 ***  ( 0,0336)
 0,2456 ***  ( 0,0565)  0,2640 ***  ( 0,0555)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level
Variance (_cons)  0,0405  ( 0,0166)  0,0384  ( 0,0158)
Firm level
Variance (_cons)  0,0367  ( 0,0043)  0,0381  ( 0,0045)
Variance (Residual)  0,0051  ( 0,0002)  0,0051  ( 0,0002)
Log likelihood 1 274,8 1 280,6
Deviance  -2 549,7  -2 561,2
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets | countinuous predictors centered 
Model 5-3A:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + 
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Model 5-3B:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij +
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Dependent variable - Overall disclosure index (DISC)
Model 5-3A Model 5-3B
FListing (FList)
Intercept
RANDOM PART
Model 5-2.2 plus Model 5-2.2 plus
FSales&Markets FSales&Markets
and FListing
Year
Year_sqr
FSales&Markets (FS&M)
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Annex XII: Estimation results for Model 5-3C and Model 5-3D (step 3 
intermediate models including control variables) 
 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0162 ***  ( 0,0032)  0,0159 ***  ( 0,0032)
 - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)  - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)
 - 0,0037  ( 0,0374)  - 0,0050  ( 0,0374)
 - 0,1096 ***  ( 0,0317)  - 0,1093 ***  ( 0,0317)
 0,1956 ***  ( 0,0285)  0,1959 ***  ( 0,0285)
 0,0015  ( 0,0059)  0,0015  ( 0,0059)
 0,0482 ***  ( 0,0177)  0,0475 ***  ( 0,0177)
 - 0,0488  ( 0,0476)
 0,0000  ( 0,0006)
 0,1494 ***  ( 0,0522)  0,1505 ***  ( 0,0522)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level
Variance (_cons)  0,0308  ( 0,0126)  0,0307  ( 0,0126)
Firm level
Variance (_cons)  0,0291  ( 0,0035)  0,0291  ( 0,0035)
Variance (Residual)  0,0050  ( 0,0002)  0,0050  ( 0,0002)
Log likelihood 1 306,1 1 306,6
Deviance  -2 612,2  -2 613,2
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets | countinuous predictors centered 
Model 5-3C:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ500 Sizetij + γ600 OwCtij +
            + γ010 Indij +
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Model 5-3D:
DISCtij = γ000+γ100Yeartij+γ200Year_sqrtij+γ300FS&Mtij+γ400FListtij+γ500Sizetij+γ600OwCtij+γ700ROAtij+γ800Levtij +
            + γ010 Indij +
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
FListing (FList)
Industry (Ind)
Intercept
RANDOM PART
Size
Ownership concentration (OwC)
Model 5-3B plus Model 5-3B plus
control variables control variables
(Size | OwC) (Size | OwC | ROA | Lev)
Year
Year_sqr
FSales&Markets (FS&M)
Leverage (Lev)
Return on Assets (ROA)
Dependent variable - Overall disclosure index (DISC)
Model 5-3C Model 5-3D
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 Annex XIII: Estimation results for Model 5-4A and Model 5-4B 
(step 4 intermediate models including control variables) 
 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries | inst envir )  14 | 3
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0166 ***  ( 0,0031)  0,0166 ***  ( 0,0031)
 - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)  - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)
 0,0086  ( 0,0363)  0,0093  ( 0,0366)
 - 0,0960 ***  ( 0,0304)  - 0,0997 ***  ( 0,0307)
 0,1954 ***  ( 0,0275)  0,1980 ***  ( 0,0282)
 0,4957 ***  ( 0,0647)  0,5105 ***  ( 0,0484)
 0,3128 ***  ( 0,0585)  0,3223 ***  ( 0,0507)
 0,1452 ***  ( 0,0423)  0,1457 ***  ( 0,0337)
 0,0406  ( 0,0577)
 0,1355 **  ( 0,0605)
 - 0,0229  ( 0,0482)  0,0334  ( 0,0383)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level
Variance (_cons)  0,0013  ( 0,0014)  0,0026  ( 0,0029)
Firm level
Variance (_cons)  0,0286  ( 0,0034)  0,0306  ( 0,0035)
Variance (Residual)  0,0051  ( 0,0002)  0,0051  ( 0,0002)
Log likelihood 1 317,8 1 312,8
Deviance  -2 635,6  -2 625,5
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets | countinuous predictors centered 
Model 5-4A: 
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ010 Indij +
            + γ001 Mand_Guidj + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + γ004 CMEj + γ005 MMEj
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
Model 5-4B: 
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ010 Indij +
            + γ001 Mand_Guidj + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + 
            + ɛt ij + µ0ij + u00j
control variables CME | MME environment as level-3 grouping
Level-3 grouping variable: country variable (instead of country)
Dependent variable - Overall disclosure index (DISC)
Model 5-4A Model 5-4B
Model 5-4 plus Model 5-4 with institutional 
Mixed Market Economies (MME)
RANDOM PART
Coordinated Market Economies (CME)
Year
Year_sqr
FSales&Markets (FS&M)
MListing (MList)
Industry (Ind)
Mandatory_Guidance (Mand_Guid)
Not_Mand_Detailed_Guidance (NMD_Guid)
Not_Mand_Not_Detailed_Guidance (NMND_Guid)
Intercept
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 265 - 
Annex XIV: Estimation results for Model 5-6.1 and Model 5-6.2 (final 
models including control variables) 
 
Number of observations 1 344
Number of groups:
    3rd level (countries)  14
    2nd level (firms)       168
Number of occasions: 8 (1st level)
FIXED PART Independent variables Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
 0,0149 ***  ( 0,0031)  0,0176 ***  ( 0,0035)
 - 0,0016 ***  ( 0,0004)  - 0,0019 ***  ( 0,0005)
 - 0,0282  ( 0,0550)  - 0,0651  ( 0,0606)
 - 0,0206  ( 0,0373)  0,0012  ( 0,0424)
 0,1824 ***  ( 0,0306)  0,2058 ***  ( 0,0346)
 0,4750 ***  ( 0,0678)  0,5303 ***  ( 0,0750)
 0,3220 ***  ( 0,0613)  0,3298 ***  ( 0,0689)
 0,1328 ***  ( 0,0430)  0,1968 ***  ( 0,0478)
 0,0057 *  ( 0,0030)  0,0040  ( 0,0033)
 0,1459  ( 0,1663)  0,1969  ( 0,1835)
 0,0072 **  ( 0,0030)  0,0053  ( 0,0034)
 0,4535 **  ( 0,1787)  0,5681 ***  ( 0,1978)
 - 0,0007  ( 0,0019)  - 0,0047 **  ( 0,0021)
 0,2153  ( 0,1254)  - 0,0759  ( 0,1379)
 0,0020  ( 0,0059)  0,0007  ( 0,0066)
 0,0374 *  ( 0,0190)  0,0209  ( 0,0215)
 0,0368  ( 0,0594)  0,0245  ( 0,0656)
 0,1478 **  ( 0,0603)  0,0953  ( 0,0660)
 - 0,0420  ( 0,0477)  - 0,0172  ( 0,0526)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Country level 
 0,0008  ( 0,0014)  0,0007  ( 0,0016)
Firm level (unstructured)
 0,1558  ( 0,0428)  0,1725  ( 0,0458)
 0,0278  ( 0,0039)  0,0386  ( 0,0054)
 0,0173  ( 0,0106)  0,0300  ( 0,0137)
Variance (Residual)  0,0044  ( 0,0002)  0,0056  ( 0,0002)
Log likelihood 1 364,2 1 202,6
Deviance  -2 728,3  -2 405,2
***significant at 1% level (2 tailed) | **significant at 5% level (2 tailed) | *significant at 10% level (2 tailed)
Std. errors reported in brackets | countinuous predictors centered 
Model 5-6.1:
DISCtij = γ000 + γ100 Yeartij + γ200 Year_sqrtij + γ300 FS&Mtij + γ400 FListtij + γ500 Sizetij + γ600 OwCtij + γ010 Ind ij + 
            + γ001 Mand_Guidj + γ002 NMD_Guidj + γ003 NMND_Guidj + γ004 CMEj + γ005 MMEj
             + γ101 Yeartij x Mand_Guidj + γ301 FS&Mtij x Mand_Guidj + 
             + γ102 Yeartij x NMD_Guidj + γ302 FS&Mtij x NMD_Guidj + 
             + γ103 Yeartij x NMND_Guidj + γ303 FS&Mtij x NMND_Guidj + 
            + ɛtij + µ0ij + u00j + µ3ij FS&Mtij 
Model 5-6.2: Model 5-6.1 with DIFRStij (IFRS disclosure index) as the dependent variable
Variance ( _cons)
Variance (FSales&Markets)
Variance (_cons)
Covariance (FSales&Markets, _cons)
Year x NMND_Guid
FSales&Markets x NMND_Guid
Intercept
Ownership concentration (OwC)
Size
Mixed Market Economies (MME)
Coordinated Market Economies (CME)
Year
Year_sqr
FSales&Markets (FS&M)
MListing (MList)
FSales&Markets x NMD_Guid
RANDOM PART
Dependent variable
Overall disclosure index (DISC) IFRS disclosure index (DIFRS)
Model 5-6.1 Model 5-6.2
Model 5-5.1 plus Model 5-6.1 with
control variables IFRSs disclosure index (DIFRS)
(Size | OwC | CME | MME) as the dependent variable
Industry (Ind)
Not_Mand_Detailed_Guidance (NMD_Guid)
Not_Mand_Not_Detailed_Guidance (NMND_Guid)
Year x NMD_Guid
Mandatory_Guidance (Mand_Guid)
Year x Mand_Guid
FSales&Markets x Mand_Guid
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Annex XV: βij matrices describing the coefficients of comparability 
between groups 
 
PANEL A: Weighting all firms equal and assuming an overall international focus 
 No_Guidance
0,058
0,189
0,194
No_Guidance
0,056
0,194
0,257
FS&M_BlAv
0,055
0,128
0,1280,128
0,024
0,055
0,055
0,056
0,042
0,147
0,194
Coefficients βij Foreign Listed Foreign Sales&Markets_AbAv
Not_Mandatory GuidanceMandatory GuidanceCoefficients βij
Coefficients βij Not_Mandatory Detailed Not_Mandatory Not_Detailed
Foreign Sales&Markets_AbAv
Foreign Sales&Markets_BlAv
0,017
0,056
0,058
0,056
0,184
0,189
0,012
0,042
Mandatory Guidance
Not_Mandatory Guidance
No_Guidance
Not_Mandatory Detailed
Not_Mandatory Not_Detailed
No_Guidance
Foreign Listed 0,055
0,128
 
 
PANEL B: Weighting all industries equal and assuming a within international focus 
Coefficients βij Utilities Oil&Gas BMaterials Industrials Consumer G&S Other
Utilities 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Oil&Gas 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
BMaterials 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industrials 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,000
Consumer G&S 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,000
Other 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167  
 
PANEL C: Weighting all industries equal and assuming a between international focus 
Coefficients βij Utilities Oil&Gas BMaterials Industrials Consumer G&S Other
Utilities 0,000 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,033
Oil&Gas 0,033 0,000 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,033
BMaterials 0,033 0,033 0,000 0,033 0,033 0,033
Industrials 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,000 0,033 0,033
Consumer G&S 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,000 0,033
Other 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,033 0,000  
 
PANEL D: Weighting all industries equal and assuming an overall international focus 
Coefficients βij Utilities Oil&Gas BMaterials Industrials Consumer G&S Other
Utilities 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028
Oil&Gas 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028
BMaterials 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028
Industrials 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028
Consumer G&S 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028
Other 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028  
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Annex XVI: Possible disclosure methods for minimum comparable 
information on an aggregate approach 
 
Method Allowances Emissions Position Method Allowances Emissions Position
DM 1 ALL ALL ALL DM 33 CU ALL ALL
DM 2 ALL ALL PhU DM 34 CU ALL PhU
DM 3 ALL ALL CU DM 35 CU ALL CU
DM 4 ALL ALL ND DM 36 CU ALL ND
DM 5 ALL PhU ALL DM 37 CU PhU ALL
DM 6 ALL PhU PhU DM 38 CU PhU PhU
DM 7 ALL PhU CU DM 39 CU PhU CU
DM 8 ALL PhU ND DM 40 CU PhU ND
DM 9 ALL CU ALL DM 41 CU CU ALL
DM 10 ALL CU PhU DM 42 CU CU PhU
DM 11 ALL CU CU DM 43 CU CU CU
DM 12 ALL CU ND DM 44 CU CU ND
DM 13 ALL ND ALL DM 45 CU ND ALL
DM 14 ALL ND PhU DM 46 CU ND PhU
DM 15 ALL ND CU DM 47 CU ND CU
DM 16 ALL ND ND DM 48 CU ND ND
DM 17 PhU ALL ALL DM 49 ND ALL ALL
DM 18 PhU ALL PhU DM 50 ND ALL PhU
DM 19 PhU ALL CU DM 51 ND ALL CU
DM 20 PhU ALL ND DM 52 ND ALL ND
DM 21 PhU PhU ALL DM 53 ND PhU ALL
DM 22 PhU PhU PhU DM 54 ND PhU PhU
DM 23 PhU PhU CU DM 55 ND PhU CU
DM 24 PhU PhU ND DM 56 ND PhU ND
DM 25 PhU CU ALL DM 57 ND CU ALL
DM 26 PhU CU PhU DM 58 ND CU PhU
DM 27 PhU CU CU DM 59 ND CU CU
DM 28 PhU CU ND DM 60 ND CU ND
DM 29 PhU ND ALL DM 61 ND ND ALL
DM 30 PhU ND PhU DM 62 ND ND PhU
DM 31 PhU ND CU DM 63 ND ND CU
DM 32 PhU ND ND DM 64 ND ND ND
ND Not disclosed 
PhU Disclosed only in physical units (CO2 tones) 
CU Disclosed only in currency units 
ALL Disclosed both in physical units and in currency units 
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Annex XVII: αkl,MIM matrix describing the comparability between 
disclosure methods (64 x 64) 
1/3 
akl DM 1 DM 2 DM 3 DM 4 DM 5 DM 6 DM 7 DM 8 DM 9 DM 10 DM 11 DM 12 DM 13 DM 14 DM 15 DM 16 DM 17 DM 18 DM 19 DM 20 DM 21 DM 22
DM 1 1,000 0,833 0,833 0,667 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500
DM 2 0,833 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500
DM 3 0,833 0,667 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333
DM 4 0,667 0,667 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM 5 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500
DM 6 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500
DM 7 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333
DM 8 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM 9 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333
DM 10 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM 11 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM 12 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM 13 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333
DM 14 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333
DM 15 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167
DM 16 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM 17 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500
DM 18 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500
DM 19 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333
DM 20 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM 21 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500
DM 22 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500
DM 23 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333
DM 24 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM 25 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333
DM 26 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM 27 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM 28 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM 29 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333
DM 30 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333
DM 31 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167
DM 32 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM 33 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333
DM 34 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM 35 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM 36 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM 37 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333
DM 38 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333
DM 39 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167
DM 40 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM 41 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167
DM 42 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM 43 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM 44 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM 45 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167
DM 46 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167
DM 47 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM 48 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM 49 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333
DM 50 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM 51 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM 52 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM 53 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333
DM 54 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333
DM 55 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167
DM 56 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM 57 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167
DM 58 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM 59 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM 60 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM 61 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167
DM 62 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167
DM 63 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM 64 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
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Annex XVII: αkl,MIM matrix describing the comparability between 
disclosure methods (64 x 64) 
2/3 
akl DM 23 DM  24 DM 25 DM  26 DM 27 DM 28 DM  29 DM 30 DM  31 DM 32 DM  33 DM 34 DM  35 DM 36 DM  37 DM 38 DM  39 DM 40 DM 41 DM  42 DM 43
DM  1 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500
DM  2 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333
DM  3 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500
DM  4 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM  5 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  6 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  7 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333
DM  8 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  9 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500
DM  10 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333
DM  11 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500
DM  12 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM  13 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  14 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  15 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333
DM  16 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  17 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  18 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  19 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333
DM  20 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  21 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM  22 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  23 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167
DM  24 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  25 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  26 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  27 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333
DM  28 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  29 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM  30 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  31 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167
DM  32 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  33 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,833 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500
DM  34 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,667 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333
DM  35 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,667 0,500 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500
DM  36 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM  37 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  38 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  39 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333
DM  40 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  41 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500
DM  42 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333
DM  43 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500
DM  44 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333
DM  45 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  46 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  47 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333
DM  48 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  49 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  50 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  51 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333
DM  52 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  53 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM  54 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  55 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167
DM  56 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  57 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333
DM  58 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167
DM  59 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,000
DM  60 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167
DM  61 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167
DM  62 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  63 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167
DM  64 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
 - 270 - 
Annex XVII: αkl,MIM matrix describing the comparability between 
disclosure methods (64 x 64) 
3/3 
akl DM 44 DM  45 DM 46 DM  47 DM 48 DM 49 DM  50 DM 51 DM  52 DM 53 DM  54 DM 55 DM  56 DM 57 DM  58 DM 59 DM  60 DM 61 DM 62 DM  63 DM 64
DM  1 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  2 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  3 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  4 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  5 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  6 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  7 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  8 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  9 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  10 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  11 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  12 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  13 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  14 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  15 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  16 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  17 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  18 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  19 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  20 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  21 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  22 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  23 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  24 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  25 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  26 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  27 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  28 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  29 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  30 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  31 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  32 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  33 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  34 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  35 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  36 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  37 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  38 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  39 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  40 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  41 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  42 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  43 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  44 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  45 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  46 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  47 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  48 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  49 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,667 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  50 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,500 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  51 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  52 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  53 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  54 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  55 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  56 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  57 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,500 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  58 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,333 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  59 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  60 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
DM  61 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,333 0,167 0,167 0,000
DM  62 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000 0,167 0,167 0,000 0,000
DM  63 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000 0,167 0,000
DM  64 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000  
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Annex XVIII: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by type of 
guidance 
1/2 
2005 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL 2006 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,27 0,01 0,01 0,05 DM 1 0,41 0,06 0,01 0,08
DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 5 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 5 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 9 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 9 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,27 0,01 0,00 0,04 DM 11 0,27 0,00 0,00 0,04
DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 19 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 19 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02 DM 21 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,02
DM 22 0,05 0,06 0,01 0,04 DM 22 0,05 0,08 0,03 0,05
DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,02 DM 24 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,09 0,04 0,03 0,04 DM 32 0,05 0,06 0,03 0,04
DM 43 0,05 0,08 0,01 0,05 DM 43 0,05 0,08 0,01 0,05
DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 47 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 48 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,04 0,03 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,04 0,03
DM 64 0,14 0,58 0,82 0,63 DM 64 0,00 0,50 0,82 0,58
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2007 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL 2008 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,41 0,06 0,01 0,08 DM 1 0,41 0,04 0,00 0,07
DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 5 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 9 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 11 0,27 0,00 0,00 0,04 DM 11 0,23 0,00 0,00 0,03
DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 19 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 21 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,02 DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,03 0,04
DM 22 0,00 0,08 0,03 0,05 DM 22 0,05 0,07 0,05 0,06
DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,00 0,04 0,03 0,03 DM 32 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 43 0,05 0,08 0,01 0,05 DM 43 0,05 0,11 0,01 0,06
DM 47 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 47 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 48 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,02
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 DM 61 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02
DM 64 0,05 0,51 0,82 0,59 DM 64 0,05 0,50 0,82 0,58
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XVIII: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by type of 
guidance 
2/2 
2009 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL 2010 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00 0,08 DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00 0,08
DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,04 0,04 DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,04 0,04
DM 22 0,05 0,08 0,05 0,07 DM 22 0,05 0,08 0,05 0,07
DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,02 DM 32 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 43 0,05 0,11 0,01 0,06 DM 43 0,05 0,11 0,01 0,06
DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,04 0,03 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02
DM 64 0,05 0,51 0,80 0,58 DM 64 0,05 0,50 0,82 0,58
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2011 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL 2012 Mand_Guid Not_Mand_Guid No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00 0,08 DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00 0,08
DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,04 0,04 DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,04 0,04
DM 22 0,05 0,08 0,05 0,07 DM 22 0,05 0,08 0,05 0,07
DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,02 DM 32 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 43 0,05 0,11 0,01 0,06 DM 43 0,05 0,11 0,01 0,06
DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02
DM 64 0,05 0,50 0,82 0,58 DM 64 0,05 0,50 0,82 0,58
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XIX: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by type of 
guidance, adjusted to control for industry effects 
1/2 
2005 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj 2006 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj
DM 1 0,27 0,02 0,02 DM 1 0,41 0,05 0,02
DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 9 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 9 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,27 0,02 0,00 DM 11 0,27 0,00 0,00
DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 19 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 19 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,01 DM 21 0,00 0,04 0,01
DM 22 0,05 0,06 0,03 DM 22 0,05 0,09 0,06
DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 24 0,05 0,03 0,00 DM 24 0,05 0,03 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 32 0,09 0,05 0,04 DM 32 0,05 0,06 0,02
DM 43 0,05 0,09 0,03 DM 43 0,05 0,09 0,03
DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 47 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,07 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,07
DM 64 0,14 0,53 0,75 DM 64 0,00 0,45 0,75
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00
2007 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj 2008 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj
DM 1 0,41 0,05 0,02 DM 1 0,41 0,04 0,00
DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 3 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 9 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,27 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,23 0,00 0,00
DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 12 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 18 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 19 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,04 0,01 DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,02
DM 22 0,00 0,09 0,04 DM 22 0,05 0,08 0,09
DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 24 0,05 0,03 0,00 DM 24 0,00 0,05 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,05 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 32 0,00 0,05 0,04 DM 32 0,00 0,05 0,00
DM 43 0,05 0,09 0,03 DM 43 0,05 0,12 0,03
DM 47 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 47 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,04
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,01 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,04
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 61 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,00 0,01 0,06 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,03
DM 64 0,05 0,46 0,74 DM 64 0,05 0,45 0,75
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00  
 - 274 - 
Annex XIX: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by type of 
guidance, adjusted to control for industry effects 
2/2 
2009 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj 2010 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj
DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00 DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00
DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00 DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00
DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,05 DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,05
DM 22 0,05 0,10 0,07 DM 22 0,05 0,10 0,07
DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 24 0,00 0,05 0,00 DM 24 0,00 0,05 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 32 0,05 0,04 0,00 DM 32 0,05 0,04 0,00
DM 43 0,05 0,12 0,03 DM 43 0,05 0,12 0,03
DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,04 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,04
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,05 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,03
DM 64 0,05 0,46 0,72 DM 64 0,05 0,45 0,75
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00
2011 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj 2012 Mand Not_Mand_adj No_Guid_adj
DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00 DM 1 0,45 0,04 0,00
DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00 DM 3 0,09 0,00 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 9 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,14 0,00 0,00
DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 12 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 18 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 19 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,05 DM 21 0,00 0,06 0,05
DM 22 0,05 0,10 0,07 DM 22 0,05 0,10 0,07
DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 23 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 24 0,00 0,05 0,00 DM 24 0,00 0,05 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 32 0,05 0,04 0,00 DM 32 0,05 0,04 0,00
DM 43 0,05 0,12 0,03 DM 43 0,05 0,12 0,03
DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 47 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,04 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,04
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,03 DM 63 0,00 0,03 0,03
DM 64 0,05 0,45 0,75 DM 64 0,05 0,45 0,75
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XX: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by detail of 
guidance on items to be reported in the annex 
1/2 
2005 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL 2006 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,01 DM 1 0,19 0,02 0,01 0,03
DM 5 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 5 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 11 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,06 0,02 0,01 0,02 DM 21 0,06 0,04 0,01 0,03
DM 22 0,13 0,04 0,01 0,03 DM 22 0,13 0,07 0,03 0,05
DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,01 0,01 DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 24 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,13 0,02 0,03 0,03 DM 32 0,13 0,04 0,03 0,04
DM 43 0,19 0,05 0,01 0,05 DM 43 0,19 0,05 0,01 0,05
DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,03 DM 63 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,03
DM 64 0,31 0,66 0,82 0,71 DM 64 0,13 0,61 0,82 0,66
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2007 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL 2008 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,19 0,02 0,01 0,03 DM 1 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02
DM 5 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,06 0,04 0,01 0,03 DM 21 0,06 0,05 0,03 0,04
DM 22 0,13 0,07 0,03 0,05 DM 22 0,13 0,05 0,05 0,06
DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 24 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,03 DM 32 0,06 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 43 0,19 0,05 0,01 0,05 DM 43 0,25 0,07 0,01 0,06
DM 48 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,02
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,01 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 DM 61 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02 DM 63 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,02
DM 64 0,19 0,61 0,82 0,67 DM 64 0,13 0,61 0,82 0,66
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XX: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by detail of 
guidance on items to be reported in the annex 
2/2 
2009 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL 2010 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02 DM 1 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,05 DM 21 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,05
DM 22 0,13 0,07 0,05 0,07 DM 22 0,13 0,07 0,05 0,07
DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02 DM 24 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 32 0,06 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 43 0,25 0,07 0,01 0,06 DM 43 0,25 0,07 0,01 0,06
DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,04 0,04 0,03 DM 63 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,02
DM 64 0,13 0,63 0,80 0,66 DM 64 0,13 0,61 0,82 0,66
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2011 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL 2012 NM_Detail NM_Not_Detail No_Guid ALL
DM 1 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02 DM 1 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,05 DM 21 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,05
DM 22 0,13 0,07 0,05 0,07 DM 22 0,13 0,07 0,05 0,07
DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02 DM 24 0,13 0,02 0,00 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 30 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,06 0,04 0,00 0,02 DM 32 0,06 0,04 0,00 0,02
DM 43 0,25 0,07 0,01 0,06 DM 43 0,25 0,07 0,01 0,06
DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01 DM 48 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,01
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 62 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 63 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,02 DM 63 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,02
DM 64 0,13 0,61 0,82 0,66 DM 64 0,13 0,61 0,82 0,66
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XXI: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by industry 
1/2 
2005 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other 2006 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other
DM 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 1 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,05 0,03 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,11 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 21 0,11 0,07 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 22 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 22 0,11 0,07 0,13 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 23 0,06 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 23 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 31 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 32 0,00 0,07 0,07 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 32 0,06 0,07 0,03 0,05 0,03 0,00
DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 59 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 60 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 63 0,06 0,14 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 63 0,06 0,14 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 64 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,74 0,97 0,90 DM 64 0,39 0,50 0,47 0,72 0,91 0,90
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2007 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other 2008 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other
DM 1 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,05 0,03 0,00 DM 1 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,11 0,07 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 21 0,11 0,14 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 22 0,11 0,14 0,10 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 22 0,06 0,14 0,13 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 23 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 23 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 31 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 32 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,05 0,03 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10 DM 56 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 59 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 63 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 63 0,06 0,07 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 64 0,39 0,57 0,47 0,69 0,94 0,90 DM 64 0,44 0,50 0,47 0,69 0,91 0,90
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XXI: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by industry 
2/2 
2009 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other 2010 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other
DM 1 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 1 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,11 0,14 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 21 0,11 0,14 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 22 0,11 0,21 0,10 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 22 0,11 0,21 0,10 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 23 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 23 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,00 DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 31 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 32 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,05 0,03 0,00 DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,05 0,03 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 59 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 63 0,17 0,07 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 63 0,06 0,07 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 64 0,33 0,50 0,47 0,72 0,91 0,90 DM 64 0,39 0,50 0,47 0,72 0,91 0,90
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2011 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other 2012 Utilities O&G BMat Indust Cons Other
DM 1 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 1 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,00
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,11 0,14 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 21 0,11 0,14 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 22 0,11 0,21 0,10 0,05 0,00 0,00 DM 22 0,11 0,21 0,10 0,05 0,00 0,00
DM 23 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 23 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,00 DM 24 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,00
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 31 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 32 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 32 0,06 0,00 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,05 0,03 0,00 DM 43 0,11 0,00 0,13 0,05 0,03 0,00
DM 48 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10 DM 56 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,10
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 59 0,06 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 63 0,06 0,07 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 63 0,06 0,07 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 64 0,39 0,50 0,47 0,72 0,91 0,90 DM 64 0,39 0,50 0,47 0,72 0,91 0,90
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XXII: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by listing 
status and internationalization through sales 
1/2 
2005 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv 2006 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv
DM 1 0,04 0,02 0,00 DM 1 0,00 0,05 0,03
DM 5 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,03 DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,03
DM 22 0,00 0,05 0,03 DM 22 0,04 0,05 0,07
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,03
DM 32 0,00 0,05 0,03 DM 32 0,00 0,03 0,07
DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,03 DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,03
DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,00
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,04 0,00 0,07 DM 63 0,04 0,00 0,07
DM 64 0,81 0,68 0,68 DM 64 0,81 0,67 0,60
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00
2007 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv 2008 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv
DM 1 0,00 0,05 0,03 DM 1 0,00 0,02 0,03
DM 5 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,03 DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,07
DM 22 0,04 0,07 0,05 DM 22 0,00 0,08 0,07
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,03 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 32 0,00 0,02 0,07 DM 32 0,00 0,02 0,03
DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,03 DM 43 0,04 0,08 0,05
DM 48 0,08 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,02
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,02 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,00 0,00 0,05 DM 63 0,04 0,00 0,03
DM 64 0,81 0,67 0,62 DM 64 0,85 0,65 0,60
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XXII: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by listing 
status and internationalization through sales 
2/2 
2009 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv 2010 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv
DM 1 0,00 0,02 0,03 DM 1 0,00 0,02 0,03
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,08 DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,08
DM 22 0,00 0,08 0,08 DM 22 0,00 0,08 0,08
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 24 0,00 0,03 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,03 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,05
DM 43 0,04 0,08 0,05 DM 43 0,04 0,08 0,05
DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,00
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,04 0,00 0,07 DM 63 0,04 0,00 0,03
DM 64 0,85 0,67 0,57 DM 64 0,85 0,67 0,58
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00
2011 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv 2012 FListing FS&M_AbAv FS&M_BlAv
DM 1 0,00 0,02 0,03 DM 1 0,00 0,02 0,03
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,08 DM 21 0,00 0,03 0,08
DM 22 0,00 0,08 0,08 DM 22 0,00 0,08 0,08
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 24 0,00 0,03 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,03 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,02
DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,05 DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,05
DM 43 0,04 0,08 0,05 DM 43 0,04 0,08 0,05
DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,03 0,00
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03 DM 59 0,00 0,02 0,03
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 63 0,04 0,00 0,03 DM 63 0,04 0,00 0,03
DM 64 0,85 0,67 0,58 DM 64 0,85 0,67 0,58
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XXIII: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by listing 
status and internationalization through sales, adjusted to control for 
industry effects 
1/2 
2005 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj 2006 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj
DM 1 0,04 0,01 0,00 DM 1 0,00 0,03 0,02
DM 5 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,01 0,02 DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,02
DM 22 0,00 0,09 0,02 DM 22 0,04 0,10 0,05
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,00 0,01 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,01 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,03
DM 32 0,00 0,04 0,03 DM 32 0,00 0,02 0,06
DM 43 0,04 0,06 0,03 DM 43 0,04 0,06 0,03
DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 63 0,04 0,02 0,05 DM 63 0,04 0,02 0,05
DM 64 0,81 0,70 0,77 DM 64 0,81 0,67 0,70
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00
2007 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj 2008 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj
DM 1 0,00 0,03 0,02 DM 1 0,00 0,01 0,02
DM 5 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,02 DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,05
DM 22 0,04 0,12 0,04 DM 22 0,00 0,12 0,05
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,00 0,01 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 30 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,00 0,01 0,06 DM 32 0,00 0,01 0,03
DM 43 0,04 0,06 0,03 DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,05
DM 48 0,08 0,02 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,01
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,02 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 63 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 63 0,04 0,02 0,02
DM 64 0,81 0,67 0,72 DM 64 0,85 0,68 0,70
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00  
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Annex XXIII: Relative frequencies of disclosure methods by listing 
status and internationalization through sales, adjusted to control for 
industry effects 
2/2 
2009 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj 2010 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj
DM 1 0,00 0,01 0,02 DM 1 0,00 0,01 0,02
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,06 DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,06
DM 22 0,00 0,12 0,06 DM 22 0,00 0,12 0,06
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,03 DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,04
DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,05 DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,05
DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,02 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 63 0,04 0,02 0,04 DM 63 0,04 0,02 0,02
DM 64 0,85 0,69 0,68 DM 64 0,85 0,69 0,69
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00
2011 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj 2012 FListing FS&M_AbAv_adj FS&M_BlAv_adj
DM 1 0,00 0,01 0,02 DM 1 0,00 0,01 0,02
DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 5 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 11 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 16 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,06 DM 21 0,00 0,02 0,06
DM 22 0,00 0,12 0,06 DM 22 0,00 0,12 0,06
DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 23 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02 DM 24 0,00 0,02 0,02
DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 27 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 29 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 30 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,01 DM 31 0,00 0,00 0,01
DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,04 DM 32 0,00 0,00 0,04
DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,05 DM 43 0,04 0,07 0,05
DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00 DM 48 0,04 0,00 0,00
DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,00 DM 56 0,00 0,02 0,00
DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 57 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,02 DM 59 0,00 0,01 0,02
DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 60 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00 DM 61 0,00 0,00 0,00
DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00 DM 62 0,00 0,01 0,00
DM 63 0,04 0,02 0,02 DM 63 0,04 0,02 0,02
DM 64 0,85 0,69 0,69 DM 64 0,85 0,69 0,69
TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00 TOTAL 1,00 1,00 1,00  
